Make a contract that commits to appeal to a given round and performs a p+epsilon attack in that round

[whwgeorge]

Make a variant of the p+epsilon attack where the attacker 1) places a deposit that she only gets back if either her preferred outcome wins the dispute or if the dispute is appealed to the Nth round; otherwise the deposit is burned 2) performs a p+epsilon attack in the Nth round (if there is an Nth round).

In practice the value of the deposit in step 1 should exceed the potential costs of appealing the dispute the decision to the Nth round. Conceivably the deposit could be in pnk so as to also serve as the required funds to pay out the p+epsilon bribes if necessary, but due to the potential of eth to fluctuate with respect to pnk it is probably preferrable that the deposit consist of an eth portion that exceeds the cost of appeal fees and a pnk portion that suffices to be used for the p+epsilon attack.

The objective of such an attack is to see if the credible threat that a p+epsilon attack will be launched in a future round alters juror voting behavior as they attempt to be coherent with the eventual final decision.