*: rebase changes from v4.4.6-coreos #13

crawford · 2016-04-05T17:01:42Z

No description provided.

Provide a single call to allow kernel code to determine whether the system has been configured to either disable module loading entirely or to load only modules signed with a trusted key. Bugzilla: N/A Upstream-status: Fedora mustard. Replaced by securelevels, but that was nak'd Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>

Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down from userspace in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code, allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing. Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>

IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO register space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary DMA, so lock it down by default. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>

custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making it possible for an attacker to circumvent restrictions on module loading. Disable it if any such restrictions have been enabled. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>

We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a given machine, and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to be manipulated in such a way that arbitrary code can be executed in the kernel, circumventing module loading restrictions. Prevent that if any of these features are enabled. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>

Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel to be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions. Prevent this when any restrictions have been imposed on loading modules. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>

…cted This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel, which makes it possible for a user to circumvent any restrictions imposed on loading modules. Disable it in that case. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <[email protected]>

…ictions kexec permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which is something that module signing enforcement is meant to prevent. It makes sense to disable kexec in this situation. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>

Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if module loading is restricted, since it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode. Based on a patch by Kees Cook. Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>

…Boot mode UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain use cases may also require that all kernel modules also be signed. Add a configuration option that enforces this automatically when enabled. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>

The functionality of the config option is dependent upon the platform being UEFI based. Reflect this in the config deps. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <[email protected]>

UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode. Add a EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit for use with efi_enabled. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <[email protected]>

There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning from hibernate. This might compromise the signed modules trust model, so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it in a secure modules environment. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <[email protected]>

Provide two new security hooks for use with security files that are used when a file is copied up between layers: (1) security_inode_copy_up(). This is called so that the security label on the destination file can be set appropriately. (2) security_inode_copy_up_xattr(). This is called so that each xattr being copied up can be vetted - including modification and discard. Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>

Use the copy-up security hooks previously provided to allow an LSM to adjust the security on a newly created copy and to filter the xattrs copied to that file copy. Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>

Provide stubs for union/overlay copy-up handling. The xattr copy up stub discards lower SELinux xattrs rather than letting them be copied up so that the security label on the copy doesn't get corrupted. Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>

Handle the opening of a unioned file by trying to derive the label that would be attached to the union-layer inode if it doesn't exist. If the union-layer inode does exist (as it necessarily does in overlayfs, but not in unionmount), we assume that it has the right label and use that. Otherwise we try to get it from the superblock. If the superblock has a globally-applied label, we use that, otherwise we try to transition to an appropriate label. This union label is then stored in the file_security_struct. We then perform an additional check to make sure that the calling task is granted permission by the union-layer inode label to open the file in addition to a check to make sure that the task is granted permission to open the lower file with the lower inode label. Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>

File operations (eg. read, write) issued against a file that is attached to the lower layer of a union file needs to be checked against the union-layer label not the lower layer label. The union label is stored in the file_security_struct rather than being retrieved from one of the inodes. Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>

Rather than always allocating the high-order XATTR_SIZE_MAX buffer which is costly and prone to failure, only allocate what is needed and realloc if necessary. Fixes coreos/bugs#489

This enables relocating source and build trees to different roots, provided they stay reachable relative to one another. Useful for builds done within a sandbox where the eventual root is prefixed by some undesirable path component.

If a user opens a file r/w on overlayfs, and if the underlying inode is currently still on the lower fs, right now we're verifying whether selinux policy permits writes to the selinux context on the underlying inode. This is suboptimal, since we don't want confined processes to be able to write to these files if they're able to escape from a container and so don't want to permit this in policy. Have overlayfs pass down an additional flag when verifying the permission on lower inodes, and mask off the write bits in the selinux permissions check if that flag is set.

mjg59 · 2016-04-05T17:32:36Z

LGTM

commit 919ab25 upstream. The musb driver calls into this phy driver to disable/enable squelch detection. This function was introduced in 24fe86a ("phy: sun4i-usb: Add a sunxi specific function for setting squelch-detect"). This function in turn calls sun4i_usb_phy_write, which uses a mutex to guard the common access register. Unfortunately musb does this in atomic context, which results in the following warning with lock debugging enabled: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:97 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 128, pid: 96, name: kworker/0:2 CPU: 0 PID: 96 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 4.8.0-rc4-00181-gd502f8ad1c3e #13 Hardware name: Allwinner sun8i Family Workqueue: events musb_deassert_reset [<c010bc01>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0109237>] (show_stack+0xb/0xc) [<c0109237>] (show_stack) from [<c02a669b>] (dump_stack+0x67/0x74) [<c02a669b>] (dump_stack) from [<c05d68c9>] (mutex_lock+0x15/0x2c) [<c05d68c9>] (mutex_lock) from [<c02c3589>] (sun4i_usb_phy_write+0x39/0xec) [<c02c3589>] (sun4i_usb_phy_write) from [<c03e6327>] (musb_port_reset+0xfb/0x184) [<c03e6327>] (musb_port_reset) from [<c03e4917>] (musb_deassert_reset+0x1f/0x2c) [<c03e4917>] (musb_deassert_reset) from [<c012ecb5>] (process_one_work+0x129/0x2b8) [<c012ecb5>] (process_one_work) from [<c012f5e3>] (worker_thread+0xf3/0x424) [<c012f5e3>] (worker_thread) from [<c0132dbd>] (kthread+0xa1/0xb8) [<c0132dbd>] (kthread) from [<c0105f31>] (ret_from_fork+0x11/0x20) Since the register access is mmio, we can use a spinlock to guard this specific access, rather than the mutex that guards the entire phy. Fixes: ba4bdc9 ("PHY: sunxi: Add driver for sunxi usb phy") Cc: Hans de Goede <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chen-Yu Tsai <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit b6bc1c7 upstream. Function ib_create_qp() was failing to return an error when rdma_rw_init_mrs() fails, causing a crash further down in ib_create_qp() when trying to dereferece the qp pointer which was actually a negative errno. The crash: crash> log|grep BUG [ 136.458121] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000098 crash> bt PID: 3736 TASK: ffff8808543215c0 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "kworker/u64:2" #0 [ffff88084d323340] machine_kexec at ffffffff8105fbb0 #1 [ffff88084d3233b0] __crash_kexec at ffffffff81116758 #2 [ffff88084d323480] crash_kexec at ffffffff8111682d #3 [ffff88084d3234b0] oops_end at ffffffff81032bd6 #4 [ffff88084d3234e0] no_context at ffffffff8106e431 #5 [ffff88084d323530] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8106e610 #6 [ffff88084d323590] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8106e6f4 #7 [ffff88084d3235a0] __do_page_fault at ffffffff8106ebdc #8 [ffff88084d323620] do_page_fault at ffffffff8106f057 #9 [ffff88084d323660] page_fault at ffffffff816e3148 [exception RIP: ib_create_qp+427] RIP: ffffffffa02554fb RSP: ffff88084d323718 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000004 RBX: fffffffffffffff4 RCX: 000000018020001f RDX: ffff880830997fc0 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88085f407200 RBP: ffff88084d323778 R8: 0000000000000001 R9: ffffea0020bae210 R10: ffffea0020bae218 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88084d3237c8 R13: 00000000fffffff4 R14: ffff880859fa5000 R15: ffff88082eb89800 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #10 [ffff88084d323780] rdma_create_qp at ffffffffa0782681 [rdma_cm] #11 [ffff88084d3237b0] nvmet_rdma_create_queue_ib at ffffffffa07c43f3 [nvmet_rdma] #12 [ffff88084d323860] nvmet_rdma_alloc_queue at ffffffffa07c5ba9 [nvmet_rdma] #13 [ffff88084d323900] nvmet_rdma_queue_connect at ffffffffa07c5c96 [nvmet_rdma] #14 [ffff88084d323980] nvmet_rdma_cm_handler at ffffffffa07c6450 [nvmet_rdma] #15 [ffff88084d3239b0] iw_conn_req_handler at ffffffffa0787480 [rdma_cm] #16 [ffff88084d323a60] cm_conn_req_handler at ffffffffa0775f06 [iw_cm] #17 [ffff88084d323ab0] process_event at ffffffffa0776019 [iw_cm] #18 [ffff88084d323af0] cm_work_handler at ffffffffa0776170 [iw_cm] #19 [ffff88084d323cb0] process_one_work at ffffffff810a1483 #20 [ffff88084d323d90] worker_thread at ffffffff810a211d #21 [ffff88084d323ec0] kthread at ffffffff810a6c5c #22 [ffff88084d323f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff816e1ebf Fixes: 632bc3f ("IB/core, RDMA RW API: Do not exceed QP SGE send limit") Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 4dfce57 upstream. There have been several reports over the years of NULL pointer dereferences in xfs_trans_log_inode during xfs_fsr processes, when the process is doing an fput and tearing down extents on the temporary inode, something like: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018 PID: 29439 TASK: ffff880550584fa0 CPU: 6 COMMAND: "xfs_fsr" [exception RIP: xfs_trans_log_inode+0x10] #9 [ffff8800a57bbbe0] xfs_bunmapi at ffffffffa037398e [xfs] #10 [ffff8800a57bbce8] xfs_itruncate_extents at ffffffffa0391b29 [xfs] #11 [ffff8800a57bbd88] xfs_inactive_truncate at ffffffffa0391d0c [xfs] #12 [ffff8800a57bbdb8] xfs_inactive at ffffffffa0392508 [xfs] #13 [ffff8800a57bbdd8] xfs_fs_evict_inode at ffffffffa035907e [xfs] #14 [ffff8800a57bbe00] evict at ffffffff811e1b67 #15 [ffff8800a57bbe28] iput at ffffffff811e23a5 #16 [ffff8800a57bbe58] dentry_kill at ffffffff811dcfc8 #17 [ffff8800a57bbe88] dput at ffffffff811dd06c #18 [ffff8800a57bbea8] __fput at ffffffff811c823b #19 [ffff8800a57bbef0] ____fput at ffffffff811c846e #20 [ffff8800a57bbf00] task_work_run at ffffffff81093b27 #21 [ffff8800a57bbf30] do_notify_resume at ffffffff81013b0c #22 [ffff8800a57bbf50] int_signal at ffffffff8161405d As it turns out, this is because the i_itemp pointer, along with the d_ops pointer, has been overwritten with zeros when we tear down the extents during truncate. When the in-core inode fork on the temporary inode used by xfs_fsr was originally set up during the extent swap, we mistakenly looked at di_nextents to determine whether all extents fit inline, but this misses extents generated by speculative preallocation; we should be using if_bytes instead. This mistake corrupts the in-memory inode, and code in xfs_iext_remove_inline eventually gets bad inputs, causing it to memmove and memset incorrect ranges; this became apparent because the two values in ifp->if_u2.if_inline_ext[1] contained what should have been in d_ops and i_itemp; they were memmoved due to incorrect array indexing and then the original locations were zeroed with memset, again due to an array overrun. Fix this by properly using i_df.if_bytes to determine the number of extents, not di_nextents. Thanks to dchinner for looking at this with me and spotting the root cause. Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 1c7de2b upstream. There is at least one Chelsio 10Gb card which uses VPD area to store some non-standard blocks (example below). However pci_vpd_size() returns the length of the first block only assuming that there can be only one VPD "End Tag". Since 4e1a635 ("vfio/pci: Use kernel VPD access functions"), VFIO blocks access beyond that offset, which prevents the guest "cxgb3" driver from probing the device. The host system does not have this problem as its driver accesses the config space directly without pci_read_vpd(). Add a quirk to override the VPD size to a bigger value. The maximum size is taken from EEPROMSIZE in drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb3/common.h. We do not read the tag as the cxgb3 driver does as the driver supports writing to EEPROM/VPD and when it writes, it only checks for 8192 bytes boundary. The quirk is registered for all devices supported by the cxgb3 driver. This adds a quirk to the PCI layer (not to the cxgb3 driver) as the cxgb3 driver itself accesses VPD directly and the problem only exists with the vfio-pci driver (when cxgb3 is not running on the host and may not be even loaded) which blocks accesses beyond the first block of VPD data. However vfio-pci itself does not have quirks mechanism so we add it to PCI. This is the controller: Ethernet controller [0200]: Chelsio Communications Inc T310 10GbE Single Port Adapter [1425:0030] This is what I parsed from its VPD: === b'\x82*\x0010 Gigabit Ethernet-SR PCI Express Adapter\x90J\x00EC\x07D76809 FN\x0746K' 0000 Large item 42 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String b'10 Gigabit Ethernet-SR PCI Express Adapter' 002d Large item 74 bytes; name 0x10 #00 [EC] len=7: b'D76809 ' #0a [FN] len=7: b'46K7897' #14 [PN] len=7: b'46K7897' #1e [MN] len=4: b'1037' #25 [FC] len=4: b'5769' #2c [SN] len=12: b'YL102035603V' #3b [NA] len=12: b'00145E992ED1' 007a Small item 1 bytes; name 0xf End Tag 0c00 Large item 16 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String b'S310E-SR-X ' 0c13 Large item 234 bytes; name 0x10 #00 [PN] len=16: b'TBD ' #13 [EC] len=16: b'110107730D2 ' #26 [SN] len=16: b'97YL102035603V ' #39 [NA] len=12: b'00145E992ED1' #48 [V0] len=6: b'175000' #51 [V1] len=6: b'266666' #5a [V2] len=6: b'266666' #63 [V3] len=6: b'2000 ' #6c [V4] len=2: b'1 ' #71 [V5] len=6: b'c2 ' #7a [V6] len=6: b'0 ' #83 [V7] len=2: b'1 ' #88 [V8] len=2: b'0 ' #8d [V9] len=2: b'0 ' #92 [VA] len=2: b'0 ' #97 [RV] len=80: b's\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'... 0d00 Large item 252 bytes; name 0x11 #00 [VC] len=16: b'122310_1222 dp ' #13 [VD] len=16: b'610-0001-00 H1\x00\x00' #26 [VE] len=16: b'122310_1353 fp ' #39 [VF] len=16: b'610-0001-00 H1\x00\x00' #4c [RW] len=173: b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'... 0dff Small item 0 bytes; name 0xf End Tag 10f3 Large item 13315 bytes; name 0x62 !!! unknown item name 98: b'\xd0\x03\x00@`\x0c\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' === Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit f931ab4 upstream. Both arch_add_memory() and arch_remove_memory() expect a single threaded context. For example, arch/x86/mm/init_64.c::kernel_physical_mapping_init() does not hold any locks over this check and branch: if (pgd_val(*pgd)) { pud = (pud_t *)pgd_page_vaddr(*pgd); paddr_last = phys_pud_init(pud, __pa(vaddr), __pa(vaddr_end), page_size_mask); continue; } pud = alloc_low_page(); paddr_last = phys_pud_init(pud, __pa(vaddr), __pa(vaddr_end), page_size_mask); The result is that two threads calling devm_memremap_pages() simultaneously can end up colliding on pgd initialization. This leads to crash signatures like the following where the loser of the race initializes the wrong pgd entry: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff888ebfff0000 IP: memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10 PGD 2f8e8fc067 PUD 0 /* <---- Invalid PUD */ Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC CPU: 54 PID: 3818 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.6.7+ #13 task: ffff882fac290040 ti: ffff882f887a4000 task.ti: ffff882f887a4000 RIP: memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10 [..] Call Trace: ? pmem_do_bvec+0x205/0x370 [nd_pmem] ? blk_queue_enter+0x3a/0x280 pmem_rw_page+0x38/0x80 [nd_pmem] bdev_read_page+0x84/0xb0 Hold the standard memory hotplug mutex over calls to arch_{add,remove}_memory(). Fixes: 41e94a8 ("add devm_memremap_pages") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/148357647831.9498.12606007370121652979.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 45caeaa ] As Eric Dumazet pointed out this also needs to be fixed in IPv6. v2: Contains the IPv6 tcp/Ipv6 dccp patches as well. We have seen a few incidents lately where a dst_enty has been freed with a dangling TCP socket reference (sk->sk_dst_cache) pointing to that dst_entry. If the conditions/timings are right a crash then ensues when the freed dst_entry is referenced later on. A Common crashing back trace is: #8 [] page_fault at ffffffff8163e648 [exception RIP: __tcp_ack_snd_check+74] . . #9 [] tcp_rcv_established at ffffffff81580b64 #10 [] tcp_v4_do_rcv at ffffffff8158b54a #11 [] tcp_v4_rcv at ffffffff8158cd02 #12 [] ip_local_deliver_finish at ffffffff815668f4 #13 [] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff81566bd9 #14 [] ip_rcv_finish at ffffffff8156656d #15 [] ip_rcv at ffffffff81566f06 #16 [] __netif_receive_skb_core at ffffffff8152b3a2 #17 [] __netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b608 #18 [] netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b690 #19 [] vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete at ffffffffa015eeaf [vmxnet3] #20 [] vmxnet3_poll_rx_only at ffffffffa015f32a [vmxnet3] #21 [] net_rx_action at ffffffff8152bac2 #22 [] __do_softirq at ffffffff81084b4f #23 [] call_softirq at ffffffff8164845c #24 [] do_softirq at ffffffff81016fc5 #25 [] irq_exit at ffffffff81084ee5 #26 [] do_IRQ at ffffffff81648ff8 Of course it may happen with other NIC drivers as well. It's found the freed dst_entry here: 224 static bool tcp_in_quickack_mode(struct sock *sk)↩ 225 {↩ 226 ▹ const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);↩ 227 ▹ const struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);↩ 228 ↩ 229 ▹ return (dst && dst_metric(dst, RTAX_QUICKACK)) ||↩ 230 ▹ ▹ (icsk->icsk_ack.quick && !icsk->icsk_ack.pingpong);↩ 231 }↩ But there are other backtraces attributed to the same freed dst_entry in netfilter code as well. All the vmcores showed 2 significant clues: - Remote hosts behind the default gateway had always been redirected to a different gateway. A rtable/dst_entry will be added for that host. Making more dst_entrys with lower reference counts. Making this more probable. - All vmcores showed a postitive LockDroppedIcmps value, e.g: LockDroppedIcmps 267 A closer look at the tcp_v4_err() handler revealed that do_redirect() will run regardless of whether user space has the socket locked. This can result in a race condition where the same dst_entry cached in sk->sk_dst_entry can be decremented twice for the same socket via: do_redirect()->__sk_dst_check()-> dst_release(). Which leads to the dst_entry being prematurely freed with another socket pointing to it via sk->sk_dst_cache and a subsequent crash. To fix this skip do_redirect() if usespace has the socket locked. Instead let the redirect take place later when user space does not have the socket locked. The dccp/IPv6 code is very similar in this respect, so fixing it there too. As Eric Garver pointed out the following commit now invalidates routes. Which can set the dst->obsolete flag so that ipv4_dst_check() returns null and triggers the dst_release(). Fixes: ceb3320 ("ipv4: Kill routes during PMTU/redirect updates.") Cc: Eric Garver <[email protected]> Cc: Hannes Sowa <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jon Maxwell <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 0beb201 upstream. Holding the reconfig_mutex over a potential userspace fault sets up a lockdep dependency chain between filesystem-DAX and the libnvdimm ioctl path. Move the user access outside of the lock. [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 4.11.0-rc3+ #13 Tainted: G W O ------------------------------------------------------- fallocate/16656 is trying to acquire lock: (&nvdimm_bus->reconfig_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa00080b1>] nvdimm_bus_lock+0x21/0x30 [libnvdimm] but task is already holding lock: (jbd2_handle){++++..}, at: [<ffffffff813b4944>] start_this_handle+0x104/0x460 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (jbd2_handle){++++..}: lock_acquire+0xbd/0x200 start_this_handle+0x16a/0x460 jbd2__journal_start+0xe9/0x2d0 __ext4_journal_start_sb+0x89/0x1c0 ext4_dirty_inode+0x32/0x70 __mark_inode_dirty+0x235/0x670 generic_update_time+0x87/0xd0 touch_atime+0xa9/0xd0 ext4_file_mmap+0x90/0xb0 mmap_region+0x370/0x5b0 do_mmap+0x415/0x4f0 vm_mmap_pgoff+0xd7/0x120 SyS_mmap_pgoff+0x1c5/0x290 SyS_mmap+0x22/0x30 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 -> #1 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}: lock_acquire+0xbd/0x200 __might_fault+0x70/0xa0 __nd_ioctl+0x683/0x720 [libnvdimm] nvdimm_ioctl+0x8b/0xe0 [libnvdimm] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa8/0x740 SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x200 return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x7a -> #0 (&nvdimm_bus->reconfig_mutex){+.+.+.}: __lock_acquire+0x16b6/0x1730 lock_acquire+0xbd/0x200 __mutex_lock+0x88/0x9b0 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 nvdimm_bus_lock+0x21/0x30 [libnvdimm] nvdimm_forget_poison+0x25/0x50 [libnvdimm] nvdimm_clear_poison+0x106/0x140 [libnvdimm] pmem_do_bvec+0x1c2/0x2b0 [nd_pmem] pmem_make_request+0xf9/0x270 [nd_pmem] generic_make_request+0x118/0x3b0 submit_bio+0x75/0x150 Fixes: 62232e4 ("libnvdimm: control (ioctl) messages for nvdimm_bus and nvdimm devices") Cc: Dave Jiang <[email protected]> Reported-by: Vishal Verma <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

…stamp commit e2c2206 upstream. BUG: using __this_cpu_read() in preemptible [00000000] code: qemu-system-x86/2809 caller is __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20 CPU: 2 PID: 2809 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 4.11.0+ #13 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x99/0xce check_preemption_disabled+0xf5/0x100 __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20 get_kvmclock_ns+0x6f/0x110 [kvm] get_time_ref_counter+0x5d/0x80 [kvm] kvm_hv_process_stimers+0x2a1/0x8a0 [kvm] ? kvm_hv_process_stimers+0x2a1/0x8a0 [kvm] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xac9/0x1ce0 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x5bf/0x1ce0 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x7b0 [kvm] ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x7b0 [kvm] ? __fget+0xf3/0x210 do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x700 ? __fget+0x114/0x210 SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc2 RIP: 0033:0x7f9d164ed357 ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20 This can be reproduced by run kvm-unit-tests/hyperv_stimer.flat w/ CONFIG_PREEMPT and CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT enabled. Safe access to per-CPU data requires a couple of constraints, though: the thread working with the data cannot be preempted and it cannot be migrated while it manipulates per-CPU variables. If the thread is preempted, the thread that replaces it could try to work with the same variables; migration to another CPU could also cause confusion. However there is no preemption disable when reads host per-CPU tsc rate to calculate the current kvmclock timestamp. This patch fixes it by utilizing get_cpu/put_cpu pair to guarantee both __this_cpu_read() and rdtsc() are not preempted. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Cc: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit af50e4b ] syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment(). Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of reasonable length. BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189: #0: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517 #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ #26 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline] __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Benc <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jiri Benc <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 23edca8 upstream. There is a problem if we are going to unmap a rbd device and the watch_dwork is going to queue delayed work for watch: unmap Thread watch Thread timer do_rbd_remove cancel_tasks_sync(rbd_dev) queue_delayed_work for watch destroy_workqueue(rbd_dev->task_wq) drain_workqueue(wq) destroy other resources in wq call_timer_fn __queue_work() Then the delayed work escape the cancel_tasks_sync() and destroy_workqueue() and we will get an user-after-free call trace: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI Modules linked in: CPU: 7 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/7 Tainted: G OE 4.17.0-rc6+ #13 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:__queue_work+0x6a/0x3b0 RSP: 0018:ffff9427df1c3e90 EFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: ffff9427deca8400 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff9427deca8400 RSI: ffff9427df1c3e50 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff942783e39e00 R08: ffff9427deca8400 R09: ffff9427df1c3f00 R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: ffff9427cfb85970 R13: 0000000000002000 R14: 000000000001eca0 R15: 0000000000000007 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9427df1c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000004c900a005 CR4: 00000000000206e0 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? __queue_work+0x3b0/0x3b0 call_timer_fn+0x2d/0x130 run_timer_softirq+0x16e/0x430 ? tick_sched_timer+0x37/0x70 __do_softirq+0xd2/0x280 irq_exit+0xd5/0xe0 smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6c/0x130 apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 [ Move rbd_dev->watch_dwork cancellation so that rbd_reregister_watch() either bails out early because the watch is UNREGISTERED at that point or just gets cancelled. ] Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 99d1694 ("rbd: retry watch re-registration periodically") Signed-off-by: Dongsheng Yang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 7030342 upstream. The syzkaller detected a out-of-bounds issue with the events filter code, specifically here: prog[N].pred = NULL; /* #13 */ prog[N].target = 1; /* TRUE */ prog[N+1].pred = NULL; prog[N+1].target = 0; /* FALSE */ -> prog[N-1].target = N; prog[N-1].when_to_branch = false; As that's the first reference to a "N-1" index, it appears that the code got here with N = 0, which means the filter parser found no filter to parse (which shouldn't ever happen, but apparently it did). Add a new error to the parsing code that will check to make sure that N is not zero before going into this part of the code. If N = 0, then -EINVAL is returned, and a error message is added to the filter. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 8076559 ("tracing: Rewrite filter logic to be simpler and faster") Reported-by: air icy <[email protected]> bugzilla url: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200019 Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ecd6053 ] Booting a ColdFire m68k core with MMU enabled causes a "bad page state" oops since commit 1d40a5e ("mm: mark pages in use for page tables"): BUG: Bad page state in process sh pfn:01ce2 page:004fefc8 count:0 mapcount:-1024 mapping:00000000 index:0x0 flags: 0x0() raw: 00000000 00000000 00000000 fffffbff 00000000 00000100 00000200 00000000 raw: 039c4000 page dumped because: nonzero mapcount Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 22 Comm: sh Not tainted 4.17.0-07461-g1d40a5ea01d5 #13 Fix by calling pgtable_page_dtor() in our __pte_free_tlb() code path, so that the PG_table flag is cleared before we free the pte page. Note that I had to change the type of pte_free() to be static from extern. Otherwise you get a lot of warnings like this: ./arch/m68k/include/asm/mcf_pgalloc.h:80:2: warning: ‘pgtable_page_dtor’ is static but used in inline function ‘pte_free’ which is not static pgtable_page_dtor(page); ^ And making it static is consistent with our use of this in the other m68k pgalloc definitions of pte_free(). Signed-off-by: Greg Ungerer <[email protected]> CC: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit a5ba1d9 upstream. We have reports of the following crash: PID: 7 TASK: ffff88085c6d61c0 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "kworker/u25:0" #0 [ffff88085c6db710] machine_kexec at ffffffff81046239 #1 [ffff88085c6db760] crash_kexec at ffffffff810fc248 #2 [ffff88085c6db830] oops_end at ffffffff81008ae7 #3 [ffff88085c6db860] no_context at ffffffff81050b8f #4 [ffff88085c6db8b0] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81050d75 #5 [ffff88085c6db900] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81050e83 #6 [ffff88085c6db910] __do_page_fault at ffffffff8105132e #7 [ffff88085c6db9b0] do_page_fault at ffffffff8105152c #8 [ffff88085c6db9c0] page_fault at ffffffff81a3f122 [exception RIP: uart_put_char+149] RIP: ffffffff814b67b5 RSP: ffff88085c6dba78 RFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: 0000000000000292 RBX: ffffffff827c5120 RCX: 0000000000000081 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000005f RDI: ffffffff827c5120 RBP: ffff88085c6dba98 R8: 000000000000012c R9: ffffffff822ea320 R10: ffff88085fe4db04 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff881059f9c000 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 000000000000005f R15: 0000000000000fba ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #9 [ffff88085c6dbaa0] tty_put_char at ffffffff81497544 #10 [ffff88085c6dbac0] do_output_char at ffffffff8149c91c #11 [ffff88085c6dbae0] __process_echoes at ffffffff8149cb8b #12 [ffff88085c6dbb30] commit_echoes at ffffffff8149cdc2 #13 [ffff88085c6dbb60] n_tty_receive_buf_fast at ffffffff8149e49b #14 [ffff88085c6dbbc0] __receive_buf at ffffffff8149ef5a #15 [ffff88085c6dbc20] n_tty_receive_buf_common at ffffffff8149f016 #16 [ffff88085c6dbca0] n_tty_receive_buf2 at ffffffff8149f194 #17 [ffff88085c6dbcb0] flush_to_ldisc at ffffffff814a238a #18 [ffff88085c6dbd50] process_one_work at ffffffff81090be2 #19 [ffff88085c6dbe20] worker_thread at ffffffff81091b4d #20 [ffff88085c6dbeb0] kthread at ffffffff81096384 #21 [ffff88085c6dbf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81a3d69f after slogging through some dissasembly: ffffffff814b6720 <uart_put_char>: ffffffff814b6720: 55 push %rbp ffffffff814b6721: 48 89 e5 mov %rsp,%rbp ffffffff814b6724: 48 83 ec 20 sub $0x20,%rsp ffffffff814b6728: 48 89 1c 24 mov %rbx,(%rsp) ffffffff814b672c: 4c 89 64 24 08 mov %r12,0x8(%rsp) ffffffff814b6731: 4c 89 6c 24 10 mov %r13,0x10(%rsp) ffffffff814b6736: 4c 89 74 24 18 mov %r14,0x18(%rsp) ffffffff814b673b: e8 b0 8e 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3f5f0 <mcount> ffffffff814b6740: 4c 8b a7 88 02 00 00 mov 0x288(%rdi),%r12 ffffffff814b6747: 45 31 ed xor %r13d,%r13d ffffffff814b674a: 41 89 f6 mov %esi,%r14d ffffffff814b674d: 49 83 bc 24 70 01 00 cmpq $0x0,0x170(%r12) ffffffff814b6754: 00 00 ffffffff814b6756: 49 8b 9c 24 80 01 00 mov 0x180(%r12),%rbx ffffffff814b675d: 00 ffffffff814b675e: 74 2f je ffffffff814b678f <uart_put_char+0x6f> ffffffff814b6760: 48 89 df mov %rbx,%rdi ffffffff814b6763: e8 a8 67 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3cf10 <_raw_spin_lock_irqsave> ffffffff814b6768: 41 8b 8c 24 78 01 00 mov 0x178(%r12),%ecx ffffffff814b676f: 00 ffffffff814b6770: 89 ca mov %ecx,%edx ffffffff814b6772: f7 d2 not %edx ffffffff814b6774: 41 03 94 24 7c 01 00 add 0x17c(%r12),%edx ffffffff814b677b: 00 ffffffff814b677c: 81 e2 ff 0f 00 00 and $0xfff,%edx ffffffff814b6782: 75 23 jne ffffffff814b67a7 <uart_put_char+0x87> ffffffff814b6784: 48 89 c6 mov %rax,%rsi ffffffff814b6787: 48 89 df mov %rbx,%rdi ffffffff814b678a: e8 e1 64 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3cc70 <_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore> ffffffff814b678f: 44 89 e8 mov %r13d,%eax ffffffff814b6792: 48 8b 1c 24 mov (%rsp),%rbx ffffffff814b6796: 4c 8b 64 24 08 mov 0x8(%rsp),%r12 ffffffff814b679b: 4c 8b 6c 24 10 mov 0x10(%rsp),%r13 ffffffff814b67a0: 4c 8b 74 24 18 mov 0x18(%rsp),%r14 ffffffff814b67a5: c9 leaveq ffffffff814b67a6: c3 retq ffffffff814b67a7: 49 8b 94 24 70 01 00 mov 0x170(%r12),%rdx ffffffff814b67ae: 00 ffffffff814b67af: 48 63 c9 movslq %ecx,%rcx ffffffff814b67b2: 41 b5 01 mov $0x1,%r13b ffffffff814b67b5: 44 88 34 0a mov %r14b,(%rdx,%rcx,1) ffffffff814b67b9: 41 8b 94 24 78 01 00 mov 0x178(%r12),%edx ffffffff814b67c0: 00 ffffffff814b67c1: 83 c2 01 add $0x1,%edx ffffffff814b67c4: 81 e2 ff 0f 00 00 and $0xfff,%edx ffffffff814b67ca: 41 89 94 24 78 01 00 mov %edx,0x178(%r12) ffffffff814b67d1: 00 ffffffff814b67d2: eb b0 jmp ffffffff814b6784 <uart_put_char+0x64> ffffffff814b67d4: 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 data32 data32 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1) ffffffff814b67db: 00 00 00 00 00 for our build, this is crashing at: circ->buf[circ->head] = c; Looking in uart_port_startup(), it seems that circ->buf (state->xmit.buf) protected by the "per-port mutex", which based on uart_port_check() is state->port.mutex. Indeed, the lock acquired in uart_put_char() is uport->lock, i.e. not the same lock. Anyway, since the lock is not acquired, if uart_shutdown() is called, the last chunk of that function may release state->xmit.buf before its assigned to null, and cause the race above. To fix it, let's lock uport->lock when allocating/deallocating state->xmit.buf in addition to the per-port mutex. v2: switch to locking uport->lock on allocation/deallocation instead of locking the per-port mutex in uart_put_char. Note that since uport->lock is a spin lock, we have to switch the allocation to GFP_ATOMIC. v3: move the allocation outside the lock, so we can switch back to GFP_KERNEL Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <[email protected]> Cc: stable <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 6cc4a08 upstream. info->nr_rings isn't adjusted in case of ENOMEM error from negotiate_mq(). This leads to kernel panic in error path. Typical call stack involving panic - #8 page_fault at ffffffff8175936f [exception RIP: blkif_free_ring+33] RIP: ffffffffa0149491 RSP: ffff8804f7673c08 RFLAGS: 00010292 ... #9 blkif_free at ffffffffa0149aaa [xen_blkfront] #10 talk_to_blkback at ffffffffa014c8cd [xen_blkfront] #11 blkback_changed at ffffffffa014ea8b [xen_blkfront] #12 xenbus_otherend_changed at ffffffff81424670 #13 backend_changed at ffffffff81426dc3 #14 xenwatch_thread at ffffffff81422f29 #15 kthread at ffffffff810abe6a #16 ret_from_fork at ffffffff81754078 Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 7ed8ce1 ("xen-blkfront: move negotiate_mq to cover all cases of new VBDs") Signed-off-by: Manjunath Patil <[email protected]> Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c5a94f4 ] It was observed that a process blocked indefintely in __fscache_read_or_alloc_page(), waiting for FSCACHE_COOKIE_LOOKING_UP to be cleared via fscache_wait_for_deferred_lookup(). At this time, ->backing_objects was empty, which would normaly prevent __fscache_read_or_alloc_page() from getting to the point of waiting. This implies that ->backing_objects was cleared *after* __fscache_read_or_alloc_page was was entered. When an object is "killed" and then "dropped", FSCACHE_COOKIE_LOOKING_UP is cleared in fscache_lookup_failure(), then KILL_OBJECT and DROP_OBJECT are "called" and only in DROP_OBJECT is ->backing_objects cleared. This leaves a window where something else can set FSCACHE_COOKIE_LOOKING_UP and __fscache_read_or_alloc_page() can start waiting, before ->backing_objects is cleared There is some uncertainty in this analysis, but it seems to be fit the observations. Adding the wake in this patch will be handled correctly by __fscache_read_or_alloc_page(), as it checks if ->backing_objects is empty again, after waiting. Customer which reported the hang, also report that the hang cannot be reproduced with this fix. The backtrace for the blocked process looked like: PID: 29360 TASK: ffff881ff2ac0f80 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "zsh" #0 [ffff881ff43efbf8] schedule at ffffffff815e56f1 #1 [ffff881ff43efc58] bit_wait at ffffffff815e64ed #2 [ffff881ff43efc68] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff815e61b8 #3 [ffff881ff43efca0] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff815e625e #4 [ffff881ff43efd08] fscache_wait_for_deferred_lookup at ffffffffa04f2e8f [fscache] #5 [ffff881ff43efd18] __fscache_read_or_alloc_page at ffffffffa04f2ffe [fscache] #6 [ffff881ff43efd58] __nfs_readpage_from_fscache at ffffffffa0679668 [nfs] #7 [ffff881ff43efd78] nfs_readpage at ffffffffa067092b [nfs] #8 [ffff881ff43efda0] generic_file_read_iter at ffffffff81187a73 #9 [ffff881ff43efe50] nfs_file_read at ffffffffa066544b [nfs] #10 [ffff881ff43efe70] __vfs_read at ffffffff811fc756 #11 [ffff881ff43efee8] vfs_read at ffffffff811fccfa #12 [ffff881ff43eff18] sys_read at ffffffff811fda62 #13 [ffff881ff43eff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath at ffffffff815e986e Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit a777336 upstream. Authencesn template in decrypt path unconditionally calls aead_request_complete after ahash_verify which leads to following kernel panic in after decryption. [ 338.539800] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000004 [ 338.548372] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 338.551157] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 338.554919] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W I 4.19.7+ #13 [ 338.564431] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0 07/29/10 [ 338.572212] RIP: 0010:esp_input_done2+0x350/0x410 [esp4] [ 338.578030] Code: ff 0f b6 68 10 48 8b 83 c8 00 00 00 e9 8e fe ff ff 8b 04 25 04 00 00 00 83 e8 01 48 98 48 8b 3c c5 10 00 00 00 e9 f7 fd ff ff <8b> 04 25 04 00 00 00 83 e8 01 48 98 4c 8b 24 c5 10 00 00 00 e9 3b [ 338.598547] RSP: 0018:ffff911c97803c00 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 338.604268] RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff911c4469ee00 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 338.612090] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000130 RDI: ffff911b87c20400 [ 338.619874] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff911b87c20498 R09: 000000000000000a [ 338.627610] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000004 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 338.635402] R13: ffff911c89590000 R14: ffff911c91730000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 338.643234] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff911c97800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 338.652047] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 338.658299] CR2: 0000000000000004 CR3: 00000001ec20a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 338.666382] Call Trace: [ 338.669051] <IRQ> [ 338.671254] esp_input_done+0x12/0x20 [esp4] [ 338.675922] chcr_handle_resp+0x3b5/0x790 [chcr] [ 338.680949] cpl_fw6_pld_handler+0x37/0x60 [chcr] [ 338.686080] chcr_uld_rx_handler+0x22/0x50 [chcr] [ 338.691233] uldrx_handler+0x8c/0xc0 [cxgb4] [ 338.695923] process_responses+0x2f0/0x5d0 [cxgb4] [ 338.701177] ? bitmap_find_next_zero_area_off+0x3a/0x90 [ 338.706882] ? matrix_alloc_area.constprop.7+0x60/0x90 [ 338.712517] ? apic_update_irq_cfg+0x82/0xf0 [ 338.717177] napi_rx_handler+0x14/0xe0 [cxgb4] [ 338.722015] net_rx_action+0x2aa/0x3e0 [ 338.726136] __do_softirq+0xcb/0x280 [ 338.730054] irq_exit+0xde/0xf0 [ 338.733504] do_IRQ+0x54/0xd0 [ 338.736745] common_interrupt+0xf/0xf Fixes: 104880a ("crypto: authencesn - Convert to new AEAD...") Signed-off-by: Harsh Jain <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 8f9c469 upstream. Keys for "authenc" AEADs are formatted as an rtattr containing a 4-byte 'enckeylen', followed by an authentication key and an encryption key. crypto_authenc_extractkeys() parses the key to find the inner keys. However, it fails to consider the case where the rtattr's payload is longer than 4 bytes but not 4-byte aligned, and where the key ends before the next 4-byte aligned boundary. In this case, 'keylen -= RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);' underflows to a value near UINT_MAX. This causes a buffer overread and crash during crypto_ahash_setkey(). Fix it by restricting the rtattr payload to the expected size. Reproducer using AF_ALG: #include <linux/if_alg.h> #include <linux/rtnetlink.h> #include <sys/socket.h> int main() { int fd; struct sockaddr_alg addr = { .salg_type = "aead", .salg_name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))", }; struct { struct rtattr attr; __be32 enckeylen; char keys[1]; } __attribute__((packed)) key = { .attr.rta_len = sizeof(key), .attr.rta_type = 1 /* CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM */, }; fd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); bind(fd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); setsockopt(fd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, &key, sizeof(key)); } It caused: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88007ffdc000 PGD 2e01067 P4D 2e01067 PUD 2e04067 PMD 2e05067 PTE 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 0 PID: 883 Comm: authenc Not tainted 4.20.0-rc1-00108-g00c9fe37a7f27 #13 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-20181126_142135-anatol 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:sha256_ni_transform+0xb3/0x330 arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ni_asm.S:155 [...] Call Trace: sha256_ni_finup+0x10/0x20 arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ssse3_glue.c:321 crypto_shash_finup+0x1a/0x30 crypto/shash.c:178 shash_digest_unaligned+0x45/0x60 crypto/shash.c:186 crypto_shash_digest+0x24/0x40 crypto/shash.c:202 hmac_setkey+0x135/0x1e0 crypto/hmac.c:66 crypto_shash_setkey+0x2b/0xb0 crypto/shash.c:66 shash_async_setkey+0x10/0x20 crypto/shash.c:223 crypto_ahash_setkey+0x2d/0xa0 crypto/ahash.c:202 crypto_authenc_setkey+0x68/0x100 crypto/authenc.c:96 crypto_aead_setkey+0x2a/0xc0 crypto/aead.c:62 aead_setkey+0xc/0x10 crypto/algif_aead.c:526 alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:223 [inline] alg_setsockopt+0xfe/0x130 crypto/af_alg.c:256 __sys_setsockopt+0x6d/0xd0 net/socket.c:1902 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1913 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1910 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x1f/0x30 net/socket.c:1910 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x180 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: e236d4a ("[CRYPTO] authenc: Move enckeylen into key itself") Cc: <[email protected]> # v2.6.25+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c5a94f4 ] It was observed that a process blocked indefintely in __fscache_read_or_alloc_page(), waiting for FSCACHE_COOKIE_LOOKING_UP to be cleared via fscache_wait_for_deferred_lookup(). At this time, ->backing_objects was empty, which would normaly prevent __fscache_read_or_alloc_page() from getting to the point of waiting. This implies that ->backing_objects was cleared *after* __fscache_read_or_alloc_page was was entered. When an object is "killed" and then "dropped", FSCACHE_COOKIE_LOOKING_UP is cleared in fscache_lookup_failure(), then KILL_OBJECT and DROP_OBJECT are "called" and only in DROP_OBJECT is ->backing_objects cleared. This leaves a window where something else can set FSCACHE_COOKIE_LOOKING_UP and __fscache_read_or_alloc_page() can start waiting, before ->backing_objects is cleared There is some uncertainty in this analysis, but it seems to be fit the observations. Adding the wake in this patch will be handled correctly by __fscache_read_or_alloc_page(), as it checks if ->backing_objects is empty again, after waiting. Customer which reported the hang, also report that the hang cannot be reproduced with this fix. The backtrace for the blocked process looked like: PID: 29360 TASK: ffff881ff2ac0f80 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "zsh" #0 [ffff881ff43efbf8] schedule at ffffffff815e56f1 #1 [ffff881ff43efc58] bit_wait at ffffffff815e64ed #2 [ffff881ff43efc68] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff815e61b8 #3 [ffff881ff43efca0] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff815e625e #4 [ffff881ff43efd08] fscache_wait_for_deferred_lookup at ffffffffa04f2e8f [fscache] #5 [ffff881ff43efd18] __fscache_read_or_alloc_page at ffffffffa04f2ffe [fscache] #6 [ffff881ff43efd58] __nfs_readpage_from_fscache at ffffffffa0679668 [nfs] #7 [ffff881ff43efd78] nfs_readpage at ffffffffa067092b [nfs] #8 [ffff881ff43efda0] generic_file_read_iter at ffffffff81187a73 #9 [ffff881ff43efe50] nfs_file_read at ffffffffa066544b [nfs] #10 [ffff881ff43efe70] __vfs_read at ffffffff811fc756 #11 [ffff881ff43efee8] vfs_read at ffffffff811fccfa #12 [ffff881ff43eff18] sys_read at ffffffff811fda62 #13 [ffff881ff43eff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath at ffffffff815e986e Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit a777336 upstream. Authencesn template in decrypt path unconditionally calls aead_request_complete after ahash_verify which leads to following kernel panic in after decryption. [ 338.539800] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000004 [ 338.548372] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 338.551157] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 338.554919] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W I 4.19.7+ #13 [ 338.564431] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0 07/29/10 [ 338.572212] RIP: 0010:esp_input_done2+0x350/0x410 [esp4] [ 338.578030] Code: ff 0f b6 68 10 48 8b 83 c8 00 00 00 e9 8e fe ff ff 8b 04 25 04 00 00 00 83 e8 01 48 98 48 8b 3c c5 10 00 00 00 e9 f7 fd ff ff <8b> 04 25 04 00 00 00 83 e8 01 48 98 4c 8b 24 c5 10 00 00 00 e9 3b [ 338.598547] RSP: 0018:ffff911c97803c00 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 338.604268] RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff911c4469ee00 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 338.612090] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000130 RDI: ffff911b87c20400 [ 338.619874] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff911b87c20498 R09: 000000000000000a [ 338.627610] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000004 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 338.635402] R13: ffff911c89590000 R14: ffff911c91730000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 338.643234] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff911c97800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 338.652047] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 338.658299] CR2: 0000000000000004 CR3: 00000001ec20a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 338.666382] Call Trace: [ 338.669051] <IRQ> [ 338.671254] esp_input_done+0x12/0x20 [esp4] [ 338.675922] chcr_handle_resp+0x3b5/0x790 [chcr] [ 338.680949] cpl_fw6_pld_handler+0x37/0x60 [chcr] [ 338.686080] chcr_uld_rx_handler+0x22/0x50 [chcr] [ 338.691233] uldrx_handler+0x8c/0xc0 [cxgb4] [ 338.695923] process_responses+0x2f0/0x5d0 [cxgb4] [ 338.701177] ? bitmap_find_next_zero_area_off+0x3a/0x90 [ 338.706882] ? matrix_alloc_area.constprop.7+0x60/0x90 [ 338.712517] ? apic_update_irq_cfg+0x82/0xf0 [ 338.717177] napi_rx_handler+0x14/0xe0 [cxgb4] [ 338.722015] net_rx_action+0x2aa/0x3e0 [ 338.726136] __do_softirq+0xcb/0x280 [ 338.730054] irq_exit+0xde/0xf0 [ 338.733504] do_IRQ+0x54/0xd0 [ 338.736745] common_interrupt+0xf/0xf Fixes: 104880a ("crypto: authencesn - Convert to new AEAD...") Signed-off-by: Harsh Jain <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 8f9c469 upstream. Keys for "authenc" AEADs are formatted as an rtattr containing a 4-byte 'enckeylen', followed by an authentication key and an encryption key. crypto_authenc_extractkeys() parses the key to find the inner keys. However, it fails to consider the case where the rtattr's payload is longer than 4 bytes but not 4-byte aligned, and where the key ends before the next 4-byte aligned boundary. In this case, 'keylen -= RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);' underflows to a value near UINT_MAX. This causes a buffer overread and crash during crypto_ahash_setkey(). Fix it by restricting the rtattr payload to the expected size. Reproducer using AF_ALG: #include <linux/if_alg.h> #include <linux/rtnetlink.h> #include <sys/socket.h> int main() { int fd; struct sockaddr_alg addr = { .salg_type = "aead", .salg_name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))", }; struct { struct rtattr attr; __be32 enckeylen; char keys[1]; } __attribute__((packed)) key = { .attr.rta_len = sizeof(key), .attr.rta_type = 1 /* CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM */, }; fd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); bind(fd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); setsockopt(fd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, &key, sizeof(key)); } It caused: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88007ffdc000 PGD 2e01067 P4D 2e01067 PUD 2e04067 PMD 2e05067 PTE 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 0 PID: 883 Comm: authenc Not tainted 4.20.0-rc1-00108-g00c9fe37a7f27 #13 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-20181126_142135-anatol 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:sha256_ni_transform+0xb3/0x330 arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ni_asm.S:155 [...] Call Trace: sha256_ni_finup+0x10/0x20 arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ssse3_glue.c:321 crypto_shash_finup+0x1a/0x30 crypto/shash.c:178 shash_digest_unaligned+0x45/0x60 crypto/shash.c:186 crypto_shash_digest+0x24/0x40 crypto/shash.c:202 hmac_setkey+0x135/0x1e0 crypto/hmac.c:66 crypto_shash_setkey+0x2b/0xb0 crypto/shash.c:66 shash_async_setkey+0x10/0x20 crypto/shash.c:223 crypto_ahash_setkey+0x2d/0xa0 crypto/ahash.c:202 crypto_authenc_setkey+0x68/0x100 crypto/authenc.c:96 crypto_aead_setkey+0x2a/0xc0 crypto/aead.c:62 aead_setkey+0xc/0x10 crypto/algif_aead.c:526 alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:223 [inline] alg_setsockopt+0xfe/0x130 crypto/af_alg.c:256 __sys_setsockopt+0x6d/0xd0 net/socket.c:1902 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1913 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1910 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x1f/0x30 net/socket.c:1910 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x180 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: e236d4a ("[CRYPTO] authenc: Move enckeylen into key itself") Cc: <[email protected]> # v2.6.25+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 60f1bf2 upstream. When calling smp_call_ipl_cpu() from the IPL CPU, we will try to read from pcpu_devices->lowcore. However, due to prefixing, that will result in reading from absolute address 0 on that CPU. We have to go via the actual lowcore instead. This means that right now, we will read lc->nodat_stack == 0 and therfore work on a very wrong stack. This BUG essentially broke rebooting under QEMU TCG (which will report a low address protection exception). And checking under KVM, it is also broken under KVM. With 1 VCPU it can be easily triggered. :/# echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/sysrq :/# echo b > /proc/sysrq-trigger [ 28.476745] sysrq: SysRq : Resetting [ 28.476793] Kernel stack overflow. [ 28.476817] CPU: 0 PID: 424 Comm: sh Not tainted 5.0.0-rc1+ #13 [ 28.476820] Hardware name: IBM 2964 NE1 716 (KVM/Linux) [ 28.476826] Krnl PSW : 0400c00180000000 0000000000115c0c (pcpu_delegate+0x12c/0x140) [ 28.476861] R:0 T:1 IO:0 EX:0 Key:0 M:0 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:0 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 [ 28.476863] Krnl GPRS: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 000000000010dff8 0000000000000000 [ 28.476864] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000ab7090 000003e0006efbf0 [ 28.476864] 000000000010dff8 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 28.476865] 000000007fffc000 0000000000730408 000003e0006efc58 0000000000000000 [ 28.476887] Krnl Code: 0000000000115bfe: 4170f000 la %r7,0(%r15) [ 28.476887] 0000000000115c02: 41f0a000 la %r15,0(%r10) [ 28.476887] #0000000000115c06: e370f0980024 stg %r7,152(%r15) [ 28.476887] >0000000000115c0c: c0e5fffff86e brasl %r14,114ce8 [ 28.476887] 0000000000115c12: 41f07000 la %r15,0(%r7) [ 28.476887] 0000000000115c16: a7f4ffa8 brc 15,115b66 [ 28.476887] 0000000000115c1a: 0707 bcr 0,%r7 [ 28.476887] 0000000000115c1c: 0707 bcr 0,%r7 [ 28.476901] Call Trace: [ 28.476902] Last Breaking-Event-Address: [ 28.476920] [<0000000000a01c4a>] arch_call_rest_init+0x22/0x80 [ 28.476927] Kernel panic - not syncing: Corrupt kernel stack, can't continue. [ 28.476930] CPU: 0 PID: 424 Comm: sh Not tainted 5.0.0-rc1+ #13 [ 28.476932] Hardware name: IBM 2964 NE1 716 (KVM/Linux) [ 28.476932] Call Trace: Fixes: 2f859d0 ("s390/smp: reduce size of struct pcpu") Cc: [email protected] # 4.0+ Reported-by: Cornelia Huck <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b805d78 ] UBSAN report this: UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1289:24 index 6 is out of range for type 'unsigned int [6]' CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.4.162-514.55.6.9.x86_64+ #13 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 0000000000000000 1466cf39b41b23c9 ffff8801f6b07a58 ffffffff81cb35f4 0000000041b58ab3 ffffffff83230f9c ffffffff81cb34e0 ffff8801f6b07a80 ffff8801f6b07a20 1466cf39b41b23c9 ffffffff851706e0 ffff8801f6b07ae8 Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff81cb35f4>] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline] <IRQ> [<ffffffff81cb35f4>] dump_stack+0x114/0x1a0 lib/dump_stack.c:51 [<ffffffff81d94225>] ubsan_epilogue+0x12/0x8f lib/ubsan.c:164 [<ffffffff81d954db>] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x16e/0x1b2 lib/ubsan.c:382 [<ffffffff82a25acd>] __xfrm_policy_unlink+0x3dd/0x5b0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1289 [<ffffffff82a2e572>] xfrm_policy_delete+0x52/0xb0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1309 [<ffffffff82a3319b>] xfrm_policy_timer+0x30b/0x590 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:243 [<ffffffff813d3927>] call_timer_fn+0x237/0x990 kernel/time/timer.c:1144 [<ffffffff813d8e7e>] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1218 [inline] [<ffffffff813d8e7e>] run_timer_softirq+0x6ce/0xb80 kernel/time/timer.c:1401 [<ffffffff8120d6f9>] __do_softirq+0x299/0xe10 kernel/softirq.c:273 [<ffffffff8120e676>] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:350 [inline] [<ffffffff8120e676>] irq_exit+0x216/0x2c0 kernel/softirq.c:391 [<ffffffff82c5edab>] exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:652 [inline] [<ffffffff82c5edab>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8b/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:926 [<ffffffff82c5c985>] apic_timer_interrupt+0xa5/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:735 <EOI> [<ffffffff81188096>] ? native_safe_halt+0x6/0x10 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:52 [<ffffffff810834d7>] arch_safe_halt arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:111 [inline] [<ffffffff810834d7>] default_idle+0x27/0x430 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:446 [<ffffffff81085f05>] arch_cpu_idle+0x15/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:437 [<ffffffff8132abc3>] default_idle_call+0x53/0x90 kernel/sched/idle.c:92 [<ffffffff8132b32d>] cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:156 [inline] [<ffffffff8132b32d>] cpu_idle_loop kernel/sched/idle.c:251 [inline] [<ffffffff8132b32d>] cpu_startup_entry+0x60d/0x9a0 kernel/sched/idle.c:299 [<ffffffff8113e119>] start_secondary+0x3c9/0x560 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:245 The issue is triggered as this: xfrm_add_policy -->verify_newpolicy_info //check the index provided by user with XFRM_POLICY_MAX //In my case, the index is 0x6E6BB6, so it pass the check. -->xfrm_policy_construct //copy the user's policy and set xfrm_policy_timer -->xfrm_policy_insert --> __xfrm_policy_link //use the orgin dir, in my case is 2 --> xfrm_gen_index //generate policy index, there is 0x6E6BB6 then xfrm_policy_timer be fired xfrm_policy_timer --> xfrm_policy_id2dir //get dir from (policy index & 7), in my case is 6 --> xfrm_policy_delete --> __xfrm_policy_unlink //access policy_count[dir], trigger out of range access Add xfrm_policy_id2dir check in verify_newpolicy_info, make sure the computed dir is valid, to fix the issue. Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]> Fixes: e682adf ("xfrm: Try to honor policy index if it's supplied by user") Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit cf3591e upstream. Revert the commit bd293d0. The proper fix has been made available with commit d0a255e ("loop: set PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO for the worker thread"). Note that the fix offered by commit bd293d0 doesn't really prevent the deadlock from occuring - if we look at the stacktrace reported by Junxiao Bi, we see that it hangs in bit_wait_io and not on the mutex - i.e. it has already successfully taken the mutex. Changing the mutex from mutex_lock to mutex_trylock won't help with deadlocks that happen afterwards. PID: 474 TASK: ffff8813e11f4600 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "kswapd0" #0 [ffff8813dedfb938] __schedule at ffffffff8173f405 #1 [ffff8813dedfb990] schedule at ffffffff8173fa27 #2 [ffff8813dedfb9b0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff81742fec #3 [ffff8813dedfba60] io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff8173f186 #4 [ffff8813dedfbaa0] bit_wait_io at ffffffff8174034f #5 [ffff8813dedfbac0] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173fec8 #6 [ffff8813dedfbb10] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173ff81 #7 [ffff8813dedfbb90] __make_buffer_clean at ffffffffa038736f [dm_bufio] #8 [ffff8813dedfbbb0] __try_evict_buffer at ffffffffa0387bb8 [dm_bufio] #9 [ffff8813dedfbbd0] dm_bufio_shrink_scan at ffffffffa0387cc3 [dm_bufio] #10 [ffff8813dedfbc40] shrink_slab at ffffffff811a87ce #11 [ffff8813dedfbd30] shrink_zone at ffffffff811ad778 #12 [ffff8813dedfbdc0] kswapd at ffffffff811ae92f #13 [ffff8813dedfbec0] kthread at ffffffff810a8428 #14 [ffff8813dedfbf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81745242 Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Fixes: bd293d0 ("dm bufio: fix deadlock with loop device") Depends-on: d0a255e ("loop: set PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO for the worker thread") Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c268e7a ] KASAN: global-out-of-bounds Read in dvb_pll_attach Syzbot reported global-out-of-bounds Read in dvb_pll_attach, while accessing id[dvb_pll_devcount], because dvb_pll_devcount was 65, that is more than size of 'id' which is DVB_PLL_MAX(64). Rather than increasing dvb_pll_devcount every time, use ida so that numbers are allocated correctly. This does mean that no more than 64 devices can be attached at the same time, but this is more than sufficient. usb 1-1: dvb_usb_v2: will pass the complete MPEG2 transport stream to the software demuxer dvbdev: DVB: registering new adapter (774 Friio White ISDB-T USB2.0) usb 1-1: media controller created dvbdev: dvb_create_media_entity: media entity 'dvb-demux' registered. tc90522 0-0018: Toshiba TC90522 attached. usb 1-1: DVB: registering adapter 0 frontend 0 (Toshiba TC90522 ISDB-T module)... dvbdev: dvb_create_media_entity: media entity 'Toshiba TC90522 ISDB-T module' registered. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in dvb_pll_attach+0x6c5/0x830 drivers/media/dvb-frontends/dvb-pll.c:798 Read of size 4 at addr ffffffff89c9e5e0 by task kworker/0:1/12 CPU: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc6+ #13 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0xca/0x13e lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description+0x67/0x231 mm/kasan/report.c:188 __kasan_report.cold+0x1a/0x32 mm/kasan/report.c:317 kasan_report+0xe/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:614 dvb_pll_attach+0x6c5/0x830 drivers/media/dvb-frontends/dvb-pll.c:798 dvb_pll_probe+0xfe/0x174 drivers/media/dvb-frontends/dvb-pll.c:877 i2c_device_probe+0x790/0xaa0 drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c:389 really_probe+0x281/0x660 drivers/base/dd.c:509 driver_probe_device+0x104/0x210 drivers/base/dd.c:670 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:777 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:843 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2111 i2c_new_client_device+0x5b3/0xc40 drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c:778 i2c_new_device+0x19/0x50 drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c:821 dvb_module_probe+0xf9/0x220 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c:985 friio_tuner_attach+0x125/0x1d0 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/gl861.c:536 dvb_usbv2_adapter_frontend_init drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c:675 [inline] dvb_usbv2_adapter_init drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c:804 [inline] dvb_usbv2_init drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c:865 [inline] dvb_usbv2_probe.cold+0x24dc/0x255d drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c:980 usb_probe_interface+0x305/0x7a0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361 really_probe+0x281/0x660 drivers/base/dd.c:509 driver_probe_device+0x104/0x210 drivers/base/dd.c:670 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:777 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:843 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2111 usb_set_configuration+0xdf6/0x1670 drivers/usb/core/message.c:2023 generic_probe+0x9d/0xd5 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:210 usb_probe_device+0x99/0x100 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266 really_probe+0x281/0x660 drivers/base/dd.c:509 driver_probe_device+0x104/0x210 drivers/base/dd.c:670 __device_attach_driver+0x1c2/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:777 bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 __device_attach+0x217/0x360 drivers/base/dd.c:843 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:514 device_add+0xae6/0x16f0 drivers/base/core.c:2111 usb_new_device.cold+0x8c1/0x1016 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2534 hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5089 [inline] hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5204 [inline] port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5350 [inline] hub_event+0x1ada/0x3590 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5432 process_one_work+0x905/0x1570 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:2331 [inline] worker_thread+0x7ab/0xe20 kernel/workqueue.c:2417 kthread+0x30b/0x410 kernel/kthread.c:255 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 The buggy address belongs to the variable: id+0x100/0x120 Memory state around the buggy address: ffffffff89c9e480: fa fa fa fa 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 ffffffff89c9e500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 > ffffffff89c9e580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa ^ ffffffff89c9e600: 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffffffff89c9e680: 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ================================================================== Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Sean Young <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 238191d ] If a faulty initiator fails to bind the socket to the iSCSI connection before emitting a command, for instance, a subsequent send_pdu, it will crash the kernel due to a null pointer dereference in sock_sendmsg(), as shown in the log below. This patch makes sure the bind succeeded before trying to use the socket. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 3 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u8:0 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc2.iscsi+ #13 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 24.158246] Workqueue: iscsi_q_0 iscsi_xmitworker [ 24.158883] RIP: 0010:apparmor_socket_sendmsg+0x5/0x20 [...] [ 24.161739] RSP: 0018:ffffab6440043ca0 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 24.162400] RAX: ffffffff891c1c00 RBX: ffffffff89d53968 RCX: 0000000000000001 [ 24.163253] RDX: 0000000000000030 RSI: ffffab6440043d00 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 24.164104] RBP: 0000000000000030 R08: 0000000000000030 R09: 0000000000000030 [ 24.165166] R10: ffffffff893e66a0 R11: 0000000000000018 R12: ffffab6440043d00 [ 24.166038] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff9d5575a62e90 [ 24.166919] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9d557db80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 24.167890] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 24.168587] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 000000007a838000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [ 24.169451] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 24.170320] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 24.171214] Call Trace: [ 24.171537] security_socket_sendmsg+0x3a/0x50 [ 24.172079] sock_sendmsg+0x16/0x60 [ 24.172506] iscsi_sw_tcp_xmit_segment+0x77/0x120 [ 24.173076] iscsi_sw_tcp_pdu_xmit+0x58/0x170 [ 24.173604] ? iscsi_dbg_trace+0x63/0x80 [ 24.174087] iscsi_tcp_task_xmit+0x101/0x280 [ 24.174666] iscsi_xmit_task+0x83/0x110 [ 24.175206] iscsi_xmitworker+0x57/0x380 [ 24.175757] ? __schedule+0x2a2/0x700 [ 24.176273] process_one_work+0x1b5/0x360 [ 24.176837] worker_thread+0x50/0x3c0 [ 24.177353] kthread+0xf9/0x130 [ 24.177799] ? process_one_work+0x360/0x360 [ 24.178401] ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90 [ 24.178915] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 [ 24.179421] Modules linked in: [ 24.179856] CR2: 0000000000000018 [ 24.180327] ---[ end trace b4b7674b6df5f480 ]--- Signed-off-by: Anatol Pomazau <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Frank Mayhar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Frank Mayhar <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Bharath Ravi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bharath Ravi <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Khazhimsel Kumykov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Khazhimsel Kumykov <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Lee Duncan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

@c-

[ Upstream commit 6abf572 ] Running stress-test test_2 in mtd-utils on ubi device, sometimes we can get following oops message: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffff00000140 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 280a067 P4D 280a067 PUD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 0 PID: 60 Comm: kworker/u16:1 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.2.0 #13 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0 -0-ga698c8995f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-ubifs_0_0) RIP: 0010:rb_next_postorder+0x2e/0xb0 Code: 80 db 03 01 48 85 ff 0f 84 97 00 00 00 48 8b 17 48 83 05 bc 80 db 03 01 48 83 e2 fc 0f 84 82 00 00 00 48 83 05 b2 80 db 03 01 <48> 3b 7a 10 48 89 d0 74 02 f3 c3 48 8b 52 08 48 83 05 a3 80 db 03 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000887758 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: ffff888129ae4700 RBX: ffff888138b08400 RCX: 0000000080800001 RDX: ffffffff00000130 RSI: 0000000080800024 RDI: ffff888138b08400 RBP: ffff888138b08400 R08: ffffea0004a6b920 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffc90000887740 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888128d48000 R13: 0000000000000800 R14: 000000000000011e R15: 00000000000007c8 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88813ba00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffff00000140 CR3: 000000013789d000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: destroy_old_idx+0x5d/0xa0 [ubifs] ubifs_tnc_start_commit+0x4fe/0x1380 [ubifs] do_commit+0x3eb/0x830 [ubifs] ubifs_run_commit+0xdc/0x1c0 [ubifs] Above Oops are due to the slab-out-of-bounds happened in do-while of function layout_in_gaps indirectly called by ubifs_tnc_start_commit. In function layout_in_gaps, there is a do-while loop placing index nodes into the gaps created by obsolete index nodes in non-empty index LEBs until rest index nodes can totally be placed into pre-allocated empty LEBs. @c->gap_lebs points to a memory area(integer array) which records LEB numbers used by 'in-the-gaps' method. Whenever a fitable index LEB is found, corresponding lnum will be incrementally written into the memory area pointed by @c->gap_lebs. The size ((@c->lst.idx_lebs + 1) * sizeof(int)) of memory area is allocated before do-while loop and can not be changed in the loop. But @c->lst.idx_lebs could be increased by function ubifs_change_lp (called by layout_leb_in_gaps->ubifs_find_dirty_idx_leb->get_idx_gc_leb) during the loop. So, sometimes oob happens when number of cycles in do-while loop exceeds the original value of @c->lst.idx_lebs. See detail in https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=204229. This patch fixes oob in layout_in_gaps. Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e1aa1a1 ] Fix following lockdep warning disabling bh in ath_dynack_node_init/ath_dynack_node_deinit [ 75.955878] -------------------------------- [ 75.955880] inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage. [ 75.955884] swapper/0/0 [HC0[0]:SC1[3]:HE1:SE0] takes: [ 75.955888] 00000000792a7ee0 (&(&da->qlock)->rlock){+.?.}, at: ath_dynack_sample_ack_ts+0x4d/0xa0 [ath9k_hw] [ 75.955905] {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at: [ 75.955912] lock_acquire+0x9a/0x160 [ 75.955917] _raw_spin_lock+0x2c/0x70 [ 75.955927] ath_dynack_node_init+0x2a/0x60 [ath9k_hw] [ 75.955934] ath9k_sta_state+0xec/0x160 [ath9k] [ 75.955976] drv_sta_state+0xb2/0x740 [mac80211] [ 75.956008] sta_info_insert_finish+0x21a/0x420 [mac80211] [ 75.956039] sta_info_insert_rcu+0x12b/0x2c0 [mac80211] [ 75.956069] sta_info_insert+0x7/0x70 [mac80211] [ 75.956093] ieee80211_prep_connection+0x42e/0x730 [mac80211] [ 75.956120] ieee80211_mgd_auth.cold+0xb9/0x15c [mac80211] [ 75.956152] cfg80211_mlme_auth+0x143/0x350 [cfg80211] [ 75.956169] nl80211_authenticate+0x25e/0x2b0 [cfg80211] [ 75.956172] genl_family_rcv_msg+0x198/0x400 [ 75.956174] genl_rcv_msg+0x42/0x90 [ 75.956176] netlink_rcv_skb+0x35/0xf0 [ 75.956178] genl_rcv+0x1f/0x30 [ 75.956180] netlink_unicast+0x154/0x200 [ 75.956182] netlink_sendmsg+0x1bf/0x3d0 [ 75.956186] ___sys_sendmsg+0x2c2/0x2f0 [ 75.956187] __sys_sendmsg+0x44/0x80 [ 75.956190] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1a0 [ 75.956192] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 75.956194] irq event stamp: 2357092 [ 75.956196] hardirqs last enabled at (2357092): [<ffffffff818c62de>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3e/0x50 [ 75.956199] hardirqs last disabled at (2357091): [<ffffffff818c60b1>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x11/0x80 [ 75.956202] softirqs last enabled at (2357072): [<ffffffff8106dc09>] irq_enter+0x59/0x60 [ 75.956204] softirqs last disabled at (2357073): [<ffffffff8106dcbe>] irq_exit+0xae/0xc0 [ 75.956206] other info that might help us debug this: [ 75.956207] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 75.956208] CPU0 [ 75.956209] ---- [ 75.956210] lock(&(&da->qlock)->rlock); [ 75.956213] <Interrupt> [ 75.956214] lock(&(&da->qlock)->rlock); [ 75.956216] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 75.956217] 1 lock held by swapper/0/0: [ 75.956219] #0: 000000003bb5675c (&(&sc->sc_pcu_lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: ath9k_tasklet+0x55/0x240 [ath9k] [ 75.956225] stack backtrace: [ 75.956228] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc1-wdn+ #13 [ 75.956229] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Studio XPS 1340/0K183D, BIOS A11 09/08/2009 [ 75.956231] Call Trace: [ 75.956233] <IRQ> [ 75.956236] dump_stack+0x67/0x90 [ 75.956239] mark_lock+0x4c1/0x640 [ 75.956242] ? check_usage_backwards+0x130/0x130 [ 75.956245] ? sched_clock_local+0x12/0x80 [ 75.956247] __lock_acquire+0x484/0x7a0 [ 75.956250] ? __lock_acquire+0x3b9/0x7a0 [ 75.956252] lock_acquire+0x9a/0x160 [ 75.956259] ? ath_dynack_sample_ack_ts+0x4d/0xa0 [ath9k_hw] [ 75.956262] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x80 [ 75.956268] ? ath_dynack_sample_ack_ts+0x4d/0xa0 [ath9k_hw] [ 75.956275] ath_dynack_sample_ack_ts+0x4d/0xa0 [ath9k_hw] [ 75.956280] ath_rx_tasklet+0xd09/0xe90 [ath9k] [ 75.956286] ath9k_tasklet+0x102/0x240 [ath9k] [ 75.956288] tasklet_action_common.isra.0+0x6d/0x170 [ 75.956291] __do_softirq+0xcc/0x425 [ 75.956294] irq_exit+0xae/0xc0 [ 75.956296] do_IRQ+0x8a/0x110 [ 75.956298] common_interrupt+0xf/0xf [ 75.956300] </IRQ> [ 75.956303] RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xb2/0x400 [ 75.956308] RSP: 0018:ffffffff82203e70 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffd7 [ 75.956310] RAX: ffffffff82219800 RBX: ffffffff822bd0a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 75.956312] RDX: 0000000000000046 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: ffffffff82219800 [ 75.956314] RBP: ffff888155a01c00 R08: 00000011af51aabe R09: 0000000000000000 [ 75.956315] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000002 [ 75.956317] R13: 00000011af51aabe R14: 0000000000000003 R15: ffffffff82219800 [ 75.956321] cpuidle_enter+0x24/0x40 [ 75.956323] do_idle+0x1ac/0x220 [ 75.956326] cpu_startup_entry+0x14/0x20 [ 75.956329] start_kernel+0x482/0x489 [ 75.956332] secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 Fixes: c774d57 ("ath9k: add dynamic ACK timeout estimation") Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]> Tested-by: Koen Vandeputte <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 7cf64b1 upstream. vt_in_use() dereferences console_driver->ttys[i] without proper locking. This is broken because the tty can be closed and freed concurrently. We could fix this by using 'READ_ONCE(console_driver->ttys[i]) != NULL' and skipping the check of tty_struct::count. But, looking at console_driver->ttys[i] isn't really appropriate anyway because even if it is NULL the tty can still be in the process of being closed. Instead, fix it by making vt_in_use() require console_lock() and check whether the vt is allocated and has port refcount > 1. This works since following the patch "vt: vt_ioctl: fix VT_DISALLOCATE freeing in-use virtual console" the port refcount is incremented while the vt is open. Reproducer (very unreliable, but it worked for me after a few minutes): #include <fcntl.h> #include <linux/vt.h> int main() { int fd, nproc; struct vt_stat state; char ttyname[16]; fd = open("/dev/tty10", O_RDONLY); for (nproc = 1; nproc < 8; nproc *= 2) fork(); for (;;) { sprintf(ttyname, "/dev/tty%d", rand() % 8); close(open(ttyname, O_RDONLY)); ioctl(fd, VT_GETSTATE, &state); } } KASAN report: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vt_in_use drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:48 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vt_ioctl+0x1ad3/0x1d70 drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:657 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888065722468 by task syz-vt2/132 CPU: 0 PID: 132 Comm: syz-vt2 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc5-00130-g089b6d3654916 #13 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ?-20191223_100556-anatol 04/01/2014 Call Trace: [...] vt_in_use drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:48 [inline] vt_ioctl+0x1ad3/0x1d70 drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:657 tty_ioctl+0x9db/0x11b0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2660 [...] Allocated by task 136: [...] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:669 [inline] alloc_tty_struct+0x96/0x8a0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2982 tty_init_dev+0x23/0x350 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1334 tty_open_by_driver drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1987 [inline] tty_open+0x3ca/0xb30 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2035 [...] Freed by task 41: [...] kfree+0xbf/0x200 mm/slab.c:3757 free_tty_struct+0x8d/0xb0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:177 release_one_tty+0x22d/0x2f0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1468 process_one_work+0x7f1/0x14b0 kernel/workqueue.c:2264 worker_thread+0x8b/0xc80 kernel/workqueue.c:2410 [...] Fixes: 4001d7b ("vt: push down the tty lock so we can see what is left to tackle") Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.4+ Acked-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

Matthew Garrett and others added 21 commits April 5, 2016 09:45

efi: Make EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE depend on EFI

dbfa35d

The functionality of the config option is dependent upon the platform being UEFI based. Reflect this in the config deps. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <[email protected]>

efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit

f8c98a5

UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode. Add a EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit for use with efi_enabled. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <[email protected]>

Overlayfs: Use copy-up security hooks

72e2836

Use the copy-up security hooks previously provided to allow an LSM to adjust the security on a newly created copy and to filter the xattrs copied to that file copy. Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>

SELinux: Stub in copy-up handling

7640e15

Provide stubs for union/overlay copy-up handling. The xattr copy up stub discards lower SELinux xattrs rather than letting them be copied up so that the security label on the copy doesn't get corrupted. Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>

overlayfs: use a minimal buffer in ovl_copy_xattr

6f36c5d

Rather than always allocating the high-order XATTR_SIZE_MAX buffer which is costly and prone to failure, only allocate what is needed and realloc if necessary. Fixes coreos/bugs#489

crawford merged this pull request into coreos:v4.5-coreos Apr 5, 2016

crawford deleted the v4.5-coreos branch April 5, 2016 17:32

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*: rebase changes from v4.4.6-coreos #13

*: rebase changes from v4.4.6-coreos #13

crawford commented Apr 5, 2016

mjg59 commented Apr 5, 2016

*: rebase changes from v4.4.6-coreos #13

*: rebase changes from v4.4.6-coreos #13

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crawford commented Apr 5, 2016

mjg59 commented Apr 5, 2016