Merge pull request #150 from nikpivkin/go2rego-aws-1

refactor(checks): migrate AWS accessanalyzer, athena, cloudfront to Rego

.github/actions/setup-opa/action.yaml

@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ description: Setup OPA CLI
 runs:
   using: composite
   steps:
-    - name: Setup OPA v0.58.0
+    - name: Setup OPA
       shell: bash
       run: |
-        curl --retry 3 -L -o opa_linux_amd64_static https://github.com/open-policy-agent/opa/releases/download/v0.58.0/opa_linux_amd64_static 
-        curl -L -o checksum https://github.com/open-policy-agent/opa/releases/download/v0.58.0/opa_linux_amd64_static.sha256
+        curl --retry 3 -L -o opa_linux_amd64_static https://github.com/open-policy-agent/opa/releases/download/v0.65.0/opa_linux_amd64_static 
+        curl -L -o checksum https://github.com/open-policy-agent/opa/releases/download/v0.65.0/opa_linux_amd64_static.sha256
         sha256sum -c checksum
         chmod 755 ./opa_linux_amd64_static
         sudo mv ./opa_linux_amd64_static /usr/local/bin/opa

avd_docs/aws/accessanalyzer/AVD-AWS-0175/docs.md

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
 
-
 AWS IAM Access Analyzer helps you identify the resources in your organization and
 accounts, such as Amazon S3 buckets or IAM roles, that are shared with an external entity.
 This lets you identify unintended access to your resources and data. Access Analyzer
@@ -10,7 +9,7 @@ keys, AWS Lambda functions, and Amazon SQS(Simple Queue Service) queues.
 
 
 ### Impact
-Reduced visibility of externally shared resources.
+<!-- Add Impact here -->
 
 <!-- DO NOT CHANGE -->
 {{ remediationActions }}

avd_docs/aws/athena/AVD-AWS-0006/docs.md

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 
-Athena databases and workspace result sets should be encrypted at rests. These databases and query sets are generally derived from data in S3 buckets and should have the same level of at rest protection.
+Data can be read if the Athena Database is compromised. Athena databases and workspace result sets should be encrypted at rests. These databases and query sets are generally derived from data in S3 buckets and should have the same level of at rest protection.
+
 
 ### Impact
-Data can be read if the Athena Database is compromised
+<!-- Add Impact here -->
 
 <!-- DO NOT CHANGE -->
 {{ remediationActions }}

avd_docs/aws/athena/AVD-AWS-0007/docs.md

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 
-Athena workgroup configuration should be enforced to prevent client side changes to disable encryption settings.
+Clients can ignore encryption requirements without enforced configuration. Athena workgroup configuration should be enforced to prevent client side changes to disable encryption settings.
+
 
 ### Impact
-Clients can ignore encryption requirements
+<!-- Add Impact here -->
 
 <!-- DO NOT CHANGE -->
 {{ remediationActions }}

avd_docs/aws/cloudtrail/AVD-AWS-0014/docs.md

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 
-When creating Cloudtrail in the AWS Management Console the trail is configured by default to be multi-region, this isn't the case with the Terraform resource. Cloudtrail should cover the full AWS account to ensure you can track changes in regions you are not actively operting in.
+Activity could be happening in your account in a different region. When creating Cloudtrail in the AWS Management Console the trail is configured by default to be multi-region, this isn't the case with the Terraform resource. Cloudtrail should cover the full AWS account to ensure you can track changes in regions you are not actively operting in.
+
 
 ### Impact
-Activity could be happening in your account in a different region
+<!-- Add Impact here -->
 
 <!-- DO NOT CHANGE -->
 {{ remediationActions }}

avd_docs/aws/cloudtrail/AVD-AWS-0015/docs.md

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 
-Using Customer managed keys provides comprehensive control over cryptographic keys, enabling management of policies, permissions, and rotation, thus enhancing security and compliance measures for sensitive data and systems.
+Using AWS managed keys does not allow for fine grained control.  Using Customer managed keys provides comprehensive control over cryptographic keys, enabling management of policies, permissions, and rotation, thus enhancing security and compliance measures for sensitive data and systems.
+
 
 ### Impact
-Using AWS managed keys does not allow for fine grained control
+<!-- Add Impact here -->
 
 <!-- DO NOT CHANGE -->
 {{ remediationActions }}

avd_docs/aws/cloudtrail/AVD-AWS-0016/docs.md

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 
-Log validation should be activated on Cloudtrail logs to prevent the tampering of the underlying data in the S3 bucket. It is feasible that a rogue actor compromising an AWS account might want to modify the log data to remove trace of their actions.
+Illicit activity could be removed from the logs. Log validation should be activated on Cloudtrail logs to prevent the tampering of the underlying data in the S3 bucket. It is feasible that a rogue actor compromising an AWS account might want to modify the log data to remove trace of their actions.
+
 
 ### Impact
-Illicit activity could be removed from the logs
+<!-- Add Impact here -->
 
 <!-- DO NOT CHANGE -->
 {{ remediationActions }}

avd_docs/aws/cloudtrail/AVD-AWS-0161/docs.md

@@ -1,10 +1,9 @@
 
-
-CloudTrail logs a record of every API call made in your account. These log files are stored in an S3 bucket. CIS recommends that the S3 bucket policy, or access control list (ACL), applied to the S3 bucket that CloudTrail logs to prevents public access to the CloudTrail logs. Allowing public access to CloudTrail log content might aid an adversary in identifying weaknesses in the affected account's use or configuration.
+CloudTrail logs will be publicly exposed, potentially containing sensitive information. CloudTrail logs a record of every API call made in your account. These log files are stored in an S3 bucket. CIS recommends that the S3 bucket policy, or access control list (ACL), applied to the S3 bucket that CloudTrail logs to prevents public access to the CloudTrail logs. Allowing public access to CloudTrail log content might aid an adversary in identifying weaknesses in the affected account's use or configuration.
 
 
 ### Impact
-CloudTrail logs will be publicly exposed, potentially containing sensitive information
+<!-- Add Impact here -->
 
 <!-- DO NOT CHANGE -->
 {{ remediationActions }}

avd_docs/aws/cloudtrail/AVD-AWS-0162/docs.md

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 
+Realtime log analysis is not available without enabling CloudWatch logging.
 
 CloudTrail is a web service that records AWS API calls made in a given account. The recorded information includes the identity of the API caller, the time of the API call, the source IP address of the API caller, the request parameters, and the response elements returned by the AWS service.
 
@@ -8,7 +9,7 @@ For a trail that is enabled in all Regions in an account, CloudTrail sends log f
 
 
 ### Impact
-Realtime log analysis is not available without enabling CloudWatch logging
+<!-- Add Impact here -->
 
 <!-- DO NOT CHANGE -->
 {{ remediationActions }}

avd_docs/aws/cloudtrail/AVD-AWS-0163/docs.md

@@ -1,13 +1,11 @@
 
 Amazon S3 bucket access logging generates a log that contains access records for each request made to your S3 bucket. An access log record contains details about the request, such as the request type, the resources specified in the request worked, and the time and date the request was processed.
-
 CIS recommends that you enable bucket access logging on the CloudTrail S3 bucket.
-
 By enabling S3 bucket logging on target S3 buckets, you can capture all events that might affect objects in a target bucket. Configuring logs to be placed in a separate bucket enables access to log information, which can be useful in security and incident response workflows.
 
 
 ### Impact
-There is no way to determine the access to this bucket
+<!-- Add Impact here -->
 
 <!-- DO NOT CHANGE -->
 {{ remediationActions }}

checks/cloud/aws/accessanalyzer/enable_access_analyzer.go

@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ keys, AWS Lambda functions, and Amazon SQS(Simple Queue Service) queues.
 		Links: []string{
 			"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html",
 		},
-		Severity: severity.Low,
+		Severity:   severity.Low,
+		Deprecated: true,
 	},
 	func(s *state.State) (results scan.Results) {
 		var enabled bool

checks/cloud/aws/accessanalyzer/enable_access_analyzer.rego

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+# METADATA
+# title: Enable IAM Access analyzer for IAM policies about all resources in each region.
+# description: |
+#   AWS IAM Access Analyzer helps you identify the resources in your organization and
+#   accounts, such as Amazon S3 buckets or IAM roles, that are shared with an external entity.
+#   This lets you identify unintended access to your resources and data. Access Analyzer
+#   identifies resources that are shared with external principals by using logic-based reasoning
+#   to analyze the resource-based policies in your AWS environment. IAM Access Analyzer
+#   continuously monitors all policies for S3 bucket, IAM roles, KMS(Key Management Service)
+#   keys, AWS Lambda functions, and Amazon SQS(Simple Queue Service) queues.
+# scope: package
+# schemas:
+#   - input: schema["cloud"]
+# related_resources:
+#   - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html
+# custom:
+#   id: AVD-AWS-0175
+#   avd_id: AVD-AWS-0175
+#   provider: aws
+#   service: accessanalyzer
+#   severity: LOW
+#   short_code: enable-access-analyzer
+#   recommended_action: Enable IAM Access analyzer across all regions.
+#   frameworks:
+#     cis-aws-1.4:
+#       - "1.20"
+#   input:
+#     selector:
+#       - type: cloud
+#         subtypes:
+#           - service: accessanalyzer
+#             provider: aws
+package builtin.aws.accessanalyzer.aws0175
+
+import rego.v1
+
+deny contains res if {
+	not has_active_analyzer
+	res := result.new("Access Analyzer is not enabled.", {})
+}
+
+has_active_analyzer if {
+	some analyzer in input.aws.accessanalyzer.analyzers
+	analyzer.active.value
+}

checks/cloud/aws/accessanalyzer/enable_access_analyzer_test.rego

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+package builtin.aws.accessanalyzer.aws0175_test
+
+import rego.v1
+
+import data.builtin.aws.accessanalyzer.aws0175 as check
+import data.lib.test
+
+test_disallow_no_analyzers if {
+	r := check.deny with input as {"aws": {"accessanalyzer": {"analyzers": []}}}
+	test.assert_equal_message("Access Analyzer is not enabled.", r)
+}
+
+test_disallow_analyzer_disabled if {
+	r := check.deny with input as {"aws": {"accessanalyzer": {"analyzers": [{"active": {"value": false}}]}}}
+	test.assert_equal_message("Access Analyzer is not enabled.", r)
+}
+
+test_allow_one_of_analyzer_disabled if {
+	r := check.deny with input as {"aws": {"accessanalyzer": {"analyzers": [{"active": {"value": false}}, {"active": {"value": true}}]}}}
+	test.assert_empty(r)
+}
+
+test_allow_analyzer_enabled if {
+	r := check.deny with input as {"aws": {"accessanalyzer": {"analyzers": [{"active": {"value": true}}]}}}
+	test.assert_empty(r)
+}

checks/cloud/aws/athena/enable_at_rest_encryption.go

@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ var CheckEnableAtRestEncryption = rules.Register(
 			Links:               cloudFormationEnableAtRestEncryptionLinks,
 			RemediationMarkdown: cloudFormationEnableAtRestEncryptionRemediationMarkdown,
 		},
-		Severity: severity.High,
+		Severity:   severity.High,
+		Deprecated: true,
 	},
 	func(s *state.State) (results scan.Results) {
 		for _, workgroup := range s.AWS.Athena.Workgroups {

checks/cloud/aws/athena/enable_at_rest_encryption.rego

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# METADATA
+# title: Athena databases and workgroup configurations are created unencrypted at rest by default, they should be encrypted
+# description: |
+#   Data can be read if the Athena Database is compromised. Athena databases and workspace result sets should be encrypted at rests. These databases and query sets are generally derived from data in S3 buckets and should have the same level of at rest protection.
+# scope: package
+# schemas:
+#   - input: schema["cloud"]
+# related_resources:
+#   - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/athena/latest/ug/encryption.html
+# custom:
+#   id: AVD-AWS-0006
+#   avd_id: AVD-AWS-0006
+#   provider: aws
+#   service: athena
+#   severity: HIGH
+#   short_code: enable-at-rest-encryption
+#   recommended_action: Enable encryption at rest for Athena databases and workgroup configurations
+#   input:
+#     selector:
+#       - type: cloud
+#         subtypes:
+#           - service: athena
+#             provider: aws
+#   terraform:
+#     links:
+#       - https://registry.terraform.io/providers/hashicorp/aws/latest/docs/resources/athena_workgroup#encryption_configuration
+#       - https://registry.terraform.io/providers/hashicorp/aws/latest/docs/resources/athena_database#encryption_configuration
+#     good_examples: checks/cloud/aws/athena/enable_at_rest_encryption.tf.go
+#     bad_examples: checks/cloud/aws/athena/enable_at_rest_encryption.tf.go
+#   cloudformation:
+#     good_examples: checks/cloud/aws/athena/enable_at_rest_encryption.cf.go
+#     bad_examples: checks/cloud/aws/athena/enable_at_rest_encryption.cf.go
+package builtin.aws.athena.aws0006
+
+import rego.v1
+
+encryption_type_none := ""
+
+deny contains res if {
+	some workgroup in input.aws.athena.workgroups
+	is_encryption_type_none(workgroup.encryption)
+	res := result.new("Workgroup does not have encryption configured.", workgroup)
+}
+
+deny contains res if {
+	some database in input.aws.athena.databases
+	is_encryption_type_none(database.encryption)
+	res := result.new("Database does not have encryption configured.", database)
+}
+
+is_encryption_type_none(encryption) if {
+	encryption.type.value == encryption_type_none
+}