Skip to content
New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

Sign up for GitHub

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

Jump to bottom

readiness tables #2651

Merged
merged 1 commit into from
May 16, 2020
Merged

readiness tables #2651

Changes from all commits
Commits
Show all changes
1 commit
Select commit
File filter

Filter by extension

Filter by extension
Conversations
Failed to load comments.
Loading
Jump to
Jump to file
Failed to load files.
Loading
Diff view
Diff view
12 changes: 6 additions & 6 deletions EIPS/eip-1057.md
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ This document presents an overview of the algorithm and examines what it means t

## Motivation

Ever since the first bitcoin mining ASIC was released, many new Proof of Work algorithms have been created with the intention of being “ASIC-resistant”. The goal of “ASIC-resistance” is to resist the centralization of PoW mining power such that these coins couldn’t be so easily manipulated by a few players.
Ever since the first bitcoin mining ASIC was released, many new Proof of Work algorithms have been created with the intention of being “ASIC-resistant”. The goal of “ASIC-resistance” is to resist the centralization of PoW mining power such that these coins couldn’t be so easily manipulated by a few players.

Ethereum's approach is to incentivize a geographically-distributed community of miners with a low barrier to entry on commodity hardware. As stated in the Yellow Paper:

Expand All @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ It is from these premises that Ethash was designed.
5 years of experience with the Ethereum blockchain have demonstrated the success of our approach. This success cannot be taken for granted.
* 11 years of experience with PoW Blockchains have shown a centralization in hardware development, resulting in a few companies controlling the lifecycle of new hardware, limited distribution and multiple incidents of leverage & contention ((citations))
* new ASICs for Ethash are providing higher efficiency than GPUs ((cite device specs))
* the existing Ethereum network is now circa 40% [secured by E3 devices](https://www.overleaf.com/project/5e222c2cac8911000178b239).
* the existing Ethereum network is now circa 40% [secured by E3 devices](https://www.overleaf.com/project/5e222c2cac8911000178b239).
* new devices are coming online with ((cite even better specs))

ProgPow restores Ethash' ASIC-resistance by extending Etash with a GPU-specific approach to the second path.
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -69,9 +69,9 @@ These would result in minimal, roughly 1.1-1.2x, efficiency gains. This is much
### Rationale for PoW on Commodity Hardware
With the growth of large mining pools, the control of hashing power has been delegated to the top few pools to provide a steadier economic return for small miners. While some have made the argument that large centralized pools defeats the purpose of “ASIC resistance,” it’s important to note that ASIC based coins are even more centralized for several reasons.

1. No natural distribution: There isn’t an economic purpose for ultra-specialized hardware outside of mining and thus no reason for most people to have it.
2. No reserve group: Thus, there’s no reserve pool of hardware or reserve pool of interested parties to jump in when coin price is volatile and attractive for manipulation.
3. High barrier to entry: Initial miners are those rich enough to invest capital and ecological resources on the unknown experiment a new coin may be. Thus, initial coin distribution through mining will be very limited causing centralized economic bias.
1. No natural distribution: There isn’t an economic purpose for ultra-specialized hardware outside of mining and thus no reason for most people to have it.
2. No reserve group: Thus, there’s no reserve pool of hardware or reserve pool of interested parties to jump in when coin price is volatile and attractive for manipulation.
3. High barrier to entry: Initial miners are those rich enough to invest capital and ecological resources on the unknown experiment a new coin may be. Thus, initial coin distribution through mining will be very limited causing centralized economic bias.
4. Delegated centralization vs implementation centralization: While pool centralization is delegated, hardware monoculture is not: only the limiter buyers of this hardware can participate so there isn’t even the possibility of divesting control on short notice.
5. No obvious decentralization of control even with decentralized mining: Once large custom ASIC makers get into the game, designing back-doored hardware is trivial. ASIC makers have no incentive to be transparent or fair in market participation.

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ void progPowLoop(
if (i < PROGPOW_CNT_MATH)
{
// Random Math
// Generate 2 unique sources
// Generate 2 unique sources
int src_rnd = kiss99(prog_rnd) % (PROGPOW_REGS * (PROGPOW_REGS-1));
int src1 = src_rnd % PROGPOW_REGS; // 0 <= src1 < PROGPOW_REGS
int src2 = src_rnd / PROGPOW_REGS; // 0 <= src2 < PROGPOW_REGS - 1
Expand Down