Vulnerability Report
Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
Smart contract applications that make use of the selfdestruct
functionality and their end-users.
Classification
The vulnerability has been classified as high
with a CVSS score of 8.2
. It has the potential to create a denial-of-service to all contracts that can invoke the selfdestruct
function to destroy a smart contract.
Users Impacted
Due to the successfully coordinated security vulnerability disclosure, no smart contracts were impacted through the use of this vulnerability. Smart contract states and storage values are not affected by this vulnerability. User funds and balances are safe.
Disclosure
In Ethermint running versions before v0.17.2
, the contract selfdestruct
invocation permanently removes the corresponding bytecode from the internal database storage. However, due to a bug in the DeleteAccount
function, all contracts that used the identical bytecode (i.e shared the same CodeHash
) will also stop working once one contract invokes selfdestruct
, even though the other contracts did not invoke the selfdestruct
OPCODE.
Additional Details
The same contract bytecode can be deployed multiple times to create multiple contract instances. In the internal database, the bytecode is stored as a key-value entry bytecode hash --> bytecode
which is shared by those contracts. Unfortunately, when one of the contracts invokes selfdestruct
, it will remove the corresponding bytecode hash -> bytecode
entry, and thus it disables all the contracts that share the same bytecode.
The attack scenario is as follows:
- The malicious attacker identifies a vulnerable contract that can invoke
selfdestruct
- The attacker deploys a copy of the contract with identical bytecode
- Finally, the attacker triggers the
selfdestruct
operation on their redeployed contract, actively causing a DoS on the original and vulnerable contract. All transactions will fail until a workaround is used (see below).
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
This vulnerability has been patched in Ethermint versions ≥v0.18.0. The patch has state machine-breaking changes for applications using Ethermint so a coordinated upgrade procedure is required.
Details
The patch removes the bytecode deletion logic, i.e. contract bytecodes are never deleted from the internal database after the patch.
At the moment, Ethermint does not track how many times each bytecode is used, and thus it cannot determine if it is safe to delete a particular bytecode on selfdestruct
invocations. This behavior is the same with go-ethereum.
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
If a contract is subject to DoS due to this issue, the user can redeploy the same contract, i.e with identical bytecode, so that the original contract's code is recovered.
The new contract deployment restores the bytecode hash -> bytecode
entry in the internal state.
References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Reach out to the Core Team in Discord
Credits
Thanks to the
Vulnerability Report
Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
Smart contract applications that make use of the
selfdestruct
functionality and their end-users.Classification
The vulnerability has been classified as
high
with a CVSS score of8.2
. It has the potential to create a denial-of-service to all contracts that can invoke theselfdestruct
function to destroy a smart contract.Users Impacted
Due to the successfully coordinated security vulnerability disclosure, no smart contracts were impacted through the use of this vulnerability. Smart contract states and storage values are not affected by this vulnerability. User funds and balances are safe.
Disclosure
In Ethermint running versions before
v0.17.2
, the contractselfdestruct
invocation permanently removes the corresponding bytecode from the internal database storage. However, due to a bug in theDeleteAccount
function, all contracts that used the identical bytecode (i.e shared the sameCodeHash
) will also stop working once one contract invokesselfdestruct
, even though the other contracts did not invoke theselfdestruct
OPCODE.Additional Details
The same contract bytecode can be deployed multiple times to create multiple contract instances. In the internal database, the bytecode is stored as a key-value entry
bytecode hash --> bytecode
which is shared by those contracts. Unfortunately, when one of the contracts invokesselfdestruct
, it will remove the correspondingbytecode hash -> bytecode
entry, and thus it disables all the contracts that share the same bytecode.The attack scenario is as follows:
selfdestruct
selfdestruct
operation on their redeployed contract, actively causing a DoS on the original and vulnerable contract. All transactions will fail until a workaround is used (see below).Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
This vulnerability has been patched in Ethermint versions ≥v0.18.0. The patch has state machine-breaking changes for applications using Ethermint so a coordinated upgrade procedure is required.
Details
The patch removes the bytecode deletion logic, i.e. contract bytecodes are never deleted from the internal database after the patch.
At the moment, Ethermint does not track how many times each bytecode is used, and thus it cannot determine if it is safe to delete a particular bytecode on
selfdestruct
invocations. This behavior is the same with go-ethereum.Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
If a contract is subject to DoS due to this issue, the user can redeploy the same contract, i.e with identical bytecode, so that the original contract's code is recovered.
The new contract deployment restores the
bytecode hash -> bytecode
entry in the internal state.References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Credits
Thanks to the