diff --git a/libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go b/libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go
index e6269bea812..78b6998c38f 100644
--- a/libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go
+++ b/libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ func mountCgroupV1(m *configs.Mount, c *mountConfig) error {
 		if c.cgroupns {
 			subsystemPath := filepath.Join(c.root, b.Destination)
 			subsystemName := filepath.Base(b.Destination)
-			if err := os.MkdirAll(subsystemPath, 0o755); err != nil {
+			if err := utils.MkdirAllInRoot(c.root, subsystemPath, 0o755); err != nil {
 				return err
 			}
 			if err := utils.WithProcfd(c.root, b.Destination, func(procfd string) error {
@@ -406,15 +406,26 @@ func createMountpoint(rootfs string, m *configs.Mount, mountFd *int, source stri
 				return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: file bind mount over rootfs", errRootfsToFile)
 			}
 			// Make the parent directory.
-			if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(dest), 0o755); err != nil {
+			destDir, destBase := filepath.Split(dest)
+			destDirFd, err := utils.MkdirAllInRootOpen(rootfs, destDir, 0o755)
+			if err != nil {
 				return "", fmt.Errorf("make parent dir of file bind-mount: %w", err)
 			}
-			// Make the target file.
-			f, err := os.OpenFile(dest, os.O_CREATE, 0o755)
-			if err != nil {
-				return "", fmt.Errorf("create target of file bind-mount: %w", err)
+			defer destDirFd.Close()
+			// Make the target file. We want to avoid opening any file that is
+			// already there because it could be a "bad" file like an invalid
+			// device or hung tty that might cause a DoS, so we use mknodat.
+			// destBase does not contain any "/" components, and mknodat does
+			// not follow trailing symlinks, so we can safely just call mknodat
+			// here.
+			if err := unix.Mknodat(int(destDirFd.Fd()), destBase, unix.S_IFREG|0o644, 0); err != nil {
+				// If we get EEXIST, there was already an inode there and
+				// we can consider that a success.
+				if !errors.Is(err, unix.EEXIST) {
+					err = &os.PathError{Op: "mknod regular file", Path: dest, Err: err}
+					return "", fmt.Errorf("create target of file bind-mount: %w", err)
+				}
 			}
-			_ = f.Close()
 			// Nothing left to do.
 			return dest, nil
 		}
@@ -433,7 +444,7 @@ func createMountpoint(rootfs string, m *configs.Mount, mountFd *int, source stri
 		}
 	}
 
-	if err := os.MkdirAll(dest, 0o755); err != nil {
+	if err := utils.MkdirAllInRoot(rootfs, dest, 0o755); err != nil {
 		return "", err
 	}
 	return dest, nil
@@ -463,7 +474,7 @@ func mountToRootfs(m *configs.Mount, c *mountConfig) error {
 		} else if !fi.IsDir() {
 			return fmt.Errorf("filesystem %q must be mounted on ordinary directory", m.Device)
 		}
-		if err := os.MkdirAll(dest, 0o755); err != nil {
+		if err := utils.MkdirAllInRoot(rootfs, dest, 0o755); err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
 		// Selinux kernels do not support labeling of /proc or /sys.
@@ -751,7 +762,7 @@ func createDeviceNode(rootfs string, node *devices.Device, bind bool) error {
 	if dest == rootfs {
 		return fmt.Errorf("%w: mknod over rootfs", errRootfsToFile)
 	}
-	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(dest), 0o755); err != nil {
+	if err := utils.MkdirAllInRoot(rootfs, filepath.Dir(dest), 0o755); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
 	if bind {
diff --git a/libcontainer/system/linux.go b/libcontainer/system/linux.go
index 16edc6ba6d9..32bab6922bd 100644
--- a/libcontainer/system/linux.go
+++ b/libcontainer/system/linux.go
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ package system
 import (
 	"os"
 	"os/exec"
+	"runtime"
+	"strings"
 	"unsafe"
 
 	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
@@ -102,3 +104,42 @@ func GetSubreaper() (int, error) {
 
 	return int(i), nil
 }
+
+func prepareAt(dir *os.File, path string) (int, string) {
+	if dir == nil {
+		return unix.AT_FDCWD, path
+	}
+
+	// Rather than just filepath.Join-ing path here, do it manually so the
+	// error and handle correctly indicate cases like path=".." as being
+	// relative to the correct directory. The handle.Name() might end up being
+	// wrong but because this is (currently) only used in MkdirAllInRoot, that
+	// isn't a problem.
+	dirName := dir.Name()
+	if !strings.HasSuffix(dirName, "/") {
+		dirName += "/"
+	}
+	fullPath := dirName + path
+
+	return int(dir.Fd()), fullPath
+}
+
+func Openat(dir *os.File, path string, flags int, mode uint32) (*os.File, error) {
+	dirFd, fullPath := prepareAt(dir, path)
+	fd, err := unix.Openat(dirFd, path, flags, mode)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, &os.PathError{Op: "openat", Path: fullPath, Err: err}
+	}
+	runtime.KeepAlive(dir)
+	return os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), fullPath), nil
+}
+
+func Mkdirat(dir *os.File, path string, mode uint32) error {
+	dirFd, fullPath := prepareAt(dir, path)
+	err := unix.Mkdirat(dirFd, path, mode)
+	if err != nil {
+		err = &os.PathError{Op: "mkdirat", Path: fullPath, Err: err}
+	}
+	runtime.KeepAlive(dir)
+	return err
+}
diff --git a/libcontainer/utils/utils_unix.go b/libcontainer/utils/utils_unix.go
index 0d95a203789..460b94cef3f 100644
--- a/libcontainer/utils/utils_unix.go
+++ b/libcontainer/utils/utils_unix.go
@@ -4,12 +4,17 @@
 package utils
 
 import (
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	_ "unsafe" // for go:linkname
 
+	"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/system"
+
+	securejoin "github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin"
 	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
 )
 
@@ -130,3 +135,112 @@ func IsLexicallyInRoot(root, path string) bool {
 	}
 	return strings.HasPrefix(path, root)
 }
+
+// MkdirAllInRootOpen attempts to make
+//
+//	path, _ := securejoin.SecureJoin(root, unsafePath)
+//	os.MkdirAll(path, mode)
+//	os.Open(path)
+//
+// safer against attacks where components in the path are changed between
+// SecureJoin returning and MkdirAll (or Open) being called. In particular, we
+// try to detect any symlink components in the path while we are doing the
+// MkdirAll.
+//
+// NOTE: Unlike os.MkdirAll, mode is not Go's os.FileMode, it is the unix mode
+// (the suid/sgid/sticky bits are not the same as for os.FileMode).
+//
+// NOTE: If unsafePath is a subpath of root, we assume that you have already
+// called SecureJoin and so we use the provided path verbatim without resolving
+// any symlinks (this is done in a way that avoids symlink-exchange races).
+// This means that the path also must not contain ".." elements, otherwise an
+// error will occur.
+//
+// This is a somewhat less safe alternative to
+// <https://github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/pull/13>, but it should
+// detect attempts to trick us into creating directories outside of the root.
+// We should migrate to securejoin.MkdirAll once it is merged.
+func MkdirAllInRootOpen(root, unsafePath string, mode uint32) (_ *os.File, Err error) {
+	// If the path is already "within" the root, use it verbatim.
+	fullPath := unsafePath
+	if !IsLexicallyInRoot(root, unsafePath) {
+		var err error
+		fullPath, err = securejoin.SecureJoin(root, unsafePath)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+	subPath, err := filepath.Rel(root, fullPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	// Check for any silly mode bits.
+	if mode&^0o7777 != 0 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("tried to include non-mode bits in MkdirAll mode: 0o%.3o", mode)
+	}
+
+	currentDir, err := os.OpenFile(root, unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("open root handle: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer func() {
+		if Err != nil {
+			currentDir.Close()
+		}
+	}()
+
+	for _, part := range strings.Split(subPath, string(filepath.Separator)) {
+		switch part {
+		case "", ".":
+			// Skip over no-op components.
+			continue
+		case "..":
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("possible breakout detected: found %q component in SecureJoin subpath %s", part, subPath)
+		}
+
+		nextDir, err := system.Openat(currentDir, part, unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_NOFOLLOW|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
+		switch {
+		case err == nil:
+			// Update the currentDir.
+			_ = currentDir.Close()
+			currentDir = nextDir
+
+		case errors.Is(err, unix.ENOTDIR):
+			// This might be a symlink or some other random file. Either way,
+			// error out.
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot mkdir in %s/%s: %w", currentDir.Name(), part, unix.ENOTDIR)
+
+		case errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist):
+			// Luckily, mkdirat will not follow trailing symlinks, so this is
+			// safe to do as-is.
+			if err := system.Mkdirat(currentDir, part, mode); err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			// Open the new directory. There is a race here where an attacker
+			// could swap the directory with a different directory, but
+			// MkdirAll's fuzzy semantics mean we don't care about that.
+			nextDir, err := system.Openat(currentDir, part, unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_NOFOLLOW|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("open newly created directory: %w", err)
+			}
+			// Update the currentDir.
+			_ = currentDir.Close()
+			currentDir = nextDir
+
+		default:
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+	return currentDir, nil
+}
+
+// MkdirAllInRoot is a wrapper around MkdirAllInRootOpen which closes the
+// returned handle, for callers that don't need to use it.
+func MkdirAllInRoot(root, unsafePath string, mode uint32) error {
+	f, err := MkdirAllInRootOpen(root, unsafePath, mode)
+	if err == nil {
+		_ = f.Close()
+	}
+	return err
+}