This library was originally just an implementation of SecureJoin
which was
intended to be included in the Go standard library as a safer
filepath.Join
that would restrict the path lookup to be inside a root
directory.
The implementation was based on code that existed in several container
runtimes. Unfortunately, this API is fundamentally unsafe against attackers
that can modify path components after SecureJoin
returns and before the
caller uses the path, allowing for some fairly trivial TOCTOU attacks.
SecureJoin
(and SecureJoinVFS
) are still provided by this library to
support legacy users, but new users are strongly suggested to avoid using
SecureJoin
and instead use the new api or switch to
libpathrs.
With the above limitations in mind, this library guarantees the following:
-
If no error is set, the resulting string must be a child path of
root
and will not contain any symlink path components (they will all be expanded). -
When expanding symlinks, all symlink path components must be resolved relative to the provided root. In particular, this can be considered a userspace implementation of how
chroot(2)
operates on file paths. Note that these symlinks will not be expanded lexically (filepath.Clean
is not called on the input before processing). -
Non-existent path components are unaffected by
SecureJoin
(similar tofilepath.EvalSymlinks
's semantics). -
The returned path will always be
filepath.Clean
ed and thus not contain any..
components.
A (trivial) implementation of this function on GNU/Linux systems could be done
with the following (note that this requires root privileges and is far more
opaque than the implementation in this library, and also requires that
readlink
is inside the root
path and is trustworthy):
package securejoin
import (
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
)
func SecureJoin(root, unsafePath string) (string, error) {
unsafePath = string(filepath.Separator) + unsafePath
cmd := exec.Command("chroot", root,
"readlink", "--canonicalize-missing", "--no-newline", unsafePath)
output, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
expanded := string(output)
return filepath.Join(root, expanded), nil
}
While we recommend users switch to libpathrs as soon as it has a stable release, some methods implemented by libpathrs have been ported to this library to ease the transition. These APIs are only supported on Linux.
These APIs are implemented such that filepath-securejoin
will
opportunistically use certain newer kernel APIs that make these operations far
more secure. In particular:
-
All of the lookup operations will use
openat2
on new enough kernels (Linux 5.6 or later) to restrict lookups through magic-links and bind-mounts (for certain operations) and to make use ofRESOLVE_IN_ROOT
to efficiently resolve symlinks within a rootfs. -
The APIs provide hardening against a malicious
/proc
mount to either detect or avoid being tricked by a/proc
that is not legitimate. This is done usingopenat2
for all users, and privileged users will also be further protected by usingfsopen
andopen_tree
(Linux 5.2 or later).
func OpenInRoot(root, unsafePath string) (*os.File, error)
func OpenatInRoot(root *os.File, unsafePath string) (*os.File, error)
func Reopen(handle *os.File, flags int) (*os.File, error)
OpenInRoot
is a much safer version of
path, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(root, unsafePath)
file, err := os.OpenFile(path, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_CLOEXEC)
that protects against various race attacks that could lead to serious security
issues, depending on the application. Note that the returned *os.File
is an
O_PATH
file descriptor, which is quite restricted. Callers will probably need
to use Reopen
to get a more usable handle (this split is done to provide
useful features like PTY spawning and to avoid users accidentally opening bad
inodes that could cause a DoS).
Callers need to be careful in how they use the returned *os.File
. Usually it
is only safe to operate on the handle directly, and it is very easy to create a
security issue. libpathrs provides far more helpers to make using
these handles safer -- there is currently no plan to port them to
filepath-securejoin
.
OpenatInRoot
is like OpenInRoot
except that the root is provided using an
*os.File
. This allows you to ensure that multiple OpenatInRoot
(or
MkdirAllHandle
) calls are operating on the same rootfs.
NOTE: Unlike
SecureJoin
,OpenInRoot
will error out as soon as it hits a dangling symlink or non-existent path. This is in contrast toSecureJoin
which treated non-existent components as though they were real directories, and would allow for partial resolution of dangling symlinks. These behaviours are at odds with how Linux treats non-existent paths and dangling symlinks, and so these are no longer allowed.
func MkdirAll(root, unsafePath string, mode int) error
func MkdirAllHandle(root *os.File, unsafePath string, mode int) (*os.File, error)
MkdirAll
is a much safer version of
path, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(root, unsafePath)
err = os.MkdirAll(path, mode)
that protects against the same kinds of races that OpenInRoot
protects
against.
MkdirAllHandle
is like MkdirAll
except that the root is provided using an
*os.File
(the reason for this is the same as with OpenatInRoot
) and an
*os.File
of the final created directory is returned (this directory is
guaranteed to be effectively identical to the directory created by
MkdirAllHandle
, which is not possible to ensure by just using OpenatInRoot
after MkdirAll
).
NOTE: Unlike
SecureJoin
,MkdirAll
will error out as soon as it hits a dangling symlink or non-existent path. This is in contrast toSecureJoin
which treated non-existent components as though they were real directories, and would allow for partial resolution of dangling symlinks. These behaviours are at odds with how Linux treats non-existent paths and dangling symlinks, and so these are no longer allowed. This means thatMkdirAll
will not create non-existent directories referenced by a dangling symlink.
The license of this project is the same as Go, which is a BSD 3-clause license
available in the LICENSE
file.