Merge branch 'master' into fix_typo_eip_1380

ethereum · Nov 12, 2023 · 2835b1d · 2835b1d
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diff --git a/EIPS/eip-3455.md b/EIPS/eip-3455.md
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ title: SUDO Opcode
 description: A new opcode is introduced to allow calling from an arbitrary sender address.
 author: William Morriss (@wjmelements), Baptiste Vauthey (@thabaptiser)
 discussions-to: https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/eip-3455-sudo-opcode/5860
-status: Draft
+status: Stagnant
 type: Standards Track
 category: Core
 created: 2021-04-01

diff --git a/EIPS/eip-5000.md b/EIPS/eip-5000.md
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ title: MULDIV instruction
 description: Introduce a new instruction to perform x * y / z in 512-bit precision
 author: Harikrishnan Mulackal (@hrkrshnn), Alex Beregszaszi (@axic), Paweł Bylica (@chfast)
 discussions-to: https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/muldiv-instruction/9930
-status: Draft
+status: Stagnant
 type: Standards Track
 category: Core
 created: 2022-03-14

diff --git a/EIPS/eip-6810.md b/EIPS/eip-6810.md
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ title: Ex Post Facto Cascading Revert
 description: Allow transactions to be reversed after confirmation
 author: William Morriss (@wjmelements)
 discussions-to: https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/eip-6810-ex-post-facto-cascading-revert/13630
-status: Draft
+status: Stagnant
 type: Standards Track
 category: Core
 created: 2023-04-01

diff --git a/EIPS/eip-7549.md b/EIPS/eip-7549.md
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ Gossip verification rules for the `beacon_attestation_${subnet_id}` topic includ
 > - [IGNORE] There has been no other valid attestation seen on an attestation subnet that has an identical attestation.data.target.epoch and participating validator index.
 > - [REJECT] The signature of attestation is valid.
 
-For an unaggregated attestation, the tupple (slot, index, aggregation_bits) uniquely identify a single public key. Thus there is a single correct value for the field `index`. If an attacker mutates the `index` field the signature will fail to verify and the message will be dropped. This is the same outcome of mutating the aggregation bits, which is possible today. If implementations verify the attestation signature before registering it in a 'first-seen' cache, there's no risk of cache pollution.
+For an unaggregated attestation, the tuple (slot, index, aggregation_bits) uniquely identify a single public key. Thus there is a single correct value for the field `index`. If an attacker mutates the `index` field the signature will fail to verify and the message will be dropped. This is the same outcome of mutating the aggregation bits, which is possible today. If implementations verify the attestation signature before registering it in a 'first-seen' cache, there's no risk of cache pollution.
 
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