4.4.x #18

redbrain17 · 2017-11-22T17:28:10Z

merged 4.4.100 into 4.4.x

[ Upstream commit da8892d ] The adv7604 driver platform data contains fields for configuring the drive strength of the output pins. When probing the driver through DT these fields are not explicitly initialized, which means they are left at 0. This is a reserved setting for the drive strength configuration though and can cause signal integrity issues. Whether these signal integrity issues are visible depends on the PCB specifics (e.g. the higher the load capacitance for the output the more visible the issue). But it has been observed on existing solutions at high pixel clock rates. Initialize the drive strength settings to the power-on-reset value of the device when probing through devicetree to avoid this issue. Fixes: 0e158be ("adv7604: Add DT support") Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart <[email protected]> Tested-by: Niklas Söderlund <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 879e5a0 ] Fix: WARNING: drivers/video/fbdev/pmag-ba-fb.o(.text+0x308): Section mismatch in reference from the function pmagbafb_probe() to the function .init.text:pmagbafb_erase_cursor() The function pmagbafb_probe() references the function __init pmagbafb_erase_cursor(). This is often because pmagbafb_probe lacks a __init annotation or the annotation of pmagbafb_erase_cursor is wrong. -- a fallout from a missed update from commit 9625b51 ("VIDEO: PMAG-BA: Fix section mismatch") and then commit 48c68c4 ("Drivers: video: remove __dev* attributes.") Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d9bf28e ] The PCI core will write to the bridge window config multiple times while they are enabled. This can lead to mbus failures like this: mvebu_mbus: cannot add window '4:e8', conflicts with another window mvebu-pcie mbus:pex@e0000000: Could not create MBus window at [mem 0xe0000000-0xe00fffff]: -22 For me this is happening during a hotplug cycle. The PCI core is not changing the values, just writing them twice while active. The patch addresses the general case of any change to an active window, but not atomically. The code is slightly refactored so io and mem can share more of the window logic. Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jason Cooper <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 56dd5af ] The default for the maximum number of tx/rx queues of one interface is the number of cpus of the system today. As each queue pair reserves 512 grant pages this default consumes a ridiculous number of grants for large guests. Limit the queue number to 8 as default. This value can be modified via a module parameter if required. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a67834f ] Call drm_debugfs_cleanup() in case drm_debugfs_init() fails to cover for failure in the drm_driver.debugfs_init callback. Signed-off-by: Noralf Trønnes <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]> Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 37451bc ] Some counters are added in Commit 6e0365b ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Add ICP real mode counters"), to provide some performance statistics to determine whether further optimizing is needed for real mode functions. The n_reject counter counts how many times ICP rejects an irq because of priority in real mode. The redelivery of an lsi that is still asserted after eoi doesn't fall into this category, so the increasement there is removed. Also, it needs to be increased in icp_rm_deliver_irq() if it rejects another one. Signed-off-by: Li Zhong <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 810871c ] To prevent corruption of the stage-1 context pointer field when updating STEs, rebuild the entire containing dword instead of clearing individual fields. Signed-off-by: Nate Watterson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a674c7d ] It is not implemented on the kmcoge4 hardware and if not disabled it leads to error messages with the corenet32_smp_defconfig. Signed-off-by: Valentin Longchamp <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Scott Wood <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4cd6a59 ] We have more than four uarts on some SoCs and that can cause noise with errors while booting. Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7dede91 ] Some preemptible check warnings were reported from enable_kernel_vsx(). This patch disables preemption in aes_ctr.c before enabling vsx, and they are now consistent with other files in the same directory. Signed-off-by: Li Zhong <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 10e840d ] These stand-alone trigger drivers were using iio_trigger_put() where they should have been using iio_trigger_free(). The iio_trigger_put() adds a module_put which is bad since they never did a module_get. In the sysfs driver, module_get/put's are used as triggers are added & removed. This extra module_put() occurs on an error path in the probe routine (probably rare). In the bfin-timer & interrupt trigger drivers, the module resources are not explicitly managed, so it's doing a put on something that was never get'd. It occurs on the probe error path and on the remove path (not so rare). Tested with the sysfs trigger driver. The bfin & interrupt drivers were build tested & inspected only. Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4567d68 ] Some bus names are pretty long and do not fit into 17 chars. Increase therefore MII_BUS_ID_SIZE and phy_fixup.bus_id to larger number. Now mii_bus.id can host larger name. Signed-off-by: Volodymyr Bendiuga <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Magnus Öberg <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a752ba1 ] Even though most of its registers are 8-bit wide, the IRDA has two 16-bit registers that make it a 16-bit peripheral and not a 8-bit peripheral with addresses shifted by one. Fix the registers offset in the driver and the platform data regshift value. Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 76b8db0 ] On some platforms(e.g. rk3399 board), we can call hcd_add/remove consecutively without calling usb_put_hcd/usb_create_hcd in between, so hcd->flags can be stale. If the HC dies due to whatever reason then without this patch we get the below error on next hcd_add. [173.296154] xhci-hcd xhci-hcd.2.auto: HC died; cleaning up [173.296209] xhci-hcd xhci-hcd.2.auto: xHCI Host Controller [173.296762] xhci-hcd xhci-hcd.2.auto: new USB bus registered, assigned bus number 6 [173.296931] usb usb6: We don't know the algorithms for LPM for this host, disabling LPM. [173.297179] usb usb6: New USB device found, idVendor=1d6b, idProduct=0003 [173.297203] usb usb6: New USB device strings: Mfr=3, Product=2, SerialNumber=1 [173.297222] usb usb6: Product: xHCI Host Controller [173.297240] usb usb6: Manufacturer: Linux 4.4.21 xhci-hcd [173.297257] usb usb6: SerialNumber: xhci-hcd.2.auto [173.298680] hub 6-0:1.0: USB hub found [173.298749] hub 6-0:1.0: 1 port detected [173.299382] rockchip-dwc3 usb@fe800000: USB HOST connected [173.395418] hub 5-0:1.0: activate --> -19 [173.603447] irq 228: nobody cared (try booting with the "irqpoll" option) [173.603493] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.4.21 Freescale#9 [173.603513] Hardware name: Google Kevin (DT) [173.603531] Call trace: [173.603568] [<ffffffc0002087dc>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x160 [173.603596] [<ffffffc00020895c>] show_stack+0x20/0x28 [173.603623] [<ffffffc0004b28a8>] dump_stack+0x90/0xb0 [173.603650] [<ffffffc00027347c>] __report_bad_irq+0x48/0xe8 [173.603674] [<ffffffc0002737cc>] note_interrupt+0x1e8/0x28c [173.603698] [<ffffffc000270a38>] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x1d4/0x25c [173.603722] [<ffffffc000270b0c>] handle_irq_event+0x4c/0x7c [173.603748] [<ffffffc00027456c>] handle_fasteoi_irq+0xb4/0x124 [173.603777] [<ffffffc00026fe3c>] generic_handle_irq+0x30/0x44 [173.603804] [<ffffffc0002701a8>] __handle_domain_irq+0x90/0xbc [173.603827] [<ffffffc0002006f4>] gic_handle_irq+0xcc/0x188 ... [173.604500] [<ffffffc000203700>] el1_irq+0x80/0xf8 [173.604530] [<ffffffc000261388>] cpu_startup_entry+0x38/0x3cc [173.604558] [<ffffffc00090f7d8>] rest_init+0x8c/0x94 [173.604585] [<ffffffc000e009ac>] start_kernel+0x3d0/0x3fc [173.604607] [<0000000000b16000>] 0xb16000 [173.604622] handlers: [173.604648] [<ffffffc000642084>] usb_hcd_irq [173.604673] Disabling IRQ Freescale#228 Signed-off-by: William wu <[email protected]> Acked-by: Roger Quadros <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f169fd6 ] After adding the following nft rule, then ping 224.0.0.1: # nft add rule netdev t c pkttype host counter The warning complain message will be printed out again and again: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 10182 at net/netfilter/nft_meta.c:163 \ nft_meta_get_eval+0x3fe/0x460 [nft_meta] [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack+0x85/0xc2 __warn+0xcb/0xf0 warn_slowpath_null+0x1d/0x20 nft_meta_get_eval+0x3fe/0x460 [nft_meta] nft_do_chain+0xff/0x5e0 [nf_tables] So we should deal with PACKET_LOOPBACK in netdev family too. For ipv4, convert it to PACKET_BROADCAST/MULTICAST according to the destination address's type; For ipv6, convert it to PACKET_MULTICAST directly. Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ebd89a2 ] ah4 input processing uses the asynchronous hash crypto API which supplies an error code as part of the operation completion but the error code was being ignored. Treat a crypto API error indication as a verification failure. While a crypto API reported error would almost certainly result in a memcpy of the digest failing anyway and thus the security risk seems minor, performing a memory compare on what might be uninitialized memory is wrong. Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 08fea55 ] This driver reports input events on their interrupts which are triggered by the sensor's status register changes. But only single bit change is reported in the interrupt handler. So if there are multiple bits are changed at almost the same time, other press or release events are ignored. This fixes it by detecting all changed bits in the status register. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9723ddc ] This driver reports misc scan input events on the sensor's status register changes. But the event capability for them was not set in the device initialization, so these events were ignored. This change adds the missing event capability. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 27d41d2 ] Since ipoib_cm_tx_start function and ipoib_cm_tx_reap function belong to different work queues, they can run in parallel. In this case if ipoib_cm_tx_reap calls list_del and release the lock, ipoib_cm_tx_start may acquire it and call list_del_init on the already deleted object. Changing list_del to list_del_init in ipoib_cm_tx_reap fixes the problem. Fixes: 839fcab ("IPoIB: Connected mode experimental support") Signed-off-by: Feras Daoud <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Erez Shitrit <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alex Vesker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Yuval Shaia <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1034051 ] STARTLAN needs to be the first IPA command after MPC initialization completes. So move the qeth_send_startlan() call from the layer disciplines into the core path, right after the MPC handshake. While at it, replace the magic LAN OFFLINE return code with the existing enum. Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Richter <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ursula Braun <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3a89eaa ] The support for DSA Ethernet switch chips depends on TCP/IP networking, thus explicit that HAVE_NET_DSA depends on INET. DSA uses SWITCHDEV, thus select it instead of depending on it. Signed-off-by: Vivien Didelot <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <[email protected]> Tested-by: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 298747b upstream. The current driver code is not checking for the error values returned by 'hp_wmi_dock_state()' and 'hp_wmi_tablet_state()' before passing the returned values down to 'input_report_switch()'. This error code is being translated to '1' in the input subsystem, reporting the wrong status. The biggest problem caused by this issue is that several laptops are wrongly reported by the driver as docked, preventing them to be put to sleep using the LID (and in most cases they are not even dockable). With this patch we create the report switches only if we are able to read the dock and tablet mode status correctly from ACPI. Signed-off-by: Carlo Caione <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Darren Hart (VMware) <[email protected]> Cc: Philip Müller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 2b02c20 upstream. Some firmwares in Huawei E3372H devices have been observed to switch back to NTB 32-bit format after altsetting switch. This patch implements a driver flag to check for the device settings and set NTB format to 16-bit again if needed. The flag has been activated for devices controlled by the huawei_cdc_ncm.c driver. V1->V2: - fixed broken error checks - some corrections to the commit message V2->V3: - variable name changes, to clarify what's happening - check (and possibly set) the NTB format later in the common bind code path Signed-off-by: Enrico Mioso <[email protected]> Reported-and-tested-by: Christian Panton <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Bjørn Mork <[email protected]> CC: Bjørn Mork <[email protected]> CC: Christian Panton <[email protected]> CC: [email protected] CC: [email protected] CC: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Cc: Porto Rio <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit ee618b4 upstream. As the previous patch did for encrypted-keys, zero sensitive any potentially sensitive data related to the "trusted" key type before it is freed. Notably, we were not zeroing the tpm_buf structures in which the actual key is stored for TPM seal and unseal, nor were we zeroing the trusted_key_payload in certain error paths. Cc: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> Cc: David Safford <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit a3c812f upstream. When calling keyctl_read() on a key of type "trusted", if the user-supplied buffer was too small, the kernel ignored the buffer length and just wrote past the end of the buffer, potentially corrupting userspace memory. Fix it by instead returning the size required, as per the documentation for keyctl_read(). We also don't even fill the buffer at all in this case, as this is slightly easier to implement than doing a short read, and either behavior appears to be permitted. It also makes it match the behavior of the "encrypted" key type. Fixes: d00a1c7 ("keys: add new trusted key-type") Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: James Morris <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit c7dfc2f upstream. hp_wmi_tablet_state() fails to return the correct error code when hp_wmi_perform_query() returns the HP WMI query specific error code that is a positive value. Signed-off-by: Carlo Caione <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Darren Hart (VMware) <[email protected]> Cc: Philip Müller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit d313876 upstream. All the helper functions (i.e. hp_wmi_dock_state, hp_wmi_tablet_state, ...) using hp_wmi_perform_query to perform an HP WMI query shadow the returned value in case of error. We return -EINVAL only when the HP WMI query returns a positive value (the specific error code) to not mix this up with the actual value returned by the helper function. Suggested-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Carlo Caione <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Darren Hart (VMware) <[email protected]> Cc: Philip Müller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 7c47889 upstream. I recently encountered wreckage because access_ok() was used where it should not be, add an explicit WARN when access_ok() is used wrongly. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> [add include/preempt.h to fix build error - gregkh] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit cef572a upstream. When queue_work() is used in irq (not in task context), there is a potential case that trigger NULL pointer dereference. ---------------------------------------------------------------- worker_thread() |-spin_lock_irq() |-process_one_work() |-worker->current_pwq = pwq |-spin_unlock_irq() |-worker->current_func(work) |-spin_lock_irq() |-worker->current_pwq = NULL |-spin_unlock_irq() //interrupt here |-irq_handler |-__queue_work() //assuming that the wq is draining |-is_chained_work(wq) |-current_wq_worker() //Here, 'current' is the interrupted worker! |-current->current_pwq is NULL here! |-schedule() ---------------------------------------------------------------- Avoid it by checking for task context in current_wq_worker(), and if not in task context, we shouldn't use the 'current' to check the condition. Reported-by: Xiaofei Tan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Li Bin <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Lai Jiangshan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Fixes: 8d03ecf ("workqueue: reimplement is_chained_work() using current_wq_worker()") Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit d041b55 upstream. struct sha1_ctx_mgr allocated in sha1_mb_mod_init() via kzalloc() and later passed in sha1_mb_flusher_mgr_flush_avx2() function where instructions vmovdqa used to access the struct. vmovdqa requires 16-bytes aligned argument, but nothing guarantees that struct sha1_ctx_mgr will have that alignment. Unaligned vmovdqa will generate GP fault. Fix this by replacing vmovdqa with vmovdqu which doesn't have alignment requirements. Fixes: 2249cbb ("crypto: sha-mb - SHA1 multibuffer submit and flush routines for AVX2") Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 2a4a62a upstream. syscall_stub_data() expects the data_count parameter to be the number of longs, not bytes. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in syscall_stub_data+0x70/0xe0 Read of size 128 at addr 000000006411f6f0 by task swapper/1 CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.18.0+ Freescale#18 Call Trace: show_stack.cold+0x166/0x2a7 __dump_stack+0x3a/0x43 dump_stack_lvl+0x1f/0x27 print_report.cold+0xdb/0xf81 kasan_report+0x119/0x1f0 kasan_check_range+0x3a3/0x440 memcpy+0x52/0x140 syscall_stub_data+0x70/0xe0 write_ldt_entry+0xac/0x190 init_new_ldt+0x515/0x960 init_new_context+0x2c4/0x4d0 mm_init.constprop.0+0x5ed/0x760 mm_alloc+0x118/0x170 0x60033f48 do_one_initcall+0x1d7/0x860 0x60003e7b kernel_init+0x6e/0x3d4 new_thread_handler+0x1e7/0x2c0 The buggy address belongs to stack of task swapper/1 and is located at offset 64 in frame: init_new_ldt+0x0/0x960 This frame has 2 objects: [32, 40) 'addr' [64, 80) 'desc' ================================================================== Fixes: 858259c ("uml: maintain own LDT entries") Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5dd7caf ] In __unregister_kprobe_top(), if the currently unregistered probe has post_handler but other child probes of the aggrprobe do not have post_handler, the post_handler of the aggrprobe is cleared. If this is a ftrace-based probe, there is a problem. In later calls to disarm_kprobe(), we will use kprobe_ftrace_ops because post_handler is NULL. But we're armed with kprobe_ipmodify_ops. This triggers a WARN in __disarm_kprobe_ftrace() and may even cause use-after-free: Failed to disarm kprobe-ftrace at kernel_clone+0x0/0x3c0 (error -2) WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 137 at kernel/kprobes.c:1135 __disarm_kprobe_ftrace.isra.21+0xcf/0xe0 Modules linked in: testKprobe_007(-) CPU: 5 PID: 137 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4-dirty Freescale#18 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> __disable_kprobe+0xcd/0xe0 __unregister_kprobe_top+0x12/0x150 ? mutex_lock+0xe/0x30 unregister_kprobes.part.23+0x31/0xa0 unregister_kprobe+0x32/0x40 __x64_sys_delete_module+0x15e/0x260 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x2cd/0x6b0 do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [...] For the kprobe-on-ftrace case, we keep the post_handler setting to identify this aggrprobe armed with kprobe_ipmodify_ops. This way we can disarm it correctly. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Fixes: 0bc11ed ("kprobes: Allow kprobes coexist with livepatch") Reported-by: Zhao Gongyi <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Li Huafei <[email protected]> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

…g the sock [ Upstream commit 3cf7203 ] There is a race condition in vxlan that when deleting a vxlan device during receiving packets, there is a possibility that the sock is released after getting vxlan_sock vs from sk_user_data. Then in later vxlan_ecn_decapsulate(), vxlan_get_sk_family() we will got NULL pointer dereference. e.g. #0 [ffffa25ec6978a38] machine_kexec at ffffffff8c669757 #1 [ffffa25ec6978a90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c0a4d #2 [ffffa25ec6978b58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c1c48 #3 [ffffa25ec6978b60] oops_end at ffffffff8c627f2b #4 [ffffa25ec6978b80] page_fault_oops at ffffffff8c678fcb #5 [ffffa25ec6978bd8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d109542 #6 [ffffa25ec6978c00] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d200b62 [exception RIP: vxlan_ecn_decapsulate+0x3b] RIP: ffffffffc1014e7b RSP: ffffa25ec6978cb0 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: ffff8aa000888000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffff8a9fc7ab803e RDI: ffff8a9fd1168700 RBP: ffff8a9fc7ab803e R8: 0000000000700000 R9: 00000000000010ae R10: ffff8a9fcb748980 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8a9fd1168700 R13: ffff8aa000888000 R14: 00000000002a0000 R15: 00000000000010ae ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffffa25ec6978ce8] vxlan_rcv at ffffffffc10189cd [vxlan] #8 [ffffa25ec6978d90] udp_queue_rcv_one_skb at ffffffff8cfb6507 #9 [ffffa25ec6978dc0] udp_unicast_rcv_skb at ffffffff8cfb6e45 #10 [ffffa25ec6978dc8] __udp4_lib_rcv at ffffffff8cfb8807 #11 [ffffa25ec6978e20] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu at ffffffff8cf76951 #12 [ffffa25ec6978e48] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff8cf76bde #13 [ffffa25ec6978ea0] __netif_receive_skb_one_core at ffffffff8cecde9b #14 [ffffa25ec6978ec8] process_backlog at ffffffff8cece139 #15 [ffffa25ec6978f00] __napi_poll at ffffffff8ceced1a #16 [ffffa25ec6978f28] net_rx_action at ffffffff8cecf1f3 #17 [ffffa25ec6978fa0] __softirqentry_text_start at ffffffff8d4000ca #18 [ffffa25ec6978ff0] do_softirq at ffffffff8c6fbdc3 Reproducer: https://github.com/Mellanox/ovs-tests/blob/master/test-ovs-vxlan-remove-tunnel-during-traffic.sh Fix this by waiting for all sk_user_data reader to finish before releasing the sock. Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki <[email protected]> Fixes: 6a93cc9 ("udp-tunnel: Add a few more UDP tunnel APIs") Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b6702a9 ] syzkaller reported use-after-free with the stack trace like below [1]: [ 38.960489][ C3] ================================================================== [ 38.963216][ C3] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240 [ 38.964950][ C3] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888048e03450 by task swapper/3/0 [ 38.966363][ C3] [ 38.967053][ C3] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 6.0.0-09039-ga6afa4199d3d-dirty #18 [ 38.968464][ C3] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-1.fc36 04/01/2014 [ 38.969959][ C3] Call Trace: [ 38.970841][ C3] <IRQ> [ 38.971663][ C3] dump_stack_lvl+0xfc/0x174 [ 38.972620][ C3] print_report.cold+0x2c3/0x752 [ 38.973626][ C3] ? ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240 [ 38.974644][ C3] kasan_report+0xb1/0x1d0 [ 38.975720][ C3] ? ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240 [ 38.976831][ C3] ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240 [ 38.978412][ C3] __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x353/0x5b0 [ 38.979755][ C3] usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x385/0x430 [ 38.981266][ C3] dummy_timer+0x140c/0x34e0 [ 38.982925][ C3] ? notifier_call_chain+0xb5/0x1e0 [ 38.984761][ C3] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xb/0x60 [ 38.986242][ C3] ? lock_release+0x51c/0x790 [ 38.987323][ C3] ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x37/0x70 [ 38.988483][ C3] ? __wake_up_common_lock+0xde/0x130 [ 38.989621][ C3] ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4a0/0x4a0 [ 38.990777][ C3] ? lock_acquire+0x472/0x550 [ 38.991919][ C3] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xb/0x60 [ 38.993138][ C3] ? lock_acquire+0x472/0x550 [ 38.994890][ C3] ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860 [ 38.996266][ C3] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x16f/0x230 [ 38.997670][ C3] ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860 [ 38.999116][ C3] call_timer_fn+0x1a0/0x6a0 [ 39.000668][ C3] ? add_timer_on+0x4a0/0x4a0 [ 39.002137][ C3] ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4a0/0x4a0 [ 39.003809][ C3] ? __next_timer_interrupt+0x226/0x2a0 [ 39.005509][ C3] __run_timers.part.0+0x69a/0xac0 [ 39.007025][ C3] ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860 [ 39.008716][ C3] ? call_timer_fn+0x6a0/0x6a0 [ 39.010254][ C3] ? cpuacct_percpu_seq_show+0x10/0x10 [ 39.011795][ C3] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x40 [ 39.013277][ C3] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x69/0x2b0 [ 39.014724][ C3] run_timer_softirq+0xb6/0x1d0 [ 39.016196][ C3] __do_softirq+0x1d2/0x9be [ 39.017616][ C3] __irq_exit_rcu+0xeb/0x190 [ 39.019004][ C3] irq_exit_rcu+0x5/0x20 [ 39.020361][ C3] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8f/0xb0 [ 39.021965][ C3] </IRQ> [ 39.023237][ C3] <TASK> In ar5523_probe(), ar5523_host_available() calls ar5523_cmd() as below (there are other functions which finally call ar5523_cmd()): ar5523_probe() -> ar5523_host_available() -> ar5523_cmd_read() -> ar5523_cmd() If ar5523_cmd() timed out, then ar5523_host_available() failed and ar5523_probe() freed the device structure. So, ar5523_cmd_tx_cb() might touch the freed structure. This patch fixes this issue by canceling in-flight tx cmd if submitted urb timed out. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=9e12b2d54300842b71bdd18b54971385ff0d0d3a [1] Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

…g the sock [ Upstream commit 3cf7203 ] There is a race condition in vxlan that when deleting a vxlan device during receiving packets, there is a possibility that the sock is released after getting vxlan_sock vs from sk_user_data. Then in later vxlan_ecn_decapsulate(), vxlan_get_sk_family() we will got NULL pointer dereference. e.g. #0 [ffffa25ec6978a38] machine_kexec at ffffffff8c669757 Freescale#1 [ffffa25ec6978a90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c0a4d Freescale#2 [ffffa25ec6978b58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c1c48 Freescale#3 [ffffa25ec6978b60] oops_end at ffffffff8c627f2b Freescale#4 [ffffa25ec6978b80] page_fault_oops at ffffffff8c678fcb Freescale#5 [ffffa25ec6978bd8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d109542 Freescale#6 [ffffa25ec6978c00] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d200b62 [exception RIP: vxlan_ecn_decapsulate+0x3b] RIP: ffffffffc1014e7b RSP: ffffa25ec6978cb0 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: ffff8aa000888000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffff8a9fc7ab803e RDI: ffff8a9fd1168700 RBP: ffff8a9fc7ab803e R8: 0000000000700000 R9: 00000000000010ae R10: ffff8a9fcb748980 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8a9fd1168700 R13: ffff8aa000888000 R14: 00000000002a0000 R15: 00000000000010ae ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 Freescale#7 [ffffa25ec6978ce8] vxlan_rcv at ffffffffc10189cd [vxlan] Freescale#8 [ffffa25ec6978d90] udp_queue_rcv_one_skb at ffffffff8cfb6507 Freescale#9 [ffffa25ec6978dc0] udp_unicast_rcv_skb at ffffffff8cfb6e45 Freescale#10 [ffffa25ec6978dc8] __udp4_lib_rcv at ffffffff8cfb8807 Freescale#11 [ffffa25ec6978e20] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu at ffffffff8cf76951 Freescale#12 [ffffa25ec6978e48] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff8cf76bde Freescale#13 [ffffa25ec6978ea0] __netif_receive_skb_one_core at ffffffff8cecde9b Freescale#14 [ffffa25ec6978ec8] process_backlog at ffffffff8cece139 Freescale#15 [ffffa25ec6978f00] __napi_poll at ffffffff8ceced1a Freescale#16 [ffffa25ec6978f28] net_rx_action at ffffffff8cecf1f3 Freescale#17 [ffffa25ec6978fa0] __softirqentry_text_start at ffffffff8d4000ca Freescale#18 [ffffa25ec6978ff0] do_softirq at ffffffff8c6fbdc3 Reproducer: https://github.com/Mellanox/ovs-tests/blob/master/test-ovs-vxlan-remove-tunnel-during-traffic.sh Fix this by waiting for all sk_user_data reader to finish before releasing the sock. Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki <[email protected]> Fixes: 6a93cc9 ("udp-tunnel: Add a few more UDP tunnel APIs") Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b6702a9 ] syzkaller reported use-after-free with the stack trace like below [1]: [ 38.960489][ C3] ================================================================== [ 38.963216][ C3] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240 [ 38.964950][ C3] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888048e03450 by task swapper/3/0 [ 38.966363][ C3] [ 38.967053][ C3] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 6.0.0-09039-ga6afa4199d3d-dirty Freescale#18 [ 38.968464][ C3] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-1.fc36 04/01/2014 [ 38.969959][ C3] Call Trace: [ 38.970841][ C3] <IRQ> [ 38.971663][ C3] dump_stack_lvl+0xfc/0x174 [ 38.972620][ C3] print_report.cold+0x2c3/0x752 [ 38.973626][ C3] ? ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240 [ 38.974644][ C3] kasan_report+0xb1/0x1d0 [ 38.975720][ C3] ? ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240 [ 38.976831][ C3] ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240 [ 38.978412][ C3] __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x353/0x5b0 [ 38.979755][ C3] usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x385/0x430 [ 38.981266][ C3] dummy_timer+0x140c/0x34e0 [ 38.982925][ C3] ? notifier_call_chain+0xb5/0x1e0 [ 38.984761][ C3] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xb/0x60 [ 38.986242][ C3] ? lock_release+0x51c/0x790 [ 38.987323][ C3] ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x37/0x70 [ 38.988483][ C3] ? __wake_up_common_lock+0xde/0x130 [ 38.989621][ C3] ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4a0/0x4a0 [ 38.990777][ C3] ? lock_acquire+0x472/0x550 [ 38.991919][ C3] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xb/0x60 [ 38.993138][ C3] ? lock_acquire+0x472/0x550 [ 38.994890][ C3] ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860 [ 38.996266][ C3] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x16f/0x230 [ 38.997670][ C3] ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860 [ 38.999116][ C3] call_timer_fn+0x1a0/0x6a0 [ 39.000668][ C3] ? add_timer_on+0x4a0/0x4a0 [ 39.002137][ C3] ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4a0/0x4a0 [ 39.003809][ C3] ? __next_timer_interrupt+0x226/0x2a0 [ 39.005509][ C3] __run_timers.part.0+0x69a/0xac0 [ 39.007025][ C3] ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860 [ 39.008716][ C3] ? call_timer_fn+0x6a0/0x6a0 [ 39.010254][ C3] ? cpuacct_percpu_seq_show+0x10/0x10 [ 39.011795][ C3] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x40 [ 39.013277][ C3] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x69/0x2b0 [ 39.014724][ C3] run_timer_softirq+0xb6/0x1d0 [ 39.016196][ C3] __do_softirq+0x1d2/0x9be [ 39.017616][ C3] __irq_exit_rcu+0xeb/0x190 [ 39.019004][ C3] irq_exit_rcu+0x5/0x20 [ 39.020361][ C3] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8f/0xb0 [ 39.021965][ C3] </IRQ> [ 39.023237][ C3] <TASK> In ar5523_probe(), ar5523_host_available() calls ar5523_cmd() as below (there are other functions which finally call ar5523_cmd()): ar5523_probe() -> ar5523_host_available() -> ar5523_cmd_read() -> ar5523_cmd() If ar5523_cmd() timed out, then ar5523_host_available() failed and ar5523_probe() freed the device structure. So, ar5523_cmd_tx_cb() might touch the freed structure. This patch fixes this issue by canceling in-flight tx cmd if submitted urb timed out. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=9e12b2d54300842b71bdd18b54971385ff0d0d3a [1] Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 031af50 upstream. The inline assembly for arm64's cmpxchg_double*() implementations use a +Q constraint to hazard against other accesses to the memory location being exchanged. However, the pointer passed to the constraint is a pointer to unsigned long, and thus the hazard only applies to the first 8 bytes of the location. GCC can take advantage of this, assuming that other portions of the location are unchanged, leading to a number of potential problems. This is similar to what we fixed back in commit: fee960b ("arm64: xchg: hazard against entire exchange variable") ... but we forgot to adjust cmpxchg_double*() similarly at the same time. The same problem applies, as demonstrated with the following test: | struct big { | u64 lo, hi; | } __aligned(128); | | unsigned long foo(struct big *b) | { | u64 hi_old, hi_new; | | hi_old = b->hi; | cmpxchg_double_local(&b->lo, &b->hi, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78); | hi_new = b->hi; | | return hi_old ^ hi_new; | } ... which GCC 12.1.0 compiles as: | 0000000000000000 <foo>: | 0: d503233f paciasp | 4: aa0003e4 mov x4, x0 | 8: 1400000e b 40 <foo+0x40> | c: d2800240 mov x0, #0x12 // Freescale#18 | 10: d2800681 mov x1, #0x34 // Freescale#52 | 14: aa0003e5 mov x5, x0 | 18: aa0103e6 mov x6, x1 | 1c: d2800ac2 mov x2, #0x56 // Freescale#86 | 20: d2800f03 mov x3, #0x78 // Freescale#120 | 24: 48207c82 casp x0, x1, x2, x3, [x4] | 28: ca050000 eor x0, x0, x5 | 2c: ca060021 eor x1, x1, x6 | 30: aa010000 orr x0, x0, x1 | 34: d2800000 mov x0, #0x0 // #0 <--- BANG | 38: d50323bf autiasp | 3c: d65f03c0 ret | 40: d2800240 mov x0, #0x12 // Freescale#18 | 44: d2800681 mov x1, #0x34 // Freescale#52 | 48: d2800ac2 mov x2, #0x56 // Freescale#86 | 4c: d2800f03 mov x3, #0x78 // Freescale#120 | 50: f9800091 prfm pstl1strm, [x4] | 54: c87f1885 ldxp x5, x6, [x4] | 58: ca0000a5 eor x5, x5, x0 | 5c: ca0100c6 eor x6, x6, x1 | 60: aa0600a6 orr x6, x5, x6 | 64: b5000066 cbnz x6, 70 <foo+0x70> | 68: c8250c82 stxp w5, x2, x3, [x4] | 6c: 35ffff45 cbnz w5, 54 <foo+0x54> | 70: d2800000 mov x0, #0x0 // #0 <--- BANG | 74: d50323bf autiasp | 78: d65f03c0 ret Notice that at the lines with "BANG" comments, GCC has assumed that the higher 8 bytes are unchanged by the cmpxchg_double() call, and that `hi_old ^ hi_new` can be reduced to a constant zero, for both LSE and LL/SC versions of cmpxchg_double(). This patch fixes the issue by passing a pointer to __uint128_t into the +Q constraint, ensuring that the compiler hazards against the entire 16 bytes being modified. With this change, GCC 12.1.0 compiles the above test as: | 0000000000000000 <foo>: | 0: f9400407 ldr x7, [x0, Freescale#8] | 4: d503233f paciasp | 8: aa0003e4 mov x4, x0 | c: 1400000f b 48 <foo+0x48> | 10: d2800240 mov x0, #0x12 // Freescale#18 | 14: d2800681 mov x1, #0x34 // Freescale#52 | 18: aa0003e5 mov x5, x0 | 1c: aa0103e6 mov x6, x1 | 20: d2800ac2 mov x2, #0x56 // Freescale#86 | 24: d2800f03 mov x3, #0x78 // Freescale#120 | 28: 48207c82 casp x0, x1, x2, x3, [x4] | 2c: ca050000 eor x0, x0, x5 | 30: ca060021 eor x1, x1, x6 | 34: aa010000 orr x0, x0, x1 | 38: f9400480 ldr x0, [x4, Freescale#8] | 3c: d50323bf autiasp | 40: ca0000e0 eor x0, x7, x0 | 44: d65f03c0 ret | 48: d2800240 mov x0, #0x12 // Freescale#18 | 4c: d2800681 mov x1, #0x34 // Freescale#52 | 50: d2800ac2 mov x2, #0x56 // Freescale#86 | 54: d2800f03 mov x3, #0x78 // Freescale#120 | 58: f9800091 prfm pstl1strm, [x4] | 5c: c87f1885 ldxp x5, x6, [x4] | 60: ca0000a5 eor x5, x5, x0 | 64: ca0100c6 eor x6, x6, x1 | 68: aa0600a6 orr x6, x5, x6 | 6c: b5000066 cbnz x6, 78 <foo+0x78> | 70: c8250c82 stxp w5, x2, x3, [x4] | 74: 35ffff45 cbnz w5, 5c <foo+0x5c> | 78: f9400480 ldr x0, [x4, Freescale#8] | 7c: d50323bf autiasp | 80: ca0000e0 eor x0, x7, x0 | 84: d65f03c0 ret ... sampling the high 8 bytes before and after the cmpxchg, and performing an EOR, as we'd expect. For backporting, I've tested this atop linux-4.9.y with GCC 5.5.0. Note that linux-4.9.y is oldest currently supported stable release, and mandates GCC 5.1+. Unfortunately I couldn't get a GCC 5.1 binary to run on my machines due to library incompatibilities. I've also used a standalone test to check that we can use a __uint128_t pointer in a +Q constraint at least as far back as GCC 4.8.5 and LLVM 3.9.1. Fixes: 5284e1b ("arm64: xchg: Implement cmpxchg_double") Fixes: e9a4b79 ("arm64: cmpxchg_dbl: patch in lse instructions when supported by the CPU") Reported-by: Boqun Feng <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Y6DEfQXymYVgL3oJ@boqun-archlinux/ Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]> Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Cc: Steve Capper <[email protected]> Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 031af50 ] The inline assembly for arm64's cmpxchg_double*() implementations use a +Q constraint to hazard against other accesses to the memory location being exchanged. However, the pointer passed to the constraint is a pointer to unsigned long, and thus the hazard only applies to the first 8 bytes of the location. GCC can take advantage of this, assuming that other portions of the location are unchanged, leading to a number of potential problems. This is similar to what we fixed back in commit: fee960b ("arm64: xchg: hazard against entire exchange variable") ... but we forgot to adjust cmpxchg_double*() similarly at the same time. The same problem applies, as demonstrated with the following test: | struct big { | u64 lo, hi; | } __aligned(128); | | unsigned long foo(struct big *b) | { | u64 hi_old, hi_new; | | hi_old = b->hi; | cmpxchg_double_local(&b->lo, &b->hi, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78); | hi_new = b->hi; | | return hi_old ^ hi_new; | } ... which GCC 12.1.0 compiles as: | 0000000000000000 <foo>: | 0: d503233f paciasp | 4: aa0003e4 mov x4, x0 | 8: 1400000e b 40 <foo+0x40> | c: d2800240 mov x0, #0x12 // Freescale#18 | 10: d2800681 mov x1, #0x34 // Freescale#52 | 14: aa0003e5 mov x5, x0 | 18: aa0103e6 mov x6, x1 | 1c: d2800ac2 mov x2, #0x56 // Freescale#86 | 20: d2800f03 mov x3, #0x78 // Freescale#120 | 24: 48207c82 casp x0, x1, x2, x3, [x4] | 28: ca050000 eor x0, x0, x5 | 2c: ca060021 eor x1, x1, x6 | 30: aa010000 orr x0, x0, x1 | 34: d2800000 mov x0, #0x0 // #0 <--- BANG | 38: d50323bf autiasp | 3c: d65f03c0 ret | 40: d2800240 mov x0, #0x12 // Freescale#18 | 44: d2800681 mov x1, #0x34 // Freescale#52 | 48: d2800ac2 mov x2, #0x56 // Freescale#86 | 4c: d2800f03 mov x3, #0x78 // Freescale#120 | 50: f9800091 prfm pstl1strm, [x4] | 54: c87f1885 ldxp x5, x6, [x4] | 58: ca0000a5 eor x5, x5, x0 | 5c: ca0100c6 eor x6, x6, x1 | 60: aa0600a6 orr x6, x5, x6 | 64: b5000066 cbnz x6, 70 <foo+0x70> | 68: c8250c82 stxp w5, x2, x3, [x4] | 6c: 35ffff45 cbnz w5, 54 <foo+0x54> | 70: d2800000 mov x0, #0x0 // #0 <--- BANG | 74: d50323bf autiasp | 78: d65f03c0 ret Notice that at the lines with "BANG" comments, GCC has assumed that the higher 8 bytes are unchanged by the cmpxchg_double() call, and that `hi_old ^ hi_new` can be reduced to a constant zero, for both LSE and LL/SC versions of cmpxchg_double(). This patch fixes the issue by passing a pointer to __uint128_t into the +Q constraint, ensuring that the compiler hazards against the entire 16 bytes being modified. With this change, GCC 12.1.0 compiles the above test as: | 0000000000000000 <foo>: | 0: f9400407 ldr x7, [x0, Freescale#8] | 4: d503233f paciasp | 8: aa0003e4 mov x4, x0 | c: 1400000f b 48 <foo+0x48> | 10: d2800240 mov x0, #0x12 // Freescale#18 | 14: d2800681 mov x1, #0x34 // Freescale#52 | 18: aa0003e5 mov x5, x0 | 1c: aa0103e6 mov x6, x1 | 20: d2800ac2 mov x2, #0x56 // Freescale#86 | 24: d2800f03 mov x3, #0x78 // Freescale#120 | 28: 48207c82 casp x0, x1, x2, x3, [x4] | 2c: ca050000 eor x0, x0, x5 | 30: ca060021 eor x1, x1, x6 | 34: aa010000 orr x0, x0, x1 | 38: f9400480 ldr x0, [x4, Freescale#8] | 3c: d50323bf autiasp | 40: ca0000e0 eor x0, x7, x0 | 44: d65f03c0 ret | 48: d2800240 mov x0, #0x12 // Freescale#18 | 4c: d2800681 mov x1, #0x34 // Freescale#52 | 50: d2800ac2 mov x2, #0x56 // Freescale#86 | 54: d2800f03 mov x3, #0x78 // Freescale#120 | 58: f9800091 prfm pstl1strm, [x4] | 5c: c87f1885 ldxp x5, x6, [x4] | 60: ca0000a5 eor x5, x5, x0 | 64: ca0100c6 eor x6, x6, x1 | 68: aa0600a6 orr x6, x5, x6 | 6c: b5000066 cbnz x6, 78 <foo+0x78> | 70: c8250c82 stxp w5, x2, x3, [x4] | 74: 35ffff45 cbnz w5, 5c <foo+0x5c> | 78: f9400480 ldr x0, [x4, Freescale#8] | 7c: d50323bf autiasp | 80: ca0000e0 eor x0, x7, x0 | 84: d65f03c0 ret ... sampling the high 8 bytes before and after the cmpxchg, and performing an EOR, as we'd expect. For backporting, I've tested this atop linux-4.9.y with GCC 5.5.0. Note that linux-4.9.y is oldest currently supported stable release, and mandates GCC 5.1+. Unfortunately I couldn't get a GCC 5.1 binary to run on my machines due to library incompatibilities. I've also used a standalone test to check that we can use a __uint128_t pointer in a +Q constraint at least as far back as GCC 4.8.5 and LLVM 3.9.1. Fixes: 5284e1b ("arm64: xchg: Implement cmpxchg_double") Fixes: e9a4b79 ("arm64: cmpxchg_dbl: patch in lse instructions when supported by the CPU") Reported-by: Boqun Feng <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Y6DEfQXymYVgL3oJ@boqun-archlinux/ Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]> Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Cc: Steve Capper <[email protected]> Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

…g the sock [ Upstream commit 3cf7203 ] There is a race condition in vxlan that when deleting a vxlan device during receiving packets, there is a possibility that the sock is released after getting vxlan_sock vs from sk_user_data. Then in later vxlan_ecn_decapsulate(), vxlan_get_sk_family() we will got NULL pointer dereference. e.g. #0 [ffffa25ec6978a38] machine_kexec at ffffffff8c669757 Freescale#1 [ffffa25ec6978a90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c0a4d Freescale#2 [ffffa25ec6978b58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c1c48 Freescale#3 [ffffa25ec6978b60] oops_end at ffffffff8c627f2b Freescale#4 [ffffa25ec6978b80] page_fault_oops at ffffffff8c678fcb Freescale#5 [ffffa25ec6978bd8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d109542 Freescale#6 [ffffa25ec6978c00] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d200b62 [exception RIP: vxlan_ecn_decapsulate+0x3b] RIP: ffffffffc1014e7b RSP: ffffa25ec6978cb0 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: ffff8aa000888000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffff8a9fc7ab803e RDI: ffff8a9fd1168700 RBP: ffff8a9fc7ab803e R8: 0000000000700000 R9: 00000000000010ae R10: ffff8a9fcb748980 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8a9fd1168700 R13: ffff8aa000888000 R14: 00000000002a0000 R15: 00000000000010ae ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 Freescale#7 [ffffa25ec6978ce8] vxlan_rcv at ffffffffc10189cd [vxlan] Freescale#8 [ffffa25ec6978d90] udp_queue_rcv_one_skb at ffffffff8cfb6507 Freescale#9 [ffffa25ec6978dc0] udp_unicast_rcv_skb at ffffffff8cfb6e45 Freescale#10 [ffffa25ec6978dc8] __udp4_lib_rcv at ffffffff8cfb8807 Freescale#11 [ffffa25ec6978e20] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu at ffffffff8cf76951 Freescale#12 [ffffa25ec6978e48] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff8cf76bde Freescale#13 [ffffa25ec6978ea0] __netif_receive_skb_one_core at ffffffff8cecde9b Freescale#14 [ffffa25ec6978ec8] process_backlog at ffffffff8cece139 Freescale#15 [ffffa25ec6978f00] __napi_poll at ffffffff8ceced1a Freescale#16 [ffffa25ec6978f28] net_rx_action at ffffffff8cecf1f3 Freescale#17 [ffffa25ec6978fa0] __softirqentry_text_start at ffffffff8d4000ca Freescale#18 [ffffa25ec6978ff0] do_softirq at ffffffff8c6fbdc3 Reproducer: https://github.com/Mellanox/ovs-tests/blob/master/test-ovs-vxlan-remove-tunnel-during-traffic.sh Fix this by waiting for all sk_user_data reader to finish before releasing the sock. Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki <[email protected]> Fixes: 6a93cc9 ("udp-tunnel: Add a few more UDP tunnel APIs") Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b6702a9 ] syzkaller reported use-after-free with the stack trace like below [1]: [ 38.960489][ C3] ================================================================== [ 38.963216][ C3] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240 [ 38.964950][ C3] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888048e03450 by task swapper/3/0 [ 38.966363][ C3] [ 38.967053][ C3] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 6.0.0-09039-ga6afa4199d3d-dirty Freescale#18 [ 38.968464][ C3] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-1.fc36 04/01/2014 [ 38.969959][ C3] Call Trace: [ 38.970841][ C3] <IRQ> [ 38.971663][ C3] dump_stack_lvl+0xfc/0x174 [ 38.972620][ C3] print_report.cold+0x2c3/0x752 [ 38.973626][ C3] ? ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240 [ 38.974644][ C3] kasan_report+0xb1/0x1d0 [ 38.975720][ C3] ? ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240 [ 38.976831][ C3] ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240 [ 38.978412][ C3] __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x353/0x5b0 [ 38.979755][ C3] usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x385/0x430 [ 38.981266][ C3] dummy_timer+0x140c/0x34e0 [ 38.982925][ C3] ? notifier_call_chain+0xb5/0x1e0 [ 38.984761][ C3] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xb/0x60 [ 38.986242][ C3] ? lock_release+0x51c/0x790 [ 38.987323][ C3] ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x37/0x70 [ 38.988483][ C3] ? __wake_up_common_lock+0xde/0x130 [ 38.989621][ C3] ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4a0/0x4a0 [ 38.990777][ C3] ? lock_acquire+0x472/0x550 [ 38.991919][ C3] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xb/0x60 [ 38.993138][ C3] ? lock_acquire+0x472/0x550 [ 38.994890][ C3] ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860 [ 38.996266][ C3] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x16f/0x230 [ 38.997670][ C3] ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860 [ 38.999116][ C3] call_timer_fn+0x1a0/0x6a0 [ 39.000668][ C3] ? add_timer_on+0x4a0/0x4a0 [ 39.002137][ C3] ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4a0/0x4a0 [ 39.003809][ C3] ? __next_timer_interrupt+0x226/0x2a0 [ 39.005509][ C3] __run_timers.part.0+0x69a/0xac0 [ 39.007025][ C3] ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860 [ 39.008716][ C3] ? call_timer_fn+0x6a0/0x6a0 [ 39.010254][ C3] ? cpuacct_percpu_seq_show+0x10/0x10 [ 39.011795][ C3] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x40 [ 39.013277][ C3] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x69/0x2b0 [ 39.014724][ C3] run_timer_softirq+0xb6/0x1d0 [ 39.016196][ C3] __do_softirq+0x1d2/0x9be [ 39.017616][ C3] __irq_exit_rcu+0xeb/0x190 [ 39.019004][ C3] irq_exit_rcu+0x5/0x20 [ 39.020361][ C3] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8f/0xb0 [ 39.021965][ C3] </IRQ> [ 39.023237][ C3] <TASK> In ar5523_probe(), ar5523_host_available() calls ar5523_cmd() as below (there are other functions which finally call ar5523_cmd()): ar5523_probe() -> ar5523_host_available() -> ar5523_cmd_read() -> ar5523_cmd() If ar5523_cmd() timed out, then ar5523_host_available() failed and ar5523_probe() freed the device structure. So, ar5523_cmd_tx_cb() might touch the freed structure. This patch fixes this issue by canceling in-flight tx cmd if submitted urb timed out. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=9e12b2d54300842b71bdd18b54971385ff0d0d3a [1] Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 031af50 ] The inline assembly for arm64's cmpxchg_double*() implementations use a +Q constraint to hazard against other accesses to the memory location being exchanged. However, the pointer passed to the constraint is a pointer to unsigned long, and thus the hazard only applies to the first 8 bytes of the location. GCC can take advantage of this, assuming that other portions of the location are unchanged, leading to a number of potential problems. This is similar to what we fixed back in commit: fee960b ("arm64: xchg: hazard against entire exchange variable") ... but we forgot to adjust cmpxchg_double*() similarly at the same time. The same problem applies, as demonstrated with the following test: | struct big { | u64 lo, hi; | } __aligned(128); | | unsigned long foo(struct big *b) | { | u64 hi_old, hi_new; | | hi_old = b->hi; | cmpxchg_double_local(&b->lo, &b->hi, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78); | hi_new = b->hi; | | return hi_old ^ hi_new; | } ... which GCC 12.1.0 compiles as: | 0000000000000000 <foo>: | 0: d503233f paciasp | 4: aa0003e4 mov x4, x0 | 8: 1400000e b 40 <foo+0x40> | c: d2800240 mov x0, #0x12 // Freescale#18 | 10: d2800681 mov x1, #0x34 // Freescale#52 | 14: aa0003e5 mov x5, x0 | 18: aa0103e6 mov x6, x1 | 1c: d2800ac2 mov x2, #0x56 // Freescale#86 | 20: d2800f03 mov x3, #0x78 // Freescale#120 | 24: 48207c82 casp x0, x1, x2, x3, [x4] | 28: ca050000 eor x0, x0, x5 | 2c: ca060021 eor x1, x1, x6 | 30: aa010000 orr x0, x0, x1 | 34: d2800000 mov x0, #0x0 // #0 <--- BANG | 38: d50323bf autiasp | 3c: d65f03c0 ret | 40: d2800240 mov x0, #0x12 // Freescale#18 | 44: d2800681 mov x1, #0x34 // Freescale#52 | 48: d2800ac2 mov x2, #0x56 // Freescale#86 | 4c: d2800f03 mov x3, #0x78 // Freescale#120 | 50: f9800091 prfm pstl1strm, [x4] | 54: c87f1885 ldxp x5, x6, [x4] | 58: ca0000a5 eor x5, x5, x0 | 5c: ca0100c6 eor x6, x6, x1 | 60: aa0600a6 orr x6, x5, x6 | 64: b5000066 cbnz x6, 70 <foo+0x70> | 68: c8250c82 stxp w5, x2, x3, [x4] | 6c: 35ffff45 cbnz w5, 54 <foo+0x54> | 70: d2800000 mov x0, #0x0 // #0 <--- BANG | 74: d50323bf autiasp | 78: d65f03c0 ret Notice that at the lines with "BANG" comments, GCC has assumed that the higher 8 bytes are unchanged by the cmpxchg_double() call, and that `hi_old ^ hi_new` can be reduced to a constant zero, for both LSE and LL/SC versions of cmpxchg_double(). This patch fixes the issue by passing a pointer to __uint128_t into the +Q constraint, ensuring that the compiler hazards against the entire 16 bytes being modified. With this change, GCC 12.1.0 compiles the above test as: | 0000000000000000 <foo>: | 0: f9400407 ldr x7, [x0, Freescale#8] | 4: d503233f paciasp | 8: aa0003e4 mov x4, x0 | c: 1400000f b 48 <foo+0x48> | 10: d2800240 mov x0, #0x12 // Freescale#18 | 14: d2800681 mov x1, #0x34 // Freescale#52 | 18: aa0003e5 mov x5, x0 | 1c: aa0103e6 mov x6, x1 | 20: d2800ac2 mov x2, #0x56 // Freescale#86 | 24: d2800f03 mov x3, #0x78 // Freescale#120 | 28: 48207c82 casp x0, x1, x2, x3, [x4] | 2c: ca050000 eor x0, x0, x5 | 30: ca060021 eor x1, x1, x6 | 34: aa010000 orr x0, x0, x1 | 38: f9400480 ldr x0, [x4, Freescale#8] | 3c: d50323bf autiasp | 40: ca0000e0 eor x0, x7, x0 | 44: d65f03c0 ret | 48: d2800240 mov x0, #0x12 // Freescale#18 | 4c: d2800681 mov x1, #0x34 // Freescale#52 | 50: d2800ac2 mov x2, #0x56 // Freescale#86 | 54: d2800f03 mov x3, #0x78 // Freescale#120 | 58: f9800091 prfm pstl1strm, [x4] | 5c: c87f1885 ldxp x5, x6, [x4] | 60: ca0000a5 eor x5, x5, x0 | 64: ca0100c6 eor x6, x6, x1 | 68: aa0600a6 orr x6, x5, x6 | 6c: b5000066 cbnz x6, 78 <foo+0x78> | 70: c8250c82 stxp w5, x2, x3, [x4] | 74: 35ffff45 cbnz w5, 5c <foo+0x5c> | 78: f9400480 ldr x0, [x4, Freescale#8] | 7c: d50323bf autiasp | 80: ca0000e0 eor x0, x7, x0 | 84: d65f03c0 ret ... sampling the high 8 bytes before and after the cmpxchg, and performing an EOR, as we'd expect. For backporting, I've tested this atop linux-4.9.y with GCC 5.5.0. Note that linux-4.9.y is oldest currently supported stable release, and mandates GCC 5.1+. Unfortunately I couldn't get a GCC 5.1 binary to run on my machines due to library incompatibilities. I've also used a standalone test to check that we can use a __uint128_t pointer in a +Q constraint at least as far back as GCC 4.8.5 and LLVM 3.9.1. Fixes: 5284e1b ("arm64: xchg: Implement cmpxchg_double") Fixes: e9a4b79 ("arm64: cmpxchg_dbl: patch in lse instructions when supported by the CPU") Reported-by: Boqun Feng <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Y6DEfQXymYVgL3oJ@boqun-archlinux/ Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]> Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Cc: Steve Capper <[email protected]> Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4e264be ] When a system with E810 with existing VFs gets rebooted the following hang may be observed. Pid 1 is hung in iavf_remove(), part of a network driver: PID: 1 TASK: ffff965400e5a340 CPU: 24 COMMAND: "systemd-shutdow" #0 [ffffaad04005fa50] __schedule at ffffffff8b3239cb #1 [ffffaad04005fae8] schedule at ffffffff8b323e2d #2 [ffffaad04005fb00] schedule_hrtimeout_range_clock at ffffffff8b32cebc #3 [ffffaad04005fb80] usleep_range_state at ffffffff8b32c930 #4 [ffffaad04005fbb0] iavf_remove at ffffffffc12b9b4c [iavf] #5 [ffffaad04005fbf0] pci_device_remove at ffffffff8add7513 #6 [ffffaad04005fc10] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff8af08baa #7 [ffffaad04005fc40] pci_stop_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc5fc #8 [ffffaad04005fc60] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc81e #9 [ffffaad04005fc70] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at ffffffff8adf9429 #10 [ffffaad04005fca8] sriov_disable at ffffffff8adf98e4 #11 [ffffaad04005fcc8] ice_free_vfs at ffffffffc04bb2c8 [ice] #12 [ffffaad04005fd10] ice_remove at ffffffffc04778fe [ice] #13 [ffffaad04005fd38] ice_shutdown at ffffffffc0477946 [ice] #14 [ffffaad04005fd50] pci_device_shutdown at ffffffff8add58f1 #15 [ffffaad04005fd70] device_shutdown at ffffffff8af05386 #16 [ffffaad04005fd98] kernel_restart at ffffffff8a92a870 #17 [ffffaad04005fda8] __do_sys_reboot at ffffffff8a92abd6 #18 [ffffaad04005fee0] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317159 #19 [ffffaad04005ff08] __context_tracking_enter at ffffffff8b31b6fc #20 [ffffaad04005ff18] syscall_exit_to_user_mode at ffffffff8b31b50d #21 [ffffaad04005ff28] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317169 #22 [ffffaad04005ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8b40009b RIP: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RSP: 00007fffbcc55a98 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RDX: 0000000001234567 RSI: 0000000028121969 RDI: 00000000fee1dead RBP: 00007fffbcc55ca0 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 00007fffbcc54e90 R10: 00007fffbcc55050 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fffbcc55af0 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a9 CS: 0033 SS: 002b During reboot all drivers PM shutdown callbacks are invoked. In iavf_shutdown() the adapter state is changed to __IAVF_REMOVE. In ice_shutdown() the call chain above is executed, which at some point calls iavf_remove(). However iavf_remove() expects the VF to be in one of the states __IAVF_RUNNING, __IAVF_DOWN or __IAVF_INIT_FAILED. If that's not the case it sleeps forever. So if iavf_shutdown() gets invoked before iavf_remove() the system will hang indefinitely because the adapter is already in state __IAVF_REMOVE. Fix this by returning from iavf_remove() if the state is __IAVF_REMOVE, as we already went through iavf_shutdown(). Fixes: 9745780 ("iavf: Add waiting so the port is initialized in remove") Fixes: a841733 ("iavf: Fix race condition between iavf_shutdown and iavf_remove") Reported-by: Marius Cornea <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Assmann <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4e264be ] When a system with E810 with existing VFs gets rebooted the following hang may be observed. Pid 1 is hung in iavf_remove(), part of a network driver: PID: 1 TASK: ffff965400e5a340 CPU: 24 COMMAND: "systemd-shutdow" #0 [ffffaad04005fa50] __schedule at ffffffff8b3239cb Freescale#1 [ffffaad04005fae8] schedule at ffffffff8b323e2d Freescale#2 [ffffaad04005fb00] schedule_hrtimeout_range_clock at ffffffff8b32cebc Freescale#3 [ffffaad04005fb80] usleep_range_state at ffffffff8b32c930 Freescale#4 [ffffaad04005fbb0] iavf_remove at ffffffffc12b9b4c [iavf] Freescale#5 [ffffaad04005fbf0] pci_device_remove at ffffffff8add7513 Freescale#6 [ffffaad04005fc10] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff8af08baa Freescale#7 [ffffaad04005fc40] pci_stop_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc5fc Freescale#8 [ffffaad04005fc60] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc81e Freescale#9 [ffffaad04005fc70] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at ffffffff8adf9429 Freescale#10 [ffffaad04005fca8] sriov_disable at ffffffff8adf98e4 Freescale#11 [ffffaad04005fcc8] ice_free_vfs at ffffffffc04bb2c8 [ice] Freescale#12 [ffffaad04005fd10] ice_remove at ffffffffc04778fe [ice] Freescale#13 [ffffaad04005fd38] ice_shutdown at ffffffffc0477946 [ice] Freescale#14 [ffffaad04005fd50] pci_device_shutdown at ffffffff8add58f1 Freescale#15 [ffffaad04005fd70] device_shutdown at ffffffff8af05386 Freescale#16 [ffffaad04005fd98] kernel_restart at ffffffff8a92a870 Freescale#17 [ffffaad04005fda8] __do_sys_reboot at ffffffff8a92abd6 Freescale#18 [ffffaad04005fee0] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317159 Freescale#19 [ffffaad04005ff08] __context_tracking_enter at ffffffff8b31b6fc Freescale#20 [ffffaad04005ff18] syscall_exit_to_user_mode at ffffffff8b31b50d Freescale#21 [ffffaad04005ff28] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317169 Freescale#22 [ffffaad04005ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8b40009b RIP: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RSP: 00007fffbcc55a98 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RDX: 0000000001234567 RSI: 0000000028121969 RDI: 00000000fee1dead RBP: 00007fffbcc55ca0 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 00007fffbcc54e90 R10: 00007fffbcc55050 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fffbcc55af0 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a9 CS: 0033 SS: 002b During reboot all drivers PM shutdown callbacks are invoked. In iavf_shutdown() the adapter state is changed to __IAVF_REMOVE. In ice_shutdown() the call chain above is executed, which at some point calls iavf_remove(). However iavf_remove() expects the VF to be in one of the states __IAVF_RUNNING, __IAVF_DOWN or __IAVF_INIT_FAILED. If that's not the case it sleeps forever. So if iavf_shutdown() gets invoked before iavf_remove() the system will hang indefinitely because the adapter is already in state __IAVF_REMOVE. Fix this by returning from iavf_remove() if the state is __IAVF_REMOVE, as we already went through iavf_shutdown(). Fixes: 9745780 ("iavf: Add waiting so the port is initialized in remove") Fixes: a841733 ("iavf: Fix race condition between iavf_shutdown and iavf_remove") Reported-by: Marius Cornea <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Assmann <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 0b0747d upstream. The following processes run into a deadlock. CPU 41 was waiting for CPU 29 to handle a CSD request while holding spinlock "crashdump_lock", but CPU 29 was hung by that spinlock with IRQs disabled. PID: 17360 TASK: ffff95c1090c5c40 CPU: 41 COMMAND: "mrdiagd" !# 0 [ffffb80edbf37b58] __read_once_size at ffffffff9b871a40 include/linux/compiler.h:185:0 !# 1 [ffffb80edbf37b58] atomic_read at ffffffff9b871a40 arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:27:0 !# 2 [ffffb80edbf37b58] dump_stack at ffffffff9b871a40 lib/dump_stack.c:54:0 # 3 [ffffb80edbf37b78] csd_lock_wait_toolong at ffffffff9b131ad5 kernel/smp.c:364:0 # 4 [ffffb80edbf37b78] __csd_lock_wait at ffffffff9b131ad5 kernel/smp.c:384:0 # 5 [ffffb80edbf37bf8] csd_lock_wait at ffffffff9b13267a kernel/smp.c:394:0 # 6 [ffffb80edbf37bf8] smp_call_function_many at ffffffff9b13267a kernel/smp.c:843:0 # 7 [ffffb80edbf37c50] smp_call_function at ffffffff9b13279d kernel/smp.c:867:0 # 8 [ffffb80edbf37c50] on_each_cpu at ffffffff9b13279d kernel/smp.c:976:0 # 9 [ffffb80edbf37c78] flush_tlb_kernel_range at ffffffff9b085c4b arch/x86/mm/tlb.c:742:0 Freescale#10 [ffffb80edbf37cb8] __purge_vmap_area_lazy at ffffffff9b23a1e0 mm/vmalloc.c:701:0 Freescale#11 [ffffb80edbf37ce0] try_purge_vmap_area_lazy at ffffffff9b23a2cc mm/vmalloc.c:722:0 Freescale#12 [ffffb80edbf37ce0] free_vmap_area_noflush at ffffffff9b23a2cc mm/vmalloc.c:754:0 Freescale#13 [ffffb80edbf37cf8] free_unmap_vmap_area at ffffffff9b23bb3b mm/vmalloc.c:764:0 Freescale#14 [ffffb80edbf37cf8] remove_vm_area at ffffffff9b23bb3b mm/vmalloc.c:1509:0 Freescale#15 [ffffb80edbf37d18] __vunmap at ffffffff9b23bb8a mm/vmalloc.c:1537:0 Freescale#16 [ffffb80edbf37d40] vfree at ffffffff9b23bc85 mm/vmalloc.c:1612:0 Freescale#17 [ffffb80edbf37d58] megasas_free_host_crash_buffer [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc020b7f2 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c:3932:0 Freescale#18 [ffffb80edbf37d80] fw_crash_state_store [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc01f804d drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c:3291:0 Freescale#19 [ffffb80edbf37dc0] dev_attr_store at ffffffff9b56dd7b drivers/base/core.c:758:0 Freescale#20 [ffffb80edbf37dd0] sysfs_kf_write at ffffffff9b326acf fs/sysfs/file.c:144:0 Freescale#21 [ffffb80edbf37de0] kernfs_fop_write at ffffffff9b325fd4 fs/kernfs/file.c:316:0 Freescale#22 [ffffb80edbf37e20] __vfs_write at ffffffff9b29418a fs/read_write.c:480:0 Freescale#23 [ffffb80edbf37ea8] vfs_write at ffffffff9b294462 fs/read_write.c:544:0 Freescale#24 [ffffb80edbf37ee8] SYSC_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:590:0 Freescale#25 [ffffb80edbf37ee8] SyS_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:582:0 Freescale#26 [ffffb80edbf37f30] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9b003ca9 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298:0 Freescale#27 [ffffb80edbf37f58] entry_SYSCALL_64 at ffffffff9ba001b1 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:238:0 PID: 17355 TASK: ffff95c1090c3d80 CPU: 29 COMMAND: "mrdiagd" !# 0 [ffffb80f2d3c7d30] __read_once_size at ffffffff9b0f2ab0 include/linux/compiler.h:185:0 !# 1 [ffffb80f2d3c7d30] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f2ab0 kernel/locking/qspinlock.c:368:0 # 2 [ffffb80f2d3c7d58] pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f244b arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:674:0 # 3 [ffffb80f2d3c7d58] queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f244b arch/x86/include/asm/qspinlock.h:53:0 # 4 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] queued_spin_lock at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:90:0 # 5 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] do_raw_spin_lock_flags at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/linux/spinlock.h:173:0 # 6 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] __raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:122:0 # 7 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff9b8961a6 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:160:0 # 8 [ffffb80f2d3c7d88] fw_crash_buffer_store [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc01f8129 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c:3205:0 # 9 [ffffb80f2d3c7dc0] dev_attr_store at ffffffff9b56dd7b drivers/base/core.c:758:0 Freescale#10 [ffffb80f2d3c7dd0] sysfs_kf_write at ffffffff9b326acf fs/sysfs/file.c:144:0 Freescale#11 [ffffb80f2d3c7de0] kernfs_fop_write at ffffffff9b325fd4 fs/kernfs/file.c:316:0 Freescale#12 [ffffb80f2d3c7e20] __vfs_write at ffffffff9b29418a fs/read_write.c:480:0 Freescale#13 [ffffb80f2d3c7ea8] vfs_write at ffffffff9b294462 fs/read_write.c:544:0 Freescale#14 [ffffb80f2d3c7ee8] SYSC_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:590:0 Freescale#15 [ffffb80f2d3c7ee8] SyS_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:582:0 Freescale#16 [ffffb80f2d3c7f30] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9b003ca9 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298:0 Freescale#17 [ffffb80f2d3c7f58] entry_SYSCALL_64 at ffffffff9ba001b1 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:238:0 The lock is used to synchronize different sysfs operations, it doesn't protect any resource that will be touched by an interrupt. Consequently it's not required to disable IRQs. Replace the spinlock with a mutex to fix the deadlock. Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a154f5f ] The following call trace shows a deadlock issue due to recursive locking of mutex "device_mutex". First lock acquire is in target_for_each_device() and second in target_free_device(). PID: 148266 TASK: ffff8be21ffb5d00 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "iscsi_ttx" #0 [ffffa2bfc9ec3b18] __schedule at ffffffffa8060e7f Freescale#1 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ba0] schedule at ffffffffa8061224 Freescale#2 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bb8] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa80615ee Freescale#3 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bc8] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa8062fd7 Freescale#4 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c40] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffffa80631d3 Freescale#5 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c50] mutex_lock at ffffffffa806320c Freescale#6 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c68] target_free_device at ffffffffc0935998 [target_core_mod] Freescale#7 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c90] target_core_dev_release at ffffffffc092f975 [target_core_mod] Freescale#8 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ca0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d250f Freescale#9 [ffffa2bfc9ec3cd0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d2583 Freescale#10 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ce0] target_devices_idr_iter at ffffffffc0933f3a [target_core_mod] Freescale#11 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d00] idr_for_each at ffffffffa803f6fc Freescale#12 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d60] target_for_each_device at ffffffffc0935670 [target_core_mod] Freescale#13 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d98] transport_deregister_session at ffffffffc0946408 [target_core_mod] Freescale#14 [ffffa2bfc9ec3dc8] iscsit_close_session at ffffffffc09a44a6 [iscsi_target_mod] Freescale#15 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df0] iscsit_close_connection at ffffffffc09a4a88 [iscsi_target_mod] Freescale#16 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df8] finish_task_switch at ffffffffa76e5d07 Freescale#17 [ffffa2bfc9ec3e78] iscsit_take_action_for_connection_exit at ffffffffc0991c23 [iscsi_target_mod] Freescale#18 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ea0] iscsi_target_tx_thread at ffffffffc09a403b [iscsi_target_mod] Freescale#19 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f08] kthread at ffffffffa76d8080 Freescale#20 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffa8200364 Fixes: 36d4cb4 ("scsi: target: Avoid that EXTENDED COPY commands trigger lock inversion") Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e3e82fc ] When creating ceq_0 during probing irdma, cqp.sc_cqp will be sent as a cqp_request to cqp->sc_cqp.sq_ring. If the request is pending when removing the irdma driver or unplugging its aux device, cqp.sc_cqp will be dereferenced as wrong struct in irdma_free_pending_cqp_request(). PID: 3669 TASK: ffff88aef892c000 CPU: 28 COMMAND: "kworker/28:0" #0 [fffffe0000549e38] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff810e3a34 Freescale#1 [fffffe0000549e40] nmi_handle at ffffffff810788b2 Freescale#2 [fffffe0000549ea0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8107938f Freescale#3 [fffffe0000549eb8] do_nmi at ffffffff81079582 Freescale#4 [fffffe0000549ef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff82e016b4 [exception RIP: native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+1291] RIP: ffffffff8127e72b RSP: ffff88aa841ef778 RFLAGS: 00000046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88b01f849700 RCX: ffffffff8127e47e RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff83857ec0 RBP: ffff88afe3e4efc8 R8: ffffed15fc7c9dfa R9: ffffed15fc7c9dfa R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed15fc7c9df9 R12: 0000000000740000 R13: ffff88b01f849708 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: ffffed1603f092e1 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0000 -- <NMI exception stack> -- Freescale#5 [ffff88aa841ef778] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8127e72b Freescale#6 [ffff88aa841ef7b0] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff82c22aa4 Freescale#7 [ffff88aa841ef7c8] __wake_up_common_lock at ffffffff81257363 Freescale#8 [ffff88aa841ef888] irdma_free_pending_cqp_request at ffffffffa0ba12cc [irdma] Freescale#9 [ffff88aa841ef958] irdma_cleanup_pending_cqp_op at ffffffffa0ba1469 [irdma] Freescale#10 [ffff88aa841ef9c0] irdma_ctrl_deinit_hw at ffffffffa0b2989f [irdma] Freescale#11 [ffff88aa841efa28] irdma_remove at ffffffffa0b252df [irdma] Freescale#12 [ffff88aa841efae8] auxiliary_bus_remove at ffffffff8219afdb Freescale#13 [ffff88aa841efb00] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff821882e6 Freescale#14 [ffff88aa841efb38] bus_remove_device at ffffffff82184278 Freescale#15 [ffff88aa841efb88] device_del at ffffffff82179d23 Freescale#16 [ffff88aa841efc48] ice_unplug_aux_dev at ffffffffa0eb1c14 [ice] Freescale#17 [ffff88aa841efc68] ice_service_task at ffffffffa0d88201 [ice] Freescale#18 [ffff88aa841efde8] process_one_work at ffffffff811c589a Freescale#19 [ffff88aa841efe60] worker_thread at ffffffff811c71ff Freescale#20 [ffff88aa841eff10] kthread at ffffffff811d87a0 Freescale#21 [ffff88aa841eff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff82e0022f Fixes: 44d9e52 ("RDMA/irdma: Implement device initialization definitions") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Suggested-by: "Ismail, Mustafa" <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Shifeng Li <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Shiraz Saleem <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f8bbc07 ] vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents. When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump packet and soft lockup will be detected. net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate. PID: 33036 TASK: ffff949da6f20000 CPU: 23 COMMAND: "vhost-32980" #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253 Freescale#1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3 Freescale#2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e Freescale#3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d Freescale#4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663 [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20] RIP: ffffffff89792594 RSP: ffffa655314979e8 RFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: ffffffff89792500 RBX: ffffffff8af428a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00000000000003fd RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: ffffffff8af428a0 RBP: 0000000000002710 R8: 0000000000000004 R9: 000000000000000f R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff8acbf64f R12: 0000000000000020 R13: ffffffff8acbf698 R14: 0000000000000058 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 Freescale#5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594 Freescale#6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470 Freescale#7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6 Freescale#8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605 Freescale#9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558 Freescale#10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124 Freescale#11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07 Freescale#12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306 Freescale#13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765 Freescale#14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun] Freescale#15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun] Freescale#16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net] Freescale#17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost] Freescale#18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72 Freescale#19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f Fixes: ef3db4a ("tun: avoid BUG, dump packet on GSO errors") Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f8bbc07 ] vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents. When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump packet and soft lockup will be detected. net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate. PID: 33036 TASK: ffff949da6f20000 CPU: 23 COMMAND: "vhost-32980" #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253 #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3 #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663 [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20] RIP: ffffffff89792594 RSP: ffffa655314979e8 RFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: ffffffff89792500 RBX: ffffffff8af428a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00000000000003fd RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: ffffffff8af428a0 RBP: 0000000000002710 R8: 0000000000000004 R9: 000000000000000f R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff8acbf64f R12: 0000000000000020 R13: ffffffff8acbf698 R14: 0000000000000058 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594 #6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470 #7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6 #8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605 #9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558 #10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124 #11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07 #12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306 #13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765 #14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun] #15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun] #16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net] #17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost] #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72 #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f Fixes: ef3db4a ("tun: avoid BUG, dump packet on GSO errors") Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 769e6a1 ] ui_browser__show() is capturing the input title that is stack allocated memory in hist_browser__run(). Avoid a use after return by strdup-ing the string. Committer notes: Further explanation from Ian Rogers: My command line using tui is: $ sudo bash -c 'rm /tmp/asan.log*; export ASAN_OPTIONS="log_path=/tmp/asan.log"; /tmp/perf/perf mem record -a sleep 1; /tmp/perf/perf mem report' I then go to the perf annotate view and quit. This triggers the asan error (from the log file): ``` ==1254591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-return on address 0x7f2813331920 at pc 0x7f28180 65991 bp 0x7fff0a21c750 sp 0x7fff0a21bf10 READ of size 80 at 0x7f2813331920 thread T0 #0 0x7f2818065990 in __interceptor_strlen ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:461 #1 0x7f2817698251 in SLsmg_write_wrapped_string (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x98251) #2 0x7f28176984b9 in SLsmg_write_nstring (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x984b9) #3 0x55c94045b365 in ui_browser__write_nstring ui/browser.c:60 #4 0x55c94045c558 in __ui_browser__show_title ui/browser.c:266 #5 0x55c94045c776 in ui_browser__show ui/browser.c:288 #6 0x55c94045c06d in ui_browser__handle_resize ui/browser.c:206 #7 0x55c94047979b in do_annotate ui/browsers/hists.c:2458 #8 0x55c94047fb17 in evsel__hists_browse ui/browsers/hists.c:3412 #9 0x55c940480a0c in perf_evsel_menu__run ui/browsers/hists.c:3527 #10 0x55c940481108 in __evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3613 #11 0x55c9404813f7 in evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3661 #12 0x55c93ffa253f in report__browse_hists tools/perf/builtin-report.c:671 #13 0x55c93ffa58ca in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1141 #14 0x55c93ffaf159 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805 #15 0x55c94000c05c in report_events tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:374 #16 0x55c94000d96d in cmd_mem tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:516 #17 0x55c9400e44ee in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350 #18 0x55c9400e4a5a in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403 #19 0x55c9400e4e22 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447 #20 0x55c9400e53ad in main tools/perf/perf.c:561 #21 0x7f28170456c9 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #22 0x7f2817045784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 #23 0x55c93ff544c0 in _start (/tmp/perf/perf+0x19a4c0) (BuildId: 84899b0e8c7d3a3eaa67b2eb35e3d8b2f8cd4c93) Address 0x7f2813331920 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame #0 0x55c94046e85e in hist_browser__run ui/browsers/hists.c:746 This frame has 1 object(s): [32, 192) 'title' (line 747) <== Memory access at offset 32 is inside this variable HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork ``` hist_browser__run isn't on the stack so the asan error looks legit. There's no clean init/exit on struct ui_browser so I may be trading a use-after-return for a memory leak, but that seems look a good trade anyway. Fixes: 05e8b08 ("perf ui browser: Stop using 'self'") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Cc: Athira Rajeev <[email protected]> Cc: Ben Gainey <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: James Clark <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Kajol Jain <[email protected]> Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]> Cc: K Prateek Nayak <[email protected]> Cc: Li Dong <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Oliver Upton <[email protected]> Cc: Paran Lee <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <[email protected]> Cc: Sun Haiyong <[email protected]> Cc: Tim Chen <[email protected]> Cc: Yanteng Si <[email protected]> Cc: Yicong Yang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit be346c1 upstream. The code in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() estimates number of necessary transaction credits using ocfs2_calc_extend_credits(). This however does not take into account that the IO could be arbitrarily large and can contain arbitrary number of extents. Extent tree manipulations do often extend the current transaction but not in all of the cases. For example if we have only single block extents in the tree, ocfs2_mark_extent_written() will end up calling ocfs2_replace_extent_rec() all the time and we will never extend the current transaction and eventually exhaust all the transaction credits if the IO contains many single block extents. Once that happens a WARN_ON(jbd2_handle_buffer_credits(handle) <= 0) is triggered in jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata() and subsequently OCFS2 aborts in response to this error. This was actually triggered by one of our customers on a heavily fragmented OCFS2 filesystem. To fix the issue make sure the transaction always has enough credits for one extent insert before each call of ocfs2_mark_extent_written(). Heming Zhao said: ------ PANIC: "Kernel panic - not syncing: OCFS2: (device dm-1): panic forced after error" PID: xxx TASK: xxxx CPU: 5 COMMAND: "SubmitThread-CA" #0 machine_kexec at ffffffff8c069932 Freescale#1 __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c1338fa Freescale#2 panic at ffffffff8c1d69b9 Freescale#3 ocfs2_handle_error at ffffffffc0c86c0c [ocfs2] Freescale#4 __ocfs2_abort at ffffffffc0c88387 [ocfs2] Freescale#5 ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc0c51e98 [ocfs2] Freescale#6 ocfs2_split_extent at ffffffffc0c27ea3 [ocfs2] Freescale#7 ocfs2_change_extent_flag at ffffffffc0c28053 [ocfs2] Freescale#8 ocfs2_mark_extent_written at ffffffffc0c28347 [ocfs2] Freescale#9 ocfs2_dio_end_io_write at ffffffffc0c2bef9 [ocfs2] Freescale#10 ocfs2_dio_end_io at ffffffffc0c2c0f5 [ocfs2] Freescale#11 dio_complete at ffffffff8c2b9fa7 Freescale#12 do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff8c2bc09f Freescale#13 ocfs2_direct_IO at ffffffffc0c2b653 [ocfs2] Freescale#14 generic_file_direct_write at ffffffff8c1dcf14 Freescale#15 __generic_file_write_iter at ffffffff8c1dd07b Freescale#16 ocfs2_file_write_iter at ffffffffc0c49f1f [ocfs2] Freescale#17 aio_write at ffffffff8c2cc72e Freescale#18 kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8c248dde Freescale#19 do_io_submit at ffffffff8c2ccada Freescale#20 do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8c004984 Freescale#21 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8c8000ba Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: c15471f ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io") Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]> Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]> Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]> Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]> Cc: Gang He <[email protected]> Cc: Jun Piao <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f0c1802 ] When running BPF selftests (./test_progs -t sockmap_basic) on a Loongarch platform, the following kernel panic occurs: [...] Oops[Freescale#1]: CPU: 22 PID: 2824 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G OE 6.10.0-rc2+ Freescale#18 Hardware name: LOONGSON Dabieshan/Loongson-TC542F0, BIOS Loongson-UDK2018 ... ... ra: 90000000048bf6c0 sk_msg_recvmsg+0x120/0x560 ERA: 9000000004162774 copy_page_to_iter+0x74/0x1c0 CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE) PRMD: 0000000c (PPLV0 +PIE +PWE) EUEN: 00000007 (+FPE +SXE +ASXE -BTE) ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7) ESTAT: 00010000 [PIL] (IS= ECode=1 EsubCode=0) BADV: 0000000000000040 PRID: 0014c011 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3C5000) Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack Process test_progs (pid: 2824, threadinfo=0000000000863a31, task=...) Stack : ... Call Trace: [<9000000004162774>] copy_page_to_iter+0x74/0x1c0 [<90000000048bf6c0>] sk_msg_recvmsg+0x120/0x560 [<90000000049f2b90>] tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser+0x170/0x4e0 [<90000000049aae34>] inet_recvmsg+0x54/0x100 [<900000000481ad5c>] sock_recvmsg+0x7c/0xe0 [<900000000481e1a8>] __sys_recvfrom+0x108/0x1c0 [<900000000481e27c>] sys_recvfrom+0x1c/0x40 [<9000000004c076ec>] do_syscall+0x8c/0xc0 [<9000000003731da4>] handle_syscall+0xc4/0x160 Code: ... ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Kernel relocated by 0x3510000 .text @ 0x9000000003710000 .data @ 0x9000000004d70000 .bss @ 0x9000000006469400 ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- [...] This crash happens every time when running sockmap_skb_verdict_shutdown subtest in sockmap_basic. This crash is because a NULL pointer is passed to page_address() in the sk_msg_recvmsg(). Due to the different implementations depending on the architecture, page_address(NULL) will trigger a panic on Loongarch platform but not on x86 platform. So this bug was hidden on x86 platform for a while, but now it is exposed on Loongarch platform. The root cause is that a zero length skb (skb->len == 0) was put on the queue. This zero length skb is a TCP FIN packet, which was sent by shutdown(), invoked in test_sockmap_skb_verdict_shutdown(): shutdown(p1, SHUT_WR); In this case, in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue(), num_sge is zero, and no page is put to this sge (see sg_set_page in sg_set_page), but this empty sge is queued into ingress_msg list. And in sk_msg_recvmsg(), this empty sge is used, and a NULL page is got by sg_page(sge). Pass this NULL page to copy_page_to_iter(), which passes it to kmap_local_page() and to page_address(), then kernel panics. To solve this, we should skip this zero length skb. So in sk_msg_recvmsg(), if copy is zero, that means it's a zero length skb, skip invoking copy_page_to_iter(). We are using the EFAULT return triggered by copy_page_to_iter to check for is_fin in tcp_bpf.c. Fixes: 604326b ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface") Suggested-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/e3a16eacdc6740658ee02a33489b1b9d4912f378.1719992715.git.tanggeliang@kylinos.cn Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit be346c1 upstream. The code in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() estimates number of necessary transaction credits using ocfs2_calc_extend_credits(). This however does not take into account that the IO could be arbitrarily large and can contain arbitrary number of extents. Extent tree manipulations do often extend the current transaction but not in all of the cases. For example if we have only single block extents in the tree, ocfs2_mark_extent_written() will end up calling ocfs2_replace_extent_rec() all the time and we will never extend the current transaction and eventually exhaust all the transaction credits if the IO contains many single block extents. Once that happens a WARN_ON(jbd2_handle_buffer_credits(handle) <= 0) is triggered in jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata() and subsequently OCFS2 aborts in response to this error. This was actually triggered by one of our customers on a heavily fragmented OCFS2 filesystem. To fix the issue make sure the transaction always has enough credits for one extent insert before each call of ocfs2_mark_extent_written(). Heming Zhao said: ------ PANIC: "Kernel panic - not syncing: OCFS2: (device dm-1): panic forced after error" PID: xxx TASK: xxxx CPU: 5 COMMAND: "SubmitThread-CA" #0 machine_kexec at ffffffff8c069932 Freescale#1 __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c1338fa Freescale#2 panic at ffffffff8c1d69b9 Freescale#3 ocfs2_handle_error at ffffffffc0c86c0c [ocfs2] Freescale#4 __ocfs2_abort at ffffffffc0c88387 [ocfs2] Freescale#5 ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc0c51e98 [ocfs2] Freescale#6 ocfs2_split_extent at ffffffffc0c27ea3 [ocfs2] Freescale#7 ocfs2_change_extent_flag at ffffffffc0c28053 [ocfs2] Freescale#8 ocfs2_mark_extent_written at ffffffffc0c28347 [ocfs2] Freescale#9 ocfs2_dio_end_io_write at ffffffffc0c2bef9 [ocfs2] Freescale#10 ocfs2_dio_end_io at ffffffffc0c2c0f5 [ocfs2] Freescale#11 dio_complete at ffffffff8c2b9fa7 Freescale#12 do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff8c2bc09f Freescale#13 ocfs2_direct_IO at ffffffffc0c2b653 [ocfs2] Freescale#14 generic_file_direct_write at ffffffff8c1dcf14 Freescale#15 __generic_file_write_iter at ffffffff8c1dd07b Freescale#16 ocfs2_file_write_iter at ffffffffc0c49f1f [ocfs2] Freescale#17 aio_write at ffffffff8c2cc72e Freescale#18 kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8c248dde Freescale#19 do_io_submit at ffffffff8c2ccada Freescale#20 do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8c004984 Freescale#21 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8c8000ba Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: c15471f ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io") Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]> Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]> Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]> Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]> Cc: Gang He <[email protected]> Cc: Jun Piao <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f0c1802 ] When running BPF selftests (./test_progs -t sockmap_basic) on a Loongarch platform, the following kernel panic occurs: [...] Oops[Freescale#1]: CPU: 22 PID: 2824 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G OE 6.10.0-rc2+ Freescale#18 Hardware name: LOONGSON Dabieshan/Loongson-TC542F0, BIOS Loongson-UDK2018 ... ... ra: 90000000048bf6c0 sk_msg_recvmsg+0x120/0x560 ERA: 9000000004162774 copy_page_to_iter+0x74/0x1c0 CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE) PRMD: 0000000c (PPLV0 +PIE +PWE) EUEN: 00000007 (+FPE +SXE +ASXE -BTE) ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7) ESTAT: 00010000 [PIL] (IS= ECode=1 EsubCode=0) BADV: 0000000000000040 PRID: 0014c011 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3C5000) Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack Process test_progs (pid: 2824, threadinfo=0000000000863a31, task=...) Stack : ... Call Trace: [<9000000004162774>] copy_page_to_iter+0x74/0x1c0 [<90000000048bf6c0>] sk_msg_recvmsg+0x120/0x560 [<90000000049f2b90>] tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser+0x170/0x4e0 [<90000000049aae34>] inet_recvmsg+0x54/0x100 [<900000000481ad5c>] sock_recvmsg+0x7c/0xe0 [<900000000481e1a8>] __sys_recvfrom+0x108/0x1c0 [<900000000481e27c>] sys_recvfrom+0x1c/0x40 [<9000000004c076ec>] do_syscall+0x8c/0xc0 [<9000000003731da4>] handle_syscall+0xc4/0x160 Code: ... ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Kernel relocated by 0x3510000 .text @ 0x9000000003710000 .data @ 0x9000000004d70000 .bss @ 0x9000000006469400 ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- [...] This crash happens every time when running sockmap_skb_verdict_shutdown subtest in sockmap_basic. This crash is because a NULL pointer is passed to page_address() in the sk_msg_recvmsg(). Due to the different implementations depending on the architecture, page_address(NULL) will trigger a panic on Loongarch platform but not on x86 platform. So this bug was hidden on x86 platform for a while, but now it is exposed on Loongarch platform. The root cause is that a zero length skb (skb->len == 0) was put on the queue. This zero length skb is a TCP FIN packet, which was sent by shutdown(), invoked in test_sockmap_skb_verdict_shutdown(): shutdown(p1, SHUT_WR); In this case, in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue(), num_sge is zero, and no page is put to this sge (see sg_set_page in sg_set_page), but this empty sge is queued into ingress_msg list. And in sk_msg_recvmsg(), this empty sge is used, and a NULL page is got by sg_page(sge). Pass this NULL page to copy_page_to_iter(), which passes it to kmap_local_page() and to page_address(), then kernel panics. To solve this, we should skip this zero length skb. So in sk_msg_recvmsg(), if copy is zero, that means it's a zero length skb, skip invoking copy_page_to_iter(). We are using the EFAULT return triggered by copy_page_to_iter to check for is_fin in tcp_bpf.c. Fixes: 604326b ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface") Suggested-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/e3a16eacdc6740658ee02a33489b1b9d4912f378.1719992715.git.tanggeliang@kylinos.cn Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit be346c1 upstream. The code in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() estimates number of necessary transaction credits using ocfs2_calc_extend_credits(). This however does not take into account that the IO could be arbitrarily large and can contain arbitrary number of extents. Extent tree manipulations do often extend the current transaction but not in all of the cases. For example if we have only single block extents in the tree, ocfs2_mark_extent_written() will end up calling ocfs2_replace_extent_rec() all the time and we will never extend the current transaction and eventually exhaust all the transaction credits if the IO contains many single block extents. Once that happens a WARN_ON(jbd2_handle_buffer_credits(handle) <= 0) is triggered in jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata() and subsequently OCFS2 aborts in response to this error. This was actually triggered by one of our customers on a heavily fragmented OCFS2 filesystem. To fix the issue make sure the transaction always has enough credits for one extent insert before each call of ocfs2_mark_extent_written(). Heming Zhao said: ------ PANIC: "Kernel panic - not syncing: OCFS2: (device dm-1): panic forced after error" PID: xxx TASK: xxxx CPU: 5 COMMAND: "SubmitThread-CA" #0 machine_kexec at ffffffff8c069932 Freescale#1 __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c1338fa Freescale#2 panic at ffffffff8c1d69b9 Freescale#3 ocfs2_handle_error at ffffffffc0c86c0c [ocfs2] Freescale#4 __ocfs2_abort at ffffffffc0c88387 [ocfs2] Freescale#5 ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc0c51e98 [ocfs2] Freescale#6 ocfs2_split_extent at ffffffffc0c27ea3 [ocfs2] Freescale#7 ocfs2_change_extent_flag at ffffffffc0c28053 [ocfs2] Freescale#8 ocfs2_mark_extent_written at ffffffffc0c28347 [ocfs2] Freescale#9 ocfs2_dio_end_io_write at ffffffffc0c2bef9 [ocfs2] Freescale#10 ocfs2_dio_end_io at ffffffffc0c2c0f5 [ocfs2] Freescale#11 dio_complete at ffffffff8c2b9fa7 Freescale#12 do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff8c2bc09f Freescale#13 ocfs2_direct_IO at ffffffffc0c2b653 [ocfs2] Freescale#14 generic_file_direct_write at ffffffff8c1dcf14 Freescale#15 __generic_file_write_iter at ffffffff8c1dd07b Freescale#16 ocfs2_file_write_iter at ffffffffc0c49f1f [ocfs2] Freescale#17 aio_write at ffffffff8c2cc72e Freescale#18 kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8c248dde Freescale#19 do_io_submit at ffffffff8c2ccada Freescale#20 do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8c004984 Freescale#21 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8c8000ba Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: c15471f ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io") Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]> Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]> Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]> Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]> Cc: Gang He <[email protected]> Cc: Jun Piao <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f0c1802 ] When running BPF selftests (./test_progs -t sockmap_basic) on a Loongarch platform, the following kernel panic occurs: [...] Oops[Freescale#1]: CPU: 22 PID: 2824 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G OE 6.10.0-rc2+ Freescale#18 Hardware name: LOONGSON Dabieshan/Loongson-TC542F0, BIOS Loongson-UDK2018 ... ... ra: 90000000048bf6c0 sk_msg_recvmsg+0x120/0x560 ERA: 9000000004162774 copy_page_to_iter+0x74/0x1c0 CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE) PRMD: 0000000c (PPLV0 +PIE +PWE) EUEN: 00000007 (+FPE +SXE +ASXE -BTE) ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7) ESTAT: 00010000 [PIL] (IS= ECode=1 EsubCode=0) BADV: 0000000000000040 PRID: 0014c011 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3C5000) Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack Process test_progs (pid: 2824, threadinfo=0000000000863a31, task=...) Stack : ... Call Trace: [<9000000004162774>] copy_page_to_iter+0x74/0x1c0 [<90000000048bf6c0>] sk_msg_recvmsg+0x120/0x560 [<90000000049f2b90>] tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser+0x170/0x4e0 [<90000000049aae34>] inet_recvmsg+0x54/0x100 [<900000000481ad5c>] sock_recvmsg+0x7c/0xe0 [<900000000481e1a8>] __sys_recvfrom+0x108/0x1c0 [<900000000481e27c>] sys_recvfrom+0x1c/0x40 [<9000000004c076ec>] do_syscall+0x8c/0xc0 [<9000000003731da4>] handle_syscall+0xc4/0x160 Code: ... ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Kernel relocated by 0x3510000 .text @ 0x9000000003710000 .data @ 0x9000000004d70000 .bss @ 0x9000000006469400 ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- [...] This crash happens every time when running sockmap_skb_verdict_shutdown subtest in sockmap_basic. This crash is because a NULL pointer is passed to page_address() in the sk_msg_recvmsg(). Due to the different implementations depending on the architecture, page_address(NULL) will trigger a panic on Loongarch platform but not on x86 platform. So this bug was hidden on x86 platform for a while, but now it is exposed on Loongarch platform. The root cause is that a zero length skb (skb->len == 0) was put on the queue. This zero length skb is a TCP FIN packet, which was sent by shutdown(), invoked in test_sockmap_skb_verdict_shutdown(): shutdown(p1, SHUT_WR); In this case, in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue(), num_sge is zero, and no page is put to this sge (see sg_set_page in sg_set_page), but this empty sge is queued into ingress_msg list. And in sk_msg_recvmsg(), this empty sge is used, and a NULL page is got by sg_page(sge). Pass this NULL page to copy_page_to_iter(), which passes it to kmap_local_page() and to page_address(), then kernel panics. To solve this, we should skip this zero length skb. So in sk_msg_recvmsg(), if copy is zero, that means it's a zero length skb, skip invoking copy_page_to_iter(). We are using the EFAULT return triggered by copy_page_to_iter to check for is_fin in tcp_bpf.c. Fixes: 604326b ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface") Suggested-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/e3a16eacdc6740658ee02a33489b1b9d4912f378.1719992715.git.tanggeliang@kylinos.cn Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c145eea ] mwifiex_get_priv_by_id() returns the priv pointer corresponding to the bss_num and bss_type, but without checking if the priv is actually currently in use. Unused priv pointers do not have a wiphy attached to them which can lead to NULL pointer dereferences further down the callstack. Fix this by returning only used priv pointers which have priv->bss_mode set to something else than NL80211_IFTYPE_UNSPECIFIED. Said NULL pointer dereference happened when an Accesspoint was started with wpa_supplicant -i mlan0 with this config: network={ ssid="somessid" mode=2 frequency=2412 key_mgmt=WPA-PSK WPA-PSK-SHA256 proto=RSN group=CCMP pairwise=CCMP psk="12345678" } When waiting for the AP to be established, interrupting wpa_supplicant with <ctrl-c> and starting it again this happens: | Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000140 | Mem abort info: | ESR = 0x0000000096000004 | EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits | SET = 0, FnV = 0 | EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 | FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault | Data abort info: | ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 | CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 | GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 | user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000046d96000 | [0000000000000140] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 | Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [Freescale#1] PREEMPT SMP | Modules linked in: caam_jr caamhash_desc spidev caamalg_desc crypto_engine authenc libdes mwifiex_sdio +mwifiex crct10dif_ce cdc_acm onboard_usb_hub fsl_imx8_ddr_perf imx8m_ddrc rtc_ds1307 lm75 rtc_snvs +imx_sdma caam imx8mm_thermal spi_imx error imx_cpufreq_dt fuse ip_tables x_tables ipv6 | CPU: 0 PID: 8 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-00007-g937242013fce-dirty Freescale#18 | Hardware name: somemachine (DT) | Workqueue: events sdio_irq_work | pstate: 00000005 (nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) | pc : mwifiex_get_cfp+0xd8/0x15c [mwifiex] | lr : mwifiex_get_cfp+0x34/0x15c [mwifiex] | sp : ffff8000818b3a70 | x29: ffff8000818b3a70 x28: ffff000006bfd8a5 x27: 0000000000000004 | x26: 000000000000002c x25: 0000000000001511 x24: 0000000002e86bc9 | x23: ffff000006bfd996 x22: 0000000000000004 x21: ffff000007bec000 | x20: 000000000000002c x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 | x17: 000000040044ffff x16: 00500072b5503510 x15: ccc283740681e517 | x14: 0201000101006d15 x13: 0000000002e8ff43 x12: 002c01000000ffb1 | x11: 0100000000000000 x10: 02e8ff43002c0100 x9 : 0000ffb100100157 | x8 : ffff000003d20000 x7 : 00000000000002f1 x6 : 00000000ffffe124 | x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000003 x3 : 0000000000000000 | x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0001000000011001 x0 : 0000000000000000 | Call trace: | mwifiex_get_cfp+0xd8/0x15c [mwifiex] | mwifiex_parse_single_response_buf+0x1d0/0x504 [mwifiex] | mwifiex_handle_event_ext_scan_report+0x19c/0x2f8 [mwifiex] | mwifiex_process_sta_event+0x298/0xf0c [mwifiex] | mwifiex_process_event+0x110/0x238 [mwifiex] | mwifiex_main_process+0x428/0xa44 [mwifiex] | mwifiex_sdio_interrupt+0x64/0x12c [mwifiex_sdio] | process_sdio_pending_irqs+0x64/0x1b8 | sdio_irq_work+0x4c/0x7c | process_one_work+0x148/0x2a0 | worker_thread+0x2fc/0x40c | kthread+0x110/0x114 | ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 | Code: a94153f3 a8c37bfd d50323bf d65f03c0 (f940a000) | ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <[email protected]> Acked-by: Brian Norris <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Francesco Dolcini <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

larsclausen and others added 30 commits November 15, 2017 17:13

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4.4.x #18

4.4.x #18

redbrain17 commented Nov 22, 2017

4.4.x #18

4.4.x #18

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redbrain17 commented Nov 22, 2017