From 8ad5766bef9575c1b952f1a8480307575d2db0f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan Leitschuh Date: Fri, 4 Nov 2022 15:06:16 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] vuln-fix: Zip Slip Vulnerability This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability. This change does one of two things. This change either 1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip. OR 2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`. For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`. The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory. It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object. For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`; however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`. Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') Severity: High CVSSS: 7.4 Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip) Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh Bug-tracker: https://github.com/JLLeitschuh/security-research/issues/16 Co-authored-by: Moderne --- .../services/importexport/ImportExportBaseService.java | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) mode change 100755 => 100644 core/src/main/java/org/jahia/services/importexport/ImportExportBaseService.java diff --git a/core/src/main/java/org/jahia/services/importexport/ImportExportBaseService.java b/core/src/main/java/org/jahia/services/importexport/ImportExportBaseService.java old mode 100755 new mode 100644 index b78829feff1..ac62fb7069c --- a/core/src/main/java/org/jahia/services/importexport/ImportExportBaseService.java +++ b/core/src/main/java/org/jahia/services/importexport/ImportExportBaseService.java @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ public static String updatedServerDirectoryPath(String serverDirectoryPath) thro return null; } File exportPath = new File(serverDirectoryPath); - return exportPath.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(SettingsBean.getInstance().getJahiaExportsDiskPath()) + return exportPath.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(SettingsBean.getInstance().getJahiaExportsDiskPath()) ? exportPath.getCanonicalPath() : new File(SettingsBean.getInstance().getJahiaExportsDiskPath(), serverDirectoryPath).getCanonicalPath(); } @@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ public static boolean isDirectoryEmpty(String pathStr) throws IOException { public static boolean isValidServerDirectory(String serverDirectory) { try { File serverDirectoryFile = new File(serverDirectory); - if (!serverDirectoryFile.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(EXPORT_PATH.getCanonicalPath())) { + if (!serverDirectoryFile.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(EXPORT_PATH.getCanonicalFile().toPath())) { logger.error("User is trying to export to {} which is outside the allowed location {}", serverDirectory, EXPORT_PATH.getCanonicalPath()); return false; @@ -2023,7 +2023,7 @@ private String validateZipName(String filename) throws java.io.IOException { String canonicalPath = new File(filename).getCanonicalPath(); String canonicalID = new File(".").getCanonicalPath(); - if (canonicalPath.startsWith(canonicalID)) { + if (new File(filename).getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(canonicalID)) { return canonicalPath.substring(canonicalID.length() + 1); } else { throw new IllegalStateException("File is outside extraction target directory.");