Skip to content

Yamato-Security/hayabusa-rules

BranchesTags

Repository files navigation

Hayabusa Logo

[ English ] | [日本語]

About Hayabusa-Rules

This is a repository containing curated sigma rules that detect attacks in Windows event logs. It is mainly used for Hayabusa detections rules and config files, as well as Velociraptor's built-in sigma detection. The advantage of using this repository over the upstream sigma repository is that we include only rules that most sigma-native tools should be able to parse. We also de-abstract the logsource field by adding the necessary Channel, EventID, etc... fields to the rules to make it easier to understand what the rule is filtering on and more importantly to reduce false positives. We also create new rules with converted field names and values for process_creation rules and registry based rules so that the sigma rules will not only detect on Sysmon logs, but will detect on built-in Windows logs as well.

Companion Projects

  • EnableWindowsLogSettings - documentation and scripts to properly enable Windows event logs.
  • Hayabusa - sigma-based threat hunting and fast forensics timeline generator for Windows event logs.
  • Hayabusa Encoded Rules - The same as this repository but the rules and config files are stored in one file and XORed to prevent false positives from anti-virus.
  • Hayabusa EVTX - A more maintained fork of the evtx crate.
  • Hayabusa Sample EVTXs - Sample evtx files to use for testing Hayabusa/Sigma detection rules.
  • Presentations - Presentations from talks that we have given about our tools and resources.
  • Sigma to Hayabusa Converter - Curates upstream Windows event log based Sigma rules into an easier to use form.
  • Takajo - Analyzer for hayabusa results.
  • WELA (Windows Event Log Analyzer) - An analyzer for Windows event logs written in PowerShell. (Deprecated and replaced by Takajo.)

Table of Contents

About creating rule files

Hayabusa detection rules are written in YAML format with a file extension of .yml. (.yaml files will be ignored.) They are a subset of sigma rules but also contain some added features. We are trying to make them as close to sigma rules as possible so that it is easy to convert Hayabusa rules back to sigma to give back to the community. Hayabusa rules can express complex detection rules by combining not only simple string matching but also regular expressions, AND, OR, and other conditions. In this section, we will explain how to write Hayabusa detection rules.

Rule file format

Example:

#Author section
author: Zach Mathis
date: 2022/03/22
modified: 2022/04/17

#Alert section
title: Possible Timestomping
details: 'Path: %TargetFilename% ¦ Process: %Image% ¦ User: %User% ¦ CreationTime: %CreationUtcTime% ¦ PreviousTime: %PreviousCreationUtcTime% ¦ PID: %PID% ¦ PGUID: %ProcessGuid%'
description: |
    The Change File Creation Time Event is registered when a file creation time is explicitly modified by a process.
    This event helps tracking the real creation time of a file.
    Attackers may change the file creation time of a backdoor to make it look like it was installed with the operating system.
    Note that many processes legitimately change the creation time of a file; it does not necessarily indicate malicious activity.

#Rule section
id: f03e34c4-6432-4a30-9ae2-76ae6329399a
level: low
status: stable
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: sysmon
    definition: Sysmon needs to be installed and configured.
detection:
    selection_basic:
        Channel: Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
        EventID: 2
    condition: selection_basic
falsepositives:
    - unknown
tags:
    - t1070.006
    - attack.defense_evasion
references:
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006/
ruletype: Hayabusa

#Sample XML Event
sample-message: |
    File creation time changed:
    RuleName: technique_id=T1099,technique_name=Timestomp
    UtcTime: 2022-04-12 22:52:00.688
    ProcessGuid: {43199d79-0290-6256-3704-000000001400}
    ProcessId: 9752
    Image: C:\TMP\mim.exe
    TargetFilename: C:\Users\IEUser\AppData\Local\Temp\Quest Software\PowerGUI\51f5c69c-5d16-47e1-9864-038c8510d919\mk.ps1
    CreationUtcTime: 2016-05-16 09:13:50.950
    PreviousCreationUtcTime: 2022-04-12 22:52:00.563
    User: ZACH-LOG-TEST\IEUser
sample-evtx: |
    <Event xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event">
        <System>
            <Provider Name="Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon" Guid="{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}" />
            <EventID>2</EventID>
            <Version>5</Version>
            <Level>4</Level>
            <Task>2</Task>
            <Opcode>0</Opcode>
            <Keywords>0x8000000000000000</Keywords>
            <TimeCreated SystemTime="2022-04-12T22:52:00.689654600Z" />
            <EventRecordID>8946</EventRecordID>
            <Correlation />
            <Execution ProcessID="3408" ThreadID="4276" />
            <Channel>Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational</Channel>
            <Computer>Zach-log-test</Computer>
            <Security UserID="S-1-5-18" />
        </System>
        <EventData>
            <Data Name="RuleName">technique_id=T1099,technique_name=Timestomp</Data>
            <Data Name="UtcTime">2022-04-12 22:52:00.688</Data>
            <Data Name="ProcessGuid">{43199d79-0290-6256-3704-000000001400}</Data>
            <Data Name="ProcessId">9752</Data>
            <Data Name="Image">C:\TMP\mim.exe</Data>
            <Data Name="TargetFilename">C:\Users\IEUser\AppData\Local\Temp\Quest Software\PowerGUI\51f5c69c-5d16-47e1-9864-038c8510d919\mk.ps1</Data>
            <Data Name="CreationUtcTime">2016-05-16 09:13:50.950</Data>
            <Data Name="PreviousCreationUtcTime">2022-04-12 22:52:00.563</Data>
            <Data Name="User">ZACH-LOG-TEST\IEUser</Data>
        </EventData>
    </Event>

Author section

  • author [required]: Name of the author(s).
  • date [required]: Date the rule was made.
  • modified [optional]: Date the rule was updated.

Alert section

  • title [required]: Rule file title. This will also be the name of the alert that gets displayed so the briefer the better. (Should not be longer than 85 characters.)
  • details [optional]: The details of the alert that gets displayed. Please output any fields in the Windows event log that are useful for analysis. Fields are seperated by " ¦ ". Field placeholders are enclosed with a % (Example: %MemberName%) and need to be defined in rules/config/eventkey_alias.txt. (Explained below.)
  • description [optional]: A description of the rule. This does not get displayed so you can make this long and detailed.

Rule section

  • id [required]: A randomly generated version 4 UUID used to uniquely identify the rule. You can generate one here.
  • level [required]: Severity level based on sigma's definition. Please write one of the following: informational,low,medium,high,critical
  • status[required]: Status based on sigma's definition. Please write one of the following: deprecated, experimental, test, stable.
  • logsource [required]: While this is not actually used by Hayabusa at the moment, we define logsource in the same way as sigma in order to be compatible with sigma rules.
  • detection [required]: The detection logic goes here. (Explained below.)
  • falsepositives [required]: The possibilities for false positives. For example: system administrator, normal user usage, normal system usage, legacy application, security team, none. If it is unknown, please write unknown.
  • tags [optional]: If the technique is a LOLBINS/LOLBAS technique, please add the lolbas tag. If the alert can be mapped to a technique in the MITRE ATT&CK framework, please add the tactic ID (Example: attack.t1098) and any applicable tactics below:
    • attack.reconnaissance -> Reconnaissance (Recon)
    • attack.resource_development -> Resource Development (ResDev)
    • attack.initial_access -> Initial Access (InitAccess)
    • attack.execution -> Execution (Exec)
    • attack.persistence -> Persistence (Persis)
    • attack.privilege_escalation -> Privilege Escalation (PrivEsc)
    • attack.defense_evasion -> Defense Evasion (Evas)
    • attack.credential_access -> Credential Access (CredAccess)
    • attack.discovery -> Discovery (Disc)
    • attack.lateral_movement -> Lateral Movement (LatMov)
    • attack.collection -> Collection (Collect)
    • attack.command_and_control -> Command and Control (C2)
    • attack.exfiltration -> Exfiltration (Exfil)
    • attack.impact -> Impact (Impact)
  • references [optional]: Any links to references.
  • ruletype [required]: Hayabusa for hayabusa rules. Rules automatically converted from sigma Windows rules will be Sigma.

Sample XML Event

  • sample-message [required]: Starting forward, we ask rule authors to include sample messages for their rules. This is the rendered message that Windows' Event Viewer displays.
  • sample-evtx [required]: Starting forward, we ask rule authors to include sample XML events for their rules.

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in rules in order to make the output as concise as possible:

  • Acct -> Account
  • Addr -> Address
  • Auth -> Authentication
  • Cli -> Client
  • Chan -> Channel
  • Cmd -> Command
  • Cnt -> Count
  • Comp -> Computer
  • Conn -> Connection/Connected
  • Creds -> Credentials
  • Crit -> Critical
  • Disconn -> Disconnection/Disconnected
  • Dir -> Directory
  • Drv -> Driver
  • Dst -> Destination
  • EID -> Event ID
  • Err -> Error
  • Exec -> Execution
  • FP -> False Positive
  • FW -> Firewall
  • GTW -> Gateway
  • Grp -> Group
  • Img -> Image
  • Inj -> Injection
  • Krb -> Kerberos
  • LID -> Logon ID
  • Med -> Medium
  • Net -> Network
  • Obj -> Object
  • Op -> Operational/Operation
  • Proto -> Protocol
  • PW -> Password
  • Reconn -> Reconnection
  • Req -> Request
  • Rsp -> Response
  • Sess -> Session
  • Sig -> Signature
  • Susp -> Suspicious
  • Src -> Source
  • Svc -> Service
  • Svr -> Server
  • Temp -> Temporary
  • Term -> Termination/Terminated
  • Tkt -> Ticket
  • Tgt -> Target
  • Unkwn -> Unknown
  • Usr -> User
  • Perm -> Permament
  • Pkg -> Package
  • Priv -> Privilege
  • Proc -> Process
  • PID -> Process ID
  • PGUID -> Process GUID (Global Unique ID)
  • Ver -> Version

Detection field

Selection fundamentals

First, the fundamentals of how to create a selection rule will be explained.

How to write AND and OR logic

To write AND logic, we use nested dictionaries. The detection rule below defines that both conditions have to be true in order for the rule to match.

  • EventID has to exactly be 7040.
  • AND
  • Channel has to exactly be System.
detection:
    selection:
        Event.System.EventID: 7040
        Event.System.Channel: System
    condition: selection

To write OR logic, we use lists (Dictionaries that start with -). In the detection rule below, either one of the conditions will result in the rule being triggered.

  • EventID has to exactly be 7040.
  • OR
  • Channel has to exactly be System.
detection:
    selection:
        - Event.System.EventID: 7040
        - Event.System.Channel: System
    condition: selection

We can also combine AND and OR logic as shown below. In this case, the rule matches when the following two conditions are both true.

  • EventID is either exactly 7040 OR 7041.
  • AND
  • Channel is exactly System.
detection:
    selection:
        Event.System.EventID:
          - 7040
          - 7041
        Event.System.Channel: System
    condition: selection

Eventkeys

The following is an excerpt of a Windows event log, formatted in the original XML. The Event.System.Channel field in the rule file example above refers to the original XML tag: <Event><System><Channel>System<Channel><System></Event> Nested XML tags are replaced by tag names seperated by dots (.). In hayabusa rules, these field strings connected together with dots are refered to as eventkeys.

<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'>
    <System>
        <EventID>7040</EventID>
        <Channel>System</Channel>
    </System>
    <EventData>
        <Data Name='param1'>Background Intelligent Transfer Service</Data>
        <Data Name='param2'>auto start</Data>
    </EventData>
</Event>

Eventkey Aliases

Long eventkeys with many . seperations are common, so hayabusa will use aliases to make them easier to work with. Aliases are defined in the rules/config/eventkey_alias.txt file. This file is a CSV file made up of alias and event_key mappings. You can rewrite the rule above as shown below with aliases making the rule easier to read.

detection:
    selection:
        Channel: System
        EventID: 7040
    condition: selection

Caution: Undefined Eventkey Aliases

Not all eventkey aliases are defined in rules/config/eventkey_alias.txt. If you are not getting the correct data in the details (Alert details) message, and instead are getting n/a (not available) or if the selection in your detection logic is not working properly, then you may need to update rules/config/eventkey_alias.txt with a new alias.

How to use XML attributes in conditions

XML elements may have attributes set by adding a space to the element. For example, Name in Provider Name below is an XML attribute of the Provider element.

<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'>
    <System>
        <Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing' Guid='{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}'/>
        <EventID>4672</EventID>
        <EventRecordID>607469</EventRecordID>
        <Channel>Security</Channel>
        <Security />
    </System>
</Event>

To specify XML attributes in an eventkey, use the format {eventkey}_attributes.{attribute_name}. For example, to specify the Name attribute of the Provider element in a rule file, it would look like this:

detection:
    selection:
        Channel: Security
        EventID: 4672
        Event.System.Provider_attributes.Name: 'Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing'
    condition: selection

grep search

Hayabusa can perform grep searches in Windows event log files by not specifying any eventkeys.

To do a grep search, specify the detection as shown below. In this case, if the strings mimikatz or metasploit are included in the Windows Event log, it will match. It is also possible to specify wildcards.

detection:
    selection:
        - mimikatz
        - metasploit

Note: Hayabusa internally converts Windows event log data to JSON format before processing the data so it is not possible to match on XML tags.

EventData

Windows event logs are divided into two parts: the System part where the fundamental data (Event ID, Timestamp, Record ID, Log name (Channel)) is written, and the EventData or UserData part where arbitrary data is written depending on the Event ID. One problem that arises often is that the names of the fields nested in EventData are all called Data so the eventkeys described so far cannot distinguish between SubjectUserSid and SubjectUserName.

<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'>
    <System>
        <EventID>5379</EventID>
        <TimeCreated SystemTime='2021-10-20T10:16:18.7782563Z' />
        <EventRecordID>607469</EventRecordID>
        <Channel>Security</Channel>
        <Security />
    </System>
    <EventData>
        <Data Name='SubjectUserSid'>S-1-1-11-1111111111-111111111-1111111111-1111</Data>
        <Data Name='SubjectUserName'>hayabusa</Data>
        <Data Name='SubjectDomainName'>DESKTOP-HAYABUSA</Data>
        <Data Name='SubjectLogonId'>0x11111111</Data>
    </EventData>
</Event>

To deal with this problem, you can specify the value assigned in Data Name. For example, if you want to use SubjectUserName and SubjectDomainName in the EventData as a condition of a rule, you can describe it as follows:

detection:
    selection:
        Channel: System
        EventID: 7040
        Event.EventData.SubjectUserName: hayabusa
        Event.EventData.SubjectDomainName: DESKTOP-HAYBUSA
    condition: selection

Abnormal patterns in EventData

Some of the tags nested in EventData do not have a Name attribute.

<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'>
    <System>
        <EventID>5379</EventID>
        <Channel>Security</Channel>
        <Security />
    </System>
    <EventData>
        <Data>Available</Data>
        <Data>None</Data>
        <Data>NewEngineState=Available PreviousEngineState=None (...)</Data>
    </EventData>
</Event>

To detect an event log like the one above, you can specify an eventkey named Data. In this case, the condition will match as long as any one of the nested Data tags equals None.

detection:
    selection:
        Channel: Security
        EventID: 5379
        Data: None
    condition: selection

Outputting field data from multiple field names with the same name

Some events will save their data to field names all called Data like in the previous example. If you specify %Data% in details:, all of the data will be outputted in an array.

For example: ["rundll32.exe","6.1.7600.16385","4a5bc637","KERNELBASE.dll","6.1.7601.23392","56eb2fb9","c0000005"]

If you want to print out just the first Data field data, you can specify %Data[1]% in your details: alert string and only rundll32.exe will be outputted.

Field Modifiers

A pipe character can be used with eventkeys as shown below for matching strings. All of the conditions we have described so far use exact matches, but by using field modifiers, you can describe more flexible detection rules. In the following example, if a value of Data contains the string EngineVersion=2, it will match the condition.

detection:
    selection:
        Channel: 'Windows PowerShell'
        EventID: 400
        Data|contains: 'EngineVersion=2'
    condition: selection

String matches are case insensitive. However, they become case sensitive whenever |re or |equalsfield are used.

Supported Sigma Field Modifiers

You can check the current status of all of the supported and unsupported field modifiers as well as how many times these modifiers are used in Sigma and Hayabusa rules at https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-rules/blob/main/doc/SupportedSigmaFieldModifiers.md . This document is updated every time there is an update to Sigma or Hayabusa rules.

  • '|all':: This field modifier is different from those above because it does not get applied to a certain field but to all fields.

    In this example, both strings Keyword-1 and Keyword-2 need to exist but can exist anywhere in any field:

    detection:
    keywords:
        '|all':
            - 'Keyword-1'
            - 'Keyword-2'
    condition: keywords

  • |base64offset|contains: Data will be encoded to base64 in three different ways depending on its position in the encoded string. This modifier will encoded a string to all three variations and check if the string is encoded somewhere in the base64 string.

  • |cased: Make the search case-sensitive.

  • |cidr: Matches on a IPv4 or IPv6 CIDR notation (Ex: 192.0.2.0/24)

  • |contains: Checks if a word is contained in the data

  • |contains|all: Checks if multiple words are contained in the data

  • |contains|all|windash: Same as |contains|windash but all of the keywords need to be present.

  • |contains|windash: Will check the string as-is, as well as convert the first - character to a / character and check that variation as well.

  • |endswith: Checks the end of the string.

  • |endswith|windash: Checks the end of the string and performs variations for dashes.

  • |exists: Checks if a field exists.

  • |fieldref: Checks to see if the values in two fields are the same. This is the same as the |equalsfield modifier.

  • |re: Use case-sensitive regular expressions. (We are using the regex crate so please out the documentation at https://docs.rs/regex/latest/regex/#syntax to learn how to write supported regular expressions.)

    Caution: Regular expression syntax in Sigma rules uses PCRE with certain metacharacters for character classes, lookbehind, atomic grouping, etc... being unsupported. The Rust regex crate should be able to use all regular expressions in Sigma rules but there is a possibility of incompatibility.

  • |re|i: (Insensitive) Use case-insensitive regular expressions.

  • |re|m: (Multi-line) Match across multiple lines. ^ / $ match the start/end of line.

  • |re|s: (Single-line) dot (.) matches all characters, including the newline character.

  • |startswith: Checks the string from the beginning.

Extra Field Modifiers

The following modifiers are not in the sigma specification but have been added for very specific use cases.

  • |equalsfield: Check if two fields have the same value. You can use not in the condition if you want to check if two fields are different.
  • |endswithfield: Check if the field on the left ends with the string of the field on the right. You can use not in the condition if they are different.

Unsupported Field Modifiers

The following modifiers are currently not supported, but currently only the |expand and |contains|expand modifiers are actually used in rules:

  • base64Ç€utf16be
  • base64Ç€utf16le
  • base64Ç€wide
  • contains|expand
  • expand
  • gt
  • gte
  • lt
  • lte

Wildcards

Wildcards can be used in eventkeys. In the example below, if ProcessCommandLine starts with the string "malware", the rule will match. The specification is fundamentally the same as sigma rule wildcards so will be case insensitive.

detection:
    selection:
        Channel: Security
        EventID: 4688
        ProcessCommandLine: malware*
    condition: selection

The following two wildcards can be used.

  • *: Matches any string of zero or more characters. (Internally it is converted to the regular expression .*)
  • ?: Matches any single character. (Internally converted to the regular expression .)

About escaping wildcards:

  • Wildcards (* and ?) can be escaped by using a backslash: \*, \?.
  • If you want to use a backslash right before a wildcard then write \\* or \\?.
  • Escaping is not required if you are using backslashes by themselves.

null keyword

The null keyword can be used to check if field does not exist.

detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4688
        ProcessCommandLine: null
    condition: selection

Note: This is different from ProcessCommandLine: '' which checks if the value of a field is empty.

condition

With the notation we explained above, you can express AND and OR logic but it will be confusing if you are trying to define complex logic. When you want to make more complex rules, you should use the condition keyword as shown below.

detection:
  SELECTION_1:
    EventID: 3
  SELECTION_2:
    Initiated: 'true'
  SELECTION_3:
    DestinationPort:
    - '4444'
    - '666'
  SELECTION_4:
    Image: '*\Program Files*'
  SELECTION_5:
    DestinationIp:
    - 10.*
    - 192.168.*
    - 172.16.*
    - 127.*
  SELECTION_6:
    DestinationIsIpv6: 'false'
  condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not ((SELECTION_4 or (SELECTION_5 and SELECTION_6))))

The following expressions can be used for condition.

  • {expression1} and {expression2}: Require both {expression1} AND {expression2}
  • {expression1} or {expression2}: Require either {expression1} OR {expression2}
  • not {expression}: Reverse the logic of {expression}
  • ( {expression} ): Set precedance of {expression}. It follows the same precedance logic as in mathematics.

In the above example, selection names such as SELECTION_1, SELECTION_2, etc... are used but they can be named anything as long as they only contain the following characters: a-z A-Z 0-9 _

However, please use the standard convention of selection_1, selection_2, filter_1, filter_2, etc... to make things easy to read whenever possible.

not logic

Many rules will result in false positives so it is very common to have a selection for signatures to search for but also a filter selection to not alert on false positives. For example:

detection:
    selection:
        Channel: Security
        EventID: 4673
    filter:
        - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe
        - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe
        - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\audiodg.exe
        - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
        - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\mmc.exe
        - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe
        - ProcessName: C:\Windows\explorer.exe
        - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\SettingSyncHost.exe
        - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\sdiagnhost.exe
        - ProcessName|startswith: C:\Program Files
        - SubjectUserName: LOCAL SERVICE
    condition: selection and not filter

Sigma correlations

We have implemented half of the Sigma version 2 correlations as defined here.

Supported correlations:

  • Event Count (event_count)
  • Value Count (value_count)

Unsupported correlations:

  • Temporal Proximity (temporal)
  • Ordered Temporal Proximity (temporal_ordered)

Event Count rules

These are rules that count certain events and alert if too many or not enough number of these events occur within a timeframe. Common examples of detecting many events within a certain time period are for detecting password guessing attacks, password spray attacks and denial of service attacks. You could also use these rules to detect log source reliability issues, such as when certain events fall below a certain threshold.

Event Count rule example:

The following example uses two rules to detect password guessing attacks. There will be an alert when the referenced rule matches 5 or more times within 5 minutes and the IpAddress field is the same for those events.

Note that we have only included the necessary fields in order to understand the concept. The full rule that this example is based on is located here for your reference.

Event Count correlation rule:

title: PW Guessing
id: 23179f25-6fce-4827-bae1-b219deaf563e
correlation:
    type: event_count
    rules:
        - 5b0b75dc-9190-4047-b9a8-14164cee8a31
    group-by:
        - IpAddress
    timespan: 5m
    condition:
        gte: 5

Failed Logon - Incorrect Password rule:

title: Failed Logon - Incorrect Password
id: 5b0b75dc-9190-4047-b9a8-14164cee8a31
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        Channel: Security
        EventID: 4625
        SubStatus: "0xc000006a" #Wrong password
    filter:
       IpAddress: "-"
    condition: selection and not filter

Deprecated count rule example:

The above correlation and referenced rules provide the same results as the following rule which uses the older count modifier:

title: PW Guessing
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        Channel: Security
        EventID: 4625
        SubStatus: "0xc000006a" #Wrong password
    filter:
       IpAddress: "-"
    condition: selection and not filter | count() by IpAddress >= 5
    timeframe: 5m

Event Count rule output:

The rules above will create the following output:

% ./hayabusa csv-timeline -d ../hayabusa-sample-evtx -r password-guessing-sample.yml -w
% 
Timestamp · RuleTitle · Level · Computer · Channel · EventID · RecordID · Details · ExtraFieldInfo
2016-09-20 01:50:06.513 +09:00 · PW Guessing · med · DESKTOP-M5SN04R · Sec · 4625 · - · Count: 3558 ¦ IpAddress: 192.168.198.149 · -

Value Count rules

These rules counts the same events within a time frame with different values of a given field.

Examples:

  • Network scans where a single source IP address tries to connect to many different destination IP addresses and/or ports.
  • Password spraying attacks where a single source fails to authenticate with many different users.
  • Detect tools like BloodHound that enumerate many high-privilege AD groups within a short time frame.

Value Count rule example:

The following rule detects when an attacker is trying to guess usernames. That is, when the same source IP address (IpAddress) fails to logon with more than 3 different usernames (TargetUserName) within 5 minutes.

Note that we have only included the necessary fields in order to understand the concept. The full rule that this example is based on is located here for your reference.

Value Count correlation rule:

title: User Guessing
id: 0ae09af3-f30f-47c2-a31c-83e0b918eeee
correlation:
    type: value_count
    rules:
        - b2c74582-0d44-49fe-8faa-014dcdafee62
    group-by:
        - IpAddress
    timespan: 5m
    condition:
        gt: 3
        field: TargetUserName

Value Count Logon Failure (Non-existant User) rule:

title: Failed Logon - Non-Existant User
id: b2c74582-0d44-49fe-8faa-014dcdafee62
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        Channel: Security
        EventID: 4625
        SubStatus: "0xc0000064" #Username does not exist
    condition: selection

Deprecated count modifier rule:

The above correlation and referenced rules provide the same results as the following rule which uses the older count modifier:

title: User Guessing
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        Channel: Security
        EventID: 4625
        SubStatus: "0xc0000064" #Username does not exist
    condition: selection | count(TargetUserName) by IpAddress > 3 
    timeframe: 5m

Value Count rule output:

The rules above will create the following output:

2018-08-23 23:24:22.523 +09:00 · User Guessing · med · dmz-ftp · Sec · 4625 · - · Count: 4 ¦ TargetUserName: ninja-labs/root/[email protected]/sarutobi ¦ IpAddress: - ¦ LogonType: 8 ¦ TargetDomainName:  ¦ ProcessName: C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe ¦ LogonProcessName: Advapi ¦ WorkstationName: DMZ-FTP · -

2018-08-28 08:03:13.770 +09:00 · User Guessing · med · dmz-ftp · Sec · 4625 · - · Count: 4 ¦ TargetUserName: root/[email protected]/sarutobi/[email protected] ¦ IpAddress: - ¦ LogonType: 8 ¦ TargetDomainName:  ¦ ProcessName: C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe ¦ LogonProcessName: Advapi ¦ WorkstationName: DMZ-FTP · -

2018-09-01 12:51:58.346 +09:00 · User Guessing · med · dmz-ftp · Sec · 4625 · - · Count: 4 ¦ TargetUserName: root/[email protected]/admin/[email protected] ¦ IpAddress: - ¦ LogonType: 8 ¦ TargetDomainName:  ¦ ProcessName: C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe ¦ LogonProcessName: Advapi ¦ WorkstationName: DMZ-FTP · -

2018-09-02 03:55:13.007 +09:00 · User Guessing · med · dmz-ftp · Sec · 4625 · - · Count: 4 ¦ TargetUserName: root/[email protected]/[email protected]/admin ¦ IpAddress: - ¦ LogonType: 8 ¦ TargetDomainName:  ¦ ProcessName: C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe ¦ LogonProcessName: Advapi ¦ WorkstationName: DMZ-FTP · -

Notes on correlation rules

  1. You should include all of your correlation and referenced rules in a single file and separate them with a YAML separator of ---.

  2. By default, referenced correlation rules will not be outputted. If you want to see the output of the referenced rules, then you need to add generate: true under correlation. This is very useful to turn on and check when creating correlation rules.

    Example:

    correlation:
    generate: true

  3. You can use alias names instead of rule IDs when referencing rules in order to make things easier to understand.

  4. You can reference multiple rules.

  5. You can use multiple fields in group-by. If you do, then all of the values in those fields need to be the same or else you will not get an alert. Most of the time, you will write rules that filter on certain fields with group-by in order to reduce false positives, however, it is possible to omit group-by to create a more generic rule.

  6. The timestamp of the correlation rule will be the very beginning of the attack so you should check events after that to confirm if it is a false positive or not.

Deprecated features

These features are still supported in Hayabusa but will not be used inside rules in the future.

Nesting keywords inside eventkeys

Eventkeys can be nested with specific keywords. In the example below, the rule will match if the following are true:

  • ServiceName is called malicious-service or contains a regular expression in ./rules/config/regex/detectlist_suspicous_services.txt.
  • ImagePath has a minimum of 1000 characters.
  • ImagePath does not have any matches in the allowlist.
detection:
    selection:
        Channel: System
        EventID: 7045
        ServiceName:
            - value: malicious-service
            - regexes: ./rules/config/regex/detectlist_suspicous_services.txt
        ImagePath:
            min_length: 1000
            allowlist: ./rules/config/regex/allowlist_legitimate_services.txt
    condition: selection

Currently, the following keywords can be specified:

  • value: matches by string (wildcards and pipes can also be specified).
  • min_length: matches when the number of characters is greater than or equal to the specified number.
  • regexes: matches if one of the regular expressions in the file that you specify in this field matches.
  • allowlist: rule will be skipped if there is any match found in the list of regular expressions in the file that you specify in this field.

regexes and allowlist keywords

Hayabusa had two built-in regular expression files used for the ./rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/System/7045_CreateOrModiftySystemProcess-WindowsService_MaliciousServiceInstalled.yml file:

  • ./rules/config/regex/detectlist_suspicous_services.txt: to detect suspicious service names
  • ./rules/config/regex/allowlist_legitimate_services.txt: to allow legitimate services

Files defined in regexes and allowlist can be edited to change the behavior of all rules that reference them without having to change any rule file itself.

You can also use different detectlist and allowlist textfiles that you create.

Aggregation conditions (Count rules)

This is still supported in Hayabusa but will be replaced by Sigma correlation rules in the future.

Basics

The condition keyword described above implements not only AND and OR logic, but is also able to count or "aggregate" events. This function is called the "aggregation condition" and is specified by connecting a condition with a pipe. In this password spray detection example below, a conditional expression is used to determine if there are 5 or more TargetUserName values from one source IpAddress within a time frame of 5 minutes.

detection:
  selection:
    Channel: Security
    EventID: 4648
  condition: selection | count(TargetUserName) by IpAddress > 5
  timeframe: 5m

Aggregation conditions can be defined in the following format:

  • count() {operator} {number}: For log events that match the first condition before the pipe, the condition will match if the number of matched logs satisfies the condition expression specified by {operator} and {number}.

{operator} can be one of the following:

  • ==: If the value is equal to the specified value, it is treated as matching the condition.
  • >=: If the value is greater than or equal to the specified value, the condition is considered to have been met.
  • >: If the value is greater than the specified value, the condition is considered to have been met.
  • <=: If the value is less than or equal to the specified value, the condition is considered to have been met.
  • <: If the value is less than the specified value, it will be treated as if the condition is met.

{number} must be a number.

timeframe can be defined in the following:

  • 15s: 15 seconds
  • 30m: 30 minutes
  • 12h: 12 hours
  • 7d: 7 days
  • 3M: 3 months

Four patterns for aggregation conditions

  1. No count argument or by keyword. Example: selection | count() > 10

    If selection matches more than 10 times within the time frame, the condition will match. These are replaced by Event Count correlation rules that do not use the group-by field.

  2. No count argument but there is a by keyword. Example: selection | count() by IpAddress > 10

    selection will have to be true more than 10 times for the same IpAddress. These #2 rules are more common than the #1 rules. You can also specify multiple fields to group by. For example: by IpAddress, Computer These are replaced by Event Count correlation rules that do use the group-by field.

  3. There is a count argument but no by keyword. Example: selection | count(TargetUserName) > 10

    If selection matches and TargetUserName is different more than 10 times within the time frame, the condition will match. These are replaced by Value Count correlation rules that do not use the group-by field.

  4. There is both a count argument and by keyword. Example: selection | count(Users) by IpAddress > 10

    For the same IpAddress, there will need to be more than 10 different TargetUserName in order for the condition to match. These #4 rules are more common than the #3 rules. These are replaced by Value Count correlation rules that use the group-by field.

Pattern 1 example

This is the most basic pattern: count() {operator} {number}. The rule below will match if selection happens 3 or more times.

Pattern 2 example

count() by {eventkey} {operator} {number}: Log events that match the condition before the pipe are grouped by the same {eventkey}. If the number of matched events for each grouping satisfies the condition specified by {operator} and {number}, then the condition will match.

Pattern 3 example

count({eventkey}) {operator} {number}: Counts how many different values of {eventkey} exist in the log event that match the condition before the condition pipe. If the number satisfies the conditional expression specified in {operator} and {number}, the condition is considered to have been met.

Pattern 4 example

count({eventkey_1}) by {eventkey_2} {operator} {number}: The logs that match the condition before the condition pipe are grouped by the same {eventkey_2}, and the number of different values of {eventkey_1} in each group is counted. If the values counted for each grouping satisfy the conditional expression specified by {operator} and {number}, the condition will match.

Count rule output

The details output for count rules is fixed and will print the original count condition in [condition] followed by the recorded eventkeys in [result].

In the example below, a list of TargetUserName usernames that were being bruteforced followed by the source IpAddress:

[condition] count(TargetUserName) by IpAddress >= 5 in timeframe [result] count:41 TargetUserName:jorchilles/jlake/cspizor/lpesce/bgalbraith/jkulikowski/baker/eskoudis/dpendolino/sarmstrong/lschifano/drook/rbowes/ebooth/melliott/econrad/sanson/dmashburn/bking/mdouglas/cragoso/psmith/bhostetler/zmathis/thessman/kperryman/cmoody/cdavis/cfleener/gsalinas/wstrzelec/jwright/edygert/ssims/jleytevidal/celgee/Administrator/mtoussain/smisenar/tbennett/bgreenwood IpAddress:10.10.2.22 timeframe:5m

The timestamp of the alert will be the time from the first event detected.

Rule creation advice

  1. When possible, always specify the Channel or ProviderName name and the EventID number. By default, only the event IDs listed in ./rules/config/target_event_IDs.txt will be scanned so you may need to add a new EventID number to this file if the EID is not already in there.

  2. Please do not use multiple selection or filter fields and excessive grouping when it is not needed. For example:

Instead of

detection:
    SELECTION_1:
        Channnel: Security
    SELECTION_2:
        EventID: 4625
    SELECTION_3:
        LogonType: 3
    FILTER_1:
        SubStatus: "0xc0000064"   #Non-existent user
    FILTER_2:
        SubStatus: "0xc000006a"   #Wrong password
    condition: SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and not (FILTER_1 or FILTER_2)

Please do this

detection:
    selection:
        Channel: Security
        EventID: 4625
        LogonType: 3
    filter:
        - SubStatus: "0xc0000064"   #Non-existent user
        - SubStatus: "0xc000006a"   #Wrong password
    condition: selection and not filter
  1. When you need multiple sections, please name the first section with channel and event ID information in the section_basic section and other selections with meaningful names after section_ and filter_. Also, please write comments to explain anything difficult to understand. For example:

Instead of

detection:
    Takoyaki:
        Channel: Security
        EventID: 4648
    Naruto:
        TargetUserName|endswith: "$"
        IpAddress: "-"
    Sushi:
        SubjectUserName|endswith: "$"
        TargetUserName|endswith: "$"
        TargetInfo|endswith: "$"
    Godzilla:
        SubjectUserName|endswith: "$"
    Ninja:
        TargetUserName|re: "(DWM|UMFD)-([0-9]|1[0-2])$"
        IpAddress: "-"
    Daisuki:
        - ProcessName|endswith: "powershell.exe"
        - ProcessName|endswith: "WMIC.exe"
    condition: Takoyaki and Daisuki and not (Naruto and not Godzilla) and not Ninja and not Sushi

Please do this

detection:
    selection_basic:
        Channel: Security
        EventID: 4648
    selection_TargetUserIsComputerAccount:
        TargetUserName|endswith: "$"
        IpAddress: "-"
    filter_UsersAndTargetServerAreComputerAccounts:     #Filter system noise
        SubjectUserName|endswith: "$"
        TargetUserName|endswith: "$"
        TargetInfo|endswith: "$"
    filter_SubjectUserIsComputerAccount:
        SubjectUserName|endswith: "$"
    filter_SystemAccounts:
        TargetUserName|re: "(DWM|UMFD)-([0-9]|1[0-2])$" #Filter out default Desktop Windows Manager and User Mode Driver Framework accounts
        IpAddress: "-"                                  #Don't filter if the IP address is remote to catch attackers who created backdoor accounts that look like DWM-12, etc..
    selection_SuspiciousProcess:
        - ProcessName|endswith: "powershell.exe"
        - ProcessName|endswith: "WMIC.exe"
    condition: selection_basic and selection_SuspiciousProcess and not (selection_TargetUserIsComputerAccount
               and not filter_SubjectUserIsComputerAccount) and not filter_SystemAccounts and not filter_UsersAndTargetServerAreComputerAccounts

Converting Sigma rules to Hayabusa format

We have created a backend to convert rules from Sigma to Hayabusa-compatible format here.

Twitter

You can recieve the latest news about Hayabusa, rule updates, other Yamato Security tools, etc... by following us on Twitter at @SecurityYamato.

About

Curated Windows event log Sigma rules used in Hayabusa and Velociraptor.

Topics

windows attack log analysis event dfir mitre sigma hayabusa

Resources

Readme

License

View license
Activity
Custom properties

Stars

144 stars

Watchers

9 watching

Forks

23 forks
Report repository

Releases 28

v2.18.0 Latest
Nov 3, 2024
+ 27 releases

Packages

No packages published

Contributors 12

Languages