This protocol assumes an underlying authenticated and ordered transport mechanism that takes care of framing individual messages. BOLT #8 specifies the canonical transport layer used in Lightning, though it can be replaced by any transport that fulfills the above guarantees.
The default TCP port depends on the network used. The most common networks are:
- Bitcoin mainnet with port number 9735 or the corresponding hexadecimal
0x2607
; - Bitcoin testnet with port number 19735 (
0x4D17
); - Bitcoin signet with port number 39735 (
0x9B37
).
The Unicode code point for LIGHTNING 1, and the port convention try to follow the Bitcoin Core convention.
All data fields are unsigned big-endian unless otherwise specified.
- Connection Handling and Multiplexing
- Lightning Message Format
- Type-Length-Value Format
- Fundamental Types
- Setup Messages
- Control Messages
- Appendix A: BigSize Test Vectors
- Appendix B: Type-Length-Value Test Vectors
- Appendix C: Message Extension
- Appendix D: Signed Integers Test Vectors
- Acknowledgments
- References
- Authors
Implementations MUST use a single connection per peer; channel messages (which include a channel ID) are multiplexed over this single connection.
After decryption, all Lightning messages are of the form:
type
: a 2-byte big-endian field indicating the type of messagepayload
: a variable-length payload that comprises the remainder of the message and that conforms to a format matching thetype
extension
: an optional TLV stream
The type
field indicates how to interpret the payload
field.
The format for each individual type is defined by a specification in this repository.
The type follows the it's ok to be odd rule, so nodes MAY send odd-numbered types without ascertaining that the recipient understands it.
The messages are grouped logically into five groups, ordered by the most significant bit that is set:
- Setup & Control (types
0
-31
): messages related to connection setup, control, supported features, and error reporting (described below) - Channel (types
32
-127
): messages used to setup and tear down micropayment channels (described in BOLT #2) - Commitment (types
128
-255
): messages related to updating the current commitment transaction, which includes adding, revoking, and settling HTLCs as well as updating fees and exchanging signatures (described in BOLT #2) - Routing (types
256
-511
): messages containing node and channel announcements, as well as any active route exploration (described in BOLT #7) - Custom (types
32768
-65535
): experimental and application-specific messages
The size of the message is required by the transport layer to fit into a 2-byte unsigned int; therefore, the maximum possible size is 65535 bytes.
A sending node:
- MUST NOT send an evenly-typed message not listed here without prior negotiation.
- MUST NOT send evenly-typed TLV records in the
extension
without prior negotiation. - that negotiates an option in this specification:
- MUST include all the fields annotated with that option.
- When defining custom messages:
- SHOULD pick a random
type
to avoid collision with other custom types. - SHOULD pick a
type
that doesn't conflict with other experiments listed in this issue. - SHOULD pick an odd
type
identifiers when regular nodes should ignore the additional data. - SHOULD pick an even
type
identifiers when regular nodes should reject the message and close the connection.
- SHOULD pick a random
A receiving node:
- upon receiving a message of odd, unknown type:
- MUST ignore the received message.
- upon receiving a message of even, unknown type:
- MUST close the connection.
- MAY fail the channels.
- upon receiving a known message with insufficient length for the contents:
- MUST close the connection.
- MAY fail the channels.
- upon receiving a message with an
extension
:- MAY ignore the
extension
. - Otherwise, if the
extension
is invalid:- MUST close the connection.
- MAY fail the channels.
- MAY ignore the
By default SHA2
and Bitcoin public keys are both encoded as
big endian, thus it would be unusual to use a different endian for
other fields.
Length is limited to 65535 bytes by the cryptographic wrapping, and messages in the protocol are never more than that length anyway.
The it's ok to be odd rule allows for future optional extensions
without negotiation or special coding in clients. The extension field
similarly allows for future expansion by letting senders include additional
TLV data. Note that an extension field can only be added when the message
payload
doesn't already fill the 65535 bytes maximum length.
Implementations may prefer to have message data aligned on an 8-byte boundary (the largest natural alignment requirement of any type here); however, adding a 6-byte padding after the type field was considered wasteful: alignment may be achieved by decrypting the message into a buffer with 6-bytes of pre-padding.
Throughout the protocol, a TLV (Type-Length-Value) format is used to allow for the backwards-compatible addition of new fields to existing message types.
A tlv_record
represents a single field, encoded in the form:
- [
bigsize
:type
] - [
bigsize
:length
] - [
length
:value
]
A tlv_stream
is a series of (possibly zero) tlv_record
s, represented as the
concatenation of the encoded tlv_record
s. When used to extend existing
messages, a tlv_stream
is typically placed after all currently defined fields.
The type
is encoded using the BigSize format. It functions as a
message-specific, 64-bit identifier for the tlv_record
determining how the
contents of value
should be decoded. type
identifiers below 2^16 are
reserved for use in this specification. type
identifiers greater than or equal
to 2^16 are available for custom records. Any record not defined in this
specification is considered a custom record. This includes experimental and
application-specific messages.
The length
is encoded using the BigSize format signaling the size of
value
in bytes.
The value
depends entirely on the type
, and should be encoded or decoded
according to the message-specific format determined by type
.
The sending node:
- MUST order
tlv_record
s in atlv_stream
by strictly-increasingtype
, hence MUST not produce more than a single TLV record with the sametype
- MUST minimally encode
type
andlength
. - When defining custom record
type
identifiers:- SHOULD pick random
type
identifiers to avoid collision with other custom types. - SHOULD pick odd
type
identifiers when regular nodes should ignore the additional data. - SHOULD pick even
type
identifiers when regular nodes should reject the full tlv stream containing the custom record.
- SHOULD pick random
- SHOULD NOT use redundant, variable-length encodings in a
tlv_record
.
The receiving node:
- if zero bytes remain before parsing a
type
:- MUST stop parsing the
tlv_stream
.
- MUST stop parsing the
- if a
type
orlength
is not minimally encoded:- MUST fail to parse the
tlv_stream
.
- MUST fail to parse the
- if decoded
type
s are not strictly-increasing (including situations when two or more occurrences of the sametype
are met):- MUST fail to parse the
tlv_stream
.
- MUST fail to parse the
- if
length
exceeds the number of bytes remaining in the message:- MUST fail to parse the
tlv_stream
.
- MUST fail to parse the
- if
type
is known:- MUST decode the next
length
bytes using the known encoding fortype
. - if
length
is not exactly equal to that required for the known encoding fortype
:- MUST fail to parse the
tlv_stream
.
- MUST fail to parse the
- if variable-length fields within the known encoding for
type
are not minimal:- MUST fail to parse the
tlv_stream
.
- MUST fail to parse the
- MUST decode the next
- otherwise, if
type
is unknown:- if
type
is even:- MUST fail to parse the
tlv_stream
.
- MUST fail to parse the
- otherwise, if
type
is odd:- MUST discard the next
length
bytes.
- MUST discard the next
- if
The primary advantage in using TLV is that a reader is able to ignore new fields that it does not understand, since each field carries the exact size of the encoded element. Without TLV, even if a node does not wish to use a particular field, the node is forced to add parsing logic for that field in order to determine the offset of any fields that follow.
The strict monotonicity constraint ensures that all type
s are unique and can
appear at most once. Fields that map to complex objects, e.g. vectors, maps, or
structs, should do so by defining the encoding such that the object is
serialized within a single tlv_record
. The uniqueness constraint, among other
things, enables the following optimizations:
- canonical ordering is defined independent of the encoded
value
s. - canonical ordering can be known at compile-time, rather than being determined dynamically at the time of encoding.
- verifying canonical ordering requires less state and is less-expensive.
- variable-size fields can reserve their expected size up front, rather than appending elements sequentially and incurring double-and-copy overhead.
The use of a bigsize for type
and length
permits a space savings for small
type
s or short value
s. This potentially leaves more space for application
data over the wire or in an onion payload.
All type
s must appear in increasing order to create a canonical encoding of
the underlying tlv_record
s. This is crucial when computing signatures over a
tlv_stream
, as it ensures verifiers will be able to recompute the same message
digest as the signer. Note that the canonical ordering over the set of fields
can be enforced even if the verifier does not understand what the fields
contain.
Writers should avoid using redundant, variable-length encodings in a
tlv_record
since this results in encoding the length twice and complicates
computing the outer length. As an example, when writing a variable length byte
array, the value
should contain only the raw bytes and forgo an additional
internal length since the tlv_record
already carries the number of bytes that
follow. On the other hand, if a tlv_record
contains multiple, variable-length
elements then this would not be considered redundant, and is needed to allow the
receiver to parse individual elements from value
.
Various fundamental types are referred to in the message specifications:
byte
: an 8-bit bytes8
: an 8-bit signed integeru16
: a 2 byte unsigned integers16
: a 2 byte signed integeru32
: a 4 byte unsigned integers32
: a 4 byte signed integeru64
: an 8 byte unsigned integers64
: an 8 byte signed integer
Signed integers use standard big-endian two's complement representation (see test vectors below).
For the final value in TLV records, truncated integers may be used. Leading zeros in truncated integers MUST be omitted:
tu16
: a 0 to 2 byte truncated unsigned integertu32
: a 0 to 4 byte truncated unsigned integertu64
: a 0 to 8 byte truncated unsigned integer
When used to encode amounts, the previous fields MUST comply with the upper bound of 21 million BTC:
- satoshi amounts MUST be at most
0x000775f05a074000
- milli-satoshi amounts MUST be at most
0x1d24b2dfac520000
The following convenience types are also defined:
chain_hash
: a 32-byte chain identifier (see BOLT #0)channel_id
: a 32-byte channel_id (see BOLT #2)sha256
: a 32-byte SHA2-256 hashsignature
: a 64-byte bitcoin Elliptic Curve signaturebip340sig
: a 64-byte bitcoin Elliptic Curve Schnorr signature as per BIP-340point
: a 33-byte Elliptic Curve point (compressed encoding as per SEC 1 standard)short_channel_id
: an 8 byte value identifying a channel (see BOLT #7)sciddir_or_pubkey
: either 9 or 33 bytes referencing or identifying a node, respectively- if the first byte is 0 or 1, then an 8-byte
short_channel_id
follows for a total of 9 bytes- 0 for the first byte indicates this refers to
node_id_1
in thechannel_announcement
forshort_channel_id
- 1 for the first byte indicates this refers to
node_id_2
in thechannel_announcement
forshort_channel_id
(see BOLT #7
- 0 for the first byte indicates this refers to
- if the first byte is 2 or 3, then the value is a 33-byte
point
- if the first byte is 0 or 1, then an 8-byte
bigsize
: a variable-length, unsigned integer similar to Bitcoin's CompactSize encoding, but big-endian. Described in BigSize.utf8
: a byte as part of a UTF-8 string. A writer MUST ensure an array of these is a valid UTF-8 string, a reader MAY reject any messages containing an array of these which is not a valid UTF-8 string.
Once authentication is complete, the first message reveals the features supported or required by this node, even if this is a reconnection.
BOLT #9 specifies lists of features. Each feature is generally represented by 2 bits. The least-significant bit is numbered 0, which is even, and the next most significant bit is numbered 1, which is odd. For historical reasons, features are divided into global and local feature bitmasks.
A feature is offered if a peer set it in the init
message for the current connection (as either even or odd). A feature is negotiated if either both peers offered it, or the local node offered it as even: it can assume the peer supports it, as it did not disconnect as it would be required to do.
The features
field MUST be padded to bytes with 0s.
-
type: 16 (
init
) -
data:
- [
u16
:gflen
] - [
gflen*byte
:globalfeatures
] - [
u16
:flen
] - [
flen*byte
:features
] - [
init_tlvs
:tlvs
]
- [
-
tlv_stream
:init_tlvs
-
types:
- type: 1 (
networks
) - data:
- [
...*chain_hash
:chains
]
- [
- type: 3 (
remote_addr
) - data:
- [
...*byte
:data
]
- [
- type: 1 (
The optional networks
indicates the chains the node is interested in.
The optional remote_addr
can be used to circumvent NAT issues.
The sending node:
- MUST send
init
as the first Lightning message for any connection. - MUST set feature bits as defined in BOLT #9.
- MUST set any undefined feature bits to 0.
- SHOULD NOT set features greater than 13 in
globalfeatures
. - SHOULD use the minimum length required to represent the
features
field. - SHOULD set
networks
to all chains it will gossip or open channels for. - SHOULD set
remote_addr
to reflect the remote IP address (and port) of an incoming connection, if the node is the receiver and the connection was done via IP. - if it sets
remote_addr
:- MUST set it to a valid
address descriptor
(1 byte type and data) as described in BOLT 7. - SHOULD NOT set private addresses as
remote_addr
.
- MUST set it to a valid
The receiving node:
- MUST wait to receive
init
before sending any other messages. - MUST combine (bitwise OR) the two feature bitmaps into one logical
features
map. - MUST respond to known feature bits as specified in BOLT #9.
- upon receiving unknown odd feature bits that are non-zero:
- MUST ignore the bit.
- upon receiving unknown even feature bits that are non-zero:
- MUST close the connection.
- upon receiving
networks
containing no common chains- MAY close the connection.
- if the feature vector does not set all known, transitive dependencies:
- MUST close the connection.
- MAY use the
remote_addr
to update itsnode_announcement
There used to be two feature bitfields here, but for backwards compatibility they're now combined into one.
This semantic allows both future incompatible changes and future backward compatible changes. Bits should generally be assigned in pairs, in order that optional features may later become compulsory.
Nodes wait for receipt of the other's features to simplify error diagnosis when features are incompatible.
Since all networks share the same port, but most implementations only
support a single network, the networks
fields avoids nodes
erroneously believing they will receive updates about their preferred
network, or that they can open channels.
For simplicity of diagnosis, it's often useful to tell a peer that something is incorrect.
-
type: 17 (
error
) -
data:
- [
channel_id
:channel_id
] - [
u16
:len
] - [
len*byte
:data
]
- [
-
type: 1 (
warning
) -
data:
- [
channel_id
:channel_id
] - [
u16
:len
] - [
len*byte
:data
]
- [
The channel is referred to by channel_id
, unless channel_id
is 0 (i.e. all bytes are 0), in which case it refers to all channels.
The funding node using channel establishment v1 (open_channel
):
- for all error messages sent before (and including) the
funding_created
message:- MUST use
temporary_channel_id
in lieu ofchannel_id
.
- MUST use
The fundee node using channel establishment v1 (accept_channel
):
- for all error messages sent before (and not including) the
funding_signed
message:- MUST use
temporary_channel_id
in lieu ofchannel_id
.
- MUST use
The opener node using channel establishment v2 (open_channel2
):
- for all error messages sent before the
accept_channel2
message is received:- MUST use
temporary_channel_id
in lieu ofchannel_id
.
- MUST use
The accepter node using channel establishment v2 (open_channel2
):
- for all error messages sent before (and including) the
accept_channel2
message:- MUST use
temporary_channel_id
in lieu ofchannel_id
.
- MUST use
A sending node:
- SHOULD send
error
for protocol violations or internal errors that make channels unusable or that make further communication unusable. - SHOULD send
error
with the unknownchannel_id
in reply to messages of type32
-255
related to unknown channels. - when sending
error
:- MUST fail the channel(s) referred to by the error message.
- MAY set
channel_id
to all zero to indicate all channels.
- when sending
warning
:- MAY set
channel_id
to all zero if the warning is not related to a specific channel.
- MAY set
- MAY send an empty
data
field. - when failure was caused by an invalid signature check:
- SHOULD include the raw, hex-encoded transaction in reply to a
funding_created
,funding_signed
,closing_signed
, orcommitment_signed
message.
- SHOULD include the raw, hex-encoded transaction in reply to a
The receiving node:
- upon receiving
error
:- if
channel_id
is all zero:- MUST fail all channels with the sending node.
- otherwise:
- MUST fail the channel referred to by
channel_id
, if that channel is with the sending node.
- MUST fail the channel referred to by
- if
- upon receiving
warning
:- SHOULD log the message for later diagnosis.
- MAY attempt
shutdown
if permitted at this point.
- if no existing channel is referred to by
channel_id
:- MUST ignore the message.
- if
data
is not composed solely of printable ASCII characters (For reference: the printable character set includes byte values 32 through 126, inclusive):- SHOULD NOT print out
data
verbatim.
- SHOULD NOT print out
There are unrecoverable errors that require an abort of conversations; if the connection is simply dropped, then the peer may retry the connection. It's also useful to describe protocol violations for diagnosis, as this indicates that one peer has a bug.
On the other hand, overuse of error messages has lead to implementations ignoring them (to avoid an otherwise expensive channel break), so the "warning" message was added to allow some degree of retry or recovery for spurious errors.
It may be wise not to distinguish errors in production settings, lest
it leak information — hence, the optional data
field.
In order to allow for the existence of long-lived TCP connections, at times it may be required that both ends keep alive the TCP connection at the application level. Such messages also allow obfuscation of traffic patterns.
- type: 18 (
ping
) - data:
- [
u16
:num_pong_bytes
] - [
u16
:byteslen
] - [
byteslen*byte
:ignored
]
- [
The pong
message is to be sent whenever a ping
message is received. It
serves as a reply and also serves to keep the connection alive, while
explicitly notifying the other end that the receiver is still active. Within
the received ping
message, the sender will specify the number of bytes to be
included within the data payload of the pong
message.
- type: 19 (
pong
) - data:
- [
u16
:byteslen
] - [
byteslen*byte
:ignored
]
- [
A node sending a ping
message:
- SHOULD set
ignored
to 0s. - MUST NOT set
ignored
to sensitive data such as secrets or portions of initialized memory. - if it doesn't receive a corresponding
pong
:- MAY close the network connection,
- and MUST NOT fail the channels in this case.
- MAY close the network connection,
A node sending a pong
message:
- SHOULD set
ignored
to 0s. - MUST NOT set
ignored
to sensitive data such as secrets or portions of initialized memory.
A node receiving a ping
message:
- if
num_pong_bytes
is less than 65532:- MUST respond by sending a
pong
message, withbyteslen
equal tonum_pong_bytes
.
- MUST respond by sending a
- otherwise (
num_pong_bytes
is not less than 65532):- MUST ignore the
ping
.
- MUST ignore the
A node receiving a pong
message:
- if
byteslen
does not correspond to anyping
'snum_pong_bytes
value it has sent:- MAY close the connection.
The largest possible message is 65535 bytes; thus, the maximum sensible byteslen
is 65531 — in order to account for the type field (pong
) and the byteslen
itself. This allows
a convenient cutoff for num_pong_bytes
to indicate that no reply should be sent.
Connections between nodes within the network may be long lived, as payment
channels have an indefinite lifetime. However, it's likely that
no new data will be
exchanged for a
significant portion of a connection's lifetime. Also, on several platforms it's possible that Lightning
clients will be put to sleep without prior warning. Hence, a
distinct ping
message is used, in order to probe for the liveness of the connection on
the other side, as well as to keep the established connection active.
Additionally, the ability for a sender to request that the receiver send a response with a particular number of bytes enables nodes on the network to create synthetic traffic. Such traffic can be used to partially defend against packet and timing analysis — as nodes can fake the traffic patterns of typical exchanges without applying any true updates to their respective channels.
When combined with the onion routing protocol defined in BOLT #4, careful statistically driven synthetic traffic can serve to further bolster the privacy of participants within the network.
Limited precautions are recommended against ping
flooding, however some
latitude is given because of network delays. Note that there are other methods
of incoming traffic flooding (e.g. sending odd unknown message types, or padding
every message maximally).
Finally, the usage of periodic ping
messages serves to promote frequent key
rotations as specified within BOLT #8.
The following test vectors can be used to assert the correctness of a BigSize implementation used in the TLV format. The format is identical to the CompactSize encoding used in bitcoin, but replaces the little-endian encoding of multi-byte values with big-endian.
Values encoded with BigSize will produce an encoding of either 1, 3, 5, or 9
bytes depending on the size of the integer. The encoding is a piece-wise
function that takes a uint64
value x
and produces:
uint8(x) if x < 0xfd
0xfd + be16(uint16(x)) if x < 0x10000
0xfe + be32(uint32(x)) if x < 0x100000000
0xff + be64(x) otherwise.
Here +
denotes concatenation and be16
, be32
, and be64
produce a
big-endian encoding of the input for 16, 32, and 64-bit integers, respectively.
A value is said to be minimally encoded if it could not be encoded using fewer bytes. For example, a BigSize encoding that occupies 5 bytes but whose value is less than 0x10000 is not minimally encoded. All values decoded with BigSize should be checked to ensure they are minimally encoded.
The following is an example of how to execute the BigSize decoding tests.
func testReadBigSize(t *testing.T, test bigSizeTest) {
var buf [8]byte
r := bytes.NewReader(test.Bytes)
val, err := tlv.ReadBigSize(r, &buf)
if err != nil && err.Error() != test.ExpErr {
t.Fatalf("expected decoding error: %v, got: %v",
test.ExpErr, err)
}
// If we expected a decoding error, there's no point checking the value.
if test.ExpErr != "" {
return
}
if val != test.Value {
t.Fatalf("expected value: %d, got %d", test.Value, val)
}
}
A correct implementation should pass against these test vectors:
[
{
"name": "zero",
"value": 0,
"bytes": "00"
},
{
"name": "one byte high",
"value": 252,
"bytes": "fc"
},
{
"name": "two byte low",
"value": 253,
"bytes": "fd00fd"
},
{
"name": "two byte high",
"value": 65535,
"bytes": "fdffff"
},
{
"name": "four byte low",
"value": 65536,
"bytes": "fe00010000"
},
{
"name": "four byte high",
"value": 4294967295,
"bytes": "feffffffff"
},
{
"name": "eight byte low",
"value": 4294967296,
"bytes": "ff0000000100000000"
},
{
"name": "eight byte high",
"value": 18446744073709551615,
"bytes": "ffffffffffffffffff"
},
{
"name": "two byte not canonical",
"value": 0,
"bytes": "fd00fc",
"exp_error": "decoded bigsize is not canonical"
},
{
"name": "four byte not canonical",
"value": 0,
"bytes": "fe0000ffff",
"exp_error": "decoded bigsize is not canonical"
},
{
"name": "eight byte not canonical",
"value": 0,
"bytes": "ff00000000ffffffff",
"exp_error": "decoded bigsize is not canonical"
},
{
"name": "two byte short read",
"value": 0,
"bytes": "fd00",
"exp_error": "unexpected EOF"
},
{
"name": "four byte short read",
"value": 0,
"bytes": "feffff",
"exp_error": "unexpected EOF"
},
{
"name": "eight byte short read",
"value": 0,
"bytes": "ffffffffff",
"exp_error": "unexpected EOF"
},
{
"name": "one byte no read",
"value": 0,
"bytes": "",
"exp_error": "EOF"
},
{
"name": "two byte no read",
"value": 0,
"bytes": "fd",
"exp_error": "unexpected EOF"
},
{
"name": "four byte no read",
"value": 0,
"bytes": "fe",
"exp_error": "unexpected EOF"
},
{
"name": "eight byte no read",
"value": 0,
"bytes": "ff",
"exp_error": "unexpected EOF"
}
]
The following is an example of how to execute the BigSize encoding tests.
func testWriteBigSize(t *testing.T, test bigSizeTest) {
var (
w bytes.Buffer
buf [8]byte
)
err := tlv.WriteBigSize(&w, test.Value, &buf)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to encode %d as bigsize: %v",
test.Value, err)
}
if bytes.Compare(w.Bytes(), test.Bytes) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected bytes: %v, got %v",
test.Bytes, w.Bytes())
}
}
A correct implementation should pass against the following test vectors:
[
{
"name": "zero",
"value": 0,
"bytes": "00"
},
{
"name": "one byte high",
"value": 252,
"bytes": "fc"
},
{
"name": "two byte low",
"value": 253,
"bytes": "fd00fd"
},
{
"name": "two byte high",
"value": 65535,
"bytes": "fdffff"
},
{
"name": "four byte low",
"value": 65536,
"bytes": "fe00010000"
},
{
"name": "four byte high",
"value": 4294967295,
"bytes": "feffffffff"
},
{
"name": "eight byte low",
"value": 4294967296,
"bytes": "ff0000000100000000"
},
{
"name": "eight byte high",
"value": 18446744073709551615,
"bytes": "ffffffffffffffffff"
}
]
The following tests assume that two separate TLV namespaces exist: n1 and n2.
The n1 namespace supports the following TLV types:
tlv_stream
:n1
- types:
- type: 1 (
tlv1
) - data:
- [
tu64
:amount_msat
]
- type: 2 (
tlv2
) - data:
- [
short_channel_id
:scid
]
- type: 3 (
tlv3
) - data:
- [
point
:node_id
] - [
u64
:amount_msat_1
] - [
u64
:amount_msat_2
]
- type: 254 (
tlv4
) - data:
- [
u16
:cltv_delta
]
- type: 1 (
The n2 namespace supports the following TLV types:
tlv_stream
:n2
- types:
- type: 0 (
tlv1
) - data:
- [
tu64
:amount_msat
]
- type: 11 (
tlv2
) - data:
- [
tu32
:cltv_expiry
]
- type: 0 (
The following TLV streams in any namespace should trigger a decoding failure:
-
Invalid stream: 0xfd
-
Reason: type truncated
-
Invalid stream: 0xfd01
-
Reason: type truncated
-
Invalid stream: 0xfd0001 00
-
Reason: not minimally encoded type
-
Invalid stream: 0xfd0101
-
Reason: missing length
-
Invalid stream: 0x0f fd
-
Reason: (length truncated)
-
Invalid stream: 0x0f fd26
-
Reason: (length truncated)
-
Invalid stream: 0x0f fd2602
-
Reason: missing value
-
Invalid stream: 0x0f fd0001 00
-
Reason: not minimally encoded length
-
Invalid stream: 0x0f fd0201 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
-
Reason: value truncated
The following TLV streams in either namespace should trigger a decoding failure:
-
Invalid stream: 0x12 00
-
Reason: unknown even type.
-
Invalid stream: 0xfd0102 00
-
Reason: unknown even type.
-
Invalid stream: 0xfe01000002 00
-
Reason: unknown even type.
-
Invalid stream: 0xff0100000000000002 00
-
Reason: unknown even type.
The following TLV streams in namespace n1
should trigger a decoding
failure:
-
Invalid stream: 0x01 09 ffffffffffffffffff
-
Reason: greater than encoding length for
n1
stlv1
. -
Invalid stream: 0x01 01 00
-
Reason: encoding for
n1
stlv1
samount_msat
is not minimal -
Invalid stream: 0x01 02 0001
-
Reason: encoding for
n1
stlv1
samount_msat
is not minimal -
Invalid stream: 0x01 03 000100
-
Reason: encoding for
n1
stlv1
samount_msat
is not minimal -
Invalid stream: 0x01 04 00010000
-
Reason: encoding for
n1
stlv1
samount_msat
is not minimal -
Invalid stream: 0x01 05 0001000000
-
Reason: encoding for
n1
stlv1
samount_msat
is not minimal -
Invalid stream: 0x01 06 000100000000
-
Reason: encoding for
n1
stlv1
samount_msat
is not minimal -
Invalid stream: 0x01 07 00010000000000
-
Reason: encoding for
n1
stlv1
samount_msat
is not minimal -
Invalid stream: 0x01 08 0001000000000000
-
Reason: encoding for
n1
stlv1
samount_msat
is not minimal -
Invalid stream: 0x02 07 01010101010101
-
Reason: less than encoding length for
n1
stlv2
. -
Invalid stream: 0x02 09 010101010101010101
-
Reason: greater than encoding length for
n1
stlv2
. -
Invalid stream: 0x03 21 023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb
-
Reason: less than encoding length for
n1
stlv3
. -
Invalid stream: 0x03 29 023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb0000000000000001
-
Reason: less than encoding length for
n1
stlv3
. -
Invalid stream: 0x03 30 023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb000000000000000100000000000001
-
Reason: less than encoding length for
n1
stlv3
. -
Invalid stream: 0x03 31 043da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb00000000000000010000000000000002
-
Reason:
n1
snode_id
is not a valid point. -
Invalid stream: 0x03 32 023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb0000000000000001000000000000000001
-
Reason: greater than encoding length for
n1
stlv3
. -
Invalid stream: 0xfd00fe 00
-
Reason: less than encoding length for
n1
stlv4
. -
Invalid stream: 0xfd00fe 01 01
-
Reason: less than encoding length for
n1
stlv4
. -
Invalid stream: 0xfd00fe 03 010101
-
Reason: greater than encoding length for
n1
stlv4
. -
Invalid stream: 0x00 00
-
Reason: unknown even field for
n1
s namespace.
The following TLV streams in either namespace should correctly decode, and be ignored:
-
Valid stream: 0x
-
Explanation: empty message
-
Valid stream: 0x21 00
-
Explanation: Unknown odd type.
-
Valid stream: 0xfd0201 00
-
Explanation: Unknown odd type.
-
Valid stream: 0xfd00fd 00
-
Explanation: Unknown odd type.
-
Valid stream: 0xfd00ff 00
-
Explanation: Unknown odd type.
-
Valid stream: 0xfe02000001 00
-
Explanation: Unknown odd type.
-
Valid stream: 0xff0200000000000001 00
-
Explanation: Unknown odd type.
The following TLV streams in n1
namespace should correctly decode,
with the values given here:
-
Valid stream: 0x01 00
-
Values:
tlv1
amount_msat
=0 -
Valid stream: 0x01 01 01
-
Values:
tlv1
amount_msat
=1 -
Valid stream: 0x01 02 0100
-
Values:
tlv1
amount_msat
=256 -
Valid stream: 0x01 03 010000
-
Values:
tlv1
amount_msat
=65536 -
Valid stream: 0x01 04 01000000
-
Values:
tlv1
amount_msat
=16777216 -
Valid stream: 0x01 05 0100000000
-
Values:
tlv1
amount_msat
=4294967296 -
Valid stream: 0x01 06 010000000000
-
Values:
tlv1
amount_msat
=1099511627776 -
Valid stream: 0x01 07 01000000000000
-
Values:
tlv1
amount_msat
=281474976710656 -
Valid stream: 0x01 08 0100000000000000
-
Values:
tlv1
amount_msat
=72057594037927936 -
Valid stream: 0x02 08 0000000000000226
-
Values:
tlv2
scid
=0x0x550 -
Valid stream: 0x03 31 023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb00000000000000010000000000000002
-
Values:
tlv3
node_id
=023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54ebamount_msat_1
=1amount_msat_2
=2 -
Valid stream: 0xfd00fe 02 0226
-
Values:
tlv4
cltv_delta
=550
Any appending of an invalid stream to a valid stream should trigger a decoding failure.
Any appending of a higher-numbered valid stream to a lower-numbered valid stream should not trigger a decoding failure.
In addition, the following TLV streams in namespace n1
should
trigger a decoding failure:
-
Invalid stream: 0x02 08 0000000000000226 01 01 2a
-
Reason: valid TLV records but invalid ordering
-
Invalid stream: 0x02 08 0000000000000231 02 08 0000000000000451
-
Reason: duplicate TLV type
-
Invalid stream: 0x1f 00 0f 01 2a
-
Reason: valid (ignored) TLV records but invalid ordering
-
Invalid stream: 0x1f 00 1f 01 2a
-
Reason: duplicate TLV type (ignored)
The following TLV stream in namespace n2
should trigger a decoding
failure:
- Invalid stream: 0xffffffffffffffffff 00 00 00
- Reason: valid TLV records but invalid ordering
This section contains examples of valid and invalid extensions on the init
message. The base init
message (without extensions) for these examples is
0x001000000000
(all features turned off).
The following init
messages are valid:
0x001000000000
: no extension provided0x001000000000c9012acb0104
: the extension contains two unknown odd TLV records (with types0xc9
and0xcb
)
The following init
messages are invalid:
0x00100000000001
: the extension is present but truncated0x001000000000ca012a
: the extension contains unknown even TLV records (assuming that TLV type0xca
is unknown)0x001000000000c90101c90102
: the extension TLV stream is invalid (duplicate TLV record type0xc9
)
Note that when messages are signed, the extension is part of the signed bytes. Nodes should store the extension bytes even if they don't understand them to be able to correctly verify signatures.
The following test vector show how signed integers (s8
, s16
, s32
and s64
) are encoded using big-endian two's complement.
[
{
"value": 0,
"bytes": "00"
},
{
"value": 42,
"bytes": "2a"
},
{
"value": -42,
"bytes": "d6"
},
{
"value": 127,
"bytes": "7f"
},
{
"value": -128,
"bytes": "80"
},
{
"value": 128,
"bytes": "0080"
},
{
"value": -129,
"bytes": "ff7f"
},
{
"value": 15000,
"bytes": "3a98"
},
{
"value": -15000,
"bytes": "c568"
},
{
"value": 32767,
"bytes": "7fff"
},
{
"value": -32768,
"bytes": "8000"
},
{
"value": 32768,
"bytes": "00008000"
},
{
"value": -32769,
"bytes": "ffff7fff"
},
{
"value": 21000000,
"bytes": "01406f40"
},
{
"value": -21000000,
"bytes": "febf90c0"
},
{
"value": 2147483647,
"bytes": "7fffffff"
},
{
"value": -2147483648,
"bytes": "80000000"
},
{
"value": 2147483648,
"bytes": "0000000080000000"
},
{
"value": -2147483649,
"bytes": "ffffffff7fffffff"
},
{
"value": 500000000000,
"bytes": "000000746a528800"
},
{
"value": -500000000000,
"bytes": "ffffff8b95ad7800"
},
{
"value": 9223372036854775807,
"bytes": "7fffffffffffffff"
},
{
"value": -9223372036854775808,
"bytes": "8000000000000000"
}
]
[ TODO: (roasbeef); fin ]
[ FIXME: Insert Author List ]
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.