Update mstar-v7.dtsi #1
Closed
Conversation
This file contains bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Update uart1 fields
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
Lockdep warns that the use of the hpte_lock in native_hpte_remove() is not safe against an IRQ coming in: ================================ WARNING: inconsistent lock state 6.4.0-rc2-g0c54f4d30ecc #1 Not tainted -------------------------------- inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. qemu-system-ppc/93865 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: c0000000021f5180 (hpte_lock){+.?.}-{0:0}, at: native_lock_hpte+0x8/0xd0 {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at: lock_acquire+0x134/0x3f0 native_lock_hpte+0x44/0xd0 native_hpte_insert+0xd4/0x2a0 __hash_page_64K+0x218/0x4f0 hash_page_mm+0x464/0x840 do_hash_fault+0x11c/0x260 data_access_common_virt+0x210/0x220 __ip_select_ident+0x140/0x150 ... net_rx_action+0x3bc/0x440 __do_softirq+0x180/0x534 ... sys_sendmmsg+0x34/0x50 system_call_exception+0x128/0x320 system_call_common+0x160/0x2e4 ... Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(hpte_lock); <Interrupt> lock(hpte_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** ... Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x98/0xe0 (unreliable) print_usage_bug.part.0+0x250/0x278 mark_lock+0xc9c/0xd30 __lock_acquire+0x440/0x1ca0 lock_acquire+0x134/0x3f0 native_lock_hpte+0x44/0xd0 native_hpte_remove+0xb0/0x190 kvmppc_mmu_map_page+0x650/0x698 [kvm_pr] kvmppc_handle_pagefault+0x534/0x6e8 [kvm_pr] kvmppc_handle_exit_pr+0x6d8/0xe90 [kvm_pr] after_sprg3_load+0x80/0x90 [kvm_pr] kvmppc_vcpu_run_pr+0x108/0x270 [kvm_pr] kvmppc_vcpu_run+0x34/0x48 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x340/0x470 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x338/0x8b8 [kvm] sys_ioctl+0x7c4/0x13e0 system_call_exception+0x128/0x320 system_call_common+0x160/0x2e4 I suspect kvm_pr is the only caller that doesn't already have IRQs disabled, which is why this hasn't been reported previously. Fix it by disabling IRQs in native_hpte_remove(). Fixes: 35159b5 ("powerpc/64s: make HPTE lock and native_tlbie_lock irq-safe") Cc: [email protected] # v6.1+ Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Link: https://msgid.link/[email protected]
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
With commit 0d940a9 ("mm/pgtable: allow pte_offset_map[_lock]() to fail") the kernel is now using pmd_same to compare pmd values that are pointing to a level 4 page table page. Move the functions out of #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE and add a variant that can work with both 4K and 64K page size. kernel BUG at arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash-4k.h:141! Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=4K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries ..... NIP [c00000000048aee0] __pte_offset_map_lock+0xf0/0x164 LR [c00000000048ae78] __pte_offset_map_lock+0x88/0x164 Call Trace: 0xc0003f000009a340 (unreliable) __handle_mm_fault+0x1340/0x1980 handle_mm_fault+0xbc/0x380 __get_user_pages+0x320/0x550 get_user_pages_remote+0x13c/0x520 get_arg_page+0x80/0x1d0 copy_string_kernel+0xc8/0x250 kernel_execve+0x11c/0x270 run_init_process+0xe4/0x10c kernel_init+0xbc/0x1a0 ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c Reported-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <[email protected]> Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Link: https://msgid.link/[email protected]
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
If a task creates a new block group and that block group becomes unused before we finish its creation, at btrfs_create_pending_block_groups(), then when btrfs_mark_bg_unused() is called against the block group, we assume that the block group is currently in the list of block groups to reclaim, and we move it out of the list of new block groups and into the list of unused block groups. This has two consequences: 1) We move it out of the list of new block groups associated to the current transaction. So the block group creation is not finished and if we attempt to delete the bg because it's unused, we will not find the block group item in the extent tree (or the new block group tree), its device extent items in the device tree etc, resulting in the deletion to fail due to the missing items; 2) We don't increment the reference count on the block group when we move it to the list of unused block groups, because we assumed the block group was on the list of block groups to reclaim, and in that case it already has the correct reference count. However the block group was on the list of new block groups, in which case no extra reference was taken because it's local to the current task. This later results in doing an extra reference count decrement when removing the block group from the unused list, eventually leading the reference count to 0. This second case was caught when running generic/297 from fstests, which produced the following assertion failure and stack trace: [589.559] assertion failed: refcount_read(&block_group->refs) == 1, in fs/btrfs/block-group.c:4299 [589.559] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [589.559] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/block-group.c:4299! [589.560] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [589.560] CPU: 8 PID: 2819134 Comm: umount Tainted: G W 6.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-134+ #1 [589.560] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [589.560] RIP: 0010:btrfs_free_block_groups+0x449/0x4a0 [btrfs] [589.561] Code: 68 62 da c0 (...) [589.561] RSP: 0018:ffffa55a8c3b3d98 EFLAGS: 00010246 [589.561] RAX: 0000000000000058 RBX: ffff8f030d7f2000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [589.562] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff953f0878 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [589.562] RBP: ffff8f030d7f2088 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffa55a8c3b3c50 [589.562] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8f05850b4c00 [589.562] R13: ffff8f030d7f2090 R14: ffff8f05850b4cd8 R15: dead000000000100 [589.563] FS: 00007f497fd2e840(0000) GS:ffff8f09dfc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [589.563] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [589.563] CR2: 00007f497ff8ec10 CR3: 0000000271472006 CR4: 0000000000370ee0 [589.563] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [589.564] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [589.564] Call Trace: [589.564] <TASK> [589.565] ? __die_body+0x1b/0x60 [589.565] ? die+0x39/0x60 [589.565] ? do_trap+0xeb/0x110 [589.565] ? btrfs_free_block_groups+0x449/0x4a0 [btrfs] [589.566] ? do_error_trap+0x6a/0x90 [589.566] ? btrfs_free_block_groups+0x449/0x4a0 [btrfs] [589.566] ? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70 [589.566] ? btrfs_free_block_groups+0x449/0x4a0 [btrfs] [589.567] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 [589.567] ? btrfs_free_block_groups+0x449/0x4a0 [btrfs] [589.567] ? btrfs_free_block_groups+0x449/0x4a0 [btrfs] [589.567] close_ctree+0x35d/0x560 [btrfs] [589.568] ? fsnotify_sb_delete+0x13e/0x1d0 [589.568] ? dispose_list+0x3a/0x50 [589.568] ? evict_inodes+0x151/0x1a0 [589.568] generic_shutdown_super+0x73/0x1a0 [589.569] kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 [589.569] btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] [589.569] deactivate_locked_super+0x2e/0x70 [589.569] cleanup_mnt+0x104/0x160 [589.570] task_work_run+0x56/0x90 [589.570] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x160/0x170 [589.570] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x22/0x50 [589.570] ? __x64_sys_umount+0x12/0x20 [589.571] do_syscall_64+0x48/0x90 [589.571] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [589.571] RIP: 0033:0x7f497ff0a567 [589.571] Code: af 98 0e (...) [589.572] RSP: 002b:00007ffc98347358 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6 [589.572] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f49800b8264 RCX: 00007f497ff0a567 [589.572] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000557f558abfa0 [589.573] RBP: 0000557f558a6ba0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffc98346100 [589.573] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [589.573] R13: 0000557f558abfa0 R14: 0000557f558a6cb0 R15: 0000557f558a6dd0 [589.573] </TASK> [589.574] Modules linked in: dm_snapshot dm_thin_pool (...) [589.576] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fix this by adding a runtime flag to the block group to tell that the block group is still in the list of new block groups, and therefore it should not be moved to the list of unused block groups, at btrfs_mark_bg_unused(), until the flag is cleared, when we finish the creation of the block group at btrfs_create_pending_block_groups(). Fixes: a9f1897 ("btrfs: move out now unused BG from the reclaim list") CC: [email protected] # 5.15+ Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
The err_restore_domain flow was accidently inserted into the success path in commit 1000dcc ("iommu: Allow IOMMU_RESV_DIRECT to work on ARM"). It should only happen if iommu_create_device_direct_mappings() fails. This caused the domains the be wrongly changed and freed whenever the sysfs is used, resulting in an oops: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 3417 Comm: avocado Not tainted 6.4.0-rc4-next-20230602 #3 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R6515/07PXPY, BIOS 2.3.6 07/06/2021 RIP: 0010:__iommu_attach_device+0xc/0xa0 Code: c0 c3 cc cc cc cc 48 89 f0 c3 cc cc cc cc 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 55 48 8b 47 08 <48> 8b 00 48 85 c0 74 74 48 89 f5 e8 64 12 49 00 41 89 c4 85 c0 74 RSP: 0018:ffffabae0220bd48 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9ac04f70e410 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: ffff9ac044db20c0 RSI: ffff9ac044fa50d0 RDI: ffff9ac04f70e410 RBP: ffff9ac044fa50d0 R08: 1000000100209001 R09: 00000000000002dc R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9ac043d54700 R13: ffff9ac043d54700 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f02e30ae000(0000) GS:ffff9afeb2440000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000012afca006 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x24/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x82/0x150 ? __iommu_queue_command_sync+0x80/0xc0 ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x150 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? __iommu_attach_device+0xc/0xa0 ? __iommu_attach_device+0x1c/0xa0 __iommu_device_set_domain+0x42/0x80 __iommu_group_set_domain_internal+0x5d/0x160 iommu_setup_default_domain+0x318/0x400 iommu_group_store_type+0xb1/0x200 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12f/0x1c0 vfs_write+0x2a2/0x3b0 ksys_write+0x63/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 RIP: 0033:0x7f02e2f14a6f Reorganize the error flow so that the success branch and error branches are clearer. Fixes: 1000dcc ("iommu: Allow IOMMU_RESV_DIRECT to work on ARM") Reported-by: Dheeraj Kumar Srivastava <[email protected]> Tested-by: Vasant Hegde <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Lu Baolu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
Calling ethtool during reload can lead to call trace, because VSI isn't configured for some time, but netdev is alive. To fix it add rtnl lock for VSI deconfig and config. Set ::num_q_vectors to 0 after freeing and add a check for ::tx/rx_rings in ring related ethtool ops. Add proper unroll of filters in ice_start_eth(). Reproduction: $watch -n 0.1 -d 'ethtool -g enp24s0f0np0' $devlink dev reload pci/0000:18:00.0 action driver_reinit Call trace before fix: [66303.926205] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [66303.926259] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [66303.926286] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [66303.926311] PGD 0 P4D 0 [66303.926332] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [66303.926358] CPU: 4 PID: 933821 Comm: ethtool Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.4.0-rc5+ #1 [66303.926400] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.00.01.0014.070920180847 07/09/2018 [66303.926446] RIP: 0010:ice_get_ringparam+0x22/0x50 [ice] [66303.926649] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 87 c0 09 00 00 c7 46 04 e0 1f 00 00 c7 46 10 e0 1f 00 00 48 8b 50 20 <48> 8b 12 0f b7 52 3a 89 56 14 48 8b 40 28 48 8b 00 0f b7 40 58 48 [66303.926722] RSP: 0018:ffffad40472f39c8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [66303.926749] RAX: ffff98a8ada05828 RBX: ffff98a8c46dd060 RCX: ffffad40472f3b48 [66303.926781] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff98a8c46dd068 RDI: ffff98a8b23c4000 [66303.926811] RBP: ffffad40472f3b48 R08: 00000000000337b0 R09: 0000000000000000 [66303.926843] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000100 R12: ffff98a8b23c4000 [66303.926874] R13: ffff98a8c46dd060 R14: 000000000000000f R15: ffffad40472f3a50 [66303.926906] FS: 00007f6397966740(0000) GS:ffff98b390900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [66303.926941] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [66303.926967] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000011ac20002 CR4: 00000000007706e0 [66303.926999] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [66303.927029] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [66303.927060] PKRU: 55555554 [66303.927075] Call Trace: [66303.927094] <TASK> [66303.927111] ? __die+0x23/0x70 [66303.927140] ? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4e0 [66303.927176] ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x180 [66303.927209] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 [66303.927244] ? ice_get_ringparam+0x22/0x50 [ice] [66303.927433] rings_prepare_data+0x62/0x80 [66303.927469] ethnl_default_doit+0xe2/0x350 [66303.927501] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0xe3/0x140 [66303.927538] genl_rcv_msg+0x1b1/0x2c0 [66303.927561] ? __pfx_ethnl_default_doit+0x10/0x10 [66303.927590] ? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 [66303.927615] netlink_rcv_skb+0x58/0x110 [66303.927644] genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 [66303.927665] netlink_unicast+0x19e/0x290 [66303.927691] netlink_sendmsg+0x254/0x4d0 [66303.927717] sock_sendmsg+0x93/0xa0 [66303.927743] __sys_sendto+0x126/0x170 [66303.927780] __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 [66303.928593] do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x90 [66303.929370] ? __count_memcg_events+0x60/0xa0 [66303.930146] ? count_memcg_events.constprop.0+0x1a/0x30 [66303.930920] ? handle_mm_fault+0x9e/0x350 [66303.931688] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x258/0x740 [66303.932452] ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x180 [66303.933193] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc Fixes: 5b246e5 ("ice: split probe into smaller functions") Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michal Swiatkowski <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Tested-by: Pucha Himasekhar Reddy <[email protected]> (A Contingent worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
Arrays passed to reg_in_range_table should end with empty record. The patch solves KASAN detected bug with signature: BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in xehp_is_valid_b_counter_addr+0x2c7/0x350 [i915] Read of size 4 at addr ffffffffa1555d90 by task perf/1518 CPU: 4 PID: 1518 Comm: perf Tainted: G U 6.4.0-kasan_438-g3303d06107f3+ #1 Hardware name: Intel Corporation Meteor Lake Client Platform/MTL-P DDR5 SODIMM SBS RVP, BIOS MTLPFWI1.R00.3223.D80.2305311348 05/31/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> ... xehp_is_valid_b_counter_addr+0x2c7/0x350 [i915] Fixes: 0fa9349 ("drm/i915/perf: complete programming whitelisting for XEHPSDV") Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hajda <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Nirmoy Das <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 2f42c5a) Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
We do netif_napi_add() for all allocated q_vectors[], but potentially
do netif_napi_del() for part of them, then kfree q_vectors and leave
invalid pointers at dev->napi_list.
Reproducer:
[root@host ~]# cat repro.sh
#!/bin/bash
pf_dbsf="0000:41:00.0"
vf0_dbsf="0000:41:02.0"
g_pids=()
function do_set_numvf()
{
echo 2 >/sys/bus/pci/devices/${pf_dbsf}/sriov_numvfs
sleep $((RANDOM%3+1))
echo 0 >/sys/bus/pci/devices/${pf_dbsf}/sriov_numvfs
sleep $((RANDOM%3+1))
}
function do_set_channel()
{
local nic=$(ls -1 --indicator-style=none /sys/bus/pci/devices/${vf0_dbsf}/net/)
[ -z "$nic" ] && { sleep $((RANDOM%3)) ; return 1; }
ifconfig $nic 192.168.18.5 netmask 255.255.255.0
ifconfig $nic up
ethtool -L $nic combined 1
ethtool -L $nic combined 4
sleep $((RANDOM%3))
}
function on_exit()
{
local pid
for pid in "${g_pids[@]}"; do
kill -0 "$pid" &>/dev/null && kill "$pid" &>/dev/null
done
g_pids=()
}
trap "on_exit; exit" EXIT
while :; do do_set_numvf ; done &
g_pids+=($!)
while :; do do_set_channel ; done &
g_pids+=($!)
wait
Result:
[ 4093.900222] ==================================================================
[ 4093.900230] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in free_netdev+0x308/0x390
[ 4093.900232] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88b4dc145640 by task repro.sh/6699
[ 4093.900233]
[ 4093.900236] CPU: 10 PID: 6699 Comm: repro.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: G O --------- -t - 4.18.0 #1
[ 4093.900238] Hardware name: Powerleader PR2008AL/H12DSi-N6, BIOS 2.0 04/09/2021
[ 4093.900239] Call Trace:
[ 4093.900244] dump_stack+0x71/0xab
[ 4093.900249] print_address_description+0x6b/0x290
[ 4093.900251] ? free_netdev+0x308/0x390
[ 4093.900252] kasan_report+0x14a/0x2b0
[ 4093.900254] free_netdev+0x308/0x390
[ 4093.900261] iavf_remove+0x825/0xd20 [iavf]
[ 4093.900265] pci_device_remove+0xa8/0x1f0
[ 4093.900268] device_release_driver_internal+0x1c6/0x460
[ 4093.900271] pci_stop_bus_device+0x101/0x150
[ 4093.900273] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device+0xe/0x20
[ 4093.900275] pci_iov_remove_virtfn+0x187/0x420
[ 4093.900277] ? pci_iov_add_virtfn+0xe10/0xe10
[ 4093.900278] ? pci_get_subsys+0x90/0x90
[ 4093.900280] sriov_disable+0xed/0x3e0
[ 4093.900282] ? bus_find_device+0x12d/0x1a0
[ 4093.900290] i40e_free_vfs+0x754/0x1210 [i40e]
[ 4093.900298] ? i40e_reset_all_vfs+0x880/0x880 [i40e]
[ 4093.900299] ? pci_get_device+0x7c/0x90
[ 4093.900300] ? pci_get_subsys+0x90/0x90
[ 4093.900306] ? pci_vfs_assigned.part.7+0x144/0x210
[ 4093.900309] ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x10/0x10
[ 4093.900315] i40e_pci_sriov_configure+0x1fa/0x2e0 [i40e]
[ 4093.900318] sriov_numvfs_store+0x214/0x290
[ 4093.900320] ? sriov_totalvfs_show+0x30/0x30
[ 4093.900321] ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x10/0x10
[ 4093.900323] ? __check_object_size+0x15a/0x350
[ 4093.900326] kernfs_fop_write+0x280/0x3f0
[ 4093.900329] vfs_write+0x145/0x440
[ 4093.900330] ksys_write+0xab/0x160
[ 4093.900332] ? __ia32_sys_read+0xb0/0xb0
[ 4093.900334] ? fput_many+0x1a/0x120
[ 4093.900335] ? filp_close+0xf0/0x130
[ 4093.900338] do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x370
[ 4093.900339] ? page_fault+0x8/0x30
[ 4093.900341] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca
[ 4093.900357] RIP: 0033:0x7f16ad4d22c0
[ 4093.900359] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d d8 cb 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d 89 24 2d 00 00 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 fe dd 01 00 48 89 04 24
[ 4093.900360] RSP: 002b:00007ffd6491b7f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[ 4093.900362] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00007f16ad4d22c0
[ 4093.900363] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000001a41408 RDI: 0000000000000001
[ 4093.900364] RBP: 0000000001a41408 R08: 00007f16ad7a1780 R09: 00007f16ae1f2700
[ 4093.900364] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002
[ 4093.900365] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 00007f16ad7a0620 R15: 0000000000000001
[ 4093.900367]
[ 4093.900368] Allocated by task 820:
[ 4093.900371] kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 4093.900373] __kmalloc+0xfb/0x200
[ 4093.900376] iavf_init_interrupt_scheme+0x63b/0x1320 [iavf]
[ 4093.900380] iavf_watchdog_task+0x3d51/0x52c0 [iavf]
[ 4093.900382] process_one_work+0x56a/0x11f0
[ 4093.900383] worker_thread+0x8f/0xf40
[ 4093.900384] kthread+0x2a0/0x390
[ 4093.900385] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 4093.900387] 0xffffffffffffffff
[ 4093.900387]
[ 4093.900388] Freed by task 6699:
[ 4093.900390] __kasan_slab_free+0x137/0x190
[ 4093.900391] kfree+0x8b/0x1b0
[ 4093.900394] iavf_free_q_vectors+0x11d/0x1a0 [iavf]
[ 4093.900397] iavf_remove+0x35a/0xd20 [iavf]
[ 4093.900399] pci_device_remove+0xa8/0x1f0
[ 4093.900400] device_release_driver_internal+0x1c6/0x460
[ 4093.900401] pci_stop_bus_device+0x101/0x150
[ 4093.900402] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device+0xe/0x20
[ 4093.900403] pci_iov_remove_virtfn+0x187/0x420
[ 4093.900404] sriov_disable+0xed/0x3e0
[ 4093.900409] i40e_free_vfs+0x754/0x1210 [i40e]
[ 4093.900415] i40e_pci_sriov_configure+0x1fa/0x2e0 [i40e]
[ 4093.900416] sriov_numvfs_store+0x214/0x290
[ 4093.900417] kernfs_fop_write+0x280/0x3f0
[ 4093.900418] vfs_write+0x145/0x440
[ 4093.900419] ksys_write+0xab/0x160
[ 4093.900420] do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x370
[ 4093.900421] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca
[ 4093.900422] 0xffffffffffffffff
[ 4093.900422]
[ 4093.900424] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88b4dc144200
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192
[ 4093.900425] The buggy address is located 5184 bytes inside of
8192-byte region [ffff88b4dc144200, ffff88b4dc146200)
[ 4093.900425] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 4093.900427] page:ffffea00d3705000 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88bf04415c80 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 4093.900430] flags: 0x10000000008100(slab|head)
[ 4093.900433] raw: 0010000000008100 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff88bf04415c80
[ 4093.900434] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000030003 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 4093.900434] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 4093.900435]
[ 4093.900435] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 4093.900436] ffff88b4dc145500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 4093.900437] ffff88b4dc145580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 4093.900438] >ffff88b4dc145600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 4093.900438] ^
[ 4093.900439] ffff88b4dc145680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 4093.900440] ffff88b4dc145700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 4093.900440] ==================================================================
Although the patch #2 (of 2) can avoid the issue triggered by this
repro.sh, there still are other potential risks that if num_active_queues
is changed to less than allocated q_vectors[] by unexpected, the
mismatched netif_napi_add/del() can also cause UAF.
Since we actually call netif_napi_add() for all allocated q_vectors
unconditionally in iavf_alloc_q_vectors(), so we should fix it by
letting netif_napi_del() match to netif_napi_add().
Fixes: 5eae00c ("i40evf: main driver core")
Signed-off-by: Ding Hui <[email protected]>
Cc: Donglin Peng <[email protected]>
Cc: Huang Cun <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Madhu Chittim <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
If we set channels greater during iavf_remove(), and waiting reset done
would be timeout, then returned with error but changed num_active_queues
directly, that will lead to OOB like the following logs. Because the
num_active_queues is greater than tx/rx_rings[] allocated actually.
Reproducer:
[root@host ~]# cat repro.sh
#!/bin/bash
pf_dbsf="0000:41:00.0"
vf0_dbsf="0000:41:02.0"
g_pids=()
function do_set_numvf()
{
echo 2 >/sys/bus/pci/devices/${pf_dbsf}/sriov_numvfs
sleep $((RANDOM%3+1))
echo 0 >/sys/bus/pci/devices/${pf_dbsf}/sriov_numvfs
sleep $((RANDOM%3+1))
}
function do_set_channel()
{
local nic=$(ls -1 --indicator-style=none /sys/bus/pci/devices/${vf0_dbsf}/net/)
[ -z "$nic" ] && { sleep $((RANDOM%3)) ; return 1; }
ifconfig $nic 192.168.18.5 netmask 255.255.255.0
ifconfig $nic up
ethtool -L $nic combined 1
ethtool -L $nic combined 4
sleep $((RANDOM%3))
}
function on_exit()
{
local pid
for pid in "${g_pids[@]}"; do
kill -0 "$pid" &>/dev/null && kill "$pid" &>/dev/null
done
g_pids=()
}
trap "on_exit; exit" EXIT
while :; do do_set_numvf ; done &
g_pids+=($!)
while :; do do_set_channel ; done &
g_pids+=($!)
wait
Result:
[ 3506.152887] iavf 0000:41:02.0: Removing device
[ 3510.400799] ==================================================================
[ 3510.400820] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in iavf_free_all_tx_resources+0x156/0x160 [iavf]
[ 3510.400823] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88b6f9311008 by task repro.sh/55536
[ 3510.400823]
[ 3510.400830] CPU: 101 PID: 55536 Comm: repro.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: G O --------- -t - 4.18.0 #1
[ 3510.400832] Hardware name: Powerleader PR2008AL/H12DSi-N6, BIOS 2.0 04/09/2021
[ 3510.400835] Call Trace:
[ 3510.400851] dump_stack+0x71/0xab
[ 3510.400860] print_address_description+0x6b/0x290
[ 3510.400865] ? iavf_free_all_tx_resources+0x156/0x160 [iavf]
[ 3510.400868] kasan_report+0x14a/0x2b0
[ 3510.400873] iavf_free_all_tx_resources+0x156/0x160 [iavf]
[ 3510.400880] iavf_remove+0x2b6/0xc70 [iavf]
[ 3510.400884] ? iavf_free_all_rx_resources+0x160/0x160 [iavf]
[ 3510.400891] ? wait_woken+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 3510.400895] ? notifier_call_chain+0xc1/0x130
[ 3510.400903] pci_device_remove+0xa8/0x1f0
[ 3510.400910] device_release_driver_internal+0x1c6/0x460
[ 3510.400916] pci_stop_bus_device+0x101/0x150
[ 3510.400919] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device+0xe/0x20
[ 3510.400924] pci_iov_remove_virtfn+0x187/0x420
[ 3510.400927] ? pci_iov_add_virtfn+0xe10/0xe10
[ 3510.400929] ? pci_get_subsys+0x90/0x90
[ 3510.400932] sriov_disable+0xed/0x3e0
[ 3510.400936] ? bus_find_device+0x12d/0x1a0
[ 3510.400953] i40e_free_vfs+0x754/0x1210 [i40e]
[ 3510.400966] ? i40e_reset_all_vfs+0x880/0x880 [i40e]
[ 3510.400968] ? pci_get_device+0x7c/0x90
[ 3510.400970] ? pci_get_subsys+0x90/0x90
[ 3510.400982] ? pci_vfs_assigned.part.7+0x144/0x210
[ 3510.400987] ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x10/0x10
[ 3510.400996] i40e_pci_sriov_configure+0x1fa/0x2e0 [i40e]
[ 3510.401001] sriov_numvfs_store+0x214/0x290
[ 3510.401005] ? sriov_totalvfs_show+0x30/0x30
[ 3510.401007] ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x10/0x10
[ 3510.401011] ? __check_object_size+0x15a/0x350
[ 3510.401018] kernfs_fop_write+0x280/0x3f0
[ 3510.401022] vfs_write+0x145/0x440
[ 3510.401025] ksys_write+0xab/0x160
[ 3510.401028] ? __ia32_sys_read+0xb0/0xb0
[ 3510.401031] ? fput_many+0x1a/0x120
[ 3510.401032] ? filp_close+0xf0/0x130
[ 3510.401038] do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x370
[ 3510.401041] ? page_fault+0x8/0x30
[ 3510.401043] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca
[ 3510.401073] RIP: 0033:0x7f3a9bb842c0
[ 3510.401079] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d d8 cb 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d 89 24 2d 00 00 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 fe dd 01 00 48 89 04 24
[ 3510.401080] RSP: 002b:00007ffc05f1fe18 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[ 3510.401083] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00007f3a9bb842c0
[ 3510.401085] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000002327408 RDI: 0000000000000001
[ 3510.401086] RBP: 0000000002327408 R08: 00007f3a9be53780 R09: 00007f3a9c8a4700
[ 3510.401086] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002
[ 3510.401087] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 00007f3a9be52620 R15: 0000000000000001
[ 3510.401090]
[ 3510.401093] Allocated by task 76795:
[ 3510.401098] kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 3510.401099] __kmalloc+0xfb/0x200
[ 3510.401104] iavf_init_interrupt_scheme+0x26f/0x1310 [iavf]
[ 3510.401108] iavf_watchdog_task+0x1d58/0x4050 [iavf]
[ 3510.401114] process_one_work+0x56a/0x11f0
[ 3510.401115] worker_thread+0x8f/0xf40
[ 3510.401117] kthread+0x2a0/0x390
[ 3510.401119] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 3510.401122] 0xffffffffffffffff
[ 3510.401123]
In timeout handling, we should keep the original num_active_queues
and reset num_req_queues to 0.
Fixes: 4e5e6b5 ("iavf: Fix return of set the new channel count")
Signed-off-by: Ding Hui <[email protected]>
Cc: Donglin Peng <[email protected]>
Cc: Huang Cun <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
…encies A driver's lock (crit_lock) is used to serialize all the driver's tasks. Lockdep, however, shows a circular dependency between rtnl and crit_lock. This happens when an ndo that already holds the rtnl requests the driver to reset, since the reset task (in some paths) tries to grab rtnl to either change real number of queues of update netdev features. [566.241851] ====================================================== [566.241893] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [566.241936] 6.2.14-100.fc36.x86_64+debug #1 Tainted: G OE [566.241984] ------------------------------------------------------ [566.242025] repro.sh/2604 is trying to acquire lock: [566.242061] ffff9280fc5ceee8 (&adapter->crit_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: iavf_close+0x3c/0x240 [iavf] [566.242167] but task is already holding lock: [566.242209] ffffffff9976d350 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: iavf_remove+0x6b5/0x730 [iavf] [566.242300] which lock already depends on the new lock. [566.242353] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [566.242401] -> #1 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [566.242451] __mutex_lock+0xc1/0xbb0 [566.242489] iavf_init_interrupt_scheme+0x179/0x440 [iavf] [566.242560] iavf_watchdog_task+0x80b/0x1400 [iavf] [566.242627] process_one_work+0x2b3/0x560 [566.242663] worker_thread+0x4f/0x3a0 [566.242696] kthread+0xf2/0x120 [566.242730] ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50 [566.242763] -> #0 (&adapter->crit_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [566.242815] __lock_acquire+0x15ff/0x22b0 [566.242869] lock_acquire+0xd2/0x2c0 [566.242901] __mutex_lock+0xc1/0xbb0 [566.242934] iavf_close+0x3c/0x240 [iavf] [566.242997] __dev_close_many+0xac/0x120 [566.243036] dev_close_many+0x8b/0x140 [566.243071] unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x165/0x7c0 [566.243116] unregister_netdevice_queue+0xd3/0x110 [566.243157] iavf_remove+0x6c1/0x730 [iavf] [566.243217] pci_device_remove+0x33/0xa0 [566.243257] device_release_driver_internal+0x1bc/0x240 [566.243299] pci_stop_bus_device+0x6c/0x90 [566.243338] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device+0xe/0x20 [566.243380] pci_iov_remove_virtfn+0xd1/0x130 [566.243417] sriov_disable+0x34/0xe0 [566.243448] ice_free_vfs+0x2da/0x330 [ice] [566.244383] ice_sriov_configure+0x88/0xad0 [ice] [566.245353] sriov_numvfs_store+0xde/0x1d0 [566.246156] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x15e/0x210 [566.246921] vfs_write+0x288/0x530 [566.247671] ksys_write+0x74/0xf0 [566.248408] do_syscall_64+0x58/0x80 [566.249145] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [566.249886] other info that might help us debug this: [566.252014] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [566.253432] CPU0 CPU1 [566.254118] ---- ---- [566.254800] lock(rtnl_mutex); [566.255514] lock(&adapter->crit_lock); [566.256233] lock(rtnl_mutex); [566.256897] lock(&adapter->crit_lock); [566.257388] *** DEADLOCK *** The deadlock can be triggered by a script that is continuously resetting the VF adapter while doing other operations requiring RTNL, e.g: while :; do ip link set $VF up ethtool --set-channels $VF combined 2 ip link set $VF down ip link set $VF up ethtool --set-channels $VF combined 4 ip link set $VF down done Any operation that triggers a reset can substitute "ethtool --set-channles" As a fix, add a new task "finish_config" that do all the work which needs rtnl lock. With the exception of iavf_remove(), all work that require rtnl should be called from this task. As for iavf_remove(), at the point where we need to call unregister_netdevice() (and grab rtnl_lock), we make sure the finish_config task is not running (cancel_work_sync()) to safely grab rtnl. Subsequent finish_config work cannot restart after that since the task is guarded by the __IAVF_IN_REMOVE_TASK bit in iavf_schedule_finish_config(). Fixes: 5ac49f3 ("iavf: use mutexes for locking of critical sections") Signed-off-by: Ahmed Zaki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mateusz Palczewski <[email protected]> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
When making a DNS query inside the kernel using dns_query(), the request code can in rare cases end up creating a duplicate index key in the assoc_array of the destination keyring. It is eventually found by a BUG_ON() check in the assoc_array implementation and results in a crash. Example report: [2158499.700025] kernel BUG at ../lib/assoc_array.c:652! [2158499.700039] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [2158499.700065] CPU: 3 PID: 31985 Comm: kworker/3:1 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.3.18-150300.59.90-default #1 SLE15-SP3 [2158499.700096] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020 [2158499.700351] Workqueue: cifsiod cifs_resolve_server [cifs] [2158499.700380] RIP: 0010:assoc_array_insert+0x85f/0xa40 [2158499.700401] Code: ff 74 2b 48 8b 3b 49 8b 45 18 4c 89 e6 48 83 e7 fe e8 95 ec 74 00 3b 45 88 7d db 85 c0 79 d4 0f 0b 0f 0b 0f 0b e8 41 f2 be ff <0f> 0b 0f 0b 81 7d 88 ff ff ff 7f 4c 89 eb 4c 8b ad 58 ff ff ff 0f [2158499.700448] RSP: 0018:ffffc0bd6187faf0 EFLAGS: 00010282 [2158499.700470] RAX: ffff9f1ea7da2fe8 RBX: ffff9f1ea7da2fc1 RCX: 0000000000000005 [2158499.700492] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000000 [2158499.700515] RBP: ffffc0bd6187fbb0 R08: ffff9f185faf1100 R09: 0000000000000000 [2158499.700538] R10: ffff9f1ea7da2cc0 R11: 000000005ed8cec8 R12: ffffc0bd6187fc28 [2158499.700561] R13: ffff9f15feb8d000 R14: ffff9f1ea7da2fc0 R15: ffff9f168dc0d740 [2158499.700585] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9f185fac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [2158499.700610] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [2158499.700630] CR2: 00007fdd94fca238 CR3: 0000000809d8c006 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [2158499.700702] Call Trace: [2158499.700741] ? key_alloc+0x447/0x4b0 [2158499.700768] ? __key_link_begin+0x43/0xa0 [2158499.700790] __key_link_begin+0x43/0xa0 [2158499.700814] request_key_and_link+0x2c7/0x730 [2158499.700847] ? dns_resolver_read+0x20/0x20 [dns_resolver] [2158499.700873] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20 [2158499.700898] request_key_tag+0x43/0xa0 [2158499.700926] dns_query+0x114/0x2ca [dns_resolver] [2158499.701127] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x194/0x310 [cifs] [2158499.701164] ? scnprintf+0x49/0x90 [2158499.701190] ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70 [2158499.701211] ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70 [2158499.701405] reconn_set_ipaddr_from_hostname+0x81/0x2a0 [cifs] [2158499.701603] cifs_resolve_server+0x4b/0xd0 [cifs] [2158499.701632] process_one_work+0x1f8/0x3e0 [2158499.701658] worker_thread+0x2d/0x3f0 [2158499.701682] ? process_one_work+0x3e0/0x3e0 [2158499.701703] kthread+0x10d/0x130 [2158499.701723] ? kthread_park+0xb0/0xb0 [2158499.701746] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40 The situation occurs as follows: * Some kernel facility invokes dns_query() to resolve a hostname, for example, "abcdef". The function registers its global DNS resolver cache as current->cred.thread_keyring and passes the query to request_key_net() -> request_key_tag() -> request_key_and_link(). * Function request_key_and_link() creates a keyring_search_context object. Its match_data.cmp method gets set via a call to type->match_preparse() (resolves to dns_resolver_match_preparse()) to dns_resolver_cmp(). * Function request_key_and_link() continues and invokes search_process_keyrings_rcu() which returns that a given key was not found. The control is then passed to request_key_and_link() -> construct_alloc_key(). * Concurrently to that, a second task similarly makes a DNS query for "abcdef." and its result gets inserted into the DNS resolver cache. * Back on the first task, function construct_alloc_key() first runs __key_link_begin() to determine an assoc_array_edit operation to insert a new key. Index keys in the array are compared exactly as-is, using keyring_compare_object(). The operation finds that "abcdef" is not yet present in the destination keyring. * Function construct_alloc_key() continues and checks if a given key is already present on some keyring by again calling search_process_keyrings_rcu(). This search is done using dns_resolver_cmp() and "abcdef" gets matched with now present key "abcdef.". * The found key is linked on the destination keyring by calling __key_link() and using the previously calculated assoc_array_edit operation. This inserts the "abcdef." key in the array but creates a duplicity because the same index key is already present. Fix the problem by postponing __key_link_begin() in construct_alloc_key() until an actual key which should be linked into the destination keyring is determined. [[email protected]: added a fixes tag and cc to stable] Cc: [email protected] # v5.3+ Fixes: df593ee ("keys: Hoist locking out of __key_link_begin()") Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Joey Lee <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
At btrfs_orphan_cleanup(), if we can't find an inode (btrfs_iget() returns
an -ENOENT error pointer), we proceed with 'ret' set to -ENOENT and the
inode pointer set to ERR_PTR(-ENOENT). Later when we proceed to the body
of the following if statement:
if (ret == -ENOENT || inode->i_nlink) {
(...)
trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 1);
if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
iput(inode);
goto out;
}
(...)
ret = btrfs_del_orphan_item(trans, root,
found_key.objectid);
btrfs_end_transaction(trans);
if (ret) {
iput(inode);
goto out;
}
continue;
}
If we get an error from btrfs_start_transaction() or from the call to
btrfs_del_orphan_item() we end calling iput() against an inode pointer
that has a value of ERR_PTR(-ENOENT), resulting in a crash with the
following trace:
[876.667] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000096
[876.667] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[876.667] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[876.667] PGD 0 P4D 0
[876.668] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[876.668] CPU: 0 PID: 2356187 Comm: mount Tainted: G W 6.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-134+ #1
[876.668] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[876.668] RIP: 0010:iput+0xa/0x20
[876.668] Code: ff ff ff 66 (...)
[876.669] RSP: 0018:ffffafa9c0c9f9d0 EFLAGS: 00010282
[876.669] RAX: ffffffffffffffe4 RBX: 000000000009453b RCX: 0000000000000000
[876.669] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffafa9c0c9f930 RDI: fffffffffffffffe
[876.669] RBP: ffff95c612f3b800 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffffffffffffe4
[876.670] R10: 00018f2a71010000 R11: 000000000ead96e3 R12: ffff95cb7d6909a0
[876.670] R13: fffffffffffffffe R14: ffff95c60f477000 R15: 00000000ffffffe4
[876.670] FS: 00007f5fbe30a840(0000) GS:ffff95ccdfa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[876.670] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[876.671] CR2: 0000000000000096 CR3: 000000055e9f6004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
[876.671] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[876.671] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[876.672] Call Trace:
[876.744] <TASK>
[876.744] ? __die_body+0x1b/0x60
[876.744] ? page_fault_oops+0x15d/0x450
[876.745] ? __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x47/0x410
[876.745] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x65/0x8a0
[876.745] ? exc_page_fault+0x74/0x170
[876.746] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[876.746] ? iput+0xa/0x20
[876.746] btrfs_orphan_cleanup+0x221/0x330 [btrfs]
[876.746] btrfs_lookup_dentry+0x58f/0x5f0 [btrfs]
[876.747] btrfs_lookup+0xe/0x30 [btrfs]
[876.747] __lookup_slow+0x82/0x130
[876.785] walk_component+0xe5/0x160
[876.786] path_lookupat.isra.0+0x6e/0x150
[876.786] filename_lookup+0xcf/0x1a0
[876.786] ? mod_objcg_state+0xd2/0x360
[876.786] ? obj_cgroup_charge+0xf5/0x110
[876.787] ? should_failslab+0xa/0x20
[876.787] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x47/0x450
[876.787] vfs_path_lookup+0x51/0x90
[876.788] mount_subtree+0x8d/0x130
[876.788] btrfs_mount+0x149/0x410 [btrfs]
[876.788] ? __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x47/0x410
[876.788] ? vfs_parse_fs_param+0xc0/0x110
[876.789] legacy_get_tree+0x24/0x50
[876.834] vfs_get_tree+0x22/0xd0
[876.852] path_mount+0x2d8/0x9c0
[876.852] do_mount+0x79/0x90
[876.852] __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0
[876.853] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[876.899] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[876.958] RIP: 0033:0x7f5fbe50b76a
[876.959] Code: 48 8b 0d a9 (...)
[876.959] RSP: 002b:00007fff01925798 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[876.959] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f5fbe694264 RCX: 00007f5fbe50b76a
[876.960] RDX: 0000561bde6c8720 RSI: 0000561bde6bdec0 RDI: 0000561bde6c31a0
[876.960] RBP: 0000561bde6bdc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
[876.960] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[876.960] R13: 0000561bde6c31a0 R14: 0000561bde6c8720 R15: 0000561bde6bdc70
[876.960] </TASK>
So fix this by setting 'inode' to NULL whenever we get an error from
btrfs_iget(), and to make the code simpler, stop testing for 'ret' being
-ENOENT to check if we have an inode - instead test for 'inode' being NULL
or not. Having a NULL 'inode' prevents any iput() call from crashing, as
iput() ignores NULL inode pointers. Also, stop testing for a NULL return
value from btrfs_iget() with PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(), because btrfs_iget() never
returns NULL - in case an inode is not found, it returns ERR_PTR(-ENOENT),
and in case of memory allocation failure, it returns ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM).
We also don't need the extra iput() calls on the error branches for the
btrfs_start_transaction() and btrfs_del_orphan_item() calls, as we have
already called iput() before, so remove them.
Fixes: a13bb2c ("btrfs: add missing iputs on orphan cleanup failure")
CC: [email protected] # 6.4
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
While trying to get the subpage blocksize tests running, I hit the following panic on generic/476 assertion failed: PagePrivate(page) && page->private, in fs/btrfs/subpage.c:229 kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/subpage.c:229! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP CPU: 1 PID: 1453 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7+ torvalds#12 Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-20230301gitf80f052277c8-26.fc38 03/01/2023 pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0 lr : btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0 Call trace: btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0 btrfs_subpage_clear_checked+0x38/0xc0 btrfs_page_clear_checked+0x48/0x98 btrfs_truncate_block+0x5d0/0x6a8 btrfs_cont_expand+0x5c/0x528 btrfs_write_check.isra.0+0xf8/0x150 btrfs_buffered_write+0xb4/0x760 btrfs_do_write_iter+0x2f8/0x4b0 btrfs_file_write_iter+0x1c/0x30 do_iter_readv_writev+0xc8/0x158 do_iter_write+0x9c/0x210 vfs_iter_write+0x24/0x40 iter_file_splice_write+0x224/0x390 direct_splice_actor+0x38/0x68 splice_direct_to_actor+0x12c/0x260 do_splice_direct+0x90/0xe8 generic_copy_file_range+0x50/0x90 vfs_copy_file_range+0x29c/0x470 __arm64_sys_copy_file_range+0xcc/0x498 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x80/0xd8 do_el0_svc+0x6c/0x168 el0_svc+0x50/0x1b0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x114/0x120 el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198 This happens because during btrfs_cont_expand we'll get a page, set it as mapped, and if it's not Uptodate we'll read it. However between the read and re-locking the page we could have called release_folio() on the page, but left the page in the file mapping. release_folio() can clear the page private, and thus further down we blow up when we go to modify the subpage bits. Fix this by putting the set_page_extent_mapped() after the read. This is safe because read_folio() will call set_page_extent_mapped() before it does the read, and then if we clear page private but leave it on the mapping we're completely safe re-setting set_page_extent_mapped(). With this patch I can now run generic/476 without panicing. CC: [email protected] # 6.1+ Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
…r abort If we have a transaction abort with qgroups enabled we get a warning triggered when doing the final put on the transaction, like this: [552.6789] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [552.6815] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 81745 at fs/btrfs/transaction.c:144 btrfs_put_transaction+0x123/0x130 [btrfs] [552.6817] Modules linked in: btrfs blake2b_generic xor (...) [552.6819] CPU: 4 PID: 81745 Comm: btrfs-transacti Tainted: G W 6.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-134+ #1 [552.6819] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [552.6819] RIP: 0010:btrfs_put_transaction+0x123/0x130 [btrfs] [552.6821] Code: bd a0 01 00 (...) [552.6821] RSP: 0018:ffffa168c0527e28 EFLAGS: 00010286 [552.6821] RAX: ffff936042caed00 RBX: ffff93604a3eb448 RCX: 0000000000000000 [552.6821] RDX: ffff93606421b028 RSI: ffffffff92ff0878 RDI: ffff93606421b010 [552.6821] RBP: ffff93606421b000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffa168c0d07c20 [552.6821] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff93608dc52950 R12: ffffa168c0527e70 [552.6821] R13: ffff93606421b000 R14: ffff93604a3eb420 R15: ffff93606421b028 [552.6821] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff93675fb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [552.6821] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [552.6821] CR2: 0000558ad262b000 CR3: 000000014feda005 CR4: 0000000000370ee0 [552.6822] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [552.6822] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [552.6822] Call Trace: [552.6822] <TASK> [552.6822] ? __warn+0x80/0x130 [552.6822] ? btrfs_put_transaction+0x123/0x130 [btrfs] [552.6824] ? report_bug+0x1f4/0x200 [552.6824] ? handle_bug+0x42/0x70 [552.6824] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70 [552.6824] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 [552.6824] ? btrfs_put_transaction+0x123/0x130 [btrfs] [552.6826] btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0xe7/0x5e0 [btrfs] [552.6828] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x23/0x40 [552.6828] ? try_to_wake_up+0x94/0x5e0 [552.6828] ? __pfx_process_timeout+0x10/0x10 [552.6828] transaction_kthread+0x103/0x1d0 [btrfs] [552.6830] ? __pfx_transaction_kthread+0x10/0x10 [btrfs] [552.6832] kthread+0xee/0x120 [552.6832] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [552.6832] ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50 [552.6832] </TASK> [552.6832] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- This corresponds to this line of code: void btrfs_put_transaction(struct btrfs_transaction *transaction) { (...) WARN_ON(!RB_EMPTY_ROOT( &transaction->delayed_refs.dirty_extent_root)); (...) } The warning happens because btrfs_qgroup_destroy_extent_records(), called in the transaction abort path, we free all entries from the rbtree "dirty_extent_root" with rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(), but we don't actually empty the rbtree - it's still pointing to nodes that were freed. So set the rbtree's root node to NULL to avoid this warning (assign RB_ROOT). Fixes: 81f7eb0 ("btrfs: destroy qgroup extent records on transaction abort") CC: [email protected] # 5.10+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
Cited commit converted the neighbour code to use the standard RCU variant instead of the RCU-bh variant, but the VRF code still uses rcu_read_lock_bh() / rcu_read_unlock_bh() around the neighbour lookup code in its IPv4 and IPv6 output paths, resulting in lockdep splats [1][2]. Can be reproduced using [3]. Fix by switching to rcu_read_lock() / rcu_read_unlock(). [1] ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.5.0-rc1-custom-g9c099e6dbf98 torvalds#403 Not tainted ----------------------------- include/net/neighbour.h:302 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 2 locks held by ping/183: #0: ffff888105ea1d80 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: raw_sendmsg+0xc6c/0x33c0 #1: ffffffff85b46820 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: vrf_output+0x2e3/0x2030 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 183 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-custom-g9c099e6dbf98 torvalds#403 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc37 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xc1/0xf0 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x211/0x3b0 vrf_output+0x1380/0x2030 ip_push_pending_frames+0x125/0x2a0 raw_sendmsg+0x200d/0x33c0 inet_sendmsg+0xa2/0xe0 __sys_sendto+0x2aa/0x420 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe5/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [2] ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.5.0-rc1-custom-g9c099e6dbf98 torvalds#403 Not tainted ----------------------------- include/net/neighbour.h:302 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 2 locks held by ping6/182: #0: ffff888114b63000 (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: rawv6_sendmsg+0x1602/0x3e50 #1: ffffffff85b46820 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: vrf_output6+0xe9/0x1310 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 182 Comm: ping6 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-custom-g9c099e6dbf98 torvalds#403 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc37 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xc1/0xf0 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x211/0x3b0 vrf_output6+0xd32/0x1310 ip6_local_out+0xb4/0x1a0 ip6_send_skb+0xbc/0x340 ip6_push_pending_frames+0xe5/0x110 rawv6_sendmsg+0x2e6e/0x3e50 inet_sendmsg+0xa2/0xe0 __sys_sendto+0x2aa/0x420 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe5/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [3] #!/bin/bash ip link add name vrf-red up numtxqueues 2 type vrf table 10 ip link add name swp1 up master vrf-red type dummy ip address add 192.0.2.1/24 dev swp1 ip address add 2001:db8:1::1/64 dev swp1 ip neigh add 192.0.2.2 lladdr 00:11:22:33:44:55 nud perm dev swp1 ip neigh add 2001:db8:1::2 lladdr 00:11:22:33:44:55 nud perm dev swp1 ip vrf exec vrf-red ping 192.0.2.2 -c 1 &> /dev/null ip vrf exec vrf-red ping6 2001:db8:1::2 -c 1 &> /dev/null Fixes: 09eed11 ("neighbour: switch to standard rcu, instead of rcu_bh") Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CA+G9fYtEr-=GbcXNDYo3XOkwR+uYgehVoDjsP0pFLUpZ_AZcyg@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
Can be called via nft set element list iteration, which may acquire
rcu and/or bh read lock (depends on set type).
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:3353
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1232, name: nft
preempt_count: 0, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 0
2 locks held by nft/1232:
#0: ffff8881180e3ea8 (&nft_net->commit_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: nf_tables_valid_genid
#1: ffffffff83f5f540 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire
Call Trace:
nft_chain_validate
nft_lookup_validate_setelem
nft_pipapo_walk
nft_lookup_validate
nft_chain_validate
nft_immediate_validate
nft_chain_validate
nf_tables_validate
nf_tables_abort
No choice but to move it to nf_tables_validate().
Fixes: 81ea010 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add rescheduling points during loop detection walks")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
syzbot complained about a lockdep issue [1]
Since raw_bind() and raw_setsockopt() first get RTNL
before locking the socket, we must adopt the same order in raw_release()
[1]
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.5.0-rc1-syzkaller-00192-g78adb4bcf99e #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor.0/14110 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88804e4b6130 (sk_lock-AF_CAN){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1708 [inline]
ffff88804e4b6130 (sk_lock-AF_CAN){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: raw_bind+0xb1/0xab0 net/can/raw.c:435
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8e3df368 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: raw_bind+0xa7/0xab0 net/can/raw.c:434
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x181/0x1340 kernel/locking/mutex.c:747
raw_release+0x1c6/0x9b0 net/can/raw.c:391
__sock_release+0xcd/0x290 net/socket.c:654
sock_close+0x1c/0x20 net/socket.c:1386
__fput+0x3fd/0xac0 fs/file_table.c:384
task_work_run+0x14d/0x240 kernel/task_work.c:179
resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x210/0x240 kernel/entry/common.c:204
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:286 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:297
do_syscall_64+0x44/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
-> #0 (sk_lock-AF_CAN){+.+.}-{0:0}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x2e3d/0x5de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1ae/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5726
lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xf0 net/core/sock.c:3492
lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1708 [inline]
raw_bind+0xb1/0xab0 net/can/raw.c:435
__sys_bind+0x1ec/0x220 net/socket.c:1792
__do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1803 [inline]
__se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1801 [inline]
__x64_sys_bind+0x72/0xb0 net/socket.c:1801
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(rtnl_mutex);
lock(sk_lock-AF_CAN);
lock(rtnl_mutex);
lock(sk_lock-AF_CAN);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by syz-executor.0/14110:
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 14110 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-syzkaller-00192-g78adb4bcf99e #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/03/2023
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
check_noncircular+0x311/0x3f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2195
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x2e3d/0x5de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1ae/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5726
lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xf0 net/core/sock.c:3492
lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1708 [inline]
raw_bind+0xb1/0xab0 net/can/raw.c:435
__sys_bind+0x1ec/0x220 net/socket.c:1792
__do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1803 [inline]
__se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1801 [inline]
__x64_sys_bind+0x72/0xb0 net/socket.c:1801
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7fd89007cb29
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fd890d2a0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000031
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd89019bf80 RCX: 00007fd89007cb29
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fd8900c847a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fd89019bf80 R15: 00007ffebf8124f8
</TASK>
Fixes: ee8b94c ("can: raw: fix receiver memory leak")
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Ziyang Xuan <[email protected]>
Cc: Oliver Hartkopp <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
Skip bound chain when flushing table rules, the rule that owns this chain releases these objects. Otherwise, the following warning is triggered: WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1217 at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:2013 nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x1f7/0x210 [nf_tables] CPU: 2 PID: 1217 Comm: chain-flush Not tainted 6.1.39 #1 RIP: 0010:nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x1f7/0x210 [nf_tables] Fixes: d0e2c7d ("netfilter: nf_tables: add NFT_CHAIN_BINDING") Reported-by: Kevin Rich <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
In hci_cs_disconnect, we do hci_conn_del even if disconnection failed. ISO, L2CAP and SCO connections refer to the hci_conn without hci_conn_get, so disconn_cfm must be called so they can clean up their conn, otherwise use-after-free occurs. ISO: ========================================================== iso_sock_connect:880: sk 00000000eabd6557 iso_connect_cis:356: 70:1a:b8:98:ff:a2 -> 28:3d:c2:4a:7e:da ... iso_conn_add:140: hcon 000000001696f1fd conn 00000000b6251073 hci_dev_put:1487: hci0 orig refcnt 17 __iso_chan_add:214: conn 00000000b6251073 iso_sock_clear_timer:117: sock 00000000eabd6557 state 3 ... hci_rx_work:4085: hci0 Event packet hci_event_packet:7601: hci0: event 0x0f hci_cmd_status_evt:4346: hci0: opcode 0x0406 hci_cs_disconnect:2760: hci0: status 0x0c hci_sent_cmd_data:3107: hci0 opcode 0x0406 hci_conn_del:1151: hci0 hcon 000000001696f1fd handle 2560 hci_conn_unlink:1102: hci0: hcon 000000001696f1fd hci_conn_drop:1451: hcon 00000000d8521aaf orig refcnt 2 hci_chan_list_flush:2780: hcon 000000001696f1fd hci_dev_put:1487: hci0 orig refcnt 21 hci_dev_put:1487: hci0 orig refcnt 20 hci_req_cmd_complete:3978: opcode 0x0406 status 0x0c ... <no iso_* activity on sk/conn> ... iso_sock_sendmsg:1098: sock 00000000dea5e2e0, sk 00000000eabd6557 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000668 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc38 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:iso_sock_sendmsg (net/bluetooth/iso.c:1112) bluetooth ========================================================== L2CAP: ================================================================== hci_cmd_status_evt:4359: hci0: opcode 0x0406 hci_cs_disconnect:2760: hci0: status 0x0c hci_sent_cmd_data:3085: hci0 opcode 0x0406 hci_conn_del:1151: hci0 hcon ffff88800c999000 handle 3585 hci_conn_unlink:1102: hci0: hcon ffff88800c999000 hci_chan_list_flush:2780: hcon ffff88800c999000 hci_chan_del:2761: hci0 hcon ffff88800c999000 chan ffff888018ddd280 ... BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_send_acl+0x2d/0x540 [bluetooth] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888018ddd298 by task bluetoothd/1175 CPU: 0 PID: 1175 Comm: bluetoothd Tainted: G E 6.4.0-rc4+ #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc38 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5b/0x90 print_report+0xcf/0x670 ? __virt_addr_valid+0xf8/0x180 ? hci_send_acl+0x2d/0x540 [bluetooth] kasan_report+0xa8/0xe0 ? hci_send_acl+0x2d/0x540 [bluetooth] hci_send_acl+0x2d/0x540 [bluetooth] ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 l2cap_chan_send+0x1fd/0x1300 [bluetooth] ? l2cap_sock_sendmsg+0xf2/0x170 [bluetooth] ? __pfx_l2cap_chan_send+0x10/0x10 [bluetooth] ? lock_release+0x1d5/0x3c0 ? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x90 l2cap_sock_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 [bluetooth] sock_write_iter+0x275/0x280 ? __pfx_sock_write_iter+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 do_iter_readv_writev+0x176/0x220 ? __pfx_do_iter_readv_writev+0x10/0x10 ? find_held_lock+0x83/0xa0 ? selinux_file_permission+0x13e/0x210 do_iter_write+0xda/0x340 vfs_writev+0x1b4/0x400 ? __pfx_vfs_writev+0x10/0x10 ? __seccomp_filter+0x112/0x750 ? populate_seccomp_data+0x182/0x220 ? __fget_light+0xdf/0x100 ? do_writev+0x19d/0x210 do_writev+0x19d/0x210 ? __pfx_do_writev+0x10/0x10 ? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x149/0x210 ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x90 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x149/0x210 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc RIP: 0033:0x7ff45cb23e64 Code: 15 d1 1f 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d 9d a7 0d 00 00 74 13 b8 14 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 RSP: 002b:00007fff21ae09b8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007ff45cb23e64 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007fff21ae0aa0 RDI: 0000000000000017 RBP: 00007fff21ae0aa0 R08: 000000000095a8a0 R09: 0000607000053f40 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fff21ae0ac0 R13: 00000fffe435c150 R14: 00007fff21ae0a80 R15: 000060f000000040 </TASK> Allocated by task 771: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 hci_chan_create+0x67/0x1b0 [bluetooth] l2cap_conn_add.part.0+0x17/0x590 [bluetooth] l2cap_connect_cfm+0x266/0x6b0 [bluetooth] hci_le_remote_feat_complete_evt+0x167/0x310 [bluetooth] hci_event_packet+0x38d/0x800 [bluetooth] hci_rx_work+0x287/0xb20 [bluetooth] process_one_work+0x4f7/0x970 worker_thread+0x8f/0x620 kthread+0x17f/0x1c0 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 Freed by task 771: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x2e/0x50 ____kasan_slab_free+0x169/0x1c0 slab_free_freelist_hook+0x9e/0x1c0 __kmem_cache_free+0xc0/0x310 hci_chan_list_flush+0x46/0x90 [bluetooth] hci_conn_cleanup+0x7d/0x330 [bluetooth] hci_cs_disconnect+0x35d/0x530 [bluetooth] hci_cmd_status_evt+0xef/0x2b0 [bluetooth] hci_event_packet+0x38d/0x800 [bluetooth] hci_rx_work+0x287/0xb20 [bluetooth] process_one_work+0x4f7/0x970 worker_thread+0x8f/0x620 kthread+0x17f/0x1c0 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 ================================================================== Fixes: b8d2905 ("Bluetooth: clean up connection in hci_cs_disconnect") Signed-off-by: Pauli Virtanen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
sk->sk_state indicates whether iso_pi(sk)->conn is valid. Operations that check/update sk_state and access conn should hold lock_sock, otherwise they can race. The order of taking locks is hci_dev_lock > lock_sock > iso_conn_lock, which is how it is in connect/disconnect_cfm -> iso_conn_del -> iso_chan_del. Fix locking in iso_connect_cis/bis and sendmsg/recvmsg to take lock_sock around updating sk_state and conn. iso_conn_del must not occur during iso_connect_cis/bis, as it frees the iso_conn. Hold hdev->lock longer to prevent that. This should not reintroduce the issue fixed in commit 241f519 ("Bluetooth: ISO: Avoid circular locking dependency"), since the we acquire locks in order. We retain the fix in iso_sock_connect to release lock_sock before iso_connect_* acquires hdev->lock. Similarly for commit 6a5ad25 ("Bluetooth: ISO: Fix possible circular locking dependency"). We retain the fix in iso_conn_ready to not acquire iso_conn_lock before lock_sock. iso_conn_add shall return iso_conn with valid hcon. Make it so also when reusing an old CIS connection waiting for disconnect timeout (see __iso_sock_close where conn->hcon is set to NULL). Trace with iso_conn_del after iso_chan_add in iso_connect_cis: =============================================================== iso_sock_create:771: sock 00000000be9b69b7 iso_sock_init:693: sk 000000004dff667e iso_sock_bind:827: sk 000000004dff667e 70:1a:b8:98:ff:a2 type 1 iso_sock_setsockopt:1289: sk 000000004dff667e iso_sock_setsockopt:1289: sk 000000004dff667e iso_sock_setsockopt:1289: sk 000000004dff667e iso_sock_connect:875: sk 000000004dff667e iso_connect_cis:353: 70:1a:b8:98:ff:a2 -> 28:3d:c2:4a:7e:da hci_get_route:1199: 70:1a:b8:98:ff:a2 -> 28:3d:c2:4a:7e:da hci_conn_add:1005: hci0 dst 28:3d:c2:4a:7e:da iso_conn_add:140: hcon 000000007b65d182 conn 00000000daf8625e __iso_chan_add:214: conn 00000000daf8625e iso_connect_cfm:1700: hcon 000000007b65d182 bdaddr 28:3d:c2:4a:7e:da status 12 iso_conn_del:187: hcon 000000007b65d182 conn 00000000daf8625e, err 16 iso_sock_clear_timer:117: sock 000000004dff667e state 3 <Note: sk_state is BT_BOUND (3), so iso_connect_cis is still running at this point> iso_chan_del:153: sk 000000004dff667e, conn 00000000daf8625e, err 16 hci_conn_del:1151: hci0 hcon 000000007b65d182 handle 65535 hci_conn_unlink:1102: hci0: hcon 000000007b65d182 hci_chan_list_flush:2780: hcon 000000007b65d182 iso_sock_getsockopt:1376: sk 000000004dff667e iso_sock_getname:1070: sock 00000000be9b69b7, sk 000000004dff667e iso_sock_getname:1070: sock 00000000be9b69b7, sk 000000004dff667e iso_sock_getsockopt:1376: sk 000000004dff667e iso_sock_getname:1070: sock 00000000be9b69b7, sk 000000004dff667e iso_sock_getname:1070: sock 00000000be9b69b7, sk 000000004dff667e iso_sock_shutdown:1434: sock 00000000be9b69b7, sk 000000004dff667e, how 1 __iso_sock_close:632: sk 000000004dff667e state 5 socket 00000000be9b69b7 <Note: sk_state is BT_CONNECT (5), even though iso_chan_del sets BT_CLOSED (6). Only iso_connect_cis sets it to BT_CONNECT, so it must be that iso_chan_del occurred between iso_chan_add and end of iso_connect_cis.> BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 PGD 8000000006467067 P4D 8000000006467067 PUD 3f5f067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc38 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__iso_sock_close (net/bluetooth/iso.c:664) bluetooth =============================================================== Trace with iso_conn_del before iso_chan_add in iso_connect_cis: =============================================================== iso_connect_cis:356: 70:1a:b8:98:ff:a2 -> 28:3d:c2:4a:7e:da ... iso_conn_add:140: hcon 0000000093bc551f conn 00000000768ae504 hci_dev_put:1487: hci0 orig refcnt 21 hci_event_packet:7607: hci0: event 0x0e hci_cmd_complete_evt:4231: hci0: opcode 0x2062 hci_cc_le_set_cig_params:3846: hci0: status 0x07 hci_sent_cmd_data:3107: hci0 opcode 0x2062 iso_connect_cfm:1703: hcon 0000000093bc551f bdaddr 28:3d:c2:4a:7e:da status 7 iso_conn_del:187: hcon 0000000093bc551f conn 00000000768ae504, err 12 hci_conn_del:1151: hci0 hcon 0000000093bc551f handle 65535 hci_conn_unlink:1102: hci0: hcon 0000000093bc551f hci_chan_list_flush:2780: hcon 0000000093bc551f __iso_chan_add:214: conn 00000000768ae504 <Note: this conn was already freed in iso_conn_del above> iso_sock_clear_timer:117: sock 0000000098323f95 state 3 general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x30b29c630930aec8: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 1 PID: 1920 Comm: bluetoothd Tainted: G E 6.3.0-rc7+ #4 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc38 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:detach_if_pending+0x28/0xd0 Code: 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 47 08 48 85 c0 0f 84 ad 00 00 00 55 89 d5 53 48 83 3f 00 48 89 fb 74 7d 66 90 48 8b 03 48 8b 53 08 <> RSP: 0018:ffffb90841a67d08 EFLAGS: 00010007 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9141bd5061b8 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 30b29c630930aec8 RSI: ffff9141fdd21e80 RDI: ffff9141bd5061b8 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffb90841a67b88 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffffff8613f558 R12: ffff9141fdd21e80 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9141b5976010 R15: ffff914185755338 FS: 00007f45768bd840(0000) GS:ffff9141fdd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000619000424074 CR3: 0000000009f5e005 CR4: 0000000000170ee0 Call Trace: <TASK> timer_delete+0x48/0x80 try_to_grab_pending+0xdf/0x170 __cancel_work+0x37/0xb0 iso_connect_cis+0x141/0x400 [bluetooth] =============================================================== Trace with NULL conn->hcon in state BT_CONNECT: =============================================================== __iso_sock_close:619: sk 00000000f7c71fc5 state 1 socket 00000000d90c5fe5 ... __iso_sock_close:619: sk 00000000f7c71fc5 state 8 socket 00000000d90c5fe5 iso_chan_del:153: sk 00000000f7c71fc5, conn 0000000022c03a7e, err 104 ... iso_sock_connect:862: sk 00000000129b56c3 iso_connect_cis:348: 70:1a:b8:98:ff:a2 -> 28:3d:c2:4a:7d:2a hci_get_route:1199: 70:1a:b8:98:ff:a2 -> 28:3d:c2:4a:7d:2a hci_dev_hold:1495: hci0 orig refcnt 19 __iso_chan_add:214: conn 0000000022c03a7e <Note: reusing old conn> iso_sock_clear_timer:117: sock 00000000129b56c3 state 3 ... iso_sock_ready:1485: sk 00000000129b56c3 ... iso_sock_sendmsg:1077: sock 00000000e5013966, sk 00000000129b56c3 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000006a8 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 1 PID: 1403 Comm: wireplumber Tainted: G E 6.3.0-rc7+ #4 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc38 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:iso_sock_sendmsg+0x63/0x2a0 [bluetooth] =============================================================== Fixes: 241f519 ("Bluetooth: ISO: Avoid circular locking dependency") Fixes: 6a5ad25 ("Bluetooth: ISO: Fix possible circular locking dependency") Signed-off-by: Pauli Virtanen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
When ring_buffer_swap_cpu was called during resize process,
the cpu buffer was swapped in the middle, resulting in incorrect state.
Continuing to run in the wrong state will result in oops.
This issue can be easily reproduced using the following two scripts:
/tmp # cat test1.sh
//#! /bin/sh
for i in `seq 0 100000`
do
echo 2000 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
sleep 0.5
echo 5000 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
sleep 0.5
done
/tmp # cat test2.sh
//#! /bin/sh
for i in `seq 0 100000`
do
echo irqsoff > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/current_tracer
sleep 1
echo nop > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/current_tracer
sleep 1
done
/tmp # ./test1.sh &
/tmp # ./test2.sh &
A typical oops log is as follows, sometimes with other different oops logs.
[ 231.711293] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9 at kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2026 rb_update_pages+0x378/0x3f8
[ 231.713375] Modules linked in:
[ 231.714735] CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G W 6.5.0-rc1-00276-g20edcec23f92 torvalds#15
[ 231.716750] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[ 231.718152] Workqueue: events update_pages_handler
[ 231.719714] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 231.721171] pc : rb_update_pages+0x378/0x3f8
[ 231.722212] lr : rb_update_pages+0x25c/0x3f8
[ 231.723248] sp : ffff800082b9bd50
[ 231.724169] x29: ffff800082b9bd50 x28: ffff8000825f7000 x27: 0000000000000000
[ 231.726102] x26: 0000000000000001 x25: fffffffffffff010 x24: 0000000000000ff0
[ 231.728122] x23: ffff0000c3a0b600 x22: ffff0000c3a0b5c0 x21: fffffffffffffe0a
[ 231.730203] x20: ffff0000c3a0b600 x19: ffff0000c0102400 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 231.732329] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000ffffe7aa8510
[ 231.734212] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000002
[ 231.736291] x11: ffff8000826998a8 x10: ffff800082b9baf0 x9 : ffff800081137558
[ 231.738195] x8 : fffffc00030e82c8 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000001
[ 231.740192] x5 : ffff0000ffbafe00 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
[ 231.742118] x2 : 00000000000006aa x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : ffff0000c0007208
[ 231.744196] Call trace:
[ 231.744892] rb_update_pages+0x378/0x3f8
[ 231.745893] update_pages_handler+0x1c/0x38
[ 231.746893] process_one_work+0x1f0/0x468
[ 231.747852] worker_thread+0x54/0x410
[ 231.748737] kthread+0x124/0x138
[ 231.749549] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 231.750434] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 233.720486] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
[ 233.721696] Mem abort info:
[ 233.721935] ESR = 0x0000000096000004
[ 233.722283] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 233.722596] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 233.722805] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 233.723026] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[ 233.723458] Data abort info:
[ 233.723734] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[ 233.724176] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[ 233.724589] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[ 233.725075] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000104943000
[ 233.725592] [0000000000000000] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
[ 233.726231] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 233.726720] Modules linked in:
[ 233.727007] CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G W 6.5.0-rc1-00276-g20edcec23f92 torvalds#15
[ 233.727777] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[ 233.728225] Workqueue: events update_pages_handler
[ 233.728655] pstate: 200000c5 (nzCv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 233.729054] pc : rb_update_pages+0x1a8/0x3f8
[ 233.729334] lr : rb_update_pages+0x154/0x3f8
[ 233.729592] sp : ffff800082b9bd50
[ 233.729792] x29: ffff800082b9bd50 x28: ffff8000825f7000 x27: 0000000000000000
[ 233.730220] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff800082a8b840 x24: ffff0000c0102418
[ 233.730653] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: fffffc000304c880 x21: 0000000000000003
[ 233.731105] x20: 00000000000001f4 x19: ffff0000c0102400 x18: ffff800082fcbc58
[ 233.731727] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000001 x15: 0000000000000001
[ 233.732282] x14: ffff8000825fe0c8 x13: 0000000000000001 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 233.732709] x11: ffff8000826998a8 x10: 0000000000000ae0 x9 : ffff8000801b760c
[ 233.733148] x8 : fefefefefefefeff x7 : 0000000000000018 x6 : ffff0000c03298c0
[ 233.733553] x5 : 0000000000000002 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
[ 233.733972] x2 : ffff0000c3a0b600 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 233.734418] Call trace:
[ 233.734593] rb_update_pages+0x1a8/0x3f8
[ 233.734853] update_pages_handler+0x1c/0x38
[ 233.735148] process_one_work+0x1f0/0x468
[ 233.735525] worker_thread+0x54/0x410
[ 233.735852] kthread+0x124/0x138
[ 233.736064] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 233.736387] Code: 92400000 910006b5 aa000021 aa0303f7 (f9400060)
[ 233.736959] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
After analysis, the seq of the error is as follows [1-5]:
int ring_buffer_resize(struct trace_buffer *buffer, unsigned long size,
int cpu_id)
{
for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
//1. get cpu_buffer, aka cpu_buffer(A)
...
...
schedule_work_on(cpu,
&cpu_buffer->update_pages_work);
//2. 'update_pages_work' is queue on 'cpu', cpu_buffer(A) is passed to
// update_pages_handler, do the update process, set 'update_done' in
// complete(&cpu_buffer->update_done) and to wakeup resize process.
//---->
//3. Just at this moment, ring_buffer_swap_cpu is triggered,
//cpu_buffer(A) be swaped to cpu_buffer(B), the max_buffer.
//ring_buffer_swap_cpu is called as the 'Call trace' below.
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2f8
show_stack+0x18/0x28
dump_stack+0x12c/0x188
ring_buffer_swap_cpu+0x2f8/0x328
update_max_tr_single+0x180/0x210
check_critical_timing+0x2b4/0x2c8
tracer_hardirqs_on+0x1c0/0x200
trace_hardirqs_on+0xec/0x378
el0_svc_common+0x64/0x260
do_el0_svc+0x90/0xf8
el0_svc+0x20/0x30
el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8
el0_sync+0x180/0x1c0
//<----
/* wait for all the updates to complete */
for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
//4. get cpu_buffer, cpu_buffer(B) is used in the following process,
//the state of cpu_buffer(A) and cpu_buffer(B) is totally wrong.
//for example, cpu_buffer(A)->update_done will leave be set 1, and will
//not 'wait_for_completion' at the next resize round.
if (!cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update)
continue;
if (cpu_online(cpu))
wait_for_completion(&cpu_buffer->update_done);
cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update = 0;
}
...
}
//5. the state of cpu_buffer(A) and cpu_buffer(B) is totally wrong,
//Continuing to run in the wrong state, then oops occurs.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Chen Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
…kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.5, part #1 - Avoid pKVM finalization if KVM initialization fails - Add missing BTI instructions in the hypervisor, fixing an early boot failure on BTI systems - Handle MMU notifiers correctly for non hugepage-aligned memslots - Work around a bug in the architecture where hypervisor timer controls have UNKNOWN behavior under nested virt. - Disable preemption in kvm_arch_hardware_enable(), fixing a kernel BUG in cpu hotplug resulting from per-CPU accessor sanity checking. - Make WFI emulation on GICv4 systems robust w.r.t. preemption, consistently requesting a doorbell interrupt on vcpu_put() - Uphold RES0 sysreg behavior when emulating older PMU versions - Avoid macro expansion when initializing PMU register names, ensuring the tracepoints pretty-print the sysreg.
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
Merge series from Dmytro Maluka <[email protected]>: This series includes 2 patches related to (but not fixing) the following I2C failure which occurs sometimes during system suspend or resume and indicates a problem with a spurious DA7219 interrupt: [ 355.876211] i2c_designware i2c_designware.3: Transfer while suspended [ 355.876245] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3576 at drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-designware-master.c:570 i2c_dw_xfer+0x411/0x440 ... [ 355.876462] Call Trace: [ 355.876468] <TASK> [ 355.876475] ? update_load_avg+0x1b3/0x615 [ 355.876484] __i2c_transfer+0x101/0x1d8 [ 355.876494] i2c_transfer+0x74/0x10d [ 355.876504] regmap_i2c_read+0x6a/0x9c [ 355.876513] _regmap_raw_read+0x179/0x223 [ 355.876521] regmap_raw_read+0x1e1/0x28e [ 355.876527] regmap_bulk_read+0x17d/0x1ba [ 355.876532] ? __wake_up+0xed/0x1bb [ 355.876542] da7219_aad_irq_thread+0x54/0x2c9 [snd_soc_da7219 5fb8ebb2179cf2fea29af090f3145d68ed8e2184] [ 355.876556] irq_thread+0x13c/0x231 [ 355.876563] ? irq_forced_thread_fn+0x5f/0x5f [ 355.876570] ? irq_thread_fn+0x4d/0x4d [ 355.876576] kthread+0x13a/0x152 [ 355.876581] ? synchronize_irq+0xc3/0xc3 [ 355.876587] ? kthread_blkcg+0x31/0x31 [ 355.876592] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 355.876601] </TASK> This log shows that DA7219 AAD interrupt handler da7219_aad_irq_thread() is unexpectedly running when DA7219 is suspended and should not generate interrupts. As a result, the IRQ handler is trying to read AAD IRQ event status over I2C and is hitting the I2C driver "Transfer while suspended" failure. Patch #1 adds synchronize_irq() when suspending DA7219, to prevent the IRQ handler from running after suspending if there is a pending IRQ generated before suspending. With this patch the above failure is still reproducible, so this patch does not fix any real observed issue so far, but at least is useful for confirming that the above issue is not caused by a pending IRQ but rather looks like a DA7219 hardware issue with an unexpectedly generated IRQ. Patch #2 does not fix the above issue either, but it prevents its potentially harmful side effects. With the existing code, if the issue occurs and the IRQ handler fails to read the AAD IRQ events status over I2C, it does not check that and tries to use the garbage uninitialized value of the events status, potentially reporting bogus events. This patch fixes that by adding missing error checking. In fact I'm sending these patches not only to submit them for review but also to ask Renesas folks for any hints on a possible cause of the described DA7219 issue (AAD interrupts spuriously firing after jack detection is already disabled) or how to debug it further.
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
Jiri Olsa says:
====================
bpf: Disable preemption in perf_event_output helpers code
hi,
we got report of kernel crash [1][3] within bpf_event_output helper.
The reason is the nesting protection code in bpf_event_output that expects
disabled preemption, which is not guaranteed for programs executed by
bpf_prog_run_array_cg.
I managed to reproduce on tracing side where we have the same problem
in bpf_perf_event_output. The reproducer [2] just creates busy uprobe
and call bpf_perf_event_output helper a lot.
v3 changes:
- added acks and fixed 'Fixes' tag style [Hou Tao]
- added Closes tag to patch 2
v2 changes:
- I changed 'Fixes' commits to where I saw we switched from preempt_disable
to migrate_disable, but I'm not completely sure about the patch 2, because
it was tricky to find, would be nice if somebody could check on that
thanks,
jirka
[1] cilium/cilium#26756
[2] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jolsa/perf.git/commit/?h=bpf_output_fix_reproducer&id=8054dcc634121b884c7c331329d61d93351d03b5
[3] slack:
[66194.378161] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000001
[66194.378324] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
[66194.378447] #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
...
[66194.378692] Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
...
[66194.380666] <TASK>
[66194.380775] ? perf_output_sample+0x12a/0x9a0
[66194.380902] ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x81/0x280
[66194.381024] ? perf_event_output+0x66/0xa0
[66194.381148] ? bpf_event_output+0x13a/0x190
[66194.381270] ? bpf_event_output_data+0x22/0x40
[66194.381391] ? bpf_prog_dfc84bbde731b257_cil_sock4_connect+0x40a/0xacb
[66194.381519] ? xa_load+0x87/0xe0
[66194.381635] ? __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_addr+0xc1/0x1a0
[66194.381759] ? release_sock+0x3e/0x90
[66194.381876] ? sk_setsockopt+0x1a1/0x12f0
[66194.381996] ? udp_pre_connect+0x36/0x50
[66194.382114] ? inet_dgram_connect+0x93/0xa0
[66194.382233] ? __sys_connect+0xb4/0xe0
[66194.382353] ? udp_setsockopt+0x27/0x40
[66194.382470] ? __pfx_udp_push_pending_frames+0x10/0x10
[66194.382593] ? __sys_setsockopt+0xdf/0x1a0
[66194.382713] ? __x64_sys_connect+0xf/0x20
[66194.382832] ? do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x90
[66194.382949] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[66194.383077] </TASK>
---
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
syzkaller found a bug in unix_bind_bsd() [0]. We can reproduce it by bind()ing a socket on a path with length 108. 108 is the size of sun_addr of struct sockaddr_un and is the maximum valid length for the pathname socket. When calling bind(), we use struct sockaddr_storage as the actual buffer size, so terminating sun_addr[108] with null is legitimate as done in unix_mkname_bsd(). However, strlen(sunaddr) for such a case causes fortify_panic() if CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y. __fortify_strlen() has no idea about the actual buffer size and see the string as unterminated. Let's use strnlen() to allow sun_addr to be unterminated at 107. [0]: detected buffer overflow in __fortify_strlen kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1031! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 255 Comm: syz-executor296 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-00330-g60cc1f7d0605 #4 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030 lr : fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030 sp : ffff800089817af0 x29: ffff800089817af0 x28: ffff800089817b40 x27: 1ffff00011302f68 x26: 000000000000006e x25: 0000000000000012 x24: ffff800087e60140 x23: dfff800000000000 x22: ffff800089817c20 x21: ffff800089817c8e x20: 000000000000006c x19: ffff00000c323900 x18: ffff800086ab1630 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000001 x14: 1ffff00011302eb8 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 64a26b65474d2a00 x8 : 64a26b65474d2a00 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001 x5 : ffff800089817438 x4 : ffff800086ac99e0 x3 : ffff800080f19e8c x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 000000000000002c Call trace: fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030 _Z16__fortify_strlenPKcU25pass_dynamic_object_size1 include/linux/fortify-string.h:217 [inline] unix_bind_bsd net/unix/af_unix.c:1212 [inline] unix_bind+0xba8/0xc58 net/unix/af_unix.c:1326 __sys_bind+0x1ac/0x248 net/socket.c:1792 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1803 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __arm64_sys_bind+0x7c/0x94 net/socket.c:1801 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2c0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 el0_svc_common+0x134/0x240 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:139 do_el0_svc+0x64/0x198 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:188 el0_svc+0x2c/0x7c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:647 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:665 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591 Code: aa0003e1 d0000e80 91030000 97ffc91a (d4210000) Fixes: df8fc4e ("kbuild: Enable -fstrict-flex-arrays=3") Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
The Xeon validation group has been carrying out some loaded tests with various HW configurations, and they have seen some transmit queue time out happening during the test. This will cause the reset adapter function to be called by igc_tx_timeout(). Similar race conditions may arise when the interface is being brought down and up in igc_reinit_locked(), an interrupt being generated, and igc_clean_tx_irq() being called to complete the TX. When the igc_tx_timeout() function is invoked, this patch will turn off all TX ring HW queues during igc_down() process. TX ring HW queues will be activated again during the igc_configure_tx_ring() process when performing the igc_up() procedure later. This patch also moved existing igc_disable_tx_ring_hw() to avoid using forward declaration. Kernel trace: [ 7678.747813] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 7678.757914] NETDEV WATCHDOG: enp1s0 (igc): transmit queue 2 timed out [ 7678.770117] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 13 at net/sched/sch_generic.c:525 dev_watchdog+0x1ae/0x1f0 [ 7678.784459] Modules linked in: xt_conntrack nft_chain_nat xt_MASQUERADE xt_addrtype nft_compat nf_tables nfnetlink br_netfilter bridge stp llc overlay dm_mod emrcha(PO) emriio(PO) rktpm(PO) cegbuf_mod(PO) patch_update(PO) se(PO) sgx_tgts(PO) mktme(PO) keylocker(PO) svtdx(PO) svfs_pci_hotplug(PO) vtd_mod(PO) davemem(PO) svmabort(PO) svindexio(PO) usbx2(PO) ehci_sched(PO) svheartbeat(PO) ioapic(PO) sv8259(PO) svintr(PO) lt(PO) pcierootport(PO) enginefw_mod(PO) ata(PO) smbus(PO) spiflash_cdf(PO) arden(PO) dsa_iax(PO) oobmsm_punit(PO) cpm(PO) svkdb(PO) ebg_pch(PO) pch(PO) sviotargets(PO) svbdf(PO) svmem(PO) svbios(PO) dram(PO) svtsc(PO) targets(PO) superio(PO) svkernel(PO) cswitch(PO) mcf(PO) pentiumIII_mod(PO) fs_svfs(PO) mdevdefdb(PO) svfs_os_services(O) ixgbe mdio mdio_devres libphy emeraldrapids_svdefs(PO) regsupport(O) libnvdimm nls_cp437 snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic ledtrig_audio snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep x86_pkg_temp_thermal snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer isst_if_mbox_pci [ 7678.784496] input_leds isst_if_mmio sg snd isst_if_common soundcore wmi button sad9(O) drm fuse backlight configfs efivarfs ip_tables x_tables vmd sdhci led_class rtl8150 r8152 hid_generic pegasus mmc_block usbhid mmc_core hid megaraid_sas ixgb igb i2c_algo_bit ice i40e hpsa scsi_transport_sas e1000e e1000 e100 ax88179_178a usbnet xhci_pci sd_mod xhci_hcd t10_pi crc32c_intel crc64_rocksoft igc crc64 crc_t10dif usbcore crct10dif_generic ptp crct10dif_common usb_common pps_core [ 7679.200403] RIP: 0010:dev_watchdog+0x1ae/0x1f0 [ 7679.210201] Code: 28 e9 53 ff ff ff 4c 89 e7 c6 05 06 42 b9 00 01 e8 17 d1 fb ff 44 89 e9 4c 89 e6 48 c7 c7 40 ad fb 81 48 89 c2 e8 52 62 82 ff <0f> 0b e9 72 ff ff ff 65 8b 05 80 7d 7c 7e 89 c0 48 0f a3 05 0a c1 [ 7679.245438] RSP: 0018:ffa00000001f7d90 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 7679.256021] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ff11000109938440 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 7679.268710] RDX: ff11000361e26cd8 RSI: ff11000361e1b880 RDI: ff11000361e1b880 [ 7679.281314] RBP: ffa00000001f7da8 R08: ff1100035f8fffe8 R09: 0000000000027ffb [ 7679.293840] R10: 0000000000001f0a R11: ff1100035f840000 R12: ff11000109938000 [ 7679.306276] R13: 0000000000000002 R14: dead000000000122 R15: ffa00000001f7e18 [ 7679.318648] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff11000361e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 7679.332064] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 7679.342757] CR2: 00007ffff7fca168 CR3: 000000013b08a006 CR4: 0000000000471ef8 [ 7679.354984] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 7679.367207] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 7679.379370] PKRU: 55555554 [ 7679.386446] Call Trace: [ 7679.393152] <TASK> [ 7679.399363] ? __pfx_dev_watchdog+0x10/0x10 [ 7679.407870] call_timer_fn+0x31/0x110 [ 7679.415698] expire_timers+0xb2/0x120 [ 7679.423403] run_timer_softirq+0x179/0x1e0 [ 7679.431532] ? __schedule+0x2b1/0x820 [ 7679.439078] __do_softirq+0xd1/0x295 [ 7679.446426] ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10 [ 7679.454867] run_ksoftirqd+0x22/0x30 [ 7679.462058] smpboot_thread_fn+0xb7/0x160 [ 7679.469670] kthread+0xcd/0xf0 [ 7679.476097] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 7679.483211] ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50 [ 7679.490047] </TASK> [ 7679.495204] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 7679.503179] igc 0000:01:00.0 enp1s0: Register Dump [ 7679.511230] igc 0000:01:00.0 enp1s0: Register Name Value [ 7679.519892] igc 0000:01:00.0 enp1s0: CTRL 181c0641 [ 7679.528782] igc 0000:01:00.0 enp1s0: STATUS 40280683 [ 7679.537551] igc 0000:01:00.0 enp1s0: CTRL_EXT 10000040 [ 7679.546284] igc 0000:01:00.0 enp1s0: MDIC 180a3800 [ 7679.554942] igc 0000:01:00.0 enp1s0: ICR 00000081 [ 7679.563503] igc 0000:01:00.0 enp1s0: RCTL 04408022 [ 7679.571963] igc 0000:01:00.0 enp1s0: RDLEN[0-3] 00001000 00001000 00001000 00001000 [ 7679.583075] igc 0000:01:00.0 enp1s0: RDH[0-3] 00000068 000000b6 0000000f 00000031 [ 7679.594162] igc 0000:01:00.0 enp1s0: RDT[0-3] 00000066 000000b2 0000000e 00000030 [ 7679.605174] igc 0000:01:00.0 enp1s0: RXDCTL[0-3] 02040808 02040808 02040808 02040808 [ 7679.616196] igc 0000:01:00.0 enp1s0: RDBAL[0-3] 1bb7c000 1bb7f000 1bb82000 0ef33000 [ 7679.627242] igc 0000:01:00.0 enp1s0: RDBAH[0-3] 00000001 00000001 00000001 00000001 [ 7679.638256] igc 0000:01:00.0 enp1s0: TCTL a503f0fa [ 7679.646607] igc 0000:01:00.0 enp1s0: TDBAL[0-3] 2ba4a000 1bb6f000 1bb74000 1bb79000 [ 7679.657609] igc 0000:01:00.0 enp1s0: TDBAH[0-3] 00000001 00000001 00000001 00000001 [ 7679.668551] igc 0000:01:00.0 enp1s0: TDLEN[0-3] 00001000 00001000 00001000 00001000 [ 7679.679470] igc 0000:01:00.0 enp1s0: TDH[0-3] 000000a7 0000002d 000000bf 000000d9 [ 7679.690406] igc 0000:01:00.0 enp1s0: TDT[0-3] 000000a7 0000002d 000000bf 000000d9 [ 7679.701264] igc 0000:01:00.0 enp1s0: TXDCTL[0-3] 02100108 02100108 02100108 02100108 [ 7679.712123] igc 0000:01:00.0 enp1s0: Reset adapter [ 7683.085967] igc 0000:01:00.0 enp1s0: NIC Link is Up 1000 Mbps Full Duplex, Flow Control: RX/TX [ 8086.945561] ------------[ cut here ]------------ Entering kdb (current=0xffffffff8220b200, pid 0) on processor 0 Oops: (null) due to oops @ 0xffffffff81573888 RIP: 0010:dql_completed+0x148/0x160 Code: c9 00 48 89 57 58 e9 46 ff ff ff 45 85 e4 41 0f 95 c4 41 39 db 0f 95 c1 41 84 cc 74 05 45 85 ed 78 0a 44 89 c1 e9 27 ff ff ff <0f> 0b 01 f6 44 89 c1 29 f1 0f 48 ca eb 8c cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc RSP: 0018:ffa0000000003e00 EFLAGS: 00010287 RAX: 000000000000006c RBX: ffa0000003eb0f78 RCX: ff11000109938000 RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000160 RDI: ff110001002e9480 RBP: ffa0000000003ed8 R08: ff110001002e93c0 R09: ffa0000000003d28 R10: 0000000000007cc0 R11: 0000000000007c54 R12: 00000000ffffffd9 R13: ff1100037039cb00 R14: 00000000ffffffd9 R15: ff1100037039c048 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff11000361e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007ffff7fca168 CR3: 000000013b08a003 CR4: 0000000000471ef8 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? igc_poll+0x1a9/0x14d0 [igc] __napi_poll+0x2e/0x1b0 net_rx_action+0x126/0x250 __do_softirq+0xd1/0x295 irq_exit_rcu+0xc5/0xf0 common_interrupt+0x86/0xa0 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_common_interrupt+0x27/0x40 RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xd3/0x3e0 Code: 73 f1 ff ff 49 89 c6 8b 05 e2 ca a7 00 85 c0 0f 8f b3 02 00 00 31 ff e8 1b de 75 ff 80 7d d7 00 0f 85 cd 01 00 00 fb 45 85 ff <0f> 88 fd 00 00 00 49 63 cf 4c 2b 75 c8 48 8d 04 49 48 89 ca 48 8d RSP: 0018:ffffffff82203df0 EFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: ff11000361e2a200 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000001f RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000003cf3cf3d RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffffff82203e28 R08: 0000075ae38471c8 R09: 0000000000000018 R10: 000000000000031a R11: ffffffff8238dca0 R12: ffd1ffffff200000 R13: ffffffff8238dca0 R14: 0000075ae38471c8 R15: 0000000000000002 cpuidle_enter+0x2e/0x50 call_cpuidle+0x23/0x40 do_idle+0x1be/0x220 cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x30 rest_init+0xb5/0xc0 arch_call_rest_init+0xe/0x30 start_kernel+0x448/0x760 x86_64_start_kernel+0x109/0x150 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xe0/0xeb </TASK> more> [0]kdb> [0]kdb> [0]kdb> go Catastrophic error detected kdb_continue_catastrophic=0, type go a second time if you really want to continue [0]kdb> go Catastrophic error detected kdb_continue_catastrophic=0, attempting to continue [ 8086.955689] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. [ 8086.955697] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xc2/0x110 [ 8086.955706] Modules linked in: xt_conntrack nft_chain_nat xt_MASQUERADE xt_addrtype nft_compat nf_tables nfnetlink br_netfilter bridge stp llc overlay dm_mod emrcha(PO) emriio(PO) rktpm(PO) cegbuf_mod(PO) patch_update(PO) se(PO) sgx_tgts(PO) mktme(PO) keylocker(PO) svtdx(PO) svfs_pci_hotplug(PO) vtd_mod(PO) davemem(PO) svmabort(PO) svindexio(PO) usbx2(PO) ehci_sched(PO) svheartbeat(PO) ioapic(PO) sv8259(PO) svintr(PO) lt(PO) pcierootport(PO) enginefw_mod(PO) ata(PO) smbus(PO) spiflash_cdf(PO) arden(PO) dsa_iax(PO) oobmsm_punit(PO) cpm(PO) svkdb(PO) ebg_pch(PO) pch(PO) sviotargets(PO) svbdf(PO) svmem(PO) svbios(PO) dram(PO) svtsc(PO) targets(PO) superio(PO) svkernel(PO) cswitch(PO) mcf(PO) pentiumIII_mod(PO) fs_svfs(PO) mdevdefdb(PO) svfs_os_services(O) ixgbe mdio mdio_devres libphy emeraldrapids_svdefs(PO) regsupport(O) libnvdimm nls_cp437 snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic ledtrig_audio snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep x86_pkg_temp_thermal snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer isst_if_mbox_pci [ 8086.955751] input_leds isst_if_mmio sg snd isst_if_common soundcore wmi button sad9(O) drm fuse backlight configfs efivarfs ip_tables x_tables vmd sdhci led_class rtl8150 r8152 hid_generic pegasus mmc_block usbhid mmc_core hid megaraid_sas ixgb igb i2c_algo_bit ice i40e hpsa scsi_transport_sas e1000e e1000 e100 ax88179_178a usbnet xhci_pci sd_mod xhci_hcd t10_pi crc32c_intel crc64_rocksoft igc crc64 crc_t10dif usbcore crct10dif_generic ptp crct10dif_common usb_common pps_core [ 8086.955784] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xc2/0x110 [ 8086.955788] Code: 01 e8 82 e7 b4 ff 0f 0b 5d c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d 68 c6 eb 00 00 75 81 48 c7 c7 a0 87 f6 81 c6 05 58 c6 eb 00 01 e8 5e e7 b4 ff <0f> 0b 5d c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d 42 c6 eb 00 00 0f 85 59 ff ff ff 48 [ 8086.955790] RSP: 0018:ffa0000000003da0 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 8086.955793] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ff1100011da40ee0 RCX: ff11000361e1b888 [ 8086.955794] RDX: 00000000ffffffd8 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ff11000361e1b880 [ 8086.955795] RBP: ffa0000000003da0 R08: 80000000ffff9f45 R09: ffa0000000003d28 [ 8086.955796] R10: ff1100035f840000 R11: 0000000000000028 R12: ff11000319ff8000 [ 8086.955797] R13: ff1100011bb79d60 R14: 00000000ffffffd6 R15: ff1100037039cb00 [ 8086.955798] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff11000361e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 8086.955800] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 8086.955801] CR2: 00007ffff7fca168 CR3: 000000013b08a003 CR4: 0000000000471ef8 [ 8086.955803] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 8086.955803] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 8086.955804] PKRU: 55555554 [ 8086.955805] Call Trace: [ 8086.955806] <IRQ> [ 8086.955808] tcp_wfree+0x112/0x130 [ 8086.955814] skb_release_head_state+0x24/0xa0 [ 8086.955818] napi_consume_skb+0x9c/0x160 [ 8086.955821] igc_poll+0x5d8/0x14d0 [igc] [ 8086.955835] __napi_poll+0x2e/0x1b0 [ 8086.955839] net_rx_action+0x126/0x250 [ 8086.955843] __do_softirq+0xd1/0x295 [ 8086.955846] irq_exit_rcu+0xc5/0xf0 [ 8086.955851] common_interrupt+0x86/0xa0 [ 8086.955857] </IRQ> [ 8086.955857] <TASK> [ 8086.955858] asm_common_interrupt+0x27/0x40 [ 8086.955862] RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xd3/0x3e0 [ 8086.955866] Code: 73 f1 ff ff 49 89 c6 8b 05 e2 ca a7 00 85 c0 0f 8f b3 02 00 00 31 ff e8 1b de 75 ff 80 7d d7 00 0f 85 cd 01 00 00 fb 45 85 ff <0f> 88 fd 00 00 00 49 63 cf 4c 2b 75 c8 48 8d 04 49 48 89 ca 48 8d [ 8086.955867] RSP: 0018:ffffffff82203df0 EFLAGS: 00000202 [ 8086.955869] RAX: ff11000361e2a200 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000001f [ 8086.955870] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000003cf3cf3d RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 8086.955871] RBP: ffffffff82203e28 R08: 0000075ae38471c8 R09: 0000000000000018 [ 8086.955872] R10: 000000000000031a R11: ffffffff8238dca0 R12: ffd1ffffff200000 [ 8086.955873] R13: ffffffff8238dca0 R14: 0000075ae38471c8 R15: 0000000000000002 [ 8086.955875] cpuidle_enter+0x2e/0x50 [ 8086.955880] call_cpuidle+0x23/0x40 [ 8086.955884] do_idle+0x1be/0x220 [ 8086.955887] cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x30 [ 8086.955889] rest_init+0xb5/0xc0 [ 8086.955892] arch_call_rest_init+0xe/0x30 [ 8086.955895] start_kernel+0x448/0x760 [ 8086.955898] x86_64_start_kernel+0x109/0x150 [ 8086.955900] secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xe0/0xeb [ 8086.955904] </TASK> [ 8086.955904] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 8086.955912] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 8086.955913] kernel BUG at lib/dynamic_queue_limits.c:27! [ 8086.955918] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 8086.955922] RIP: 0010:dql_completed+0x148/0x160 [ 8086.955925] Code: c9 00 48 89 57 58 e9 46 ff ff ff 45 85 e4 41 0f 95 c4 41 39 db 0f 95 c1 41 84 cc 74 05 45 85 ed 78 0a 44 89 c1 e9 27 ff ff ff <0f> 0b 01 f6 44 89 c1 29 f1 0f 48 ca eb 8c cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc [ 8086.955927] RSP: 0018:ffa0000000003e00 EFLAGS: 00010287 [ 8086.955928] RAX: 000000000000006c RBX: ffa0000003eb0f78 RCX: ff11000109938000 [ 8086.955929] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000160 RDI: ff110001002e9480 [ 8086.955930] RBP: ffa0000000003ed8 R08: ff110001002e93c0 R09: ffa0000000003d28 [ 8086.955931] R10: 0000000000007cc0 R11: 0000000000007c54 R12: 00000000ffffffd9 [ 8086.955932] R13: ff1100037039cb00 R14: 00000000ffffffd9 R15: ff1100037039c048 [ 8086.955933] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff11000361e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 8086.955934] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 8086.955935] CR2: 00007ffff7fca168 CR3: 000000013b08a003 CR4: 0000000000471ef8 [ 8086.955936] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 8086.955937] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 8086.955938] PKRU: 55555554 [ 8086.955939] Call Trace: [ 8086.955939] <IRQ> [ 8086.955940] ? igc_poll+0x1a9/0x14d0 [igc] [ 8086.955949] __napi_poll+0x2e/0x1b0 [ 8086.955952] net_rx_action+0x126/0x250 [ 8086.955956] __do_softirq+0xd1/0x295 [ 8086.955958] irq_exit_rcu+0xc5/0xf0 [ 8086.955961] common_interrupt+0x86/0xa0 [ 8086.955964] </IRQ> [ 8086.955965] <TASK> [ 8086.955965] asm_common_interrupt+0x27/0x40 [ 8086.955968] RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xd3/0x3e0 [ 8086.955971] Code: 73 f1 ff ff 49 89 c6 8b 05 e2 ca a7 00 85 c0 0f 8f b3 02 00 00 31 ff e8 1b de 75 ff 80 7d d7 00 0f 85 cd 01 00 00 fb 45 85 ff <0f> 88 fd 00 00 00 49 63 cf 4c 2b 75 c8 48 8d 04 49 48 89 ca 48 8d [ 8086.955972] RSP: 0018:ffffffff82203df0 EFLAGS: 00000202 [ 8086.955973] RAX: ff11000361e2a200 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000001f [ 8086.955974] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000003cf3cf3d RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 8086.955974] RBP: ffffffff82203e28 R08: 0000075ae38471c8 R09: 0000000000000018 [ 8086.955975] R10: 000000000000031a R11: ffffffff8238dca0 R12: ffd1ffffff200000 [ 8086.955976] R13: ffffffff8238dca0 R14: 0000075ae38471c8 R15: 0000000000000002 [ 8086.955978] cpuidle_enter+0x2e/0x50 [ 8086.955981] call_cpuidle+0x23/0x40 [ 8086.955984] do_idle+0x1be/0x220 [ 8086.955985] cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x30 [ 8086.955987] rest_init+0xb5/0xc0 [ 8086.955990] arch_call_rest_init+0xe/0x30 [ 8086.955992] start_kernel+0x448/0x760 [ 8086.955994] x86_64_start_kernel+0x109/0x150 [ 8086.955996] secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xe0/0xeb [ 8086.955998] </TASK> [ 8086.955999] Modules linked in: xt_conntrack nft_chain_nat xt_MASQUERADE xt_addrtype nft_compat nf_tables nfnetlink br_netfilter bridge stp llc overlay dm_mod emrcha(PO) emriio(PO) rktpm(PO) cegbuf_mod(PO) patch_update(PO) se(PO) sgx_tgts(PO) mktme(PO) keylocker(PO) svtdx(PO) svfs_pci_hotplug(PO) vtd_mod(PO) davemem(PO) svmabort(PO) svindexio(PO) usbx2(PO) ehci_sched(PO) svheartbeat(PO) ioapic(PO) sv8259(PO) svintr(PO) lt(PO) pcierootport(PO) enginefw_mod(PO) ata(PO) smbus(PO) spiflash_cdf(PO) arden(PO) dsa_iax(PO) oobmsm_punit(PO) cpm(PO) svkdb(PO) ebg_pch(PO) pch(PO) sviotargets(PO) svbdf(PO) svmem(PO) svbios(PO) dram(PO) svtsc(PO) targets(PO) superio(PO) svkernel(PO) cswitch(PO) mcf(PO) pentiumIII_mod(PO) fs_svfs(PO) mdevdefdb(PO) svfs_os_services(O) ixgbe mdio mdio_devres libphy emeraldrapids_svdefs(PO) regsupport(O) libnvdimm nls_cp437 snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic ledtrig_audio snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep x86_pkg_temp_thermal snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer isst_if_mbox_pci [ 8086.956029] input_leds isst_if_mmio sg snd isst_if_common soundcore wmi button sad9(O) drm fuse backlight configfs efivarfs ip_tables x_tables vmd sdhci led_class rtl8150 r8152 hid_generic pegasus mmc_block usbhid mmc_core hid megaraid_sas ixgb igb i2c_algo_bit ice i40e hpsa scsi_transport_sas e1000e e1000 e100 ax88179_178a usbnet xhci_pci sd_mod xhci_hcd t10_pi crc32c_intel crc64_rocksoft igc crc64 crc_t10dif usbcore crct10dif_generic ptp crct10dif_common usb_common pps_core [16762.543675] INFO: NMI handler (kgdb_nmi_handler) took too long to run: 8675587.593 msecs [16762.543678] INFO: NMI handler (kgdb_nmi_handler) took too long to run: 8675587.595 msecs [16762.543673] INFO: NMI handler (kgdb_nmi_handler) took too long to run: 8675587.495 msecs [16762.543679] INFO: NMI handler (kgdb_nmi_handler) took too long to run: 8675587.599 msecs [16762.543678] INFO: NMI handler (kgdb_nmi_handler) took too long to run: 8675587.598 msecs [16762.543690] INFO: NMI handler (kgdb_nmi_handler) took too long to run: 8675587.605 msecs [16762.543684] INFO: NMI handler (kgdb_nmi_handler) took too long to run: 8675587.599 msecs [16762.543693] INFO: NMI handler (kgdb_nmi_handler) took too long to run: 8675587.613 msecs [16762.543784] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [16762.849099] RIP: 0010:dql_completed+0x148/0x160 PANIC: Fatal exception in interrupt Fixes: 9b27517 ("igc: Add ndo_tx_timeout support") Tested-by: Alejandra Victoria Alcaraz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Muhammad Husaini Zulkifli <[email protected]> Acked-by: Sasha Neftin <[email protected]> Tested-by: Naama Meir <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
On error when building the rule, the immediate expression unbinds the chain, hence objects can be deactivated by the transaction records. Otherwise, it is possible to trigger the following warning: WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 915 at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:2013 nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x1f7/0x210 [nf_tables] CPU: 3 PID: 915 Comm: chain-bind-err- Not tainted 6.1.39 #1 RIP: 0010:nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x1f7/0x210 [nf_tables] Fixes: 4bedf9e ("netfilter: nf_tables: fix chain binding transaction logic") Reported-by: Kevin Rich <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
…RULE_CHAIN_ID Bail out with EOPNOTSUPP when adding rule to bound chain via NFTA_RULE_CHAIN_ID. The following warning splat is shown when adding a rule to a deleted bound chain: WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 13692 at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:2013 nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x1f7/0x210 [nf_tables] CPU: 2 PID: 13692 Comm: chain-bound-rul Not tainted 6.1.39 #1 RIP: 0010:nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x1f7/0x210 [nf_tables] Fixes: d0e2c7d ("netfilter: nf_tables: add NFT_CHAIN_BINDING") Reported-by: Kevin Rich <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
The cited commit holds encap tbl lock unconditionally when setting up dests. But it may cause the following deadlock: PID: 1063722 TASK: ffffa062ca5d0000 CPU: 13 COMMAND: "handler8" #0 [ffffb14de05b7368] __schedule at ffffffffa1d5aa91 #1 [ffffb14de05b7410] schedule at ffffffffa1d5afdb #2 [ffffb14de05b7430] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa1d5b528 #3 [ffffb14de05b7440] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa1d5d6cb #4 [ffffb14de05b74e8] mutex_lock_nested at ffffffffa1d5ddeb #5 [ffffb14de05b74f8] mlx5e_tc_tun_encap_dests_set at ffffffffc12f2096 [mlx5_core] torvalds#6 [ffffb14de05b7568] post_process_attr at ffffffffc12d9fc5 [mlx5_core] torvalds#7 [ffffb14de05b75a0] mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc12de877 [mlx5_core] torvalds#8 [ffffb14de05b75f0] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc12e0eef [mlx5_core] torvalds#9 [ffffb14de05b7660] mlx5e_tc_add_flow at ffffffffc12e12f7 [mlx5_core] torvalds#10 [ffffb14de05b76b8] mlx5e_configure_flower at ffffffffc12e1686 [mlx5_core] torvalds#11 [ffffb14de05b7720] mlx5e_rep_indr_offload at ffffffffc12e3817 [mlx5_core] torvalds#12 [ffffb14de05b7730] mlx5e_rep_indr_setup_tc_cb at ffffffffc12e388a [mlx5_core] torvalds#13 [ffffb14de05b7740] tc_setup_cb_add at ffffffffa1ab2ba8 torvalds#14 [ffffb14de05b77a0] fl_hw_replace_filter at ffffffffc0bdec2f [cls_flower] torvalds#15 [ffffb14de05b7868] fl_change at ffffffffc0be6caa [cls_flower] torvalds#16 [ffffb14de05b7908] tc_new_tfilter at ffffffffa1ab71f0 [1031218.028143] wait_for_completion+0x24/0x30 [1031218.028589] mlx5e_update_route_decap_flows+0x9a/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] [1031218.029256] mlx5e_tc_fib_event_work+0x1ad/0x300 [mlx5_core] [1031218.029885] process_one_work+0x24e/0x510 Actually no need to hold encap tbl lock if there is no encap action. Fix it by checking if encap action exists or not before holding encap tbl lock. Fixes: 37c3b9f ("net/mlx5e: Prevent encap offload when neigh update is running") Signed-off-by: Chris Mi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Vlad Buslov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 4, 2023
The below crash can be encountered when using xdpsock in rx mode for legacy rq: the buffer gets released in the XDP_REDIRECT path, and then once again in the driver. This fix sets the flag to avoid releasing on the driver side. XSK handling of buffers for legacy rq was relying on the caller to set the skip release flag. But the referenced fix started using fragment counts for pages instead of the skip flag. Crash log: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xffff8881217e3a: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 0 PID: 14 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1+ torvalds#31 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_03b13f331978c78c+0xf/0x28 Code: ... RSP: 0018:ffff88810082fc98 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888138404901 RCX: c0ffffc900027cbc RDX: ffffffffa000b514 RSI: 00ffff8881217e32 RDI: ffff888138404901 RBP: ffff88810082fc98 R08: 0000000000091100 R09: 0000000000000006 R10: 0000000000000800 R11: 0000000000000800 R12: ffffc9000027a000 R13: ffff8881217e2dc0 R14: ffff8881217e2910 R15: ffff8881217e2f00 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88852c800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000564cb2e2cde0 CR3: 000000010e603004 CR4: 0000000000370eb0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? die_addr+0x32/0x80 ? exc_general_protection+0x192/0x390 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30 ? 0xffffffffa000b514 ? bpf_prog_03b13f331978c78c+0xf/0x28 mlx5e_xdp_handle+0x48/0x670 [mlx5_core] ? dev_gro_receive+0x3b5/0x6e0 mlx5e_xsk_skb_from_cqe_linear+0x6e/0x90 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_handle_rx_cqe+0x55/0x100 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_poll_rx_cq+0x87/0x6e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_napi_poll+0x45e/0x6b0 [mlx5_core] __napi_poll+0x25/0x1a0 net_rx_action+0x28a/0x300 __do_softirq+0xcd/0x279 ? sort_range+0x20/0x20 run_ksoftirqd+0x1a/0x20 smpboot_thread_fn+0xa2/0x130 kthread+0xc9/0xf0 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: mlx5_ib mlx5_core rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm ib_uverbs ib_core xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter overlay zram zsmalloc fuse [last unloaded: mlx5_core] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: 7abd955 ("net/mlx5e: RX, Fix page_pool page fragment tracking for XDP") Signed-off-by: Dragos Tatulea <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 13, 2024
Ethtool callbacks can be executed while reset is in progress and try to access deleted resources, e.g. getting coalesce settings can result in a NULL pointer dereference seen below. Reproduction steps: Once the driver is fully initialized, trigger reset: # echo 1 > /sys/class/net/<interface>/device/reset when reset is in progress try to get coalesce settings using ethtool: # ethtool -c <interface> BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 11 PID: 19713 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G S 6.10.0-rc7+ torvalds#7 RIP: 0010:ice_get_q_coalesce+0x2e/0xa0 [ice] RSP: 0018:ffffbab1e9bcf6a8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 000000000000000c RBX: ffff94512305b028 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9451c3f2e588 RDI: ffff9451c3f2e588 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff9451c3f2e580 R11: 000000000000001f R12: ffff945121fa9000 R13: ffffbab1e9bcf760 R14: 0000000000000013 R15: ffffffff9e65dd40 FS: 00007faee5fbe740(0000) GS:ffff94546fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000000106c2e005 CR4: 00000000001706f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ice_get_coalesce+0x17/0x30 [ice] coalesce_prepare_data+0x61/0x80 ethnl_default_doit+0xde/0x340 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xf2/0x150 genl_rcv_msg+0x1b3/0x2c0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x5b/0x110 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x19c/0x290 netlink_sendmsg+0x222/0x490 __sys_sendto+0x1df/0x1f0 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7faee60d8e27 Calling netif_device_detach() before reset makes the net core not call the driver when ethtool command is issued, the attempt to execute an ethtool command during reset will result in the following message: netlink error: No such device instead of NULL pointer dereference. Once reset is done and ice_rebuild() is executing, the netif_device_attach() is called to allow for ethtool operations to occur again in a safe manner. Fixes: fcea6f3 ("ice: Add stats and ethtool support") Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Igor Bagnucki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dawid Osuchowski <[email protected]> Tested-by: Pucha Himasekhar Reddy <[email protected]> (A Contingent worker at Intel) Reviewed-by: Michal Schmidt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 13, 2024
Steve French reported null pointer dereference error from sha256 lib. cifs.ko can send session setup requests on reused connection. If reused connection is used for binding session, conn->binding can still remain true and generate_preauth_hash() will not set sess->Preauth_HashValue and it will be NULL. It is used as a material to create an encryption key in ksmbd_gen_smb311_encryptionkey. ->Preauth_HashValue cause null pointer dereference error from crypto_shash_update(). BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 8 PID: 429254 Comm: kworker/8:39 Hardware name: LENOVO 20MAS08500/20MAS08500, BIOS N2CET69W (1.52 ) Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work [ksmbd] RIP: 0010:lib_sha256_base_do_update.isra.0+0x11e/0x1d0 [sha256_ssse3] <TASK> ? show_regs+0x6d/0x80 ? __die+0x24/0x80 ? page_fault_oops+0x99/0x1b0 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x2ee/0x6b0 ? exc_page_fault+0x83/0x1b0 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 ? __pfx_sha256_transform_rorx+0x10/0x10 [sha256_ssse3] ? lib_sha256_base_do_update.isra.0+0x11e/0x1d0 [sha256_ssse3] ? __pfx_sha256_transform_rorx+0x10/0x10 [sha256_ssse3] ? __pfx_sha256_transform_rorx+0x10/0x10 [sha256_ssse3] _sha256_update+0x77/0xa0 [sha256_ssse3] sha256_avx2_update+0x15/0x30 [sha256_ssse3] crypto_shash_update+0x1e/0x40 hmac_update+0x12/0x20 crypto_shash_update+0x1e/0x40 generate_key+0x234/0x380 [ksmbd] generate_smb3encryptionkey+0x40/0x1c0 [ksmbd] ksmbd_gen_smb311_encryptionkey+0x72/0xa0 [ksmbd] ntlm_authenticate.isra.0+0x423/0x5d0 [ksmbd] smb2_sess_setup+0x952/0xaa0 [ksmbd] __process_request+0xa3/0x1d0 [ksmbd] __handle_ksmbd_work+0x1c4/0x2f0 [ksmbd] handle_ksmbd_work+0x2d/0xa0 [ksmbd] process_one_work+0x16c/0x350 worker_thread+0x306/0x440 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xef/0x120 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> Fixes: f5a544e ("ksmbd: add support for SMB3 multichannel") Cc: [email protected] # v5.15+ Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 13, 2024
When we cork messages in psock->cork, the last message triggers the flushing will result in sending a sk_msg larger than the current message size. In this case, in tcp_bpf_send_verdict(), 'copied' becomes negative at least in the following case: 468 case __SK_DROP: 469 default: 470 sk_msg_free_partial(sk, msg, tosend); 471 sk_msg_apply_bytes(psock, tosend); 472 *copied -= (tosend + delta); // <==== HERE 473 return -EACCES; Therefore, it could lead to the following BUG with a proper value of 'copied' (thanks to syzbot). We should not use negative 'copied' as a return value here. ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/socket.c:733! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3265 Comm: syz-executor510 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-syzkaller-00060-gd07b43284ab3 #0 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 61400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:733 [inline] pc : sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:728 [inline] pc : __sock_sendmsg+0x5c/0x60 net/socket.c:745 lr : sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] lr : __sock_sendmsg+0x54/0x60 net/socket.c:745 sp : ffff800088ea3b30 x29: ffff800088ea3b30 x28: fbf00000062bc900 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffff800088ea3bc0 x25: ffff800088ea3bc0 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: f9f00000048dc000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff800088ea3d90 x20: f9f00000048dc000 x19: ffff800088ea3d90 x18: 0000000000000001 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 000000002002ffaf x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff8000815849c0 x9 : ffff8000815b49c0 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 000000000000003f x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 00000000000007e0 x4 : fff07ffffd239000 x3 : fbf00000062bc900 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 00000000fffffdef Call trace: sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:733 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x5c/0x60 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x274/0x2ac net/socket.c:2597 ___sys_sendmsg+0xac/0x100 net/socket.c:2651 __sys_sendmsg+0x84/0xe0 net/socket.c:2680 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2689 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2687 [inline] __arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x24/0x30 net/socket.c:2687 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151 el0_svc+0x34/0xec arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x12c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730 el0t_64_sync+0x19c/0x1a0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598 Code: f9404463 d63f0060 3108441f 54fffe81 (d4210000) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: 4f738ad ("bpf: create tcp_bpf_ulp allowing BPF to monitor socket TX/RX data") Reported-by: [email protected] Cc: Jakub Sitnicki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 13, 2024
The fscache_cookie_lru_timer is initialized when the fscache module is inserted, but is not deleted when the fscache module is removed. If timer_reduce() is called before removing the fscache module, the fscache_cookie_lru_timer will be added to the timer list of the current cpu. Afterwards, a use-after-free will be triggered in the softIRQ after removing the fscache module, as follows: ================================================================== BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff803c9e9 PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 21ffea067 P4D 21ffea067 PUD 21ffe6067 PMD 110a7c067 PTE 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Tainted: G W 6.11.0-rc3 torvalds#855 Tainted: [W]=WARN RIP: 0010:__run_timer_base.part.0+0x254/0x8a0 Call Trace: <IRQ> tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x627/0x810 __walk_groups.isra.0+0x47/0x140 tmigr_handle_remote+0x1fa/0x2f0 handle_softirqs+0x180/0x590 irq_exit_rcu+0x84/0xb0 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0x90 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 RIP: 0010:default_idle+0xf/0x20 default_idle_call+0x38/0x60 do_idle+0x2b5/0x300 cpu_startup_entry+0x54/0x60 start_secondary+0x20d/0x280 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x148 </TASK> Modules linked in: [last unloaded: netfs] ================================================================== Therefore delete fscache_cookie_lru_timer when removing the fscahe module. Fixes: 12bb21a ("fscache: Implement cookie user counting and resource pinning") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Acked-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 13, 2024
Commit 8c61291 ("mm: fix incorrect vbq reference in purge_fragmented_block") extended the 'vmap_block' structure to contain a 'cpu' field which is set at allocation time to the id of the initialising CPU. When a new 'vmap_block' is being instantiated by new_vmap_block(), the partially initialised structure is added to the local 'vmap_block_queue' xarray before the 'cpu' field has been initialised. If another CPU is concurrently walking the xarray (e.g. via vm_unmap_aliases()), then it may perform an out-of-bounds access to the remote queue thanks to an uninitialised index. This has been observed as UBSAN errors in Android: | Internal error: UBSAN: array index out of bounds: 00000000f2005512 [#1] PREEMPT SMP | | Call trace: | purge_fragmented_block+0x204/0x21c | _vm_unmap_aliases+0x170/0x378 | vm_unmap_aliases+0x1c/0x28 | change_memory_common+0x1dc/0x26c | set_memory_ro+0x18/0x24 | module_enable_ro+0x98/0x238 | do_init_module+0x1b0/0x310 Move the initialisation of 'vb->cpu' in new_vmap_block() ahead of the addition to the xarray. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 8c61291 ("mm: fix incorrect vbq reference in purge_fragmented_block") Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <[email protected]> Cc: Zhaoyang Huang <[email protected]> Cc: Hailong.Liu <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 13, 2024
When enable CONFIG_MEMCG & CONFIG_KFENCE & CONFIG_KMEMLEAK, the following
warning always occurs,This is because the following call stack occurred:
mem_pool_alloc
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof
slab_alloc_node
kfence_alloc
Once the kfence allocation is successful,slab->obj_exts will not be empty,
because it has already been assigned a value in kfence_init_pool.
Since in the prepare_slab_obj_exts_hook function,we perform a check for
s->flags & (SLAB_NO_OBJ_EXT | SLAB_NOLEAKTRACE),the alloc_tag_add function
will not be called as a result.Therefore,ref->ct remains NULL.
However,when we call mem_pool_free,since obj_ext is not empty, it
eventually leads to the alloc_tag_sub scenario being invoked. This is
where the warning occurs.
So we should add corresponding checks in the alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook.
For __GFP_NO_OBJ_EXT case,I didn't see the specific case where it's using
kfence,so I won't add the corresponding check in
alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook for now.
[ 3.734349] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 3.734807] alloc_tag was not set
[ 3.735129] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 40 at ./include/linux/alloc_tag.h:130 kmem_cache_free+0x444/0x574
[ 3.735866] Modules linked in: autofs4
[ 3.736211] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 40 Comm: ksoftirqd/4 Tainted: G W 6.11.0-rc3-dirty #1
[ 3.736969] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[ 3.737258] Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022
[ 3.737875] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 3.738501] pc : kmem_cache_free+0x444/0x574
[ 3.738951] lr : kmem_cache_free+0x444/0x574
[ 3.739361] sp : ffff80008357bb60
[ 3.739693] x29: ffff80008357bb70 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
[ 3.740338] x26: ffff80008207f000 x25: ffff000b2eb2fd60 x24: ffff0000c0005700
[ 3.740982] x23: ffff8000804229e4 x22: ffff800082080000 x21: ffff800081756000
[ 3.741630] x20: fffffd7ff8253360 x19: 00000000000000a8 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 3.742274] x17: ffff800ab327f000 x16: ffff800083398000 x15: ffff800081756df0
[ 3.742919] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 205d344320202020 x12: 5b5d373038343337
[ 3.743560] x11: ffff80008357b650 x10: 000000000000005d x9 : 00000000ffffffd0
[ 3.744231] x8 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x7 : ffff80008237bad0 x6 : c0000000ffff7fff
[ 3.744907] x5 : ffff80008237ba78 x4 : ffff8000820bbad0 x3 : 0000000000000001
[ 3.745580] x2 : 68d66547c09f7800 x1 : 68d66547c09f7800 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 3.746255] Call trace:
[ 3.746530] kmem_cache_free+0x444/0x574
[ 3.746931] mem_pool_free+0x44/0xf4
[ 3.747306] free_object_rcu+0xc8/0xdc
[ 3.747693] rcu_do_batch+0x234/0x8a4
[ 3.748075] rcu_core+0x230/0x3e4
[ 3.748424] rcu_core_si+0x14/0x1c
[ 3.748780] handle_softirqs+0x134/0x378
[ 3.749189] run_ksoftirqd+0x70/0x9c
[ 3.749560] smpboot_thread_fn+0x148/0x22c
[ 3.749978] kthread+0x10c/0x118
[ 3.750323] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 3.750696] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 4b87369 ("mm/slab: add allocation accounting into slab allocation and free paths")
Signed-off-by: Hao Ge <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <[email protected]>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 13, 2024
Binder objects are processed and copied individually into the target buffer during transactions. Any raw data in-between these objects is copied as well. However, this raw data copy lacks an out-of-bounds check. If the raw data exceeds the data section size then the copy overwrites the offsets section. This eventually triggers an error that attempts to unwind the processed objects. However, at this point the offsets used to index these objects are now corrupted. Unwinding with corrupted offsets can result in decrements of arbitrary nodes and lead to their premature release. Other users of such nodes are left with a dangling pointer triggering a use-after-free. This issue is made evident by the following KASAN report (trimmed): ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x19c Write of size 4 at addr ffff47fc91598f04 by task binder-util/743 CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 743 Comm: binder-util Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4 #1 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x19c binder_free_buf+0x128/0x434 binder_thread_write+0x8a4/0x3260 binder_ioctl+0x18f0/0x258c [...] Allocated by task 743: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x110/0x270 binder_new_node+0x50/0x700 binder_transaction+0x413c/0x6da8 binder_thread_write+0x978/0x3260 binder_ioctl+0x18f0/0x258c [...] Freed by task 745: kfree+0xbc/0x208 binder_thread_read+0x1c5c/0x37d4 binder_ioctl+0x16d8/0x258c [...] ================================================================== To avoid this issue, let's check that the raw data copy is within the boundaries of the data section. Fixes: 6d98eb9 ("binder: avoid potential data leakage when copying txn") Cc: Todd Kjos <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 13, 2024
The main threat to data consistency in ice_xdp() is a possible asynchronous PF reset. It can be triggered by a user or by TX timeout handler. XDP setup and PF reset code access the same resources in the following sections: * ice_vsi_close() in ice_prepare_for_reset() - already rtnl-locked * ice_vsi_rebuild() for the PF VSI - not protected * ice_vsi_open() - already rtnl-locked With an unfortunate timing, such accesses can result in a crash such as the one below: [ +1.999878] ice 0000:b1:00.0: Registered XDP mem model MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL on Rx ring 14 [ +2.002992] ice 0000:b1:00.0: Registered XDP mem model MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL on Rx ring 18 [Mar15 18:17] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: NETDEV WATCHDOG: CPU: 38: transmit queue 14 timed out 80692736 ms [ +0.000093] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: tx_timeout: VSI_num: 6, Q 14, NTC: 0x0, HW_HEAD: 0x0, NTU: 0x0, INT: 0x4000001 [ +0.000012] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: tx_timeout recovery level 1, txqueue 14 [ +0.394718] ice 0000:b1:00.0: PTP reset successful [ +0.006184] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000098 [ +0.000045] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ +0.000023] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ +0.000023] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ +0.000018] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ +0.000023] CPU: 38 PID: 7540 Comm: kworker/38:1 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc7 #1 [ +0.000031] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0014.082620210524 08/26/2021 [ +0.000036] Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice] [ +0.000183] RIP: 0010:ice_clean_tx_ring+0xa/0xd0 [ice] [...] [ +0.000013] Call Trace: [ +0.000016] <TASK> [ +0.000014] ? __die+0x1f/0x70 [ +0.000029] ? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4f0 [ +0.000029] ? schedule+0x3b/0xd0 [ +0.000027] ? exc_page_fault+0x7b/0x180 [ +0.000022] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [ +0.000031] ? ice_clean_tx_ring+0xa/0xd0 [ice] [ +0.000194] ice_free_tx_ring+0xe/0x60 [ice] [ +0.000186] ice_destroy_xdp_rings+0x157/0x310 [ice] [ +0.000151] ice_vsi_decfg+0x53/0xe0 [ice] [ +0.000180] ice_vsi_rebuild+0x239/0x540 [ice] [ +0.000186] ice_vsi_rebuild_by_type+0x76/0x180 [ice] [ +0.000145] ice_rebuild+0x18c/0x840 [ice] [ +0.000145] ? delay_tsc+0x4a/0xc0 [ +0.000022] ? delay_tsc+0x92/0xc0 [ +0.000020] ice_do_reset+0x140/0x180 [ice] [ +0.000886] ice_service_task+0x404/0x1030 [ice] [ +0.000824] process_one_work+0x171/0x340 [ +0.000685] worker_thread+0x277/0x3a0 [ +0.000675] ? preempt_count_add+0x6a/0xa0 [ +0.000677] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x23/0x50 [ +0.000679] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000653] kthread+0xf0/0x120 [ +0.000635] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000616] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 [ +0.000612] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000604] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 [ +0.000604] </TASK> The previous way of handling this through returning -EBUSY is not viable, particularly when destroying AF_XDP socket, because the kernel proceeds with removal anyway. There is plenty of code between those calls and there is no need to create a large critical section that covers all of them, same as there is no need to protect ice_vsi_rebuild() with rtnl_lock(). Add xdp_state_lock mutex to protect ice_vsi_rebuild() and ice_xdp(). Leaving unprotected sections in between would result in two states that have to be considered: 1. when the VSI is closed, but not yet rebuild 2. when VSI is already rebuild, but not yet open The latter case is actually already handled through !netif_running() case, we just need to adjust flag checking a little. The former one is not as trivial, because between ice_vsi_close() and ice_vsi_rebuild(), a lot of hardware interaction happens, this can make adding/deleting rings exit with an error. Luckily, VSI rebuild is pending and can apply new configuration for us in a managed fashion. Therefore, add an additional VSI state flag ICE_VSI_REBUILD_PENDING to indicate that ice_xdp() can just hot-swap the program. Also, as ice_vsi_rebuild() flow is touched in this patch, make it more consistent by deconfiguring VSI when coalesce allocation fails. Fixes: 2d4238f ("ice: Add support for AF_XDP") Fixes: efc2214 ("ice: Add support for XDP") Reviewed-by: Wojciech Drewek <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <[email protected]> Tested-by: Chandan Kumar Rout <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Larysa Zaremba <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 13, 2024
If we have 2 threads that are using the same file descriptor and one of them is doing direct IO writes while the other is doing fsync, we have a race where we can end up either: 1) Attempt a fsync without holding the inode's lock, triggering an assertion failures when assertions are enabled; 2) Do an invalid memory access from the fsync task because the file private points to memory allocated on stack by the direct IO task and it may be used by the fsync task after the stack was destroyed. The race happens like this: 1) A user space program opens a file descriptor with O_DIRECT; 2) The program spawns 2 threads using libpthread for example; 3) One of the threads uses the file descriptor to do direct IO writes, while the other calls fsync using the same file descriptor. 4) Call task A the thread doing direct IO writes and task B the thread doing fsyncs; 5) Task A does a direct IO write, and at btrfs_direct_write() sets the file's private to an on stack allocated private with the member 'fsync_skip_inode_lock' set to true; 6) Task B enters btrfs_sync_file() and sees that there's a private structure associated to the file which has 'fsync_skip_inode_lock' set to true, so it skips locking the inode's VFS lock; 7) Task A completes the direct IO write, and resets the file's private to NULL since it had no prior private and our private was stack allocated. Then it unlocks the inode's VFS lock; 8) Task B enters btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging(), then the assertion that checks the inode's VFS lock is held fails, since task B never locked it and task A has already unlocked it. The stack trace produced is the following: assertion failed: inode_is_locked(&inode->vfs_inode), in fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 9 PID: 5072 Comm: worker Tainted: G U OE 6.10.5-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 69f48d427608e1c09e60ea24c6c55e2ca1b049e8 Hardware name: Acer Predator PH315-52/Covini_CFS, BIOS V1.12 07/28/2020 RIP: 0010:btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs] Code: 50 d6 86 c0 e8 (...) RSP: 0018:ffff9e4a03dcfc78 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000054 RBX: ffff9078a9868e98 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff907dce4a7800 RDI: ffff907dce4a7800 RBP: ffff907805518800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9e4a03dcfb38 R10: ffff9e4a03dcfb30 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff907684ae7800 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff90774646b600 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f04b96006c0(0000) GS:ffff907dce480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f32acbfc000 CR3: 00000001fd4fa005 CR4: 00000000003726f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body.cold+0x14/0x24 ? die+0x2e/0x50 ? do_trap+0xca/0x110 ? do_error_trap+0x6a/0x90 ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70 ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] btrfs_sync_file+0x21a/0x4d0 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? __seccomp_filter+0x31d/0x4f0 __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x4f/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160 ? do_futex+0xcb/0x190 ? __x64_sys_futex+0x10e/0x1d0 ? switch_fpu_return+0x4f/0xd0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Another problem here is if task B grabs the private pointer and then uses it after task A has finished, since the private was allocated in the stack of task A, it results in some invalid memory access with a hard to predict result. This issue, triggering the assertion, was observed with QEMU workloads by two users in the Link tags below. Fix this by not relying on a file's private to pass information to fsync that it should skip locking the inode and instead pass this information through a special value stored in current->journal_info. This is safe because in the relevant section of the direct IO write path we are not holding a transaction handle, so current->journal_info is NULL. The following C program triggers the issue: $ cat repro.c /* Get the O_DIRECT definition. */ #ifndef _GNU_SOURCE #define _GNU_SOURCE #endif #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <errno.h> #include <string.h> #include <pthread.h> static int fd; static ssize_t do_write(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count, off_t offset) { while (count > 0) { ssize_t ret; ret = pwrite(fd, buf, count, offset); if (ret < 0) { if (errno == EINTR) continue; return ret; } count -= ret; buf += ret; } return 0; } static void *fsync_loop(void *arg) { while (1) { int ret; ret = fsync(fd); if (ret != 0) { perror("Fsync failed"); exit(6); } } } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { long pagesize; void *write_buf; pthread_t fsyncer; int ret; if (argc != 2) { fprintf(stderr, "Use: %s <file path>\n", argv[0]); return 1; } fd = open(argv[1], O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_DIRECT, 0666); if (fd == -1) { perror("Failed to open/create file"); return 1; } pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE); if (pagesize == -1) { perror("Failed to get page size"); return 2; } ret = posix_memalign(&write_buf, pagesize, pagesize); if (ret) { perror("Failed to allocate buffer"); return 3; } ret = pthread_create(&fsyncer, NULL, fsync_loop, NULL); if (ret != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create writer thread: %d\n", ret); return 4; } while (1) { ret = do_write(fd, write_buf, pagesize, 0); if (ret != 0) { perror("Write failed"); exit(5); } } return 0; } $ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdi $ mount /dev/sdi /mnt/sdi $ timeout 10 ./repro /mnt/sdi/foo Usually the race is triggered within less than 1 second. A test case for fstests will follow soon. Reported-by: Paulo Dias <[email protected]> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219187 Reported-by: Andreas Jahn <[email protected]> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219199 Reported-by: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/ Fixes: 939b656 ("btrfs: fix corruption after buffer fault in during direct IO append write") CC: [email protected] # 5.15+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 13, 2024
Fix circular locking dependency on runtime suspend. <4> [74.952215] ====================================================== <4> [74.952217] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected <4> [74.952219] 6.10.0-rc7-xe #1 Not tainted <4> [74.952221] ------------------------------------------------------ <4> [74.952223] kworker/7:1/82 is trying to acquire lock: <4> [74.952226] ffff888120548488 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: drm_modeset_lock_all+0x40/0x1e0 [drm] <4> [74.952260] but task is already holding lock: <4> [74.952262] ffffffffa0ae59c0 (xe_pm_runtime_lockdep_map){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: xe_pm_runtime_suspend+0x2f/0x340 [xe] <4> [74.952322] which lock already depends on the new lock. The commit 'b1d90a86 ("drm/xe: Use the encoder suspend helper also used by the i915 driver")' didn't do anything wrong. It actually fixed a critical bug, because the encoder_suspend was never getting actually called because it was returning if (has_display(xe)) instead of if (!has_display(xe)). However, this ended up introducing the encoder suspend calls in the runtime routines as well, causing the circular locking dependency. Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/2304 Fixes: b1d90a8 ("drm/xe: Use the encoder suspend helper also used by the i915 driver") Cc: Imre Deak <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cavitt <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 8da1944) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 13, 2024
We observed a null-ptr-deref in fou_gro_receive() while shutting down a host. [0] The NULL pointer is sk->sk_user_data, and the offset 8 is of protocol in struct fou. When fou_release() is called due to netns dismantle or explicit tunnel teardown, udp_tunnel_sock_release() sets NULL to sk->sk_user_data. Then, the tunnel socket is destroyed after a single RCU grace period. So, in-flight udp4_gro_receive() could find the socket and execute the FOU GRO handler, where sk->sk_user_data could be NULL. Let's use rcu_dereference_sk_user_data() in fou_from_sock() and add NULL checks in FOU GRO handlers. [0]: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 80000001032f4067 P4D 80000001032f4067 PUD 103240067 PMD 0 SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.10.216-204.855.amzn2.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Amazon EC2 c5.large/, BIOS 1.0 10/16/2017 RIP: 0010:fou_gro_receive (net/ipv4/fou.c:233) [fou] Code: 41 5f c3 cc cc cc cc e8 e7 2e 69 f4 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 f8 41 54 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 49 8b 80 88 02 00 00 <0f> b6 48 08 0f b7 42 4a 66 25 fd fd 80 cc 02 66 89 42 4a 0f b6 42 RSP: 0018:ffffa330c0003d08 EFLAGS: 00010297 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff93d9e3a6b900 RCX: 0000000000000010 RDX: ffff93d9e3a6b900 RSI: ffff93d9e3a6b900 RDI: ffff93dac2e24d08 RBP: ffff93d9e3a6b900 R08: ffff93dacbce6400 R09: 0000000000000002 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffffb5f369b0 R12: ffff93dacbce6400 R13: ffff93dac2e24d08 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffb4edd1c0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff93daee800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 0000000102140001 CR4: 00000000007706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? show_trace_log_lvl (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:259) ? __die_body.cold (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:478 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:420) ? no_context (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:752) ? exc_page_fault (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:49 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:89 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1435 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1483) ? asm_exc_page_fault (arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:571) ? fou_gro_receive (net/ipv4/fou.c:233) [fou] udp_gro_receive (include/linux/netdevice.h:2552 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:559) udp4_gro_receive (net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:604) inet_gro_receive (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1549 (discriminator 7)) dev_gro_receive (net/core/dev.c:6035 (discriminator 4)) napi_gro_receive (net/core/dev.c:6170) ena_clean_rx_irq (drivers/amazon/net/ena/ena_netdev.c:1558) [ena] ena_io_poll (drivers/amazon/net/ena/ena_netdev.c:1742) [ena] napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6847) net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:6917) __do_softirq (arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:25 include/linux/jump_label.h:200 include/trace/events/irq.h:142 kernel/softirq.c:299) asm_call_irq_on_stack (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:809) </IRQ> do_softirq_own_stack (arch/x86/include/asm/irq_stack.h:27 arch/x86/include/asm/irq_stack.h:77 arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c:77) irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:393 kernel/softirq.c:423 kernel/softirq.c:435) common_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:239) asm_common_interrupt (arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:626) RIP: 0010:acpi_idle_do_entry (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:49 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:89 drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c:114 drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c:575) Code: 8b 15 d1 3c c4 02 ed c3 cc cc cc cc 65 48 8b 04 25 40 ef 01 00 48 8b 00 a8 08 75 eb 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 00 2d d5 09 55 00 fb f4 <fa> c3 cc cc cc cc e9 be fc ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffffffffb5603e58 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000004000 RBX: ffff93dac0929c00 RCX: ffff93daee833900 RDX: ffff93daee800000 RSI: ffff93daee87dc00 RDI: ffff93daee87dc64 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffffb5e7b6c0 R09: 0000000000000044 R10: ffff93daee831b04 R11: 00000000000001cd R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffffffb5e7b740 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000 ? sched_clock_cpu (kernel/sched/clock.c:371) acpi_idle_enter (drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c:712 (discriminator 3)) cpuidle_enter_state (drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c:237) cpuidle_enter (drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c:353) cpuidle_idle_call (kernel/sched/idle.c:158 kernel/sched/idle.c:239) do_idle (kernel/sched/idle.c:302) cpu_startup_entry (kernel/sched/idle.c:395 (discriminator 1)) start_kernel (init/main.c:1048) secondary_startup_64_no_verify (arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:310) Modules linked in: udp_diag tcp_diag inet_diag nft_nat ipip tunnel4 dummy fou ip_tunnel nft_masq nft_chain_nat nf_nat wireguard nft_ct curve25519_x86_64 libcurve25519_generic nf_conntrack libchacha20poly1305 nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nft_objref chacha_x86_64 nft_counter nf_tables nfnetlink poly1305_x86_64 ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel libchacha crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper mousedev psmouse button ena ptp pps_core crc32c_intel CR2: 0000000000000008 Fixes: d92283e ("fou: change to use UDP socket GRO") Reported-by: Alphonse Kurian <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 13, 2024
Chi Zhiling reported:
We found a null pointer accessing in tracefs[1], the reason is that the
variable 'ei_child' is set to LIST_POISON1, that means the list was
removed in eventfs_remove_rec. so when access the ei_child->is_freed, the
panic triggered.
by the way, the following script can reproduce this panic
loop1 (){
while true
do
echo "p:kp submit_bio" > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events
echo "" > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events
done
}
loop2 (){
while true
do
tree /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kprobes/
done
}
loop1 &
loop2
[1]:
[ 1147.959632][T17331] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dead000000000150
[ 1147.968239][T17331] Mem abort info:
[ 1147.971739][T17331] ESR = 0x0000000096000004
[ 1147.976172][T17331] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1147.982171][T17331] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1147.985906][T17331] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1147.989734][T17331] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[ 1147.995292][T17331] Data abort info:
[ 1147.998858][T17331] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[ 1148.005023][T17331] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[ 1148.010759][T17331] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[ 1148.016752][T17331] [dead000000000150] address between user and kernel address ranges
[ 1148.024571][T17331] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP
[ 1148.030825][T17331] Modules linked in: team_mode_loadbalance team nlmon act_gact cls_flower sch_ingress bonding tls macvlan dummy ib_core bridge stp llc veth amdgpu amdxcp mfd_core gpu_sched drm_exec drm_buddy radeon crct10dif_ce video drm_suballoc_helper ghash_ce drm_ttm_helper sha2_ce ttm sha256_arm64 i2c_algo_bit sha1_ce sbsa_gwdt cp210x drm_display_helper cec sr_mod cdrom drm_kms_helper binfmt_misc sg loop fuse drm dm_mod nfnetlink ip_tables autofs4 [last unloaded: tls]
[ 1148.072808][T17331] CPU: 3 PID: 17331 Comm: ls Tainted: G W ------- ---- 6.6.43 #2
[ 1148.081751][T17331] Source Version: 21b3b386e948bedd29369af66f3e98ab01b1c650
[ 1148.088783][T17331] Hardware name: Greatwall GW-001M1A-FTF/GW-001M1A-FTF, BIOS KunLun BIOS V4.0 07/16/2020
[ 1148.098419][T17331] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 1148.106060][T17331] pc : eventfs_iterate+0x2c0/0x398
[ 1148.111017][T17331] lr : eventfs_iterate+0x2fc/0x398
[ 1148.115969][T17331] sp : ffff80008d56bbd0
[ 1148.119964][T17331] x29: ffff80008d56bbf0 x28: ffff001ff5be2600 x27: 0000000000000000
[ 1148.127781][T17331] x26: ffff001ff52ca4e0 x25: 0000000000009977 x24: dead000000000100
[ 1148.135598][T17331] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 000000000000000b x21: ffff800082645f10
[ 1148.143415][T17331] x20: ffff001fddf87c70 x19: ffff80008d56bc90 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 1148.151231][T17331] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff001ff52ca4e0
[ 1148.159048][T17331] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1148.166864][T17331] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffff8000804391d0
[ 1148.174680][T17331] x8 : 0000000180000000 x7 : 0000000000000018 x6 : 0000aaab04b92862
[ 1148.182498][T17331] x5 : 0000aaab04b92862 x4 : 0000000080000000 x3 : 0000000000000068
[ 1148.190314][T17331] x2 : 000000000000000f x1 : 0000000000007ea8 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 1148.198131][T17331] Call trace:
[ 1148.201259][T17331] eventfs_iterate+0x2c0/0x398
[ 1148.205864][T17331] iterate_dir+0x98/0x188
[ 1148.210036][T17331] __arm64_sys_getdents64+0x78/0x160
[ 1148.215161][T17331] invoke_syscall+0x78/0x108
[ 1148.219593][T17331] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xf0
[ 1148.224977][T17331] do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
[ 1148.228974][T17331] el0_svc+0x40/0x168
[ 1148.232798][T17331] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130
[ 1148.237836][T17331] el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8
[ 1148.242182][T17331] Code: 54ffff6c f9400676 910006d6 f900067 (b9405300)
[ 1148.248955][T17331] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
The issue is that list_del() is used on an SRCU protected list variable
before the synchronization occurs. This can poison the list pointers while
there is a reader iterating the list.
This is simply fixed by using list_del_rcu() that is specifically made for
this purpose.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/[email protected]/
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected]
Fixes: 43aa6f9 ("eventfs: Get rid of dentry pointers without refcounts")
Reported-by: Chi Zhiling <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Chi Zhiling <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 13, 2024
The start_kthread() and stop_thread() code was not always called with the interface_lock held. This means that the kthread variable could be unexpectedly changed causing the kthread_stop() to be called on it when it should not have been, leading to: while true; do rtla timerlat top -u -q & PID=$!; sleep 5; kill -INT $PID; sleep 0.001; kill -TERM $PID; wait $PID; done Causing the following OOPS: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 885 Comm: timerlatu/5 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4-test-00002-gbc754cc76d1b-dirty torvalds#125 a533010b71dab205ad2f507188ce8c82203b0254 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:hrtimer_active+0x58/0x300 Code: 48 c1 ee 03 41 54 48 01 d1 48 01 d6 55 53 48 83 ec 20 80 39 00 0f 85 30 02 00 00 49 8b 6f 30 4c 8d 75 10 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 <0f> b6 3c 10 4c 89 f0 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 40 38 f8 7c 09 40 84 ff 0f RSP: 0018:ffff88811d97f940 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff88823c6b5b28 RCX: ffffed10478d6b6b RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffffed10478d6b6c RDI: ffff88823c6b5b28 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff88823c6b5b58 R09: ffff88823c6b5b60 R10: ffff88811d97f957 R11: 0000000000000010 R12: 00000000000a801d R13: ffff88810d8b35d8 R14: 0000000000000010 R15: ffff88823c6b5b28 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88823c680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000561858ad7258 CR3: 000000007729e001 CR4: 0000000000170ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? die_addr+0x40/0xa0 ? exc_general_protection+0x154/0x230 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 ? hrtimer_active+0x58/0x300 ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_locks_remove_file+0x10/0x10 hrtimer_cancel+0x15/0x40 timerlat_fd_release+0x8e/0x1f0 ? security_file_release+0x43/0x80 __fput+0x372/0xb10 task_work_run+0x11e/0x1f0 ? _raw_spin_lock+0x85/0xe0 ? __pfx_task_work_run+0x10/0x10 ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x170 ? do_exit+0x7a0/0x24b0 do_exit+0x7bd/0x24b0 ? __pfx_migrate_enable+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_do_exit+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_read_tsc+0x10/0x10 ? ktime_get+0x64/0x140 ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x86/0xe0 do_group_exit+0xb0/0x220 get_signal+0x17ba/0x1b50 ? vfs_read+0x179/0xa40 ? timerlat_fd_read+0x30b/0x9d0 ? __pfx_get_signal+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_timerlat_fd_read+0x10/0x10 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x8c/0x570 ? __pfx_arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x10/0x10 ? vfs_read+0x179/0xa40 ? ksys_read+0xfe/0x1d0 ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xbc/0x130 do_syscall_64+0x74/0x110 ? __pfx___rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10 ? fpregs_restore_userregs+0xdb/0x1e0 ? fpregs_restore_userregs+0xdb/0x1e0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x116/0x130 ? do_syscall_64+0x74/0x110 ? do_syscall_64+0x74/0x110 ? do_syscall_64+0x74/0x110 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79 RIP: 0033:0x7ff0070eca9c Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7ff0070eca72. RSP: 002b:00007ff006dff8c0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00007ff0070eca9c RDX: 0000000000000400 RSI: 00007ff006dff9a0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ff006dffde0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ff000000ba0 R10: 00007ff007004b08 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003 R13: 00007ff006dff9a0 R14: 0000000000000007 R15: 0000000000000008 </TASK> Modules linked in: snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_intel_sdw_acpi snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- This is because it would mistakenly call kthread_stop() on a user space thread making it "exit" before it actually exits. Since kthreads are created based on global behavior, use a cpumask to know when kthreads are running and that they need to be shutdown before proceeding to do new work. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ This was debugged by using the persistent ring buffer: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Note, locking was originally used to fix this, but that proved to cause too many deadlocks to work around: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/[email protected]/ Cc: [email protected] Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <[email protected]> Cc: "Luis Claudio R. Goncalves" <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected] Fixes: e88ed22 ("tracing/timerlat: Add user-space interface") Reported-by: Tomas Glozar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 13, 2024
Marc Hartmayer reported:
[ 23.133876] Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference in virtual kernel address space
[ 23.133950] Failing address: 0000000000000000 TEID: 0000000000000483
[ 23.133954] Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE.
[ 23.133957] AS:000000001b8f0007 R3:0000000056cf4007 S:0000000056cf3800 P:000000000000003d
[ 23.134207] Oops: 0004 ilc:2 [#1] SMP
(snip)
[ 23.134516] Call Trace:
[ 23.134520] [<0000024e326caf28>] worker_thread+0x48/0x430
[ 23.134525] ([<0000024e326caf18>] worker_thread+0x38/0x430)
[ 23.134528] [<0000024e326d3a3e>] kthread+0x11e/0x130
[ 23.134533] [<0000024e3264b0dc>] __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[ 23.134536] [<0000024e333fb37a>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x38
[ 23.134552] Last Breaking-Event-Address:
[ 23.134553] [<0000024e333f4c04>] mutex_unlock+0x24/0x30
[ 23.134562] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oops
With debuging and analysis, worker_thread() accesses to the nullified
worker->pool when the newly created worker is destroyed before being
waken-up, in which case worker_thread() can see the result detach_worker()
reseting worker->pool to NULL at the begining.
Move the code "worker->pool = NULL;" out from detach_worker() to fix the
problem.
worker->pool had been designed to be constant for regular workers and
changeable for rescuer. To share attaching/detaching code for regular
and rescuer workers and to avoid worker->pool being accessed inadvertently
when the worker has been detached, worker->pool is reset to NULL when
detached no matter the worker is rescuer or not.
To maintain worker->pool being reset after detached, move the code
"worker->pool = NULL;" in the worker thread context after detached.
It is either be in the regular worker thread context after PF_WQ_WORKER
is cleared or in rescuer worker thread context with wq_pool_attach_mutex
held. So it is safe to do so.
Cc: Marc Hartmayer <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Reported-by: Marc Hartmayer <[email protected]>
Fixes: f4b7b53 ("workqueue: Detach workers directly in idle_cull_fn()")
Cc: [email protected] # v6.11+
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 13, 2024
…git/netfilter/nf Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net The following batch contains two fixes from Florian Westphal: Patch #1 fixes a sk refcount leak in nft_socket on mismatch. Patch #2 fixes cgroupsv2 matching from containers due to incorrect level in subtree. netfilter pull request 24-09-12 * tag 'nf-24-09-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf: netfilter: nft_socket: make cgroupsv2 matching work with namespaces netfilter: nft_socket: fix sk refcount leaks ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 13, 2024
…_module_init() Move nf flowtable bpf initialization in nf_flow_table module load routine since nf_flow_table_bpf is part of nf_flow_table module and not nf_flow_table_inet one. This patch allows to avoid the following kernel warning running the reproducer below: $modprobe nf_flow_table_inet $rmmod nf_flow_table_inet $modprobe nf_flow_table_inet modprobe: ERROR: could not insert 'nf_flow_table_inet': Invalid argument [ 184.081501] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 184.081527] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1362 at kernel/bpf/btf.c:8206 btf_populate_kfunc_set+0x23c/0x330 [ 184.081550] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1362 Comm: modprobe Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.11.0-0.rc5.22.el10.x86_64 #1 [ 184.081553] Hardware name: Red Hat OpenStack Compute, BIOS 1.14.0-1.module+el8.4.0+8855+a9e237a9 04/01/2014 [ 184.081554] RIP: 0010:btf_populate_kfunc_set+0x23c/0x330 [ 184.081558] RSP: 0018:ff22cfb38071fc90 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 184.081559] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 184.081560] RDX: 000000000000006e RSI: ffffffff95c00000 RDI: ff13805543436350 [ 184.081561] RBP: ffffffffc0e22180 R08: ff13805543410808 R09: 000000000001ec00 [ 184.081562] R10: ff13805541c8113c R11: 0000000000000010 R12: ff13805541b83c00 [ 184.081563] R13: ff13805543410800 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffffffc0e2259a [ 184.081564] FS: 00007fa436c46740(0000) GS:ff1380557ba00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 184.081569] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 184.081570] CR2: 000055e7b3187000 CR3: 0000000100c48003 CR4: 0000000000771ef0 [ 184.081571] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 184.081572] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 184.081572] PKRU: 55555554 [ 184.081574] Call Trace: [ 184.081575] <TASK> [ 184.081578] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1b0/0x2f0 [ 184.081580] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1b0/0x2f0 [ 184.081582] ? __register_btf_kfunc_id_set+0x199/0x200 [ 184.081585] ? btf_populate_kfunc_set+0x23c/0x330 [ 184.081586] ? __warn.cold+0x93/0xed [ 184.081590] ? btf_populate_kfunc_set+0x23c/0x330 [ 184.081592] ? report_bug+0xff/0x140 [ 184.081594] ? handle_bug+0x3a/0x70 [ 184.081596] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 [ 184.081597] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 184.081601] ? btf_populate_kfunc_set+0x23c/0x330 [ 184.081602] __register_btf_kfunc_id_set+0x199/0x200 [ 184.081605] ? __pfx_nf_flow_inet_module_init+0x10/0x10 [nf_flow_table_inet] [ 184.081607] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x300 [ 184.081611] do_init_module+0x60/0x230 [ 184.081614] __do_sys_init_module+0x17a/0x1b0 [ 184.081617] do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x160 [ 184.081620] ? __count_memcg_events+0x58/0xf0 [ 184.081623] ? handle_mm_fault+0x234/0x350 [ 184.081626] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x347/0x640 [ 184.081630] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x25/0x80 [ 184.081633] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x25/0x80 [ 184.081634] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x25/0x80 [ 184.081637] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 184.081639] RIP: 0033:0x7fa43652e4ce [ 184.081647] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8213be18 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000af [ 184.081649] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055e7b3176c20 RCX: 00007fa43652e4ce [ 184.081650] RDX: 000055e7737fde79 RSI: 0000000000003990 RDI: 000055e7b3185380 [ 184.081651] RBP: 000055e7737fde79 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 000055e7b3179bd0 [ 184.081651] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000040000 [ 184.081652] R13: 000055e7b3176fa0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000055e7b3179b80 Fixes: 391bb65 ("netfilter: Add bpf_xdp_flow_lookup kfunc") Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]> Acked-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Acked-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240911-nf-flowtable-bpf-modprob-fix-v1-1-f9fc075aafc3@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Oct 3, 2024
Patch series "mm: hwpoison: two more poison recovery". One more CoW path to support poison recorvery in do_cow_fault(), and the last copy_user_highpage() user is replaced to copy_mc_user_highpage() from copy_present_page() during fork to support poison recorvery too. This patch (of 2): Like commit a873dfe ("mm, hwpoison: try to recover from copy-on write faults"), there is another path which could crash because it does not have recovery code where poison is consumed by the kernel in do_cow_fault(), a crash calltrace shown below on old kernel, but it could be happened in the lastest mainline code, CPU: 7 PID: 3248 Comm: mpi Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 5.10.0 #1 pc : copy_page+0xc/0xbc lr : copy_user_highpage+0x50/0x9c Call trace: copy_page+0xc/0xbc do_cow_fault+0x118/0x2bc do_fault+0x40/0x1a4 handle_pte_fault+0x154/0x230 __handle_mm_fault+0x1a8/0x38c handle_mm_fault+0xf0/0x250 do_page_fault+0x184/0x454 do_translation_fault+0xac/0xd4 do_mem_abort+0x44/0xbc Fix it by using copy_mc_user_highpage() to handle this case and return VM_FAULT_HWPOISON for cow fault. [[email protected]: unlock/put vmf->page, per Miaohe] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jane Chu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]> Cc: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Cc: Jiaqi Yan <[email protected]> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> Cc: Tony Luck <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Oct 3, 2024
While using the IOMMU DMA path, the dma_addressing_limited() function checks ops struct which doesn't exist in the IOMMU case. This causes to the kernel panic while loading ADMGPU driver. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000a0 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 611 Comm: (udev-worker) Tainted: G T 6.11.0-clang-07154-g726e2d0cf2bb torvalds#257 Tainted: [T]=RANDSTRUCT Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/ROG STRIX Z690-G GAMING WIFI, BIOS 3701 07/03/2024 RIP: 0010:dma_addressing_limited+0x53/0xa0 Code: 8b 93 48 02 00 00 48 39 d1 49 89 d6 4c 0f 42 f1 48 85 d2 4c 0f 44 f1 f6 83 fc 02 00 00 40 75 0a 48 89 df e8 1f 09 00 00 eb 24 <4c> 8b 1c 25 a0 00 00 00 4d 85 db 74 17 48 89 df 41 ba 8b 84 2d 55 RSP: 0018:ffffa8d2c12cf740 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 00000000ffffffff RBX: ffff8948820220c8 RCX: 000000ffffffffff RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffc124dc6d RDI: ffff8948820220c8 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff894883c3f040 R13: ffff89488dac8828 R14: 000000ffffffffff R15: ffff8948820220c8 FS: 00007fe6ba881900(0000) GS:ffff894fdf700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000000a0 CR3: 0000000111984000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body+0x65/0xc0 ? page_fault_oops+0x3b9/0x450 ? _prb_read_valid+0x212/0x390 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x608/0x680 ? exc_page_fault+0x4e/0xa0 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? dma_addressing_limited+0x53/0xa0 amdgpu_ttm_init+0x56/0x4b0 [amdgpu] gmc_v8_0_sw_init+0x561/0x670 [amdgpu] amdgpu_device_ip_init+0xf5/0x570 [amdgpu] amdgpu_device_init+0x1a57/0x1ea0 [amdgpu] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x1a/0x40 ? pci_conf1_read+0xc0/0xe0 ? pci_bus_read_config_word+0x52/0xa0 amdgpu_driver_load_kms+0x15/0xa0 [amdgpu] amdgpu_pci_probe+0x1b7/0x4c0 [amdgpu] pci_device_probe+0x1c5/0x260 really_probe+0x130/0x470 __driver_probe_device+0x77/0x150 driver_probe_device+0x19/0x120 __driver_attach+0xb1/0x1e0 ? __cfi___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 bus_for_each_dev+0x115/0x170 bus_add_driver+0x192/0x2d0 driver_register+0x5c/0xf0 ? __cfi_init_module+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu] do_one_initcall+0x128/0x380 ? idr_alloc_cyclic+0x139/0x1d0 ? security_kernfs_init_security+0x42/0x140 ? __kernfs_new_node+0x1be/0x250 ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xb6/0xc0 ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x11/0x30 ? free_unref_page+0x283/0x650 ? kfree+0x274/0x3a0 ? kfree+0x274/0x3a0 ? kfree+0x274/0x3a0 ? load_module+0xf2e/0x1130 ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x12a/0x2e0 do_init_module+0x7d/0x240 __se_sys_init_module+0x19e/0x220 do_syscall_64+0x8a/0x150 ? __irq_exit_rcu+0x5e/0x100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7fe6bb5980ee Code: 48 8b 0d 3d ed 12 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 af 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 0a ed 12 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffd462219d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000af RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000556caf0d0670 RCX: 00007fe6bb5980ee RDX: 0000556caf0d3080 RSI: 0000000002893458 RDI: 00007fe6b3400010 RBP: 0000000000020000 R08: 0000000000020010 R09: 0000000000000080 R10: c26073c166186e00 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000556caf0d3430 R13: 0000556caf0d0670 R14: 0000556caf0d3080 R15: 0000556caf0ce700 </TASK> Modules linked in: amdgpu(+) i915(+) drm_suballoc_helper intel_gtt drm_exec drm_buddy iTCO_wdt i2c_algo_bit intel_pmc_bxt drm_display_helper iTCO_vendor_support gpu_sched drm_ttm_helper cec ttm amdxcp video backlight pinctrl_alderlake nct6775 hwmon_vid nct6775_core coretemp CR2: 00000000000000a0 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:dma_addressing_limited+0x53/0xa0 Code: 8b 93 48 02 00 00 48 39 d1 49 89 d6 4c 0f 42 f1 48 85 d2 4c 0f 44 f1 f6 83 fc 02 00 00 40 75 0a 48 89 df e8 1f 09 00 00 eb 24 <4c> 8b 1c 25 a0 00 00 00 4d 85 db 74 17 48 89 df 41 ba 8b 84 2d 55 RSP: 0018:ffffa8d2c12cf740 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 00000000ffffffff RBX: ffff8948820220c8 RCX: 000000ffffffffff RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffc124dc6d RDI: ffff8948820220c8 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff894883c3f040 R13: ffff89488dac8828 R14: 000000ffffffffff R15: ffff8948820220c8 FS: 00007fe6ba881900(0000) GS:ffff894fdf700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000000a0 CR3: 0000000111984000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Fixes: b5c58b2 ("dma-mapping: direct calls for dma-iommu") Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219292 Reported-by: Niklāvs Koļesņikovs <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Tested-by: Niklāvs Koļesņikovs <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Oct 3, 2024
It was reported [1] that on linux-next/fs-next the following crash is reproducible: [ 42.659136] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000b: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 42.660501] fbcon: Taking over console [ 42.660930] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000058-0x000000000000005f] [ 42.661752] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1589 Comm: dtprobed Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6+ #1 [ 42.662565] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.6.6 08/22/2023 [ 42.663472] RIP: 0010:fuse_get_req+0x36b/0x990 [fuse] [ 42.664046] Code: 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 8c 05 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 6d 08 48 8d 7d 58 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 4d 05 00 00 f6 45 59 20 0f 85 06 03 00 00 48 83 [ 42.666945] RSP: 0018:ffffc900009a7730 EFLAGS: 00010212 [ 42.668837] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff92000134eed RCX: ffffffffc20dec9a [ 42.670122] RDX: 000000000000000b RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000000000058 [ 42.672154] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1022110172 [ 42.672160] R10: ffff888110880b97 R11: ffffc900009a737a R12: 0000000000000001 [ 42.672179] R13: ffff888110880b60 R14: ffff888110880b90 R15: ffff888169973840 [ 42.672186] FS: 00007f28cd21d7c0(0000) GS:ffff8883ef280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 42.672191] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 42.[ CR02: ;32m00007f3237366208 CR3: 0 OK 79e001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [ 42.672214] PKRU: 55555554 [ 42.672218] Call Trace: [ 42.672223] <TASK> [ 42.672226] ? die_addr+0x41/0xa0 [ 42.672238] ? exc_general_protection+0x14c/0x230 [ 42.672250] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 [ 42.672260] ? fuse_get_req+0x77a/0x990 [fuse] [ 42.672281] ? fuse_get_req+0x36b/0x990 [fuse] [ 42.672300] ? kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60 [ 42.672310] ? __pfx_fuse_get_req+0x10/0x10 [fuse] [ 42.672327] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 42.672333] ? alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x195/0x440 [ 42.672340] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 42.672345] ? kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60 [ 42.672350] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 42.672355] ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x4d/0x90 [ 42.672362] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 42.672367] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x134/0x350 [ 42.672376] fuse_simple_background+0xe7/0x180 [fuse] [ 42.672406] cuse_channel_open+0x540/0x710 [cuse] [ 42.672415] misc_open+0x2a7/0x3a0 [ 42.672424] chrdev_open+0x1ef/0x5f0 [ 42.672432] ? __pfx_chrdev_open+0x10/0x10 [ 42.672439] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 42.672443] ? security_file_open+0x3bb/0x720 [ 42.672451] do_dentry_open+0x43d/0x1200 [ 42.672459] ? __pfx_chrdev_open+0x10/0x10 [ 42.672468] vfs_open+0x79/0x340 [ 42.672475] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 42.672482] do_open+0x68c/0x11e0 [ 42.672489] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 42.672495] ? __pfx_do_open+0x10/0x10 [ 42.672501] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 42.672506] ? open_last_lookups+0x2a2/0x1370 [ 42.672515] path_openat+0x24f/0x640 [ 42.672522] ? __pfx_path_openat+0x10/0x10 [ 42.723972] ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x45/0x4b0 [ 42.724787] ? __fput+0x43c/0xa70 [ 42.725100] do_filp_open+0x1b3/0x3e0 [ 42.725710] ? poison_slab_object+0x10d/0x190 [ 42.726145] ? __kasan_slab_free+0x33/0x50 [ 42.726570] ? __pfx_do_filp_open+0x10/0x10 [ 42.726981] ? do_syscall_64+0x64/0x170 [ 42.727418] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 42.728018] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 42.728505] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x131/0x270 [ 42.728922] ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 42.729494] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x14c/0x1f0 [ 42.729992] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 42.730889] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 42.732178] ? alloc_fd+0x176/0x5e0 [ 42.732585] do_sys_openat2+0x122/0x160 [ 42.732929] ? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10 [ 42.733448] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 42.734013] ? __pfx_map_id_up+0x10/0x10 [ 42.734482] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 42.735529] ? __memcg_slab_free_hook+0x292/0x500 [ 42.736131] __x64_sys_openat+0x123/0x1e0 [ 42.736526] ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10 [ 42.737369] ? __x64_sys_close+0x7c/0xd0 [ 42.737717] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 42.738192] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x11e/0x1b0 [ 42.738739] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x170 [ 42.739113] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 42.739638] RIP: 0033:0x7f28cd13e87b [ 42.740038] Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 4b 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 67 44 89 e2 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 91 00 00 00 48 8b 54 24 28 64 48 2b 14 25 [ 42.741943] RSP: 002b:00007ffc992546c0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 [ 42.742951] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f28cd44f1ee RCX: 00007f28cd13e87b [ 42.743660] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00007f28cd44f2fa RDI: 00000000ffffff9c [ 42.744518] RBP: 00007f28cd44f2fa R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 42.745211] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002 [ 42.745920] R13: 00007f28cd44f2fa R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003 [ 42.746708] </TASK> [ 42.746937] Modules linked in: cuse vfat fat ext4 mbcache jbd2 intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common kvm_amd ccp bochs drm_vram_helper kvm drm_ttm_helper ttm pcspkr i2c_piix4 drm_kms_helper i2c_smbus pvpanic_mmio pvpanic joydev sch_fq_codel drm fuse xfs nvme_tcp nvme_fabrics nvme_core sd_mod sg virtio_net net_failover virtio_scsi failover crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ata_generic pata_acpi ata_piix ghash_clmulni_intel virtio_pci sha512_ssse3 virtio_pci_legacy_dev sha256_ssse3 virtio_pci_modern_dev sha1_ssse3 libata serio_raw dm_multipath btrfs blake2b_generic xor zstd_compress raid6_pq sunrpc dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod be2iscsi bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i cxgb4 tls cxgb3i cxgb3 mdio libcxgbi libcxgb qla4xxx iscsi_boot_sysfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi qemu_fw_cfg aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd [ 42.754333] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 42.756899] RIP: 0010:fuse_get_req+0x36b/0x990 [fuse] [ 42.757851] Code: 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 8c 05 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 6d 08 48 8d 7d 58 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 4d 05 00 00 f6 45 59 20 0f 85 06 03 00 00 48 83 [ 42.760334] RSP: 0018:ffffc900009a7730 EFLAGS: 00010212 [ 42.760940] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff92000134eed RCX: ffffffffc20dec9a [ 42.761697] RDX: 000000000000000b RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000000000058 [ 42.763009] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1022110172 [ 42.763920] R10: ffff888110880b97 R11: ffffc900009a737a R12: 0000000000000001 [ 42.764839] R13: ffff888110880b60 R14: ffff888110880b90 R15: ffff888169973840 [ 42.765716] FS: 00007f28cd21d7c0(0000) GS:ffff8883ef280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 42.766890] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 42.767828] CR2: 00007f3237366208 CR3: 000000012c79e001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [ 42.768730] PKRU: 55555554 [ 42.769022] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 42.770758] Kernel Offset: 0x7200000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) [ 42.771947] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- It's obviously CUSE related callstack. For CUSE case, we don't have superblock and our checks for SB_I_NOIDMAP flag does not make any sense. Let's handle this case gracefully. Fixes: aa16880 ("fuse: add basic infrastructure to support idmappings") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-next/87v7z586py.fsf@debian-BULLSEYE-live-builder-AMD64/ [1] Reported-by: Chandan Babu R <[email protected]> Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Oct 3, 2024
We have some machines running stock Ubuntu 20.04.6 which is their 5.4.0-174-generic kernel that are running ceph and recently hit a null ptr dereference in tcp_rearm_rto(). Initially hitting it from the TLP path, but then later we also saw it getting hit from the RACK case as well. Here are examples of the oops messages we saw in each of those cases: Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.780353] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.787572] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.792971] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.798362] PGD 0 P4D 0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.801164] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.805091] CPU: 0 PID: 9180 Comm: msgr-worker-1 Tainted: G W 5.4.0-174-generic torvalds#193-Ubuntu Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.814996] Hardware name: Supermicro SMC 2x26 os-gen8 64C NVME-Y 256G/H12SSW-NTR, BIOS 2.5.V1.2U.NVMe.UEFI 05/09/2023 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.825952] RIP: 0010:tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.830656] Code: 87 ca 04 00 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d c3 c3 49 8b bc 24 40 06 00 00 eb 8d 48 bb cf f7 53 e3 a5 9b c4 20 4c 89 ef e8 0c fe 0e 00 <48> 8b 78 20 48 c1 ef 03 48 89 f8 41 8b bc 24 80 04 00 00 48 f7 e3 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.849665] RSP: 0018:ffffb75d40003e08 EFLAGS: 00010246 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.855149] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 20c49ba5e353f7cf RCX: 0000000000000000 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.862542] RDX: 0000000062177c30 RSI: 000000000000231c RDI: ffff9874ad283a60 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.869933] RBP: ffffb75d40003e20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff987605e20aa8 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.877318] R10: ffffb75d40003f00 R11: ffffb75d4460f740 R12: ffff9874ad283900 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.884710] R13: ffff9874ad283a60 R14: ffff9874ad283980 R15: ffff9874ad283d30 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.892095] FS: 00007f1ef4a2e700(0000) GS:ffff987605e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.900438] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.906435] CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000003e450ba003 CR4: 0000000000760ef0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.913822] PKRU: 55555554 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.916786] Call Trace: Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.919488] Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.921765] ? show_regs.cold+0x1a/0x1f Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.925859] ? __die+0x90/0xd9 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.929169] ? no_context+0x196/0x380 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.933088] ? ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x4e0/0x4e0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.938216] ? ip6_sublist_rcv_finish+0x3d/0x50 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.943000] ? __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x50/0x1a0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.947873] ? bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16/0x20 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.952486] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x267/0x450 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.957104] ? ipv6_list_rcv+0x112/0x140 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.961279] ? __do_page_fault+0x58/0x90 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.965458] ? do_page_fault+0x2c/0xe0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.969465] ? page_fault+0x34/0x40 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.973217] ? tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.977313] ? tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.981408] tcp_send_loss_probe+0x10b/0x220 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.985937] tcp_write_timer_handler+0x1b4/0x240 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.990809] tcp_write_timer+0x9e/0xe0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.994814] ? tcp_write_timer_handler+0x240/0x240 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.999866] call_timer_fn+0x32/0x130 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.003782] __run_timers.part.0+0x180/0x280 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.008309] ? recalibrate_cpu_khz+0x10/0x10 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.012841] ? native_x2apic_icr_write+0x30/0x30 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.017718] ? lapic_next_event+0x21/0x30 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.021984] ? clockevents_program_event+0x8f/0xe0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.027035] run_timer_softirq+0x2a/0x50 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.031212] __do_softirq+0xd1/0x2c1 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.035044] do_softirq_own_stack+0x2a/0x40 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.039480] Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.041840] do_softirq.part.0+0x46/0x50 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.046022] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x50/0x60 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.050460] _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x1e/0x20 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.054817] nf_conntrack_tcp_packet+0x29e/0xbe0 [nf_conntrack] Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.060994] ? get_l4proto+0xe7/0x190 [nf_conntrack] Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.066220] nf_conntrack_in+0xe9/0x670 [nf_conntrack] Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.071618] ipv6_conntrack_local+0x14/0x20 [nf_conntrack] Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.077356] nf_hook_slow+0x45/0xb0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.081098] ip6_xmit+0x3f0/0x5d0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.084670] ? ipv6_anycast_cleanup+0x50/0x50 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.089282] ? __sk_dst_check+0x38/0x70 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.093381] ? inet6_csk_route_socket+0x13b/0x200 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.098346] inet6_csk_xmit+0xa7/0xf0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.102263] __tcp_transmit_skb+0x550/0xb30 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.106701] tcp_write_xmit+0x3c6/0xc20 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.110792] ? __alloc_skb+0x98/0x1d0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.114708] __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x37/0x100 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.119667] tcp_push+0xfd/0x100 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.123150] tcp_sendmsg_locked+0xc70/0xdd0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.127588] tcp_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.131245] inet6_sendmsg+0x43/0x70 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.135075] __sock_sendmsg+0x48/0x70 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.138994] ____sys_sendmsg+0x212/0x280 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.143172] ___sys_sendmsg+0x88/0xd0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.147098] ? __seccomp_filter+0x7e/0x6b0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.151446] ? __switch_to+0x39c/0x460 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.155453] ? __switch_to_asm+0x42/0x80 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.159636] ? __switch_to_asm+0x5a/0x80 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.163816] __sys_sendmsg+0x5c/0xa0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.167647] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1f/0x30 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.171832] do_syscall_64+0x57/0x190 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.175748] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x5c/0xc1 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.181055] RIP: 0033:0x7f1ef692618d Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.184893] Code: 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 ca ee ff ff 8b 54 24 1c 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 2f 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 fe ee ff ff 48 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.203889] RSP: 002b:00007f1ef4a26aa0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.211708] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000084b RCX: 00007f1ef692618d Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.219091] RDX: 0000000000004000 RSI: 00007f1ef4a26b10 RDI: 0000000000000275 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.226475] RBP: 0000000000004000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000020 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.233859] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 000000000000084b Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.241243] R13: 00007f1ef4a26b10 R14: 0000000000000275 R15: 000055592030f1e8 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.248628] Modules linked in: vrf bridge stp llc vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel nls_iso8859_1 amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd kvm_amd kvm crct10dif_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper wmi_bmof ipmi_ssif input_leds joydev rndis_host cdc_ether usbnet mii ast drm_vram_helper ttm drm_kms_helper i2c_algo_bit fb_sys_fops syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt ccp mac_hid ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler nft_ct sch_fq_codel nf_tables_set nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables nfnetlink ramoops reed_solomon efi_pstore drm ip_tables x_tables autofs4 raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid0 multipath linear mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core raid1 mlx5_core hid_generic pci_hyperv_intf crc32_pclmul tls usbhid ahci mlxfw bnxt_en libahci hid nvme i2c_piix4 nvme_core wmi Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.324334] CR2: 0000000000000020 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.327944] ---[ end trace 68a2b679d1cfb4f1 ]--- Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.433435] RIP: 0010:tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.438137] Code: 87 ca 04 00 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d c3 c3 49 8b bc 24 40 06 00 00 eb 8d 48 bb cf f7 53 e3 a5 9b c4 20 4c 89 ef e8 0c fe 0e 00 <48> 8b 78 20 48 c1 ef 03 48 89 f8 41 8b bc 24 80 04 00 00 48 f7 e3 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.457144] RSP: 0018:ffffb75d40003e08 EFLAGS: 00010246 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.462629] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 20c49ba5e353f7cf RCX: 0000000000000000 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.470012] RDX: 0000000062177c30 RSI: 000000000000231c RDI: ffff9874ad283a60 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.477396] RBP: ffffb75d40003e20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff987605e20aa8 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.484779] R10: ffffb75d40003f00 R11: ffffb75d4460f740 R12: ffff9874ad283900 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.492164] R13: ffff9874ad283a60 R14: ffff9874ad283980 R15: ffff9874ad283d30 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.499547] FS: 00007f1ef4a2e700(0000) GS:ffff987605e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.507886] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.513884] CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000003e450ba003 CR4: 0000000000760ef0 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.521267] PKRU: 55555554 Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.524230] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.530885] Kernel Offset: 0x1b200000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) Jul 26 15:05:03 rx [11061396.660181] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]--- After we hit this we disabled TLP by setting tcp_early_retrans to 0 and then hit the crash in the RACK case: Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.265582] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.272719] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.278030] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.283343] PGD 0 P4D 0 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.286057] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.289896] CPU: 5 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/5 Tainted: G W 5.4.0-174-generic torvalds#193-Ubuntu Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.299107] Hardware name: Supermicro SMC 2x26 os-gen8 64C NVME-Y 256G/H12SSW-NTR, BIOS 2.5.V1.2U.NVMe.UEFI 05/09/2023 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.309970] RIP: 0010:tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.314584] Code: 87 ca 04 00 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d c3 c3 49 8b bc 24 40 06 00 00 eb 8d 48 bb cf f7 53 e3 a5 9b c4 20 4c 89 ef e8 0c fe 0e 00 <48> 8b 78 20 48 c1 ef 03 48 89 f8 41 8b bc 24 80 04 00 00 48 f7 e3 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.333499] RSP: 0018:ffffb42600a50960 EFLAGS: 00010246 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.338895] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 20c49ba5e353f7cf RCX: 0000000000000000 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.346193] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff92d687ed8160 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.353489] RBP: ffffb42600a50978 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000cd896dcc Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.360786] R10: ffff92dc3404f400 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff92d687ed8000 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.368084] R13: ffff92d687ed8160 R14: 00000000cd896dcc R15: 00000000cd8fca81 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.375381] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff93158ad40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.383632] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.389544] CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000003e775ce006 CR4: 0000000000760ee0 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.396839] PKRU: 55555554 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.399717] Call Trace: Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.402335] Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.404525] ? show_regs.cold+0x1a/0x1f Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.408532] ? __die+0x90/0xd9 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.411760] ? no_context+0x196/0x380 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.415599] ? __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x50/0x1a0 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.420392] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x1e/0x30 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.424401] ? bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16/0x20 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.428927] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x267/0x450 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.433450] ? __do_page_fault+0x58/0x90 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.437542] ? do_page_fault+0x2c/0xe0 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.441470] ? page_fault+0x34/0x40 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.445134] ? tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.449145] tcp_ack+0xa32/0xb30 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.452542] tcp_rcv_established+0x13c/0x670 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.456981] ? sk_filter_trim_cap+0x48/0x220 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.461419] tcp_v6_do_rcv+0xdb/0x450 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.465257] tcp_v6_rcv+0xc2b/0xd10 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.468918] ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xd3/0x4e0 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.473706] ip6_input_finish+0x15/0x20 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.477710] ip6_input+0xa2/0xb0 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.481109] ? ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x4e0/0x4e0 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.486151] ip6_sublist_rcv_finish+0x3d/0x50 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.490679] ip6_sublist_rcv+0x1aa/0x250 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.494779] ? ip6_rcv_finish_core.isra.0+0xa0/0xa0 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.499828] ipv6_list_rcv+0x112/0x140 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.503748] __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x1a4/0x250 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.509057] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1a1/0x2b0 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.514538] gro_normal_list.part.0+0x1e/0x40 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.519068] napi_complete_done+0x91/0x130 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.523352] mlx5e_napi_poll+0x18e/0x610 [mlx5_core] Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.528481] net_rx_action+0x142/0x390 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.532398] __do_softirq+0xd1/0x2c1 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.536142] irq_exit+0xae/0xb0 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.539452] do_IRQ+0x5a/0xf0 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.542590] common_interrupt+0xf/0xf Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.546421] Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.548695] RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0xe/0x10 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.553399] Code: 7b ff ff ff eb bd 90 90 90 90 90 90 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 36 2c 50 00 f4 c3 66 90 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 26 2c 50 00 fb f4 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 55 41 54 53 e8 dd 5e 61 ff 65 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.572309] RSP: 0018:ffffb42600177e70 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffc2 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.580040] RAX: ffffffff8ed08b20 RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 0000000000000001 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.587337] RDX: 00000000f48eeca2 RSI: 0000000000000082 RDI: 0000000000000082 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.594635] RBP: ffffb42600177e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000020f Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.601931] R10: 0000000000100000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000005 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.609229] R13: ffff93157deb5f00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.616530] ? __cpuidle_text_start+0x8/0x8 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.620886] ? default_idle+0x20/0x140 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.624804] arch_cpu_idle+0x15/0x20 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.628545] default_idle_call+0x23/0x30 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.632640] do_idle+0x1fb/0x270 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.636035] cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x30 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.640126] start_secondary+0x178/0x1d0 Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.644218] secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 Aug 7 07:26:17 rx [1006006.648568] Modules linked in: vrf bridge stp llc vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel nls_iso8859_1 nft_ct amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd kvm_amd kvm crct10dif_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper wmi_bmof ipmi_ssif input_leds joydev rndis_host cdc_ether usbnet ast mii drm_vram_helper ttm drm_kms_helper i2c_algo_bit fb_sys_fops syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt ccp mac_hid ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler sch_fq_codel nf_tables_set nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables nfnetlink ramoops reed_solomon efi_pstore drm ip_tables x_tables autofs4 raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid0 multipath linear mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core raid1 hid_generic mlx5_core pci_hyperv_intf crc32_pclmul usbhid ahci tls mlxfw bnxt_en hid libahci nvme i2c_piix4 nvme_core wmi [last unloaded: cpuid] Aug 7 07:26:17 rx [1006006.726180] CR2: 0000000000000020 Aug 7 07:26:17 rx [1006006.729718] ---[ end trace e0e2e37e4e612984 ]--- Prior to seeing the first crash and on other machines we also see the warning in tcp_send_loss_probe() where packets_out is non-zero, but both transmit and retrans queues are empty so we know the box is seeing some accounting issue in this area: Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ------------[ cut here ]------------ Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: invalid inflight: 2 state 1 cwnd 68 mss 8988 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: WARNING: CPU: 16 PID: 0 at net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2605 tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: Modules linked in: vrf bridge stp llc vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel nls_iso8859_1 nft_ct amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd kvm_amd kvm crct10dif_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper wmi_bmof ipmi_ssif joydev input_leds rndis_host cdc_ether usbnet mii ast drm_vram_helper ttm drm_kms_he> Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: CPU: 16 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/16 Not tainted 5.4.0-174-generic torvalds#193-Ubuntu Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: Hardware name: Supermicro SMC 2x26 os-gen8 64C NVME-Y 256G/H12SSW-NTR, BIOS 2.5.V1.2U.NVMe.UEFI 05/09/2023 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RIP: 0010:tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: Code: 08 26 01 00 75 e2 41 0f b6 54 24 12 41 8b 8c 24 c0 06 00 00 45 89 f0 48 c7 c7 e0 b4 20 a7 c6 05 8d 08 26 01 01 e8 4a c0 0f 00 <0f> 0b eb ba 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffb7838088ce00 EFLAGS: 00010286 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9b84b5630430 RCX: 0000000000000006 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000096 RDI: ffff9b8e4621c8c0 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RBP: ffffb7838088ce18 R08: 0000000000000927 R09: 0000000000000004 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff9b84b5630000 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000000231c R15: ffff9b84b5630430 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9b8e46200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: CR2: 000056238cec2380 CR3: 0000003e49ede005 CR4: 0000000000760ee0 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: PKRU: 55555554 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: Call Trace: Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: <IRQ> Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? show_regs.cold+0x1a/0x1f Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? __warn+0x98/0xe0 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? report_bug+0xd1/0x100 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? do_error_trap+0x9b/0xc0 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? do_invalid_op+0x3c/0x50 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? invalid_op+0x1e/0x30 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: tcp_write_timer_handler+0x1b4/0x240 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: tcp_write_timer+0x9e/0xe0 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_write_timer_handler+0x240/0x240 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: call_timer_fn+0x32/0x130 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: __run_timers.part.0+0x180/0x280 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? timerqueue_add+0x9b/0xb0 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? enqueue_hrtimer+0x3d/0x90 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? do_error_trap+0x9b/0xc0 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? do_invalid_op+0x3c/0x50 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? invalid_op+0x1e/0x30 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: tcp_write_timer_handler+0x1b4/0x240 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: tcp_write_timer+0x9e/0xe0 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_write_timer_handler+0x240/0x240 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: call_timer_fn+0x32/0x130 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: __run_timers.part.0+0x180/0x280 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? timerqueue_add+0x9b/0xb0 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? enqueue_hrtimer+0x3d/0x90 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? recalibrate_cpu_khz+0x10/0x10 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? ktime_get+0x3e/0xa0 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? native_x2apic_icr_write+0x30/0x30 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: run_timer_softirq+0x2a/0x50 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: __do_softirq+0xd1/0x2c1 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: irq_exit+0xae/0xb0 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x7b/0x140 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: </IRQ> Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0xe/0x10 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: Code: 7b ff ff ff eb bd 90 90 90 90 90 90 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 36 2c 50 00 f4 c3 66 90 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 26 2c 50 00 fb f4 <c3> 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 55 41 54 53 e8 dd 5e 61 ff 65 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffb783801cfe70 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RAX: ffffffffa6908b20 RBX: 0000000000000010 RCX: 0000000000000001 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RDX: 000000006fc0c97e RSI: 0000000000000082 RDI: 0000000000000082 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RBP: ffffb783801cfe90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000225 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: R10: 0000000000100000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000010 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: R13: ffff9b8e390b0000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? __cpuidle_text_start+0x8/0x8 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? default_idle+0x20/0x140 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: arch_cpu_idle+0x15/0x20 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: default_idle_call+0x23/0x30 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: do_idle+0x1fb/0x270 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x30 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: start_secondary+0x178/0x1d0 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ---[ end trace e7ac822987e33be1 ]--- The NULL ptr deref is coming from tcp_rto_delta_us() attempting to pull an skb off the head of the retransmit queue and then dereferencing that skb to get the skb_mstamp_ns value via tcp_skb_timestamp_us(skb). The crash is the same one that was reported a # of years ago here: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/T/#t and the kernel we're running has the fix which was added to resolve this issue. Unfortunately we've been unsuccessful so far in reproducing this problem in the lab and do not have the luxury of pushing out a new kernel to try and test if newer kernels resolve this issue at the moment. I realize this is a report against both an Ubuntu kernel and also an older 5.4 kernel. I have reported this issue to Ubuntu here: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/2077657 however I feel like since this issue has possibly cropped up again it makes sense to build in some protection in this path (even on the latest kernel versions) since the code in question just blindly assumes there's a valid skb without testing if it's NULL b/f it looks at the timestamp. Given we have seen crashes in this path before and now this case it seems like we should protect ourselves for when packets_out accounting is incorrect. While we should fix that root cause we should also just make sure the skb is not NULL before dereferencing it. Also add a warn once here to capture some information if/when the problem case is hit again. Fixes: e1a10ef ("tcp: introduce tcp_rto_delta_us() helper for xmit timer fix") Signed-off-by: Josh Hunt <[email protected]> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Oct 3, 2024
…git/netfilter/nf Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net v2: with kdoc fixes per Paolo Abeni. The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net: Patch #1 and #2 handle an esoteric scenario: Given two tasks sending UDP packets to one another, two packets of the same flow in each direction handled by different CPUs that result in two conntrack objects in NEW state, where reply packet loses race. Then, patch #3 adds a testcase for this scenario. Series from Florian Westphal. 1) NAT engine can falsely detect a port collision if it happens to pick up a reply packet as NEW rather than ESTABLISHED. Add extra code to detect this and suppress port reallocation in this case. 2) To complete the clash resolution in the reply direction, extend conntrack logic to detect clashing conntrack in the reply direction to existing entry. 3) Adds a test case. Then, an assorted list of fixes follow: 4) Add a selftest for tproxy, from Antonio Ojea. 5) Guard ctnetlink_*_size() functions under #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER_NETLINK_GLUE_CT) || defined(CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS) From Andy Shevchenko. 6) Use -m socket --transparent in iptables tproxy documentation. From XIE Zhibang. 7) Call kfree_rcu() when releasing flowtable hooks to address race with netlink dump path, from Phil Sutter. 8) Fix compilation warning in nf_reject with CONFIG_BRIDGE_NETFILTER=n. From Simon Horman. 9) Guard ctnetlink_label_size() under CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS which is its only user, to address a compilation warning. From Simon Horman. 10) Use rcu-protected list iteration over basechain hooks from netlink dump path. 11) Fix memcg for nf_tables, use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT is not complete. 12) Remove old nfqueue conntrack clash resolution. Instead trying to use same destination address consistently which requires double DNAT, use the existing clash resolution which allows clashing packets go through with different destination. Antonio Ojea originally reported an issue from the postrouting chain, I proposed a fix: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/ZuwSwAqKgCB2a51-@calendula/T/ which he reported it did not work for him. 13) Adds a selftest for patch 12. 14) Fixes ipvs.sh selftest. netfilter pull request 24-09-26 * tag 'nf-24-09-26' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf: selftests: netfilter: Avoid hanging ipvs.sh kselftest: add test for nfqueue induced conntrack race netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: remove old clash resolution logic netfilter: nf_tables: missing objects with no memcg accounting netfilter: nf_tables: use rcu chain hook list iterator from netlink dump path netfilter: ctnetlink: compile ctnetlink_label_size with CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS netfilter: nf_reject: Fix build warning when CONFIG_BRIDGE_NETFILTER=n netfilter: nf_tables: Keep deleted flowtable hooks until after RCU docs: tproxy: ignore non-transparent sockets in iptables netfilter: ctnetlink: Guard possible unused functions selftests: netfilter: nft_tproxy.sh: add tcp tests selftests: netfilter: add reverse-clash resolution test case netfilter: conntrack: add clash resolution for reverse collisions netfilter: nf_nat: don't try nat source port reallocation for reverse dir clash ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Oct 7, 2024
The km.state is not checked in driver's delayed work. When xfrm_state_check_expire() is called, the state can be reset to XFRM_STATE_EXPIRED, even if it is XFRM_STATE_DEAD already. This happens when xfrm state is deleted, but not freed yet. As __xfrm_state_delete() is called again in xfrm timer, the following crash occurs. To fix this issue, skip xfrm_state_check_expire() if km.state is not XFRM_STATE_VALID. Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000108: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 7448 Comm: kworker/u102:2 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc2+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: mlx5e_ipsec: eth%d mlx5e_ipsec_handle_sw_limits [mlx5_core] RIP: 0010:__xfrm_state_delete+0x3d/0x1b0 Code: 0f 84 8b 01 00 00 48 89 fd c6 87 c8 00 00 00 05 48 8d bb 40 10 00 00 e8 11 04 1a 00 48 8b 95 b8 00 00 00 48 8b 85 c0 00 00 00 <48> 89 42 08 48 89 10 48 8b 55 10 48 b8 00 01 00 00 00 00 ad de 48 RSP: 0018:ffff88885f945ec8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: dead000000000122 RBX: ffffffff82afa940 RCX: 0000000000000036 RDX: dead000000000100 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff82afb980 RBP: ffff888109a20340 R08: ffff88885f945ea0 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88885f945ff8 R12: 0000000000000246 R13: ffff888109a20340 R14: ffff88885f95f420 R15: ffff88885f95f400 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88885f940000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f2163102430 CR3: 00000001128d6001 CR4: 0000000000370eb0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? die_addr+0x33/0x90 ? exc_general_protection+0x1a2/0x390 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30 ? __xfrm_state_delete+0x3d/0x1b0 ? __xfrm_state_delete+0x2f/0x1b0 xfrm_timer_handler+0x174/0x350 ? __xfrm_state_delete+0x1b0/0x1b0 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x121/0x270 hrtimer_run_softirq+0x88/0xd0 handle_softirqs+0xcc/0x270 do_softirq+0x3c/0x50 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x47/0x50 mlx5e_ipsec_handle_sw_limits+0x7d/0x90 [mlx5_core] process_one_work+0x137/0x2d0 worker_thread+0x28d/0x3a0 ? rescuer_thread+0x480/0x480 kthread+0xb8/0xe0 ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 </TASK> Fixes: b2f7b01 ("net/mlx5e: Simulate missing IPsec TX limits hardware functionality") Signed-off-by: Jianbo Liu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Oct 7, 2024
After commit 7c6d2ec ("net: be more gentle about silly gso requests coming from user") virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() had sanity check to detect malicious attempts from user space to cook a bad GSO packet. Then commit cf9acc9 ("net: virtio_net_hdr_to_skb: count transport header in UFO") while fixing one issue, allowed user space to cook a GSO packet with the following characteristic : IPv4 SKB_GSO_UDP, gso_size=3, skb->len = 28. When this packet arrives in qdisc_pkt_len_init(), we end up with hdr_len = 28 (IPv4 header + UDP header), matching skb->len Then the following sets gso_segs to 0 : gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len - hdr_len, shinfo->gso_size); Then later we set qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len to back to zero :/ qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len += (gso_segs - 1) * hdr_len; This leads to the following crash in fq_codel [1] qdisc_pkt_len_init() is best effort, we only want an estimation of the bytes sent on the wire, not crashing the kernel. This patch is fixing this particular issue, a following one adds more sanity checks for another potential bug. [1] [ 70.724101] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 70.724561] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 70.724561] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 70.724561] PGD 10ac61067 P4D 10ac61067 PUD 107ee2067 PMD 0 [ 70.724561] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 70.724561] CPU: 11 UID: 0 PID: 2163 Comm: b358537762 Not tainted 6.11.0-virtme #991 [ 70.724561] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 70.724561] RIP: 0010:fq_codel_enqueue (net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:120 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:168 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:230) sch_fq_codel [ 70.724561] Code: 24 08 49 c1 e1 06 44 89 7c 24 18 45 31 ed 45 31 c0 31 ff 89 44 24 14 4c 03 8b 90 01 00 00 eb 04 39 ca 73 37 4d 8b 39 83 c7 01 <49> 8b 17 49 89 11 41 8b 57 28 45 8b 5f 34 49 c7 07 00 00 00 00 49 All code ======== 0: 24 08 and $0x8,%al 2: 49 c1 e1 06 shl $0x6,%r9 6: 44 89 7c 24 18 mov %r15d,0x18(%rsp) b: 45 31 ed xor %r13d,%r13d e: 45 31 c0 xor %r8d,%r8d 11: 31 ff xor %edi,%edi 13: 89 44 24 14 mov %eax,0x14(%rsp) 17: 4c 03 8b 90 01 00 00 add 0x190(%rbx),%r9 1e: eb 04 jmp 0x24 20: 39 ca cmp %ecx,%edx 22: 73 37 jae 0x5b 24: 4d 8b 39 mov (%r9),%r15 27: 83 c7 01 add $0x1,%edi 2a:* 49 8b 17 mov (%r15),%rdx <-- trapping instruction 2d: 49 89 11 mov %rdx,(%r9) 30: 41 8b 57 28 mov 0x28(%r15),%edx 34: 45 8b 5f 34 mov 0x34(%r15),%r11d 38: 49 c7 07 00 00 00 00 movq $0x0,(%r15) 3f: 49 rex.WB Code starting with the faulting instruction =========================================== 0: 49 8b 17 mov (%r15),%rdx 3: 49 89 11 mov %rdx,(%r9) 6: 41 8b 57 28 mov 0x28(%r15),%edx a: 45 8b 5f 34 mov 0x34(%r15),%r11d e: 49 c7 07 00 00 00 00 movq $0x0,(%r15) 15: 49 rex.WB [ 70.724561] RSP: 0018:ffff95ae85e6fb90 EFLAGS: 00000202 [ 70.724561] RAX: 0000000002000000 RBX: ffff95ae841de000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 70.724561] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000001 [ 70.724561] RBP: ffff95ae85e6fbf8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff95b710a30000 [ 70.724561] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: bdf289445ce31881 R12: ffff95ae85e6fc58 [ 70.724561] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000040 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 70.724561] FS: 000000002c5c1380(0000) GS:ffff95bd7fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 70.724561] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 70.724561] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010c568000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 70.724561] Call Trace: [ 70.724561] <TASK> [ 70.724561] ? __die (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:421 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:434) [ 70.724561] ? page_fault_oops (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:715) [ 70.724561] ? exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:26 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:87 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:147 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1489 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1539) [ 70.724561] ? asm_exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:623) [ 70.724561] ? fq_codel_enqueue (net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:120 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:168 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:230) sch_fq_codel [ 70.724561] dev_qdisc_enqueue (net/core/dev.c:3784) [ 70.724561] __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:3880 (discriminator 2) net/core/dev.c:4390 (discriminator 2)) [ 70.724561] ? irqentry_enter (kernel/entry/common.c:237) [ 70.724561] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (./arch/x86/include/asm/hardirq.h:74 (discriminator 2) arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043 (discriminator 2) arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043 (discriminator 2)) [ 70.724561] ? trace_hardirqs_on (kernel/trace/trace_preemptirq.c:58 (discriminator 4)) [ 70.724561] ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:702) [ 70.724561] ? virtio_net_hdr_to_skb.constprop.0 (./include/linux/virtio_net.h:129 (discriminator 1)) [ 70.724561] packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3145 (discriminator 1) net/packet/af_packet.c:3177 (discriminator 1)) [ 70.724561] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:107 (discriminator 4) ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2170 (discriminator 4) ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1302 (discriminator 4) ./include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:111 (discriminator 4) ./include/linux/spinlock.h:187 (discriminator 4) ./include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:127 (discriminator 4) kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178 (discriminator 4)) [ 70.724561] ? netdev_name_node_lookup_rcu (net/core/dev.c:325 (discriminator 1)) [ 70.724561] __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:730 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:745 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2210 (discriminator 1)) [ 70.724561] ? __sys_setsockopt (./include/linux/file.h:34 net/socket.c:2355) [ 70.724561] __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2222 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2218 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2218 (discriminator 1)) [ 70.724561] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 (discriminator 1)) [ 70.724561] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) [ 70.724561] RIP: 0033:0x41ae09 Fixes: cf9acc9 ("net: virtio_net_hdr_to_skb: count transport header in UFO") Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Jonathan Davies <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Davies <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Oct 7, 2024
… entry Starting with commit c0247d2 ("btrfs: send: annotate struct name_cache_entry with __counted_by()") we annotated the variable length array "name" from the name_cache_entry structure with __counted_by() to improve overflow detection. However that alone was not correct, because the length of that array does not match the "name_len" field - it matches that plus 1 to include the NUL string terminator, so that makes a fortified kernel think there's an overflow and report a splat like this: strcpy: detected buffer overflow: 20 byte write of buffer size 19 WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 3310 at __fortify_report+0x45/0x50 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 3310 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 6.11.0-prnet #1 Hardware name: CompuLab Ltd. sbc-ihsw/Intense-PC2 (IPC2), BIOS IPC2_3.330.7 X64 03/15/2018 RIP: 0010:__fortify_report+0x45/0x50 Code: 48 8b 34 (...) RSP: 0018:ffff97ebc0d6f650 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 7749924ef60fa600 RBX: ffff8bf5446a521a RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: 00000000ffffdfff RSI: ffff97ebc0d6f548 RDI: ffff8bf84e7a1cc8 RBP: ffff8bf548574080 R08: ffffffffa8c40e10 R09: 0000000000005ffd R10: 0000000000000004 R11: ffffffffa8c70e10 R12: ffff8bf551eef400 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000013 R15: 00000000000003a8 FS: 00007fae144de8c0(0000) GS:ffff8bf84e780000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fae14691690 CR3: 00000001027a2003 CR4: 00000000001706f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0x12a/0x1d0 ? __fortify_report+0x45/0x50 ? report_bug+0x154/0x1c0 ? handle_bug+0x42/0x70 ? exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x50 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? __fortify_report+0x45/0x50 __fortify_panic+0x9/0x10 __get_cur_name_and_parent+0x3bc/0x3c0 get_cur_path+0x207/0x3b0 send_extent_data+0x709/0x10d0 ? find_parent_nodes+0x22df/0x25d0 ? mas_nomem+0x13/0x90 ? mtree_insert_range+0xa5/0x110 ? btrfs_lru_cache_store+0x5f/0x1e0 ? iterate_extent_inodes+0x52d/0x5a0 process_extent+0xa96/0x11a0 ? __pfx_lookup_backref_cache+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_store_backref_cache+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_iterate_backrefs+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_check_extent_item+0x10/0x10 changed_cb+0x6fa/0x930 ? tree_advance+0x362/0x390 ? memcmp_extent_buffer+0xd7/0x160 send_subvol+0xf0a/0x1520 btrfs_ioctl_send+0x106b/0x11d0 ? __pfx___clone_root_cmp_sort+0x10/0x10 _btrfs_ioctl_send+0x1ac/0x240 btrfs_ioctl+0x75b/0x850 __se_sys_ioctl+0xca/0x150 do_syscall_64+0x85/0x160 ? __count_memcg_events+0x69/0x100 ? handle_mm_fault+0x1327/0x15c0 ? __se_sys_rt_sigprocmask+0xf1/0x180 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x75/0xa0 ? do_syscall_64+0x91/0x160 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x21d/0x630 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7fae145eeb4f Code: 00 48 89 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffdf1cb09b0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007fae145eeb4f RDX: 00007ffdf1cb0ad0 RSI: 0000000040489426 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00000000000078fe R08: 00007fae144006c0 R09: 00007ffdf1cb0927 R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffdf1cb1ce8 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 000055c499fab2e0 R15: 0000000000000004 </TASK> Fix this by not storing the NUL string terminator since we don't actually need it for name cache entries, this way "name_len" corresponds to the actual size of the "name" array. This requires marking the "name" array field with __nonstring and using memcpy() instead of strcpy() as recommended by the guidelines at: KSPP#90 Reported-by: David Arendt <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/ Fixes: c0247d2 ("btrfs: send: annotate struct name_cache_entry with __counted_by()") CC: [email protected] # 6.11 Tested-by: David Arendt <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Oct 7, 2024
…acntion [BUG] Syzbot reported a NULL pointer dereference with the following crash: FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure. start_transaction+0x830/0x1670 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:676 prepare_to_relocate+0x31f/0x4c0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3642 relocate_block_group+0x169/0xd20 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3678 ... BTRFS info (device loop0): balance: ended with status: -12 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000cc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000660-0x0000000000000667] RIP: 0010:btrfs_update_reloc_root+0x362/0xa80 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:926 Call Trace: <TASK> commit_fs_roots+0x2ee/0x720 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1496 btrfs_commit_transaction+0xfaf/0x3740 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2430 del_balance_item fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3678 [inline] reset_balance_state+0x25e/0x3c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3742 btrfs_balance+0xead/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4574 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3673 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf9/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [CAUSE] The allocation failure happens at the start_transaction() inside prepare_to_relocate(), and during the error handling we call unset_reloc_control(), which makes fs_info->balance_ctl to be NULL. Then we continue the error path cleanup in btrfs_balance() by calling reset_balance_state() which will call del_balance_item() to fully delete the balance item in the root tree. However during the small window between set_reloc_contrl() and unset_reloc_control(), we can have a subvolume tree update and created a reloc_root for that subvolume. Then we go into the final btrfs_commit_transaction() of del_balance_item(), and into btrfs_update_reloc_root() inside commit_fs_roots(). That function checks if fs_info->reloc_ctl is in the merge_reloc_tree stage, but since fs_info->reloc_ctl is NULL, it results a NULL pointer dereference. [FIX] Just add extra check on fs_info->reloc_ctl inside btrfs_update_reloc_root(), before checking fs_info->reloc_ctl->merge_reloc_tree. That DEAD_RELOC_TREE handling is to prevent further modification to the reloc tree during merge stage, but since there is no reloc_ctl at all, we do not need to bother that. Reported-by: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/ CC: [email protected] # 4.19+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Oct 7, 2024
[Syzbot reported]
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.11.0-rc4-syzkaller-00019-gb311c1b497e5 #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kswapd0/78 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88801b8d8930 (&group->mark_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: fsnotify_group_lock include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h:270 [inline]
ffff88801b8d8930 (&group->mark_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: fsnotify_destroy_mark+0x38/0x3c0 fs/notify/mark.c:578
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8ea2fd60 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat mm/vmscan.c:6841 [inline]
ffffffff8ea2fd60 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: kswapd+0xbb4/0x35a0 mm/vmscan.c:7223
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}:
...
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x3d/0x2a0 mm/slub.c:4044
inotify_new_watch fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c:599 [inline]
inotify_update_watch fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c:647 [inline]
__do_sys_inotify_add_watch fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c:786 [inline]
__se_sys_inotify_add_watch+0x72e/0x1070 fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c:729
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #0 (&group->mark_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
...
__mutex_lock+0x136/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752
fsnotify_group_lock include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h:270 [inline]
fsnotify_destroy_mark+0x38/0x3c0 fs/notify/mark.c:578
fsnotify_destroy_marks+0x14a/0x660 fs/notify/mark.c:934
fsnotify_inoderemove include/linux/fsnotify.h:264 [inline]
dentry_unlink_inode+0x2e0/0x430 fs/dcache.c:403
__dentry_kill+0x20d/0x630 fs/dcache.c:610
shrink_kill+0xa9/0x2c0 fs/dcache.c:1055
shrink_dentry_list+0x2c0/0x5b0 fs/dcache.c:1082
prune_dcache_sb+0x10f/0x180 fs/dcache.c:1163
super_cache_scan+0x34f/0x4b0 fs/super.c:221
do_shrink_slab+0x701/0x1160 mm/shrinker.c:435
shrink_slab+0x1093/0x14d0 mm/shrinker.c:662
shrink_one+0x43b/0x850 mm/vmscan.c:4815
shrink_many mm/vmscan.c:4876 [inline]
lru_gen_shrink_node mm/vmscan.c:4954 [inline]
shrink_node+0x3799/0x3de0 mm/vmscan.c:5934
kswapd_shrink_node mm/vmscan.c:6762 [inline]
balance_pgdat mm/vmscan.c:6954 [inline]
kswapd+0x1bcd/0x35a0 mm/vmscan.c:7223
[Analysis]
The problem is that inotify_new_watch() is using GFP_KERNEL to allocate
new watches under group->mark_mutex, however if dentry reclaim races
with unlinking of an inode, it can end up dropping the last dentry reference
for an unlinked inode resulting in removal of fsnotify mark from reclaim
context which wants to acquire group->mark_mutex as well.
This scenario shows that all notification groups are in principle prone
to this kind of a deadlock (previously, we considered only fanotify and
dnotify to be problematic for other reasons) so make sure all
allocations under group->mark_mutex happen with GFP_NOFS.
Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c679f13773f295d2da53
Signed-off-by: Lizhi Xu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Oct 7, 2024
This reverts commit 504fc6f. dev_queue_xmit_nit is expected to be called with BH disabled. __dev_queue_xmit has the following: /* Disable soft irqs for various locks below. Also * stops preemption for RCU. */ rcu_read_lock_bh(); VRF must follow this invariant. The referenced commit removed this protection. Which triggered a lockdep warning: ================================ WARNING: inconsistent lock state 6.11.0 #1 Tainted: G W -------------------------------- inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. btserver/134819 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: ffff8882da30c118 (rlock-AF_PACKET){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: tpacket_rcv+0x863/0x3b30 {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at: lock_acquire+0x19a/0x4f0 _raw_spin_lock+0x27/0x40 packet_rcv+0xa33/0x1320 __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0xcb0/0x3a90 __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x2c9/0x890 netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x610/0xcc0 [...] other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(rlock-AF_PACKET); <Interrupt> lock(rlock-AF_PACKET); *** DEADLOCK *** Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0xa0 mark_lock+0x102e/0x16b0 __lock_acquire+0x9ae/0x6170 lock_acquire+0x19a/0x4f0 _raw_spin_lock+0x27/0x40 tpacket_rcv+0x863/0x3b30 dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x709/0xa40 vrf_finish_direct+0x26e/0x340 [vrf] vrf_l3_out+0x5f4/0xe80 [vrf] __ip_local_out+0x51e/0x7a0 [...] Fixes: 504fc6f ("vrf: Remove unnecessary RCU-bh critical section") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ Reported-by: Ben Greear <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Oct 7, 2024
xe_migrate_copy designed to copy content of TTM resources. When source resource is null, it will trigger a NULL pointer dereference in xe_migrate_copy. To avoid this situation, update lacks source flag to true for this case, the flag will trigger xe_migrate_clear rather than xe_migrate_copy. Issue trace: <7> [317.089847] xe 0000:00:02.0: [drm:xe_migrate_copy [xe]] Pass 14, sizes: 4194304 & 4194304 <7> [317.089945] xe 0000:00:02.0: [drm:xe_migrate_copy [xe]] Pass 15, sizes: 4194304 & 4194304 <1> [317.128055] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 <1> [317.128064] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode <1> [317.128066] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page <6> [317.128069] PGD 0 P4D 0 <4> [317.128071] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI <4> [317.128074] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1440 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G U N 6.11.0-rc7-xe #1 <4> [317.128078] Tainted: [U]=USER, [N]=TEST <4> [317.128080] Hardware name: Intel Corporation Lunar Lake Client Platform/LNL-M LP5 RVP1, BIOS LNLMFWI1.R00.3221.D80.2407291239 07/29/2024 <4> [317.128082] RIP: 0010:xe_migrate_copy+0x66/0x13e0 [xe] <4> [317.128158] Code: 00 00 48 89 8d e0 fe ff ff 48 8b 40 10 4c 89 85 c8 fe ff ff 44 88 8d bd fe ff ff 65 48 8b 3c 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 7d d0 31 ff <8b> 79 10 48 89 85 a0 fe ff ff 48 8b 00 48 89 b5 d8 fe ff ff 83 ff <4> [317.128162] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000167f9f0 EFLAGS: 00010246 <4> [317.128164] RAX: ffff8881120d8028 RBX: ffff88814d070428 RCX: 0000000000000000 <4> [317.128166] RDX: ffff88813cb99c00 RSI: 0000000004000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 <4> [317.128168] RBP: ffffc9000167fbb8 R08: ffff88814e7b1f08 R09: 0000000000000001 <4> [317.128170] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88814e7b1f08 <4> [317.128172] R13: ffff88814e7b1f08 R14: ffff88813cb99c00 R15: 0000000000000001 <4> [317.128174] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88846f280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 <4> [317.128176] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 <4> [317.128178] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 000000011f676004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 <4> [317.128180] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 <4> [317.128182] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 <4> [317.128184] PKRU: 55555554 <4> [317.128185] Call Trace: <4> [317.128187] <TASK> <4> [317.128189] ? show_regs+0x67/0x70 <4> [317.128194] ? __die_body+0x20/0x70 <4> [317.128196] ? __die+0x2b/0x40 <4> [317.128198] ? page_fault_oops+0x15f/0x4e0 <4> [317.128203] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x3fb/0x970 <4> [317.128205] ? lock_acquire+0xc7/0x2e0 <4> [317.128209] ? exc_page_fault+0x87/0x2b0 <4> [317.128212] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 <4> [317.128216] ? xe_migrate_copy+0x66/0x13e0 [xe] <4> [317.128263] ? __lock_acquire+0xb9d/0x26f0 <4> [317.128265] ? __lock_acquire+0xb9d/0x26f0 <4> [317.128267] ? sg_free_append_table+0x20/0x80 <4> [317.128271] ? lock_acquire+0xc7/0x2e0 <4> [317.128273] ? mark_held_locks+0x4d/0x80 <4> [317.128275] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1e/0xd0 <4> [317.128278] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x31/0x60 <4> [317.128281] ? __pm_runtime_resume+0x60/0xa0 <4> [317.128284] xe_bo_move+0x682/0xc50 [xe] <4> [317.128315] ? lock_is_held_type+0xaa/0x120 <4> [317.128318] ttm_bo_handle_move_mem+0xe5/0x1a0 [ttm] <4> [317.128324] ttm_bo_validate+0xd1/0x1a0 [ttm] <4> [317.128328] shrink_test_run_device+0x721/0xc10 [xe] <4> [317.128360] ? find_held_lock+0x31/0x90 <4> [317.128363] ? lock_release+0xd1/0x2a0 <4> [317.128365] ? __pfx_kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x10/0x10 [kunit] <4> [317.128370] xe_bo_shrink_kunit+0x11/0x20 [xe] <4> [317.128397] kunit_try_run_case+0x6e/0x150 [kunit] <4> [317.128400] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1e/0xd0 <4> [317.128402] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x31/0x60 <4> [317.128404] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x1e/0x40 [kunit] <4> [317.128407] kthread+0xf5/0x130 <4> [317.128410] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 <4> [317.128412] ret_from_fork+0x39/0x60 <4> [317.128415] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 <4> [317.128416] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 <4> [317.128420] </TASK> Fixes: 266c858 ("drm/xe/xe2: Handle flat ccs move for igfx.") Signed-off-by: Zhanjun Dong <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Matt Roper <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 59a1c9c) Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <[email protected]>
fifteenhex
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Oct 7, 2024
…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.12, take #1 - Fix pKVM error path on init, making sure we do not change critical system registers as we're about to fail - Make sure that the host's vector length is at capped by a value common to all CPUs - Fix kvm_has_feat*() handling of "negative" features, as the current code is pretty broken - Promote Joey to the status of official reviewer, while James steps down -- hopefully only temporarly
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Update uart1 fields