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update master #1

Merged
merged 33 commits into from
Dec 12, 2017
Merged

update master #1

merged 33 commits into from
Dec 12, 2017

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frank-w
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@frank-w frank-w commented Dec 12, 2017

Merge actual kernel-repo

KAGA-KOKO and others added 30 commits November 27, 2017 08:48
Remove circular dependency deadlock in a scenario where hotplug of CPU is
being done while there is updation in cgroup and cpuset triggered from
userspace.

Process A => kthreadd => Process B => Process C => Process A

Process A
cpu_subsys_offline();
  cpu_down();
    _cpu_down();
      percpu_down_write(&cpu_hotplug_lock); //held
      cpuhp_invoke_callback();
	     workqueue_offline_cpu();
            queue_work_on(); // unbind_work on system_highpri_wq
               __queue_work();
                 insert_work();
                    wake_up_worker();
            flush_work();
               wait_for_completion();

worker_thread();
   manage_workers();
      create_worker();
	     kthread_create_on_node();
		    wake_up_process(kthreadd_task);

kthreadd
kthreadd();
  kernel_thread();
    do_fork();
      copy_process();
        percpu_down_read(&cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem);
          __rwsem_down_read_failed_common(); //waiting

Process B
kernfs_fop_write();
  cgroup_file_write();
    cgroup_procs_write();
      percpu_down_write(&cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem); //held
      cgroup_attach_task();
        cgroup_migrate();
          cgroup_migrate_execute();
            cpuset_can_attach();
              mutex_lock(&cpuset_mutex); //waiting

Process C
kernfs_fop_write();
  cgroup_file_write();
    cpuset_write_resmask();
      mutex_lock(&cpuset_mutex); //held
      update_cpumask();
        update_cpumasks_hier();
          rebuild_sched_domains_locked();
            get_online_cpus();
              percpu_down_read(&cpu_hotplug_lock); //waiting

Eliminating deadlock by reversing the locking order for cpuset_mutex and
cpu_hotplug_lock.

Signed-off-by: Prateek Sood <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Convert cpuset_hotplug_workfn() into synchronous call for cpu hotplug
path. For memory hotplug path it still gets queued as a work item.

Since cpuset_hotplug_workfn() can be made synchronous for cpu hotplug
path, it is not required to wait for cpuset hotplug while thawing
processes.

Signed-off-by: Prateek Sood <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
…rly()

This is needed in order to allow the unbound workqueue to take
housekeeping cpus into accounty

Signed-off-by: Tal Shorer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Initialize wq_unbound_cpumask to exclude cpus that were isolated by
the cmdline's isolcpus parameter.

Signed-off-by: Tal Shorer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Albert Pool <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
This macro `task_css_set` verifies that the caller is
inside proper critical section if the kernel set CONFIG_PROVE_RCU=y.

Signed-off-by: Wang Long <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Here, The function pdc_hardware_init always return zero. So it is not
necessary to check its return value.

Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Make these pdc2027x_*_timing structures const as it is never modified.

Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Commit 438a506 ("percpu: don't forget to free the temporary struct
pcpu_alloc_info") uncovered a problem on the CRIS architecture where
the bootmem allocator is initialized with virtual addresses. Given it
has:

    #define __va(x) ((void *)((unsigned long)(x) | 0x80000000))

then things just work out because the end result is the same whether you
give this a physical or a virtual address.

Untill you call memblock_free_early(__pa(address)) that is, because
values from __pa() don't match with the virtual addresses stuffed in the
bootmem allocator anymore.

Avoid freeing the temporary pcpu_alloc_info memory on that architecture
until they fix things up to let the kernel boot like it did before.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Fixes: 438a506 ("percpu: don't forget to free the temporary struct pcpu_alloc_info")
Lockdep complains that the stats update is trying to register a non-static
key. This is because u64_stats are using a seqlock on 32bit arches, which
needs to be initialized before usage.

Fixes: 041cd64 (cgroup: Implement cgroup2 basic CPU usage accounting)
Signed-off-by: Lucas Stach <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
In rsa_get_n(), if the buffer contained all 0's and "FIPS mode" is
enabled, we would read one byte past the end of the buffer while
scanning the leading zeroes.  Fix it by checking 'n_sz' before '!*ptr'.

This bug was reachable by adding a specially crafted key of type
"asymmetric" (requires CONFIG_RSA and CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER).

KASAN report:

    BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rsa_get_n+0x19e/0x1d0 crypto/rsa_helper.c:33
    Read of size 1 at addr ffff88003501a708 by task keyctl/196

    CPU: 1 PID: 196 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.14.0-09238-g1d3b78bbc6e9 #26
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014
    Call Trace:
     rsa_get_n+0x19e/0x1d0 crypto/rsa_helper.c:33
     asn1_ber_decoder+0x82a/0x1fd0 lib/asn1_decoder.c:328
     rsa_set_pub_key+0xd3/0x320 crypto/rsa.c:278
     crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key ./include/crypto/akcipher.h:364 [inline]
     pkcs1pad_set_pub_key+0xae/0x200 crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:117
     crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key ./include/crypto/akcipher.h:364 [inline]
     public_key_verify_signature+0x270/0x9d0 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c:106
     x509_check_for_self_signed+0x2ea/0x480 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:141
     x509_cert_parse+0x46a/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:129
     x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174
     asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388
     key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850
     SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline]
     SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96

    Allocated by task 196:
     __do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3711 [inline]
     __kmalloc_track_caller+0x118/0x2e0 mm/slab.c:3726
     kmemdup+0x17/0x40 mm/util.c:118
     kmemdup ./include/linux/string.h:414 [inline]
     x509_cert_parse+0x2cb/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:106
     x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174
     asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388
     key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850
     SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline]
     SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96

Fixes: 5a7de97 ("crypto: rsa - return raw integers for the ASN.1 parser")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.8+
Cc: Tudor Ambarus <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
In the AEAD interface for AF_ALG, the reference to the "null skcipher"
held by each tfm was being dropped in the wrong place -- when each
af_alg_ctx was freed instead of when the aead_tfm was freed.  As
discovered by syzkaller, a specially crafted program could use this to
cause the null skcipher to be freed while it is still in use.

Fix it by dropping the reference in the right place.

Fixes: 72548b0 ("crypto: algif_aead - copy AAD from src to dst")
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.14+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
 af_alg_free_areq_sgls()

If allocating the ->tsgl member of 'struct af_alg_async_req' failed,
during cleanup we dereferenced the NULL ->tsgl pointer in
af_alg_free_areq_sgls(), because ->tsgl_entries was nonzero.

Fix it by only freeing the ->tsgl list if it is non-NULL.

This affected both algif_skcipher and algif_aead.

Fixes: e870456 ("crypto: algif_skcipher - overhaul memory management")
Fixes: d887c52 ("crypto: algif_aead - overhaul memory management")
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.14+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Because the HMAC template didn't check that its underlying hash
algorithm is unkeyed, trying to use "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))"
through AF_ALG or through KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE resulted in the inner HMAC
being used without having been keyed, resulting in sha3_update() being
called without sha3_init(), causing a stack buffer overflow.

This is a very old bug, but it seems to have only started causing real
problems when SHA-3 support was added (requires CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3)
because the innermost hash's state is ->import()ed from a zeroed buffer,
and it just so happens that other hash algorithms are fine with that,
but SHA-3 is not.  However, there could be arch or hardware-dependent
hash algorithms also affected; I couldn't test everything.

Fix the bug by introducing a function crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey()
which tests whether a shash algorithm is keyed.  Then update the HMAC
template to require that its underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed.

Here is a reproducer:

    #include <linux/if_alg.h>
    #include <sys/socket.h>

    int main()
    {
        int algfd;
        struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
            .salg_type = "hash",
            .salg_name = "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))",
        };
        char key[4096] = { 0 };

        algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
        bind(algfd, (const struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
        setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key));
    }

Here was the KASAN report from syzbot:

    BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:341  [inline]
    BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0  crypto/sha3_generic.c:161
    Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8801cca07c40 by task syzkaller076574/3044

    CPU: 1 PID: 3044 Comm: syzkaller076574 Not tainted 4.14.0-mm1+ #25
    Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS  Google 01/01/2011
    Call Trace:
      __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
      dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53
      print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252
      kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
      kasan_report+0x25b/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
      check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline]
      check_memory_region+0x137/0x190 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267
      memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303
      memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
      sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161
      crypto_shash_update+0xcb/0x220 crypto/shash.c:109
      shash_finup_unaligned+0x2a/0x60 crypto/shash.c:151
      crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165
      hmac_finup+0x182/0x330 crypto/hmac.c:152
      crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165
      shash_digest_unaligned+0x9e/0xd0 crypto/shash.c:172
      crypto_shash_digest+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:186
      hmac_setkey+0x36a/0x690 crypto/hmac.c:66
      crypto_shash_setkey+0xad/0x190 crypto/shash.c:64
      shash_async_setkey+0x47/0x60 crypto/shash.c:207
      crypto_ahash_setkey+0xaf/0x180 crypto/ahash.c:200
      hash_setkey+0x40/0x90 crypto/algif_hash.c:446
      alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:221 [inline]
      alg_setsockopt+0x2a1/0x350 crypto/af_alg.c:254
      SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1851 [inline]
      SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1830
      entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96

Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
When asked to encrypt or decrypt 0 bytes, both the generic and x86
implementations of Salsa20 crash in blkcipher_walk_done(), either when
doing 'kfree(walk->buffer)' or 'free_page((unsigned long)walk->page)',
because walk->buffer and walk->page have not been initialized.

The bug is that Salsa20 is calling blkcipher_walk_done() even when
nothing is in 'walk.nbytes'.  But blkcipher_walk_done() is only meant to
be called when a nonzero number of bytes have been provided.

The broken code is part of an optimization that tries to make only one
call to salsa20_encrypt_bytes() to process inputs that are not evenly
divisible by 64 bytes.  To fix the bug, just remove this "optimization"
and use the blkcipher_walk API the same way all the other users do.

Reproducer:

    #include <linux/if_alg.h>
    #include <sys/socket.h>
    #include <unistd.h>

    int main()
    {
            int algfd, reqfd;
            struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
                    .salg_type = "skcipher",
                    .salg_name = "salsa20",
            };
            char key[16] = { 0 };

            algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
            bind(algfd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
            reqfd = accept(algfd, 0, 0);
            setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key));
            read(reqfd, key, sizeof(key));
    }

Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Fixes: eb6f13e ("[CRYPTO] salsa20_generic: Fix multi-page processing")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v2.6.25+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
These PP2C and PP3C registers control the configuration of the PHY
control OOB timing for the COMINIT/COMWAKE parameters respectively
for sata port. Overwrite default values with calculated ones to get
better OOB timing.

Signed-off-by: Tang Yuantian <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
The driver name "ahci" is already used by the ahci platform driver.
This leads to the following error:
Error: Driver 'ahci' is already registered, aborting...

Change the name to ahci-mtk to fix this.

Signed-off-by: Matthias Brugger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
…sstatus speed

During hotplug, it is possible for 6Gbps link speed to be limited all
the way down to 1.5 Gbps which may lead to a slower link speed when
drive is re-connected.

This behavior has been seen on a Intel Lewisburg SATA controller
(8086:a1d2) with HGST HUH728080ALE600 drive where SATA link speed was
limited to 1.5 Gbps and when re-connected the link came up 3.0 Gbps.

This patch was retested on above configuration and showed the
hotplugged link to come back online at max speed (6Gbps). I did not
see the downgrade when testing on Intel C600/X79, but retested patched
linux-4.14-rc5 kernel and didn't see any side effects from this
change. Also, successfully retested hotplug on port multiplier 3Gbps
link.

tj: Minor comment updates.

Signed-off-by: David Milburn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
This reverts commit 1599a18.

This and the previous commit led to another circular locking scenario
and the scenario which is fixed by this commit no longer exists after
e8b3f8d ("workqueue/hotplug: simplify workqueue_offline_cpu()")
which removes work item flushing from hotplug path.

Revert it for now.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Since the recent cpu/hotplug refactoring, workqueue_offline_cpu() is
guaranteed to run on the local cpu which is going offline.

This also fixes the following deadlock by removing work item
scheduling and flushing from CPU hotplug path.

 http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

tj: Description update.

Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Since the cpu/hotplug refactoring, DOWN_FAILED is never called without
preceding DOWN_PREPARE making the workaround unnecessary.  Remove it.

Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
This reverts commit aa24163.

This and the following commit led to another circular locking scenario
and the scenario which is fixed by this commit no longer exists after
e8b3f8d ("workqueue/hotplug: simplify workqueue_offline_cpu()")
which removes work item flushing from hotplug path.

Revert it for now.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
We haven't yet figured out what to do with RT threads on cgroup2.
Document the limitation.

v2: Included the warning about system management software behavior as
    suggested by Michael.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Reported-by: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <[email protected]>
System may crash after unloading ipmi_si.ko module
because a timer may remain and fire after the module cleaned up resources.

cleanup_one_si() contains the following processing.

        /*
         * Make sure that interrupts, the timer and the thread are
         * stopped and will not run again.
         */
        if (to_clean->irq_cleanup)
                to_clean->irq_cleanup(to_clean);
        wait_for_timer_and_thread(to_clean);

        /*
         * Timeouts are stopped, now make sure the interrupts are off
         * in the BMC.  Note that timers and CPU interrupts are off,
         * so no need for locks.
         */
        while (to_clean->curr_msg || (to_clean->si_state != SI_NORMAL)) {
                poll(to_clean);
                schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(1);
        }

si_state changes as following in the while loop calling poll(to_clean).

  SI_GETTING_MESSAGES
    => SI_CHECKING_ENABLES
     => SI_SETTING_ENABLES
      => SI_GETTING_EVENTS
       => SI_NORMAL

As written in the code comments above,
timers are expected to stop before the polling loop and not to run again.
But the timer is set again in the following process
when si_state becomes SI_SETTING_ENABLES.

  => poll
     => smi_event_handler
       => handle_transaction_done
          // smi_info->si_state == SI_SETTING_ENABLES
         => start_getting_events
           => start_new_msg
            => smi_mod_timer
              => mod_timer

As a result, before the timer set in start_new_msg() expires,
the polling loop may see si_state becoming SI_NORMAL
and the module clean-up finishes.

For example, hard LOCKUP and panic occurred as following.
smi_timeout was called after smi_event_handler,
kcs_event and hangs at port_inb()
trying to access I/O port after release.

    [exception RIP: port_inb+19]
    RIP: ffffffffc0473053  RSP: ffff88069fdc3d80  RFLAGS: 00000006
    RAX: ffff8806800f8e00  RBX: ffff880682bd9400  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000ca3  RSI: 0000000000000ca3  RDI: ffff8806800f8e40
    RBP: ffff88069fdc3d80   R8: ffffffff81d86dfc   R9: ffffffff81e36426
    R10: 00000000000509f0  R11: 0000000000100000  R12: 0000000000]:000000
    R13: 0000000000000000  R14: 0000000000000246  R15: ffff8806800f8e00
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0000
 --- <NMI exception stack> ---

To fix the problem I defined a flag, timer_can_start,
as member of struct smi_info.
The flag is enabled immediately after initializing the timer
and disabled immediately before waiting for timer deletion.

Fixes: 0cfec91 ("ipmi: Start the timer and thread on internal msgs")
Signed-off-by: Yamazaki Masamitsu <[email protected]>
[Adjusted for recent changes in the driver.]
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
When the IPMI PCI code was split out, some code was consolidated for
setting the io_setup field in the io structure.  The PCI code needed
this set before registration to probe register spacing, though, so
restore the old code for that function.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=197999
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Meelis Roos <[email protected]>
This patch fixes ipmi crash on parisc introduced in the kernel 4.15-rc.
The pointer io.io_setup is not initialized and thus it causes crash in
try_smi_init when attempting to call new_smi->io.io_setup.

Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
The filw was converted from print_symbol() to %pf some time
ago (044c782 "workqueue: fix checkpatch issues").
kallsyms does not seem to be needed anymore.

Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
…/herbert/crypto-2.6

Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu:
 "This push fixes the following issues:

   - buffer overread in RSA

   - potential use after free in algif_aead.

   - error path null pointer dereference in af_alg

   - forbid combinations such as hmac(hmac(sha3)) which may crash

   - crash in salsa20 due to incorrect API usage"

* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
  crypto: salsa20 - fix blkcipher_walk API usage
  crypto: hmac - require that the underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed
  crypto: af_alg - fix NULL pointer dereference in
  crypto: algif_aead - fix reference counting of null skcipher
  crypto: rsa - fix buffer overread when stripping leading zeroes
Pull IPMI fixes from Corey Minyard.

* tag 'for-linus-4.15-2' of git://github.com/cminyard/linux-ipmi:
  ipmi_si: fix crash on parisc
  ipmi_si: Fix oops with PCI devices
  ipmi: Stop timers before cleaning up the module
…ernel/git/tj/libata

Pull libata fixes from Tejun Heo:
 "Nothing too interesting. David Milburn improved a corner case
  misbehavior during hotplug. Other than that, minor driver-specific
  fixes"

* 'for-4.15-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/libata:
  libata: sata_down_spd_limit should return if driver has not recorded sstatus speed
  ahci: mtk: Change driver name to ahci-mtk
  ahci: qoriq: refine port register configuration
  pata_pdc2027x : make pdc2027x_*_timing structures const
  pata_pdc2027x: Remove unnecessary error check
  ata: mediatek: Fix typo in module description
frank-w pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 14, 2024
[ Upstream commit c68bbf5 ]

This adds a check before freeing the rx->skb in flush and close
functions to handle the kernel crash seen while removing driver after FW
download fails or before FW download completes.

dmesg log:
[   54.634586] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000080
[   54.643398] Mem abort info:
[   54.646204]   ESR = 0x0000000096000004
[   54.649964]   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[   54.655286]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[   54.658348]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[   54.661498]   FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[   54.666391] Data abort info:
[   54.669273]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[   54.674768]   CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[   54.674771]   GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[   54.674775] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000048860000
[   54.674780] [0000000000000080] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
[   54.703880] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[   54.710152] Modules linked in: btnxpuart(-) overlay fsl_jr_uio caam_jr caamkeyblob_desc caamhash_desc caamalg_desc crypto_engine authenc libdes crct10dif_ce polyval_ce polyval_generic snd_soc_imx_spdif snd_soc_imx_card snd_soc_ak5558 snd_soc_ak4458 caam secvio error snd_soc_fsl_micfil snd_soc_fsl_spdif snd_soc_fsl_sai snd_soc_fsl_utils imx_pcm_dma gpio_ir_recv rc_core sch_fq_codel fuse
[   54.744357] CPU: 3 PID: 72 Comm: kworker/u9:0 Not tainted 6.6.3-otbr-g128004619037 #2
[   54.744364] Hardware name: FSL i.MX8MM EVK board (DT)
[   54.744368] Workqueue: hci0 hci_power_on
[   54.757244] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[   54.757249] pc : kfree_skb_reason+0x18/0xb0
[   54.772299] lr : btnxpuart_flush+0x40/0x58 [btnxpuart]
[   54.782921] sp : ffff8000805ebca0
[   54.782923] x29: ffff8000805ebca0 x28: ffffa5c6cf1869c0 x27: ffffa5c6cf186000
[   54.782931] x26: ffff377b84852400 x25: ffff377b848523c0 x24: ffff377b845e7230
[   54.782938] x23: ffffa5c6ce8dbe08 x22: ffffa5c6ceb65410 x21: 00000000ffffff92
[   54.782945] x20: ffffa5c6ce8dbe98 x19: ffffffffffffffac x18: ffffffffffffffff
[   54.807651] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffa5c6ce2824ec x15: ffff8001005eb857
[   54.821917] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffffa5c6cf1a02e0 x12: 0000000000000642
[   54.821924] x11: 0000000000000040 x10: ffffa5c6cf19d690 x9 : ffffa5c6cf19d688
[   54.821931] x8 : ffff377b86000028 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
[   54.821938] x5 : ffff377b86000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
[   54.843331] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000002 x0 : ffffffffffffffac
[   54.857599] Call trace:
[   54.857601]  kfree_skb_reason+0x18/0xb0
[   54.863878]  btnxpuart_flush+0x40/0x58 [btnxpuart]
[   54.863888]  hci_dev_open_sync+0x3a8/0xa04
[   54.872773]  hci_power_on+0x54/0x2e4
[   54.881832]  process_one_work+0x138/0x260
[   54.881842]  worker_thread+0x32c/0x438
[   54.881847]  kthread+0x118/0x11c
[   54.881853]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[   54.896406] Code: a9be7bfd 910003fd f9000bf3 aa0003f3 (b940d400)
[   54.896410] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Signed-off-by: Neeraj Sanjay Kale <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Guillaume Legoupil <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
frank-w pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 14, 2024
[ Upstream commit c3a5e3e ]

When using cachefiles, lockdep may emit something similar to the circular
locking dependency notice below.  The problem appears to stem from the
following:

 (1) Cachefiles manipulates xattrs on the files in its cache when called
     from ->writepages().

 (2) The setxattr() and removexattr() system call handlers get the name
     (and value) from userspace after taking the sb_writers lock, putting
     accesses of the vma->vm_lock and mm->mmap_lock inside of that.

 (3) The afs filesystem uses a per-inode lock to prevent multiple
     revalidation RPCs and in writeback vs truncate to prevent parallel
     operations from deadlocking against the server on one side and local
     page locks on the other.

Fix this by moving the getting of the name and value in {get,remove}xattr()
outside of the sb_writers lock.  This also has the minor benefits that we
don't need to reget these in the event of a retry and we never try to take
the sb_writers lock in the event we can't pull the name and value into the
kernel.

Alternative approaches that might fix this include moving the dispatch of a
write to the cache off to a workqueue or trying to do without the
validation lock in afs.  Note that this might also affect other filesystems
that use netfslib and/or cachefiles.

 ======================================================
 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 6.10.0-build2+ #956 Not tainted
 ------------------------------------------------------
 fsstress/6050 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff888138fd82f0 (mapping.invalidate_lock#3){++++}-{3:3}, at: filemap_fault+0x26e/0x8b0

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffff888113f26d18 (&vma->vm_lock->lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: lock_vma_under_rcu+0x165/0x250

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #4 (&vma->vm_lock->lock){++++}-{3:3}:
        __lock_acquire+0xaf0/0xd80
        lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280
        down_write+0x3b/0x50
        vma_start_write+0x6b/0xa0
        vma_link+0xcc/0x140
        insert_vm_struct+0xb7/0xf0
        alloc_bprm+0x2c1/0x390
        kernel_execve+0x65/0x1a0
        call_usermodehelper_exec_async+0x14d/0x190
        ret_from_fork+0x24/0x40
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 -> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
        __lock_acquire+0xaf0/0xd80
        lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280
        __might_fault+0x7c/0xb0
        strncpy_from_user+0x25/0x160
        removexattr+0x7f/0x100
        __do_sys_fremovexattr+0x7e/0xb0
        do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

 -> #2 (sb_writers#14){.+.+}-{0:0}:
        __lock_acquire+0xaf0/0xd80
        lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280
        percpu_down_read+0x3c/0x90
        vfs_iocb_iter_write+0xe9/0x1d0
        __cachefiles_write+0x367/0x430
        cachefiles_issue_write+0x299/0x2f0
        netfs_advance_write+0x117/0x140
        netfs_write_folio.isra.0+0x5ca/0x6e0
        netfs_writepages+0x230/0x2f0
        afs_writepages+0x4d/0x70
        do_writepages+0x1e8/0x3e0
        filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x84/0xa0
        __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xa8/0xf0
        file_write_and_wait_range+0x59/0x90
        afs_release+0x10f/0x270
        __fput+0x25f/0x3d0
        __do_sys_close+0x43/0x70
        do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

 -> #1 (&vnode->validate_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
        __lock_acquire+0xaf0/0xd80
        lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280
        down_read+0x95/0x200
        afs_writepages+0x37/0x70
        do_writepages+0x1e8/0x3e0
        filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x84/0xa0
        filemap_invalidate_inode+0x167/0x1e0
        netfs_unbuffered_write_iter+0x1bd/0x2d0
        vfs_write+0x22e/0x320
        ksys_write+0xbc/0x130
        do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

 -> #0 (mapping.invalidate_lock#3){++++}-{3:3}:
        check_noncircular+0x119/0x160
        check_prev_add+0x195/0x430
        __lock_acquire+0xaf0/0xd80
        lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280
        down_read+0x95/0x200
        filemap_fault+0x26e/0x8b0
        __do_fault+0x57/0xd0
        do_pte_missing+0x23b/0x320
        __handle_mm_fault+0x2d4/0x320
        handle_mm_fault+0x14f/0x260
        do_user_addr_fault+0x2a2/0x500
        exc_page_fault+0x71/0x90
        asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30

 other info that might help us debug this:

 Chain exists of:
   mapping.invalidate_lock#3 --> &mm->mmap_lock --> &vma->vm_lock->lock

  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
   rlock(&vma->vm_lock->lock);
                                lock(&mm->mmap_lock);
                                lock(&vma->vm_lock->lock);
   rlock(mapping.invalidate_lock#3);

  *** DEADLOCK ***

 1 lock held by fsstress/6050:
  #0: ffff888113f26d18 (&vma->vm_lock->lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: lock_vma_under_rcu+0x165/0x250

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 0 PID: 6050 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 6.10.0-build2+ #956
 Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x80
  check_noncircular+0x119/0x160
  ? queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x4be/0x510
  ? __pfx_check_noncircular+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x10/0x10
  ? mark_lock+0x47/0x160
  ? init_chain_block+0x9c/0xc0
  ? add_chain_block+0x84/0xf0
  check_prev_add+0x195/0x430
  __lock_acquire+0xaf0/0xd80
  ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
  ? __lock_release.isra.0+0x13b/0x230
  lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280
  ? filemap_fault+0x26e/0x8b0
  ? __pfx_lock_acquire.part.0+0x10/0x10
  ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60
  ? lock_acquire+0xd7/0x120
  down_read+0x95/0x200
  ? filemap_fault+0x26e/0x8b0
  ? __pfx_down_read+0x10/0x10
  ? __filemap_get_folio+0x25/0x1a0
  filemap_fault+0x26e/0x8b0
  ? __pfx_filemap_fault+0x10/0x10
  ? find_held_lock+0x7c/0x90
  ? __pfx___lock_release.isra.0+0x10/0x10
  ? __pte_offset_map+0x99/0x110
  __do_fault+0x57/0xd0
  do_pte_missing+0x23b/0x320
  __handle_mm_fault+0x2d4/0x320
  ? __pfx___handle_mm_fault+0x10/0x10
  handle_mm_fault+0x14f/0x260
  do_user_addr_fault+0x2a2/0x500
  exc_page_fault+0x71/0x90
  asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30

Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
cc: Alexander Viro <[email protected]>
cc: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
cc: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
cc: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
cc: Gao Xiang <[email protected]>
cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
cc: [email protected]
cc: [email protected]
cc: [email protected]
[brauner: fix minor issues]
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
frank-w pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 14, 2024
[ Upstream commit 9715502 ]

HID driver callbacks aren't called anymore once hid_destroy_device() has
been called. Hence, hid driver_data should be freed only after the
hid_destroy_device() function returned as driver_data is used in several
callbacks.

I observed a crash with kernel 6.10.0 on my T14s Gen 3, after enabling
KASAN to debug memory allocation, I got this output:

  [   13.050438] ==================================================================
  [   13.054060] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh]
  [   13.054809] psmouse serio1: trackpoint: Synaptics TrackPoint firmware: 0x02, buttons: 3/3
  [   13.056432] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88813152f408 by task (udev-worker)/479

  [   13.060970] CPU: 5 PID: 479 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.10.0-arch1-2 #1 893bb55d7f0073f25c46adbb49eb3785fefd74b0
  [   13.063978] Hardware name: LENOVO 21CQCTO1WW/21CQCTO1WW, BIOS R22ET70W (1.40 ) 03/21/2024
  [   13.067860] Call Trace:
  [   13.069383] input: TPPS/2 Synaptics TrackPoint as /devices/platform/i8042/serio1/input/input8
  [   13.071486]  <TASK>
  [   13.071492]  dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
  [   13.074870] snd_hda_intel 0000:33:00.6: enabling device (0000 -> 0002)
  [   13.078296]  ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
  [   13.082199]  print_report+0x174/0x505
  [   13.085776]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
  [   13.089367]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.093255]  ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
  [   13.097464]  kasan_report+0xc8/0x150
  [   13.101461]  ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
  [   13.105802]  amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
  [   13.110303]  amdtp_hid_request+0xb8/0x110 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
  [   13.114879]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.119450]  sensor_hub_get_feature+0x1d3/0x540 [hid_sensor_hub 3f13be3016ff415bea03008d45d99da837ee3082]
  [   13.124097]  hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x4d0/0xad0 [hid_sensor_iio_common c3a5cbe93969c28b122609768bbe23efe52eb8f5]
  [   13.127404]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.131925]  ? __pfx_hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x10/0x10 [hid_sensor_iio_common c3a5cbe93969c28b122609768bbe23efe52eb8f5]
  [   13.136455]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x96/0xf0
  [   13.140197]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
  [   13.143602]  ? devm_iio_device_alloc+0x34/0x50 [industrialio 3d261d5e5765625d2b052be40e526d62b1d2123b]
  [   13.147234]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.150446]  ? __devm_add_action+0x167/0x1d0
  [   13.155061]  hid_gyro_3d_probe+0x120/0x7f0 [hid_sensor_gyro_3d 63da36a143b775846ab2dbb86c343b401b5e3172]
  [   13.158581]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.161814]  platform_probe+0xa2/0x150
  [   13.165029]  really_probe+0x1e3/0x8a0
  [   13.168243]  __driver_probe_device+0x18c/0x370
  [   13.171500]  driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x120
  [   13.175000]  __driver_attach+0x190/0x4a0
  [   13.178521]  ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
  [   13.181771]  bus_for_each_dev+0x106/0x180
  [   13.185033]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
  [   13.188229]  ? __pfx_bus_for_each_dev+0x10/0x10
  [   13.191446]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.194382]  bus_add_driver+0x29e/0x4d0
  [   13.197328]  driver_register+0x1a5/0x360
  [   13.200283]  ? __pfx_hid_gyro_3d_platform_driver_init+0x10/0x10 [hid_sensor_gyro_3d 63da36a143b775846ab2dbb86c343b401b5e3172]
  [   13.203362]  do_one_initcall+0xa7/0x380
  [   13.206432]  ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10
  [   13.210175]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.213211]  ? kasan_unpoison+0x44/0x70
  [   13.216688]  do_init_module+0x238/0x750
  [   13.219696]  load_module+0x5011/0x6af0
  [   13.223096]  ? kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
  [   13.226743]  ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
  [   13.230080]  ? kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
  [   13.233323]  ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180
  [   13.236778]  ? __pfx_load_module+0x10/0x10
  [   13.239703]  ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180
  [   13.243070]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.245924]  ? init_module_from_file+0x13d/0x150
  [   13.248745]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.251503]  ? init_module_from_file+0xdf/0x150
  [   13.254198]  init_module_from_file+0xdf/0x150
  [   13.256826]  ? __pfx_init_module_from_file+0x10/0x10
  [   13.259428]  ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
  [   13.261959]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.264471]  ? kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
  [   13.267026]  ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180
  [   13.269494]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.271949]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.274324]  ? _raw_spin_lock+0x85/0xe0
  [   13.276671]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
  [   13.278963]  ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x1a6/0xad0
  [   13.281193]  idempotent_init_module+0x23b/0x650
  [   13.283420]  ? __pfx_idempotent_init_module+0x10/0x10
  [   13.285619]  ? __pfx___seccomp_filter+0x10/0x10
  [   13.287714]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.289828]  ? __fget_light+0x57/0x420
  [   13.291870]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.293880]  ? security_capable+0x74/0xb0
  [   13.295820]  __x64_sys_finit_module+0xbe/0x130
  [   13.297874]  do_syscall_64+0x82/0x190
  [   13.299898]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.301905]  ? irqtime_account_irq+0x3d/0x1f0
  [   13.303877]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.305753]  ? __irq_exit_rcu+0x4e/0x130
  [   13.307577]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.309489]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  [   13.311371] RIP: 0033:0x7a21f96ade9d
  [   13.313234] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 63 de 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
  [   13.317051] RSP: 002b:00007ffeae934e78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
  [   13.319024] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005987276bfcf0 RCX: 00007a21f96ade9d
  [   13.321100] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 00007a21f8eda376 RDI: 000000000000001c
  [   13.323314] RBP: 00007a21f8eda376 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffeae934ec0
  [   13.325505] R10: 0000000000000050 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000020000
  [   13.327637] R13: 00005987276c1250 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00005987276c4530
  [   13.329737]  </TASK>

  [   13.333945] Allocated by task 139:
  [   13.336111]  kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
  [   13.336121]  kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
  [   13.336125]  __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
  [   13.336129]  amdtp_hid_probe+0xb1/0x440 [amd_sfh]
  [   13.336138]  amd_sfh_hid_client_init+0xb8a/0x10f0 [amd_sfh]
  [   13.336144]  sfh_init_work+0x47/0x120 [amd_sfh]
  [   13.336150]  process_one_work+0x673/0xeb0
  [   13.336155]  worker_thread+0x795/0x1250
  [   13.336160]  kthread+0x290/0x350
  [   13.336164]  ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70
  [   13.336169]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

  [   13.338175] Freed by task 139:
  [   13.340064]  kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
  [   13.340072]  kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
  [   13.340076]  kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
  [   13.340081]  poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180
  [   13.340085]  __kasan_slab_free+0x32/0x50
  [   13.340089]  kfree+0xe5/0x310
  [   13.340094]  amdtp_hid_remove+0xb2/0x160 [amd_sfh]
  [   13.340102]  amd_sfh_hid_client_deinit+0x324/0x640 [amd_sfh]
  [   13.340107]  amd_sfh_hid_client_init+0x94a/0x10f0 [amd_sfh]
  [   13.340113]  sfh_init_work+0x47/0x120 [amd_sfh]
  [   13.340118]  process_one_work+0x673/0xeb0
  [   13.340123]  worker_thread+0x795/0x1250
  [   13.340127]  kthread+0x290/0x350
  [   13.340132]  ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70
  [   13.340136]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

  [   13.342482] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88813152f400
                  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64
  [   13.347357] The buggy address is located 8 bytes inside of
                  freed 64-byte region [ffff88813152f400, ffff88813152f440)

  [   13.347367] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
  [   13.355409] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x13152f
  [   13.355416] anon flags: 0x2ffff8000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff)
  [   13.355423] page_type: 0xffffefff(slab)
  [   13.355429] raw: 02ffff8000000000 ffff8881000428c0 ffffea0004c43a00 0000000000000005
  [   13.355435] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffefff 0000000000000000
  [   13.355439] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

  [   13.357295] Memory state around the buggy address:
  [   13.357299]  ffff88813152f300: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  [   13.357303]  ffff88813152f380: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  [   13.357306] >ffff88813152f400: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  [   13.357309]                       ^
  [   13.357311]  ffff88813152f480: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  [   13.357315]  ffff88813152f500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  [   13.357318] ==================================================================
  [   13.357405] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
  [   13.383534] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe0a1bc4140000013: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
  [   13.383544] KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x050e020a00000098-0x050e020a0000009f]
  [   13.383551] CPU: 3 PID: 479 Comm: (udev-worker) Tainted: G    B              6.10.0-arch1-2 #1 893bb55d7f0073f25c46adbb49eb3785fefd74b0
  [   13.383561] Hardware name: LENOVO 21CQCTO1WW/21CQCTO1WW, BIOS R22ET70W (1.40 ) 03/21/2024
  [   13.383565] RIP: 0010:amd_sfh_get_report+0x81/0x530 [amd_sfh]
  [   13.383580] Code: 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 78 03 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b 63 08 49 8d 7c 24 10 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 1a 03 00 00 45 8b 74 24 10 45
  [   13.383585] RSP: 0018:ffff8881261f7388 EFLAGS: 00010212
  [   13.383592] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88813152f400 RCX: 0000000000000002
  [   13.383597] RDX: 00a1c04140000013 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 050e020a0000009b
  [   13.383600] RBP: ffff88814d010000 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: fffffbfff3ddb8c0
  [   13.383604] R10: ffffffff9eedc607 R11: ffff88810ce98000 R12: 050e020a0000008b
  [   13.383607] R13: ffff88814d010000 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000000004
  [   13.383611] FS:  00007a21f94d0880(0000) GS:ffff8887e7d80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  [   13.383615] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  [   13.383618] CR2: 00007e0014c438f0 CR3: 000000012614c000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0
  [   13.383622] PKRU: 55555554
  [   13.383625] Call Trace:
  [   13.383629]  <TASK>
  [   13.383632]  ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27
  [   13.383644]  ? die_addr+0x46/0x70
  [   13.383652]  ? exc_general_protection+0x150/0x240
  [   13.383664]  ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
  [   13.383674]  ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x81/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
  [   13.383686]  ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
  [   13.383697]  amdtp_hid_request+0xb8/0x110 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
  [   13.383706]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.383713]  sensor_hub_get_feature+0x1d3/0x540 [hid_sensor_hub 3f13be3016ff415bea03008d45d99da837ee3082]
  [   13.383727]  hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x4d0/0xad0 [hid_sensor_iio_common c3a5cbe93969c28b122609768bbe23efe52eb8f5]
  [   13.383739]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.383745]  ? __pfx_hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x10/0x10 [hid_sensor_iio_common c3a5cbe93969c28b122609768bbe23efe52eb8f5]
  [   13.383753]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x96/0xf0
  [   13.383762]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
  [   13.383768]  ? devm_iio_device_alloc+0x34/0x50 [industrialio 3d261d5e5765625d2b052be40e526d62b1d2123b]
  [   13.383790]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.383795]  ? __devm_add_action+0x167/0x1d0
  [   13.383806]  hid_gyro_3d_probe+0x120/0x7f0 [hid_sensor_gyro_3d 63da36a143b775846ab2dbb86c343b401b5e3172]
  [   13.383818]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.383826]  platform_probe+0xa2/0x150
  [   13.383832]  really_probe+0x1e3/0x8a0
  [   13.383838]  __driver_probe_device+0x18c/0x370
  [   13.383844]  driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x120
  [   13.383851]  __driver_attach+0x190/0x4a0
  [   13.383857]  ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
  [   13.383863]  bus_for_each_dev+0x106/0x180
  [   13.383868]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
  [   13.383874]  ? __pfx_bus_for_each_dev+0x10/0x10
  [   13.383880]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.383887]  bus_add_driver+0x29e/0x4d0
  [   13.383895]  driver_register+0x1a5/0x360
  [   13.383902]  ? __pfx_hid_gyro_3d_platform_driver_init+0x10/0x10 [hid_sensor_gyro_3d 63da36a143b775846ab2dbb86c343b401b5e3172]
  [   13.383910]  do_one_initcall+0xa7/0x380
  [   13.383919]  ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10
  [   13.383927]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.383933]  ? kasan_unpoison+0x44/0x70
  [   13.383943]  do_init_module+0x238/0x750
  [   13.383955]  load_module+0x5011/0x6af0
  [   13.383962]  ? kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
  [   13.383968]  ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
  [   13.383973]  ? kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
  [   13.383980]  ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180
  [   13.383993]  ? __pfx_load_module+0x10/0x10
  [   13.384007]  ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180
  [   13.384012]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.384018]  ? init_module_from_file+0x13d/0x150
  [   13.384025]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.384032]  ? init_module_from_file+0xdf/0x150
  [   13.384037]  init_module_from_file+0xdf/0x150
  [   13.384044]  ? __pfx_init_module_from_file+0x10/0x10
  [   13.384050]  ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
  [   13.384055]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.384060]  ? kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
  [   13.384066]  ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180
  [   13.384071]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.384080]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.384085]  ? _raw_spin_lock+0x85/0xe0
  [   13.384091]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
  [   13.384096]  ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x1a6/0xad0
  [   13.384106]  idempotent_init_module+0x23b/0x650
  [   13.384114]  ? __pfx_idempotent_init_module+0x10/0x10
  [   13.384120]  ? __pfx___seccomp_filter+0x10/0x10
  [   13.384129]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.384135]  ? __fget_light+0x57/0x420
  [   13.384142]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.384147]  ? security_capable+0x74/0xb0
  [   13.384157]  __x64_sys_finit_module+0xbe/0x130
  [   13.384164]  do_syscall_64+0x82/0x190
  [   13.384174]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.384179]  ? irqtime_account_irq+0x3d/0x1f0
  [   13.384188]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.384193]  ? __irq_exit_rcu+0x4e/0x130
  [   13.384201]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.384206]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  [   13.384212] RIP: 0033:0x7a21f96ade9d
  [   13.384263] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 63 de 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
  [   13.384267] RSP: 002b:00007ffeae934e78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
  [   13.384273] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005987276bfcf0 RCX: 00007a21f96ade9d
  [   13.384277] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 00007a21f8eda376 RDI: 000000000000001c
  [   13.384280] RBP: 00007a21f8eda376 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffeae934ec0
  [   13.384284] R10: 0000000000000050 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000020000
  [   13.384288] R13: 00005987276c1250 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00005987276c4530
  [   13.384297]  </TASK>
  [   13.384299] Modules linked in: soundwire_amd(+) hid_sensor_gyro_3d(+) hid_sensor_magn_3d hid_sensor_accel_3d soundwire_generic_allocation amdxcp hid_sensor_trigger drm_exec industrialio_triggered_buffer soundwire_bus gpu_sched kvm_amd kfifo_buf qmi_helpers joydev drm_buddy hid_sensor_iio_common mousedev snd_soc_core industrialio i2c_algo_bit mac80211 snd_compress drm_suballoc_helper kvm snd_hda_intel drm_ttm_helper ac97_bus snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_intel_dspcfg ttm thinkpad_acpi(+) snd_intel_sdw_acpi hid_sensor_hub snd_rpl_pci_acp6x drm_display_helper snd_hda_codec hid_multitouch libarc4 snd_acp_pci platform_profile think_lmi(+) hid_generic firmware_attributes_class wmi_bmof cec snd_acp_legacy_common sparse_keymap rapl snd_hda_core psmouse cfg80211 pcspkr snd_pci_acp6x snd_hwdep video snd_pcm snd_pci_acp5x snd_timer snd_rn_pci_acp3x ucsi_acpi snd_acp_config snd sp5100_tco rfkill snd_soc_acpi typec_ucsi thunderbolt amd_sfh k10temp mhi soundcore i2c_piix4 snd_pci_acp3x typec i2c_hid_acpi roles i2c_hid wmi acpi_tad amd_pmc
  [   13.384454]  mac_hid i2c_dev crypto_user loop nfnetlink zram ip_tables x_tables dm_crypt cbc encrypted_keys trusted asn1_encoder tee dm_mod crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul polyval_clmulni polyval_generic gf128mul ghash_clmulni_intel serio_raw sha512_ssse3 atkbd sha256_ssse3 libps2 sha1_ssse3 vivaldi_fmap nvme aesni_intel crypto_simd nvme_core cryptd ccp xhci_pci i8042 nvme_auth xhci_pci_renesas serio vfat fat btrfs blake2b_generic libcrc32c crc32c_generic crc32c_intel xor raid6_pq
  [   13.384552] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

KASAN reports a use-after-free of hid->driver_data in function
amd_sfh_get_report(). The backtrace indicates that the function is called
by amdtp_hid_request() which is one of the callbacks of hid device.
The current make sure that driver_data is freed only once
hid_destroy_device() returned.

Note that I observed the crash both on v6.9.9 and v6.10.0. The
code seems to be as it was from the early days of the driver.

Signed-off-by: Olivier Sobrie <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Basavaraj Natikar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
frank-w pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 14, 2024
[ Upstream commit b739dff ]

When of_irq_parse_raw() is invoked with a device address smaller than
the interrupt parent node (from #address-cells property), KASAN detects
the following out-of-bounds read when populating the initial match table
(dyndbg="func of_irq_parse_* +p"):

  OF: of_irq_parse_one: dev=/soc@0/picasso/watchdog, index=0
  OF:  parent=/soc@0/pci@878000000000/gpio0@17,0, intsize=2
  OF:  intspec=4
  OF: of_irq_parse_raw: ipar=/soc@0/pci@878000000000/gpio0@17,0, size=2
  OF:  -> addrsize=3
  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in of_irq_parse_raw+0x2b8/0x8d0
  Read of size 4 at addr ffffff81beca5608 by task bash/764

  CPU: 1 PID: 764 Comm: bash Tainted: G           O       6.1.67-484c613561-nokia_sm_arm64 #1
  Hardware name: Unknown Unknown Product/Unknown Product, BIOS 2023.01-12.24.03-dirty 01/01/2023
  Call trace:
   dump_backtrace+0xdc/0x130
   show_stack+0x1c/0x30
   dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x84
   print_report+0x150/0x448
   kasan_report+0x98/0x140
   __asan_load4+0x78/0xa0
   of_irq_parse_raw+0x2b8/0x8d0
   of_irq_parse_one+0x24c/0x270
   parse_interrupts+0xc0/0x120
   of_fwnode_add_links+0x100/0x2d0
   fw_devlink_parse_fwtree+0x64/0xc0
   device_add+0xb38/0xc30
   of_device_add+0x64/0x90
   of_platform_device_create_pdata+0xd0/0x170
   of_platform_bus_create+0x244/0x600
   of_platform_notify+0x1b0/0x254
   blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x9c/0xd0
   __of_changeset_entry_notify+0x1b8/0x230
   __of_changeset_apply_notify+0x54/0xe4
   of_overlay_fdt_apply+0xc04/0xd94
   ...

  The buggy address belongs to the object at ffffff81beca5600
   which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
  The buggy address is located 8 bytes inside of
   128-byte region [ffffff81beca5600, ffffff81beca5680)

  The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
  page:00000000230d3d03 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1beca4
  head:00000000230d3d03 order:1 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
  flags: 0x8000000000010200(slab|head|zone=2)
  raw: 8000000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffffff810000c300
  raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

  Memory state around the buggy address:
   ffffff81beca5500: 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
   ffffff81beca5580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  >ffffff81beca5600: 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                        ^
   ffffff81beca5680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
   ffffff81beca5700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  ==================================================================
  OF:  -> got it !

Prevent the out-of-bounds read by copying the device address into a
buffer of sufficient size.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Wiehler <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
frank-w pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 14, 2024
commit 4df1536 upstream.

Binder objects are processed and copied individually into the target
buffer during transactions. Any raw data in-between these objects is
copied as well. However, this raw data copy lacks an out-of-bounds
check. If the raw data exceeds the data section size then the copy
overwrites the offsets section. This eventually triggers an error that
attempts to unwind the processed objects. However, at this point the
offsets used to index these objects are now corrupted.

Unwinding with corrupted offsets can result in decrements of arbitrary
nodes and lead to their premature release. Other users of such nodes are
left with a dangling pointer triggering a use-after-free. This issue is
made evident by the following KASAN report (trimmed):

  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x19c
  Write of size 4 at addr ffff47fc91598f04 by task binder-util/743

  CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 743 Comm: binder-util Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4 #1
  Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  Call trace:
   _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x19c
   binder_free_buf+0x128/0x434
   binder_thread_write+0x8a4/0x3260
   binder_ioctl+0x18f0/0x258c
  [...]

  Allocated by task 743:
   __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x110/0x270
   binder_new_node+0x50/0x700
   binder_transaction+0x413c/0x6da8
   binder_thread_write+0x978/0x3260
   binder_ioctl+0x18f0/0x258c
  [...]

  Freed by task 745:
   kfree+0xbc/0x208
   binder_thread_read+0x1c5c/0x37d4
   binder_ioctl+0x16d8/0x258c
  [...]
  ==================================================================

To avoid this issue, let's check that the raw data copy is within the
boundaries of the data section.

Fixes: 6d98eb9 ("binder: avoid potential data leakage when copying txn")
Cc: Todd Kjos <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
frank-w pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 14, 2024
commit cd9253c upstream.

If we have 2 threads that are using the same file descriptor and one of
them is doing direct IO writes while the other is doing fsync, we have a
race where we can end up either:

1) Attempt a fsync without holding the inode's lock, triggering an
   assertion failures when assertions are enabled;

2) Do an invalid memory access from the fsync task because the file private
   points to memory allocated on stack by the direct IO task and it may be
   used by the fsync task after the stack was destroyed.

The race happens like this:

1) A user space program opens a file descriptor with O_DIRECT;

2) The program spawns 2 threads using libpthread for example;

3) One of the threads uses the file descriptor to do direct IO writes,
   while the other calls fsync using the same file descriptor.

4) Call task A the thread doing direct IO writes and task B the thread
   doing fsyncs;

5) Task A does a direct IO write, and at btrfs_direct_write() sets the
   file's private to an on stack allocated private with the member
   'fsync_skip_inode_lock' set to true;

6) Task B enters btrfs_sync_file() and sees that there's a private
   structure associated to the file which has 'fsync_skip_inode_lock' set
   to true, so it skips locking the inode's VFS lock;

7) Task A completes the direct IO write, and resets the file's private to
   NULL since it had no prior private and our private was stack allocated.
   Then it unlocks the inode's VFS lock;

8) Task B enters btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging(), then the
   assertion that checks the inode's VFS lock is held fails, since task B
   never locked it and task A has already unlocked it.

The stack trace produced is the following:

   assertion failed: inode_is_locked(&inode->vfs_inode), in fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983
   ------------[ cut here ]------------
   kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983!
   Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
   CPU: 9 PID: 5072 Comm: worker Tainted: G     U     OE      6.10.5-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 69f48d427608e1c09e60ea24c6c55e2ca1b049e8
   Hardware name: Acer Predator PH315-52/Covini_CFS, BIOS V1.12 07/28/2020
   RIP: 0010:btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs]
   Code: 50 d6 86 c0 e8 (...)
   RSP: 0018:ffff9e4a03dcfc78 EFLAGS: 00010246
   RAX: 0000000000000054 RBX: ffff9078a9868e98 RCX: 0000000000000000
   RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff907dce4a7800 RDI: ffff907dce4a7800
   RBP: ffff907805518800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9e4a03dcfb38
   R10: ffff9e4a03dcfb30 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff907684ae7800
   R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff90774646b600 R15: 0000000000000000
   FS:  00007f04b96006c0(0000) GS:ffff907dce480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
   CR2: 00007f32acbfc000 CR3: 00000001fd4fa005 CR4: 00000000003726f0
   Call Trace:
    <TASK>
    ? __die_body.cold+0x14/0x24
    ? die+0x2e/0x50
    ? do_trap+0xca/0x110
    ? do_error_trap+0x6a/0x90
    ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a]
    ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70
    ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a]
    ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
    ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a]
    ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a]
    btrfs_sync_file+0x21a/0x4d0 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a]
    ? __seccomp_filter+0x31d/0x4f0
    __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x4f/0x90
    do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160
    ? do_futex+0xcb/0x190
    ? __x64_sys_futex+0x10e/0x1d0
    ? switch_fpu_return+0x4f/0xd0
    ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220
    ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160
    ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220
    ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160
    ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220
    ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160
    ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220
    ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Another problem here is if task B grabs the private pointer and then uses
it after task A has finished, since the private was allocated in the stack
of task A, it results in some invalid memory access with a hard to predict
result.

This issue, triggering the assertion, was observed with QEMU workloads by
two users in the Link tags below.

Fix this by not relying on a file's private to pass information to fsync
that it should skip locking the inode and instead pass this information
through a special value stored in current->journal_info. This is safe
because in the relevant section of the direct IO write path we are not
holding a transaction handle, so current->journal_info is NULL.

The following C program triggers the issue:

   $ cat repro.c
   /* Get the O_DIRECT definition. */
   #ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
   #define _GNU_SOURCE
   #endif

   #include <stdio.h>
   #include <stdlib.h>
   #include <unistd.h>
   #include <stdint.h>
   #include <fcntl.h>
   #include <errno.h>
   #include <string.h>
   #include <pthread.h>

   static int fd;

   static ssize_t do_write(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count, off_t offset)
   {
       while (count > 0) {
           ssize_t ret;

           ret = pwrite(fd, buf, count, offset);
           if (ret < 0) {
               if (errno == EINTR)
                   continue;
               return ret;
           }
           count -= ret;
           buf += ret;
       }
       return 0;
   }

   static void *fsync_loop(void *arg)
   {
       while (1) {
           int ret;

           ret = fsync(fd);
           if (ret != 0) {
               perror("Fsync failed");
               exit(6);
           }
       }
   }

   int main(int argc, char *argv[])
   {
       long pagesize;
       void *write_buf;
       pthread_t fsyncer;
       int ret;

       if (argc != 2) {
           fprintf(stderr, "Use: %s <file path>\n", argv[0]);
           return 1;
       }

       fd = open(argv[1], O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_DIRECT, 0666);
       if (fd == -1) {
           perror("Failed to open/create file");
           return 1;
       }

       pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE);
       if (pagesize == -1) {
           perror("Failed to get page size");
           return 2;
       }

       ret = posix_memalign(&write_buf, pagesize, pagesize);
       if (ret) {
           perror("Failed to allocate buffer");
           return 3;
       }

       ret = pthread_create(&fsyncer, NULL, fsync_loop, NULL);
       if (ret != 0) {
           fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create writer thread: %d\n", ret);
           return 4;
       }

       while (1) {
           ret = do_write(fd, write_buf, pagesize, 0);
           if (ret != 0) {
               perror("Write failed");
               exit(5);
           }
       }

       return 0;
   }

   $ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdi
   $ mount /dev/sdi /mnt/sdi
   $ timeout 10 ./repro /mnt/sdi/foo

Usually the race is triggered within less than 1 second. A test case for
fstests will follow soon.

Reported-by: Paulo Dias <[email protected]>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219187
Reported-by: Andreas Jahn <[email protected]>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219199
Reported-by: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/
Fixes: 939b656 ("btrfs: fix corruption after buffer fault in during direct IO append write")
CC: [email protected] # 5.15+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
frank-w pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 23, 2024
It would be useful to see what the sched_ext scheduler state is, and what
scheduler is running, when we're dumping a task's stack. This patch
therefore adds a new print_scx_info() function that's called in the same
context as print_worker_info() and print_stop_info(). An example dump
follows.

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000999
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
  CPU: 13 PID: 2047 Comm: insmod Tainted: G           O       6.6.0-work-10323-gb58d4cae8e99-dirty #34
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS unknown 2/2/2022
  Sched_ext: qmap (enabled+all), task: runnable_at=-17ms
  RIP: 0010:init_module+0x9/0x1000 [test_module]
  ...

v3: - scx_ops_enable_state_str[] definition moved to an earlier patch as
      it's now used by core implementation.

    - Convert jiffy delta to msecs using jiffies_to_msecs() instead of
      multiplying by (HZ / MSEC_PER_SEC). The conversion is implemented in
      jiffies_delta_msecs().

v2: - We are now using scx_ops_enable_state_str[] outside
      CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG. Move it outside of CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG and to the
      top. This was reported by Changwoo and Andrea.

Signed-off-by: David Vernet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Changwoo Min <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrea Righi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
frank-w pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 23, 2024
…-level'

Eduard Zingerman says:

====================
bpf: track find_equal_scalars history on per-instruction level

This is a fix for precision tracking bug reported in [0].
It supersedes my previous attempt to fix similar issue in commit [1].
Here is a minimized test case from [0]:

    0:  call bpf_get_prandom_u32;
    1:  r7 = r0;
    2:  r8 = r0;
    3:  call bpf_get_prandom_u32;
    4:  if r0 > 1 goto +0;
    /* --- checkpoint #1: r7.id=1, r8.id=1 --- */
    5:  if r8 >= r0 goto 9f;
    6:  r8 += r8;
    /* --- checkpoint #2: r7.id=1, r8.id=0 --- */
    7:  if r7 == 0 goto 9f;
    8:  r0 /= 0;
    /* --- checkpoint #3 --- */
    9:  r0 = 42;
    10: exit;

W/o this fix verifier incorrectly assumes that instruction at label
(8) is unreachable. The issue is caused by failure to infer
precision mark for r0 at checkpoint #1:
- first verification path is:
  - (0-4): r0 range [0,1];
  - (5): r8 range [0,0], propagated to r7;
  - (6): r8.id is reset;
  - (7): jump is predicted to happen;
  - (9-10): safe exit.
- when jump at (7) is predicted mark_chain_precision() for r7 is
  called and backtrack_insn() proceeds as follows:
  - at (7) r7 is marked as precise;
  - at (5) r8 is not currently tracked and thus r0 is not marked;
  - at (4-5) boundary logic from [1] is triggered and r7,r8 are marked
    as precise;
  - => r0 precision mark is missed.
- when second branch of (4) is considered, verifier prunes the state
  because r0 is not marked as precise in the visited state.

Basically, backtracking logic fails to notice that at (5)
range information is gained for both r7 and r8, and thus both
r8 and r0 have to be marked as precise.
This happens because [1] can only account for such range
transfers at parent/child state boundaries.

The solution suggested by Andrii Nakryiko in [0] is to use jump
history to remember which registers gained range as a result of
find_equal_scalars() [renamed to sync_linked_regs()] and use
this information in backtrack_insn().
Which is what this patch-set does.

The patch-set uses u64 value as a vector of 10-bit values that
identify registers gaining range in find_equal_scalars().
This amounts to maximum of 6 possible values.
To check if such capacity is sufficient I've instrumented kernel
to track a histogram for maximal amount of registers that gain range
in find_equal_scalars per program verification [2].
Measurements done for verifier selftests and Cilium bpf object files
from [3] show that number of such registers is *always* <= 4 and
in 98% of cases it is <= 2.

When tested on a subset of selftests identified by
selftests/bpf/veristat.cfg and Cilium bpf object files from [3]
this patch-set has minimal verification performance impact:

File                      Program                   Insns   (DIFF)  States (DIFF)
------------------------  ------------------------  --------------  -------------
bpf_host.o                tail_handle_nat_fwd_ipv4    -75 (-0.61%)    -3 (-0.39%)
pyperf600_nounroll.bpf.o  on_event                  +1673 (+0.33%)    +3 (+0.01%)

[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAEf4BzZ0xidVCqB47XnkXcNhkPWF6_nTV7yt+_Lf0kcFEut2Mg@mail.gmail.com/
[1] commit 904e6dd ("bpf: Use scalar ids in mark_chain_precision()")
[2] https://github.com/eddyz87/bpf/tree/find-equal-scalars-in-jump-history-with-stats
[3] https://github.com/anakryiko/cilium

Changes:
- v2 -> v3:
  A number of stylistic changes suggested by Andrii:
  - renamings:
    - struct reg_or_spill   -> linked_reg;
    - find_equal_scalars()  -> collect_linked_regs;
    - copy_known_reg()      -> sync_linked_regs;
  - collect_linked_regs() now returns linked regs set of
    size 2 or larger;
  - dropped usage of bit fields in struct linked_reg;
  - added a patch changing references to find_equal_scalars() in
    selftests comments.
- v1 -> v2:
  - patch "bpf: replace env->cur_hist_ent with a getter function" is
    dropped (Andrii);
  - added structure linked_regs and helper functions to [de]serialize
    u64 value as such structure (Andrii);
  - bt_set_equal_scalars() renamed to bt_sync_linked_regs(), moved to
    start and end of backtrack_insn() in order to untie linked
    register logic from conditional jumps backtracking.
    Andrii requested a more radical change of moving linked registers
    processing to bt_set_xxx() functions, I did an experiment in this
    direction:
    https://github.com/eddyz87/bpf/tree/find-equal-scalars-in-jump-history--linked-regs-in-bt-set-reg
    the end result of the experiment seems much uglier than version
    presented in v2.

Revisions:
- v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
- v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
frank-w pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 23, 2024
Leak sanitizer will report memory leaks from python and the leak
sanitizer output causes tests to fail. For example:

  ```
  $ perf test 98 -v
   98: perf script tests:
  --- start ---
  test child forked, pid 1272962
  DB test
  [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ]
  [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.046 MB /tmp/perf-test-script.x0EktdCel8/perf.data (8 samples) ]
  call_path_table((1, 0, 0, 0)
  call_path_table((2, 1, 0, 140339508617447)
  call_path_table((3, 2, 2, 0)
  call_path_table((4, 3, 3, 0)
  call_path_table((5, 4, 4, 0)
  call_path_table((6, 5, 5, 0)
  call_path_table((7, 6, 6, 0)
  call_path_table((8, 7, 7, 0)
  call_path_table((9, 8, 8, 0)
  call_path_table((10, 9, 9, 0)
  call_path_table((11, 10, 10, 0)
  call_path_table((12, 11, 11, 0)
  call_path_table((13, 12, 1, 0)
  sample_table((1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 8, -2058824120, 588306954119000, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 128933429281, 0, 0, 13, 0, 0, 0, -1, -1))
  sample_table((2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 8, -2058824120, 588306954137053, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 128933429281, 0, 0, 13, 0, 0, 0, -1, -1))
  sample_table((3, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 8, -2058824120, 588306954140089, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, 0, 0, 128933429281, 0, 0, 13, 0, 0, 0, -1, -1))
  sample_table((4, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 8, -2058824120, 588306954142376, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 155, 0, 0, 128933429281, 0, 0, 13, 0, 0, 0, -1, -1))
  sample_table((5, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 8, -2058824120, 588306954144045, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2493, 0, 0, 128933429281, 0, 0, 13, 0, 0, 0, -1, -1))
  sample_table((6, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 12, 77, -2046828595, 588306954145722, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 47555, 0, 0, 128933429281, 0, 0, 13, 0, 0, 0, -1, -1))
  call_path_table((14, 9, 14, 0)
  call_path_table((15, 14, 15, 0)
  call_path_table((16, 15, 0, -1040969624)
  call_path_table((17, 16, 16, 0)
  call_path_table((18, 17, 17, 0)
  call_path_table((19, 18, 18, 0)
  call_path_table((20, 19, 19, 0)
  call_path_table((21, 20, 13, 0)
  sample_table((7, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 13, 46, -2053700898, 588306954157436, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 964078, 0, 0, 128933429281, 0, 0, 21, 0, 0, 0, -1, -1))
  call_path_table((22, 1, 21, 0)
  call_path_table((23, 22, 22, 0)
  call_path_table((24, 23, 23, 0)
  call_path_table((25, 24, 24, 0)
  call_path_table((26, 25, 25, 0)
  call_path_table((27, 26, 26, 0)
  call_path_table((28, 27, 27, 0)
  call_path_table((29, 28, 28, 0)
  call_path_table((30, 29, 29, 0)
  call_path_table((31, 30, 30, 0)
  call_path_table((32, 31, 31, 0)
  call_path_table((33, 32, 32, 0)
  call_path_table((34, 33, 33, 0)
  call_path_table((35, 34, 20, 0)
  sample_table((8, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 20, 49, -2046878127, 588306954378624, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2534317, 0, 0, 128933429281, 0, 0, 35, 0, 0, 0, -1, -1))

  =================================================================
  ==1272975==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

  Direct leak of 13628 byte(s) in 6 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x56354f60c092 in malloc (/tmp/perf/perf+0x29c092)
      #1 0x7ff25c7d02e7 in _PyObject_Malloc /build/python3.11/../Objects/obmalloc.c:2003:11
      #2 0x7ff25c7d02e7 in _PyObject_Malloc /build/python3.11/../Objects/obmalloc.c:1996:1

  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 13628 byte(s) leaked in 6 allocation(s).
  --- Cleaning up ---
  ---- end(-1) ----
   98: perf script tests                                               : FAILED!
  ```

Disable leak sanitizer when running specific perf+python tests to
avoid this. This causes the tests to pass when run with leak
sanitizer.

Reviewed-by: Aditya Gupta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Richter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
frank-w pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 23, 2024
iter_finish_branch_entry() doesn't put the branch_info from/to map
elements creating memory leaks. This can be seen with:

```
$ perf record -e cycles -b perf test -w noploop
$ perf report -D
...
Direct leak of 984344 byte(s) in 123043 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7fb2654f3bd7 in malloc libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:69
    #1 0x564d3400d10b in map__get util/map.h:186
    #2 0x564d3400d10b in ip__resolve_ams util/machine.c:1981
    #3 0x564d34014d81 in sample__resolve_bstack util/machine.c:2151
    #4 0x564d34094790 in iter_prepare_branch_entry util/hist.c:898
    #5 0x564d34098fa4 in hist_entry_iter__add util/hist.c:1238
    #6 0x564d33d1f0c7 in process_sample_event tools/perf/builtin-report.c:334
    #7 0x564d34031eb7 in perf_session__deliver_event util/session.c:1655
    #8 0x564d3403ba52 in do_flush util/ordered-events.c:245
    #9 0x564d3403ba52 in __ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:324
    #10 0x564d3402d32e in perf_session__process_user_event util/session.c:1708
    #11 0x564d34032480 in perf_session__process_event util/session.c:1877
    #12 0x564d340336ad in reader__read_event util/session.c:2399
    #13 0x564d34033fdc in reader__process_events util/session.c:2448
    #14 0x564d34033fdc in __perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2495
    #15 0x564d34033fdc in perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2661
    #16 0x564d33d27113 in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1065
    #17 0x564d33d27113 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805
    #18 0x564d33e0ccb7 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350
    #19 0x564d33e0d45e in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403
    #20 0x564d33cdd827 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447
    #21 0x564d33cdd827 in main tools/perf/perf.c:561
...
```

Clearing up the map_symbols properly creates maps reference count
issues so resolve those. Resolving this issue doesn't improve peak
heap consumption for the test above.

Committer testing:

  $ sudo dnf install libasan
  $ make -k CORESIGHT=1 EXTRA_CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" CC=clang O=/tmp/build/$(basename $PWD)/ -C tools/perf install-bin

Reviewed-by: Kan Liang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Sun Haiyong <[email protected]>
Cc: Yanteng Si <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
frank-w pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 23, 2024
AddressSanitizer found a use-after-free bug in the symbol code which
manifested as 'perf top' segfaulting.

  ==1238389==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x60b00c48844b at pc 0x5650d8035961 bp 0x7f751aaecc90 sp 0x7f751aaecc80
  READ of size 1 at 0x60b00c48844b thread T193
      #0 0x5650d8035960 in _sort__sym_cmp util/sort.c:310
      #1 0x5650d8043744 in hist_entry__cmp util/hist.c:1286
      #2 0x5650d8043951 in hists__findnew_entry util/hist.c:614
      #3 0x5650d804568f in __hists__add_entry util/hist.c:754
      #4 0x5650d8045bf9 in hists__add_entry util/hist.c:772
      #5 0x5650d8045df1 in iter_add_single_normal_entry util/hist.c:997
      #6 0x5650d8043326 in hist_entry_iter__add util/hist.c:1242
      #7 0x5650d7ceeefe in perf_event__process_sample /home/matt/src/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:845
      #8 0x5650d7ceeefe in deliver_event /home/matt/src/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1208
      #9 0x5650d7fdb51b in do_flush util/ordered-events.c:245
      #10 0x5650d7fdb51b in __ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:324
      #11 0x5650d7ced743 in process_thread /home/matt/src/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1120
      #12 0x7f757ef1f133 in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:442
      #13 0x7f757ef9f7db in clone3 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:81

When updating hist maps it's also necessary to update the hist symbol
reference because the old one gets freed in map__put().

While this bug was probably introduced with 5c24b67 ("perf
tools: Replace map->referenced & maps->removed_maps with map->refcnt"),
the symbol objects were leaked until c087e94 ("perf machine:
Fix refcount usage when processing PERF_RECORD_KSYMBOL") was merged so
the bug was masked.

Fixes: c087e94 ("perf machine: Fix refcount usage when processing PERF_RECORD_KSYMBOL")
Reported-by: Yunzhao Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming (Cloudflare) <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Riccardo Mancini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # v5.13+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
frank-w pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 23, 2024
… error

In __jbd2_log_wait_for_space(), we might call jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail()
to recover some journal space. But if an error occurs while executing
jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail() (e.g., an EIO), we don't stop waiting for free
space right away, we try other branches, and if j_committing_transaction
is NULL (i.e., the tid is 0), we will get the following complain:

============================================
JBD2: I/O error when updating journal superblock for sdd-8.
__jbd2_log_wait_for_space: needed 256 blocks and only had 217 space available
__jbd2_log_wait_for_space: no way to get more journal space in sdd-8
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 139804 at fs/jbd2/checkpoint.c:109 __jbd2_log_wait_for_space+0x251/0x2e0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 PID: 139804 Comm: kworker/u8:3 Not tainted 6.6.0+ #1
RIP: 0010:__jbd2_log_wait_for_space+0x251/0x2e0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 add_transaction_credits+0x5d1/0x5e0
 start_this_handle+0x1ef/0x6a0
 jbd2__journal_start+0x18b/0x340
 ext4_dirty_inode+0x5d/0xb0
 __mark_inode_dirty+0xe4/0x5d0
 generic_update_time+0x60/0x70
[...]
============================================

So only if jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail() returns 1, i.e., there is nothing to
clean up at the moment, continue to try to reclaim free space in other ways.

Note that this fix relies on commit 6f6a6fd ("jbd2: fix ocfs2 corrupt
when updating journal superblock fails") to make jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail
return the correct error code.

Fixes: 8c3f25d ("jbd2: don't give up looking for space so easily in __jbd2_log_wait_for_space")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
frank-w pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 23, 2024
Add nested locking with I_MUTEX_XATTR subclass to avoid lockdep warning
while handling xattr inode on file open syscall at ext4_xattr_inode_iget.

Backtrace
EXT4-fs (loop0): Ignoring removed oldalloc option
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.10.0-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor543/2794 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff8880215e1a48 (&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:782 [inline]
ffff8880215e1a48 (&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ext4_xattr_inode_iget+0x42a/0x5c0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:425

but task is already holding lock:
ffff8880215e3278 (&ei->i_data_sem/3){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_setattr+0x136d/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5559

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #1 (&ei->i_data_sem/3){++++}-{3:3}:
       lock_acquire+0x197/0x480 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5566
       down_write+0x93/0x180 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1564
       ext4_update_i_disksize fs/ext4/ext4.h:3267 [inline]
       ext4_xattr_inode_write fs/ext4/xattr.c:1390 [inline]
       ext4_xattr_inode_lookup_create fs/ext4/xattr.c:1538 [inline]
       ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x331a/0x3d80 fs/ext4/xattr.c:1662
       ext4_xattr_ibody_set+0x124/0x390 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2228
       ext4_xattr_set_handle+0xc27/0x14e0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2385
       ext4_xattr_set+0x219/0x390 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2498
       ext4_xattr_user_set+0xc9/0xf0 fs/ext4/xattr_user.c:40
       __vfs_setxattr+0x404/0x450 fs/xattr.c:177
       __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x11d/0x4f0 fs/xattr.c:208
       __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x1f9/0x210 fs/xattr.c:266
       vfs_setxattr+0x112/0x2c0 fs/xattr.c:283
       setxattr+0x1db/0x3e0 fs/xattr.c:548
       path_setxattr+0x15a/0x240 fs/xattr.c:567
       __do_sys_setxattr fs/xattr.c:582 [inline]
       __se_sys_setxattr fs/xattr.c:578 [inline]
       __x64_sys_setxattr+0xc5/0xe0 fs/xattr.c:578
       do_syscall_64+0x6d/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:62
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb

-> #0 (&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2988 [inline]
       check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3113 [inline]
       validate_chain+0x1695/0x58f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3729
       __lock_acquire+0x12fd/0x20d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4955
       lock_acquire+0x197/0x480 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5566
       down_write+0x93/0x180 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1564
       inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:782 [inline]
       ext4_xattr_inode_iget+0x42a/0x5c0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:425
       ext4_xattr_inode_get+0x138/0x410 fs/ext4/xattr.c:485
       ext4_xattr_move_to_block fs/ext4/xattr.c:2580 [inline]
       ext4_xattr_make_inode_space fs/ext4/xattr.c:2682 [inline]
       ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0xe70/0x1bb0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2774
       __ext4_expand_extra_isize+0x304/0x3f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5898
       ext4_try_to_expand_extra_isize fs/ext4/inode.c:5941 [inline]
       __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x591/0x810 fs/ext4/inode.c:6018
       ext4_setattr+0x1400/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5562
       notify_change+0xbb6/0xe60 fs/attr.c:435
       do_truncate+0x1de/0x2c0 fs/open.c:64
       handle_truncate fs/namei.c:2970 [inline]
       do_open fs/namei.c:3311 [inline]
       path_openat+0x29f3/0x3290 fs/namei.c:3425
       do_filp_open+0x20b/0x450 fs/namei.c:3452
       do_sys_openat2+0x124/0x460 fs/open.c:1207
       do_sys_open fs/open.c:1223 [inline]
       __do_sys_open fs/open.c:1231 [inline]
       __se_sys_open fs/open.c:1227 [inline]
       __x64_sys_open+0x221/0x270 fs/open.c:1227
       do_syscall_64+0x6d/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:62
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&ei->i_data_sem/3);
                               lock(&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1);
                               lock(&ei->i_data_sem/3);
  lock(&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

5 locks held by syz-executor543/2794:
 #0: ffff888026fbc448 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x4a/0x2a0 fs/namespace.c:365
 #1: ffff8880215e3488 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#7){++++}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:782 [inline]
 #1: ffff8880215e3488 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#7){++++}-{3:3}, at: do_truncate+0x1cf/0x2c0 fs/open.c:62
 #2: ffff8880215e3310 (&ei->i_mmap_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_setattr+0xec4/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5519
 #3: ffff8880215e3278 (&ei->i_data_sem/3){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_setattr+0x136d/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5559
 #4: ffff8880215e30c8 (&ei->xattr_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_write_trylock_xattr fs/ext4/xattr.h:162 [inline]
 #4: ffff8880215e30c8 (&ei->xattr_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_try_to_expand_extra_isize fs/ext4/inode.c:5938 [inline]
 #4: ffff8880215e30c8 (&ei->xattr_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x4fb/0x810 fs/ext4/inode.c:6018

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 2794 Comm: syz-executor543 Not tainted 5.10.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x177/0x211 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_circular_bug+0x146/0x1b0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2002
 check_noncircular+0x2cc/0x390 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2123
 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2988 [inline]
 check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3113 [inline]
 validate_chain+0x1695/0x58f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3729
 __lock_acquire+0x12fd/0x20d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4955
 lock_acquire+0x197/0x480 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5566
 down_write+0x93/0x180 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1564
 inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:782 [inline]
 ext4_xattr_inode_iget+0x42a/0x5c0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:425
 ext4_xattr_inode_get+0x138/0x410 fs/ext4/xattr.c:485
 ext4_xattr_move_to_block fs/ext4/xattr.c:2580 [inline]
 ext4_xattr_make_inode_space fs/ext4/xattr.c:2682 [inline]
 ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0xe70/0x1bb0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2774
 __ext4_expand_extra_isize+0x304/0x3f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5898
 ext4_try_to_expand_extra_isize fs/ext4/inode.c:5941 [inline]
 __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x591/0x810 fs/ext4/inode.c:6018
 ext4_setattr+0x1400/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5562
 notify_change+0xbb6/0xe60 fs/attr.c:435
 do_truncate+0x1de/0x2c0 fs/open.c:64
 handle_truncate fs/namei.c:2970 [inline]
 do_open fs/namei.c:3311 [inline]
 path_openat+0x29f3/0x3290 fs/namei.c:3425
 do_filp_open+0x20b/0x450 fs/namei.c:3452
 do_sys_openat2+0x124/0x460 fs/open.c:1207
 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1223 [inline]
 __do_sys_open fs/open.c:1231 [inline]
 __se_sys_open fs/open.c:1227 [inline]
 __x64_sys_open+0x221/0x270 fs/open.c:1227
 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:62
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb
RIP: 0033:0x7f0cde4ea229
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 21 18 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffd81d1c978 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0030656c69662f30 RCX: 00007f0cde4ea229
RDX: 0000000000000089 RSI: 00000000000a0a00 RDI: 00000000200001c0
RBP: 2f30656c69662f2e R08: 0000000000208000 R09: 0000000000208000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd81d1c9c0
R13: 00007ffd81d1ca00 R14: 0000000000080000 R15: 0000000000000003
EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea:2730: inode #13: comm syz-executor543: corrupted in-inode xattr

Signed-off-by: Wojciech Gładysz <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
frank-w pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 23, 2024
The fields in the hist_entry are filled on-demand which means they only
have meaningful values when relevant sort keys are used.

So if neither of 'dso' nor 'sym' sort keys are used, the map/symbols in
the hist entry can be garbage.  So it shouldn't access it
unconditionally.

I got a segfault, when I wanted to see cgroup profiles.

  $ sudo perf record -a --all-cgroups --synth=cgroup true

  $ sudo perf report -s cgroup

  Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
  0x00005555557a8d90 in map__dso (map=0x0) at util/map.h:48
  48		return RC_CHK_ACCESS(map)->dso;
  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x00005555557a8d90 in map__dso (map=0x0) at util/map.h:48
  #1  0x00005555557aa39b in map__load (map=0x0) at util/map.c:344
  #2  0x00005555557aa592 in map__find_symbol (map=0x0, addr=140736115941088) at util/map.c:385
  #3  0x00005555557ef000 in hists__findnew_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, entry=0x7fffffffa4c0, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sample_self=true)
      at util/hist.c:644
  #4  0x00005555557ef61c in __hists__add_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sym_parent=0x0, bi=0x0, mi=0x0, ki=0x0,
      block_info=0x0, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, sample_self=true, ops=0x0) at util/hist.c:761
  #5  0x00005555557ef71f in hists__add_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sym_parent=0x0, bi=0x0, mi=0x0, ki=0x0,
      sample=0x7fffffffaa90, sample_self=true) at util/hist.c:779
  #6  0x00005555557f00fb in iter_add_single_normal_entry (iter=0x7fffffffa900, al=0x7fffffffa8c0) at util/hist.c:1015
  #7  0x00005555557f09a7 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=0x7fffffffa900, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, max_stack_depth=127, arg=0x7fffffffbce0)
      at util/hist.c:1260
  #8  0x00005555555ba7ce in process_sample_event (tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c14128, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, evsel=0x555556039ad0,
      machine=0x5555560388e8) at builtin-report.c:334
  #9  0x00005555557b30c8 in evlist__deliver_sample (evlist=0x555556039010, tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c14128,
      sample=0x7fffffffaa90, evsel=0x555556039ad0, machine=0x5555560388e8) at util/session.c:1232
  #10 0x00005555557b32bc in machines__deliver_event (machines=0x5555560388e8, evlist=0x555556039010, event=0x7ffff7c14128,
      sample=0x7fffffffaa90, tool=0x7fffffffbce0, file_offset=110888, file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1271
  #11 0x00005555557b3848 in perf_session__deliver_event (session=0x5555560386d0, event=0x7ffff7c14128, tool=0x7fffffffbce0,
      file_offset=110888, file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1354
  #12 0x00005555557affaf in ordered_events__deliver_event (oe=0x555556038e60, event=0x555556135aa0) at util/session.c:132
  #13 0x00005555557bb605 in do_flush (oe=0x555556038e60, show_progress=false) at util/ordered-events.c:245
  #14 0x00005555557bb95c in __ordered_events__flush (oe=0x555556038e60, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND, timestamp=0) at util/ordered-events.c:324
  #15 0x00005555557bba46 in ordered_events__flush (oe=0x555556038e60, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND) at util/ordered-events.c:342
  #16 0x00005555557b1b3b in perf_event__process_finished_round (tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c15bb8, oe=0x555556038e60)
      at util/session.c:780
  #17 0x00005555557b3b27 in perf_session__process_user_event (session=0x5555560386d0, event=0x7ffff7c15bb8, file_offset=117688,
      file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1406

As you can see the entry->ms.map was NULL even if he->ms.map has a
value.  This is because 'sym' sort key is not given, so it cannot assume
whether he->ms.sym and entry->ms.sym is the same.  I only checked the
'sym' sort key here as it implies 'dso' behavior (so maps are the same).

Fixes: ac01c8c ("perf hist: Update hist symbol when updating maps")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]>
Cc: Matt Fleming <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
frank-w pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 23, 2024
commit 823430c ("memory tier: consolidate the initialization of
memory tiers") introduces a locking change that use guard(mutex) to
instead of mutex_lock/unlock() for memory_tier_lock.  It unexpectedly
expanded the locked region to include the hotplug_memory_notifier(), as a
result, it triggers an locking dependency detected of ABBA deadlock. 
Exclude hotplug_memory_notifier() from the locked region to fixing it.

The deadlock scenario is that when a memory online event occurs, the
execution of memory notifier will access the read lock of the
memory_chain.rwsem, then the reigistration of the memory notifier in
memory_tier_init() acquires the write lock of the memory_chain.rwsem while
holding memory_tier_lock.  Then the memory online event continues to
invoke the memory hotplug callback registered by memory_tier_init(). 
Since this callback tries to acquire the memory_tier_lock, a deadlock
occurs.

In fact, this deadlock can't happen because memory_tier_init() always
executes before memory online events happen due to the subsys_initcall()
has an higher priority than module_init().

[  133.491106] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[  133.493656] 6.11.0-rc2+ #146 Tainted: G           O     N
[  133.504290] ------------------------------------------------------
[  133.515194] (udev-worker)/1133 is trying to acquire lock:
[  133.525715] ffffffff87044e28 (memory_tier_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: memtier_hotplug_callback+0x383/0x4b0
[  133.536449]
[  133.536449] but task is already holding lock:
[  133.549847] ffffffff875d3310 ((memory_chain).rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x60/0xb0
[  133.556781]
[  133.556781] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[  133.556781]
[  133.569957]
[  133.569957] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[  133.577618]
[  133.577618] -> #1 ((memory_chain).rwsem){++++}-{3:3}:
[  133.584997]        down_write+0x97/0x210
[  133.588647]        blocking_notifier_chain_register+0x71/0xd0
[  133.592537]        register_memory_notifier+0x26/0x30
[  133.596314]        memory_tier_init+0x187/0x300
[  133.599864]        do_one_initcall+0x117/0x5d0
[  133.603399]        kernel_init_freeable+0xab0/0xeb0
[  133.606986]        kernel_init+0x28/0x2f0
[  133.610312]        ret_from_fork+0x59/0x90
[  133.613652]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  133.617012]
[  133.617012] -> #0 (memory_tier_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[  133.623390]        __lock_acquire+0x2efd/0x5c60
[  133.626730]        lock_acquire+0x1ce/0x580
[  133.629757]        __mutex_lock+0x15c/0x1490
[  133.632731]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30
[  133.635717]        memtier_hotplug_callback+0x383/0x4b0
[  133.638748]        notifier_call_chain+0xbf/0x370
[  133.641647]        blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x76/0xb0
[  133.644636]        memory_notify+0x2e/0x40
[  133.647427]        online_pages+0x597/0x720
[  133.650246]        memory_subsys_online+0x4f6/0x7f0
[  133.653107]        device_online+0x141/0x1d0
[  133.655831]        online_memory_block+0x4d/0x60
[  133.658616]        walk_memory_blocks+0xc0/0x120
[  133.661419]        add_memory_resource+0x51d/0x6c0
[  133.664202]        add_memory_driver_managed+0xf5/0x180
[  133.667060]        dev_dax_kmem_probe+0x7f7/0xb40 [kmem]
[  133.669949]        dax_bus_probe+0x147/0x230
[  133.672687]        really_probe+0x27f/0xac0
[  133.675463]        __driver_probe_device+0x1f3/0x460
[  133.678493]        driver_probe_device+0x56/0x1b0
[  133.681366]        __driver_attach+0x277/0x570
[  133.684149]        bus_for_each_dev+0x145/0x1e0
[  133.686937]        driver_attach+0x49/0x60
[  133.689673]        bus_add_driver+0x2f3/0x6b0
[  133.692421]        driver_register+0x170/0x4b0
[  133.695118]        __dax_driver_register+0x141/0x1b0
[  133.697910]        dax_kmem_init+0x54/0xff0 [kmem]
[  133.700794]        do_one_initcall+0x117/0x5d0
[  133.703455]        do_init_module+0x277/0x750
[  133.706054]        load_module+0x5d1d/0x74f0
[  133.708602]        init_module_from_file+0x12c/0x1a0
[  133.711234]        idempotent_init_module+0x3f1/0x690
[  133.713937]        __x64_sys_finit_module+0x10e/0x1a0
[  133.716492]        x64_sys_call+0x184d/0x20d0
[  133.719053]        do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140
[  133.721537]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  133.724239]
[  133.724239] other info that might help us debug this:
[  133.724239]
[  133.730832]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[  133.730832]
[  133.735298]        CPU0                    CPU1
[  133.737759]        ----                    ----
[  133.740165]   rlock((memory_chain).rwsem);
[  133.742623]                                lock(memory_tier_lock);
[  133.745357]                                lock((memory_chain).rwsem);
[  133.748141]   lock(memory_tier_lock);
[  133.750489]
[  133.750489]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[  133.750489]
[  133.756742] 6 locks held by (udev-worker)/1133:
[  133.759179]  #0: ffff888207be6158 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __driver_attach+0x26c/0x570
[  133.762299]  #1: ffffffff875b5868 (device_hotplug_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_device_hotplug+0x20/0x30
[  133.765565]  #2: ffff88820cf6a108 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_online+0x2f/0x1d0
[  133.768978]  #3: ffffffff86d08ff0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: mem_hotplug_begin+0x17/0x30
[  133.772312]  #4: ffffffff8702dfb0 (mem_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: mem_hotplug_begin+0x23/0x30
[  133.775544]  #5: ffffffff875d3310 ((memory_chain).rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x60/0xb0
[  133.779113]
[  133.779113] stack backtrace:
[  133.783728] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 1133 Comm: (udev-worker) Tainted: G           O     N 6.11.0-rc2+ #146
[  133.787220] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [N]=TEST
[  133.789948] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
[  133.793291] Call Trace:
[  133.795826]  <TASK>
[  133.798284]  dump_stack_lvl+0xea/0x150
[  133.801025]  dump_stack+0x19/0x20
[  133.803609]  print_circular_bug+0x477/0x740
[  133.806341]  check_noncircular+0x2f4/0x3e0
[  133.809056]  ? __pfx_check_noncircular+0x10/0x10
[  133.811866]  ? __pfx_lockdep_lock+0x10/0x10
[  133.814670]  ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp8+0x1c/0x30
[  133.817610]  __lock_acquire+0x2efd/0x5c60
[  133.820339]  ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
[  133.823128]  ? __dax_driver_register+0x141/0x1b0
[  133.825926]  ? do_one_initcall+0x117/0x5d0
[  133.828648]  lock_acquire+0x1ce/0x580
[  133.831349]  ? memtier_hotplug_callback+0x383/0x4b0
[  133.834293]  ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
[  133.837134]  __mutex_lock+0x15c/0x1490
[  133.839829]  ? memtier_hotplug_callback+0x383/0x4b0
[  133.842753]  ? memtier_hotplug_callback+0x383/0x4b0
[  133.845602]  ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x21/0x30
[  133.848438]  ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[  133.851200]  ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
[  133.853935]  ? global_dirty_limits+0xc0/0x160
[  133.856699]  ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x58/0xa0
[  133.859564]  mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30
[  133.862251]  ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30
[  133.864964]  memtier_hotplug_callback+0x383/0x4b0
[  133.867752]  notifier_call_chain+0xbf/0x370
[  133.870550]  ? writeback_set_ratelimit+0xe8/0x160
[  133.873372]  blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x76/0xb0
[  133.876311]  memory_notify+0x2e/0x40
[  133.879013]  online_pages+0x597/0x720
[  133.881686]  ? irqentry_exit+0x3e/0xa0
[  133.884397]  ? __pfx_online_pages+0x10/0x10
[  133.887244]  ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp8+0x1c/0x30
[  133.890299]  ? mhp_init_memmap_on_memory+0x7a/0x1c0
[  133.893203]  memory_subsys_online+0x4f6/0x7f0
[  133.896099]  ? __pfx_memory_subsys_online+0x10/0x10
[  133.899039]  ? xa_load+0x16d/0x2e0
[  133.901667]  ? __pfx_xa_load+0x10/0x10
[  133.904366]  ? __pfx_memory_subsys_online+0x10/0x10
[  133.907218]  device_online+0x141/0x1d0
[  133.909845]  online_memory_block+0x4d/0x60
[  133.912494]  walk_memory_blocks+0xc0/0x120
[  133.915104]  ? __pfx_online_memory_block+0x10/0x10
[  133.917776]  add_memory_resource+0x51d/0x6c0
[  133.920404]  ? __pfx_add_memory_resource+0x10/0x10
[  133.923104]  ? _raw_write_unlock+0x31/0x60
[  133.925781]  ? register_memory_resource+0x119/0x180
[  133.928450]  add_memory_driver_managed+0xf5/0x180
[  133.931036]  dev_dax_kmem_probe+0x7f7/0xb40 [kmem]
[  133.933665]  ? __pfx_dev_dax_kmem_probe+0x10/0x10 [kmem]
[  133.936332]  ? __pfx___up_read+0x10/0x10
[  133.938878]  dax_bus_probe+0x147/0x230
[  133.941332]  ? __pfx_dax_bus_probe+0x10/0x10
[  133.943954]  really_probe+0x27f/0xac0
[  133.946387]  ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp1+0x1e/0x30
[  133.949106]  __driver_probe_device+0x1f3/0x460
[  133.951704]  ? parse_option_str+0x149/0x190
[  133.954241]  driver_probe_device+0x56/0x1b0
[  133.956749]  __driver_attach+0x277/0x570
[  133.959228]  ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
[  133.961776]  bus_for_each_dev+0x145/0x1e0
[  133.964367]  ? __pfx_bus_for_each_dev+0x10/0x10
[  133.967019]  ? __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20
[  133.969543]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x31/0x60
[  133.972132]  driver_attach+0x49/0x60
[  133.974536]  bus_add_driver+0x2f3/0x6b0
[  133.977044]  driver_register+0x170/0x4b0
[  133.979480]  __dax_driver_register+0x141/0x1b0
[  133.982126]  ? __pfx_dax_kmem_init+0x10/0x10 [kmem]
[  133.984724]  dax_kmem_init+0x54/0xff0 [kmem]
[  133.987284]  ? __pfx_dax_kmem_init+0x10/0x10 [kmem]
[  133.989965]  do_one_initcall+0x117/0x5d0
[  133.992506]  ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10
[  133.995185]  ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xa0
[  133.997748]  ? kasan_poison+0x3e/0x60
[  134.000288]  ? kasan_unpoison+0x2c/0x60
[  134.002762]  ? kasan_poison+0x3e/0x60
[  134.005202]  ? __asan_register_globals+0x62/0x80
[  134.007753]  ? __pfx_dax_kmem_init+0x10/0x10 [kmem]
[  134.010439]  do_init_module+0x277/0x750
[  134.012953]  load_module+0x5d1d/0x74f0
[  134.015406]  ? __pfx_load_module+0x10/0x10
[  134.017887]  ? __pfx_ima_post_read_file+0x10/0x10
[  134.020470]  ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp8+0x1c/0x30
[  134.023127]  ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4+0x1a/0x20
[  134.025767]  ? security_kernel_post_read_file+0xa2/0xd0
[  134.028429]  ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4+0x1a/0x20
[  134.031162]  ? kernel_read_file+0x503/0x820
[  134.033645]  ? __pfx_kernel_read_file+0x10/0x10
[  134.036232]  ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
[  134.038766]  init_module_from_file+0x12c/0x1a0
[  134.041291]  ? init_module_from_file+0x12c/0x1a0
[  134.043936]  ? __pfx_init_module_from_file+0x10/0x10
[  134.046516]  ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x21/0x30
[  134.049091]  ? __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20
[  134.051551]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x60/0x210
[  134.054077]  idempotent_init_module+0x3f1/0x690
[  134.056643]  ? __pfx_idempotent_init_module+0x10/0x10
[  134.059318]  ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4+0x1a/0x20
[  134.061995]  ? __fget_light+0x17d/0x210
[  134.064428]  __x64_sys_finit_module+0x10e/0x1a0
[  134.066976]  x64_sys_call+0x184d/0x20d0
[  134.069405]  do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140
[  134.071926]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

[[email protected]: add mutex_lock/unlock() pair back]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 823430c ("memory tier: consolidate the initialization of memory tiers")
Signed-off-by: Yanfei Xu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: "Huang, Ying" <[email protected]>
Cc: Ho-Ren (Jack) Chuang <[email protected]>
Cc: Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
frank-w pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 23, 2024
Andrii Nakryiko says:

====================
Harden and extend ELF build ID parsing logic

The goal of this patch set is to extend existing ELF build ID parsing logic,
currently mostly used by BPF subsystem, with support for working in sleepable
mode in which memory faults are allowed and can be relied upon to fetch
relevant parts of ELF file to find and fetch .note.gnu.build-id information.

This is useful and important for BPF subsystem itself, but also for
PROCMAP_QUERY ioctl(), built atop of /proc/<pid>/maps functionality (see [0]),
which makes use of the same build_id_parse() functionality. PROCMAP_QUERY is
always called from sleepable user process context, so it doesn't have to
suffer from current restrictions of build_id_parse() which are due to the NMI
context assumption.

Along the way, we harden the logic to avoid TOCTOU, overflow, out-of-bounds
access problems.  This is the very first patch, which can be backported to
older releases, if necessary.

We also lift existing limitations of only working as long as ELF program
headers and build ID note section is contained strictly within the very first
page of ELF file.

We achieve all of the above without duplication of logic between sleepable and
non-sleepable modes through freader abstraction that manages underlying folio
from page cache (on demand) and gives a simple to use direct memory access
interface. With that, single page restrictions and adding sleepable mode
support is rather straightforward.

We also extend existing set of BPF selftests with a few tests targeting build
ID logic across sleepable and non-sleepabe contexts (we utilize sleepable and
non-sleepable uprobes for that).

   [0] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]/

v6->v7:
  - added filemap_invalidate_{lock,unlock}_shared() around read_cache_folio
    and kept Eduard's Reviewed-by (Eduard);
v5->v6:
  - use local phnum variable in get_build_id_32() (Jann);
  - switch memcmp() instead of strcmp() in parse_build_id() (Jann);
v4->v5:
  - pass proper file reference to read_cache_folio() (Shakeel);
  - fix another potential overflow due to two u32 additions (Andi);
  - add PageUptodate() check to patch #1 (Jann);
v3->v4:
  - fix few more potential overflow and out-of-bounds access issues (Andi);
  - use purely folio-based implementation for freader (Matthew);
v2->v3:
  - remove unneeded READ_ONCE()s and force phoff to u64 for 32-bit mode (Andi);
  - moved hardening fixes to the front for easier backporting (Jann);
  - call freader_cleanup() from build_id_parse_buf() for consistency (Jiri);
v1->v2:
  - ensure MADV_PAGEOUT works reliably by paging data in first (Shakeel);
  - to fix BPF CI build optionally define MADV_POPULATE_READ in selftest.
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
frank-w pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 23, 2024
Zac Ecob reported a problem where a bpf program may cause kernel crash due
to the following error:
  Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI

The failure is due to the below signed divide:
  LLONG_MIN/-1 where LLONG_MIN equals to -9,223,372,036,854,775,808.
LLONG_MIN/-1 is supposed to give a positive number 9,223,372,036,854,775,808,
but it is impossible since for 64-bit system, the maximum positive
number is 9,223,372,036,854,775,807. On x86_64, LLONG_MIN/-1 will
cause a kernel exception. On arm64, the result for LLONG_MIN/-1 is
LLONG_MIN.

Further investigation found all the following sdiv/smod cases may trigger
an exception when bpf program is running on x86_64 platform:
  - LLONG_MIN/-1 for 64bit operation
  - INT_MIN/-1 for 32bit operation
  - LLONG_MIN%-1 for 64bit operation
  - INT_MIN%-1 for 32bit operation
where -1 can be an immediate or in a register.

On arm64, there are no exceptions:
  - LLONG_MIN/-1 = LLONG_MIN
  - INT_MIN/-1 = INT_MIN
  - LLONG_MIN%-1 = 0
  - INT_MIN%-1 = 0
where -1 can be an immediate or in a register.

Insn patching is needed to handle the above cases and the patched codes
produced results aligned with above arm64 result. The below are pseudo
codes to handle sdiv/smod exceptions including both divisor -1 and divisor 0
and the divisor is stored in a register.

sdiv:
      tmp = rX
      tmp += 1 /* [-1, 0] -> [0, 1]
      if tmp >(unsigned) 1 goto L2
      if tmp == 0 goto L1
      rY = 0
  L1:
      rY = -rY;
      goto L3
  L2:
      rY /= rX
  L3:

smod:
      tmp = rX
      tmp += 1 /* [-1, 0] -> [0, 1]
      if tmp >(unsigned) 1 goto L1
      if tmp == 1 (is64 ? goto L2 : goto L3)
      rY = 0;
      goto L2
  L1:
      rY %= rX
  L2:
      goto L4  // only when !is64
  L3:
      wY = wY  // only when !is64
  L4:

  [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/tPJLTEh7S_DxFEqAI2Ji5MBSoZVg7_G-Py2iaZpAaWtM961fFTWtsnlzwvTbzBzaUzwQAoNATXKUlt0LZOFgnDcIyKCswAnAGdUF3LBrhGQ=@protonmail.com/

Reported-by: Zac Ecob <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
frank-w pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 23, 2024
Hou Tao says:

====================
The tiny patch set aims to fix two problems found during the development
of supporting dynptr key in hash table. Patch #1 fixes the missed
btf_record_free() when map creation fails and patch #2 fixes the missed
kfree() when there is no special field in the passed btf.
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
frank-w pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 23, 2024
Patch series "mm: hwpoison: two more poison recovery".

One more CoW path to support poison recorvery in do_cow_fault(), and the
last copy_user_highpage() user is replaced to copy_mc_user_highpage() from
copy_present_page() during fork to support poison recorvery too.


This patch (of 2):

Like commit a873dfe ("mm, hwpoison: try to recover from copy-on
write faults"), there is another path which could crash because it does
not have recovery code where poison is consumed by the kernel in
do_cow_fault(), a crash calltrace shown below on old kernel, but it
could be happened in the lastest mainline code,

  CPU: 7 PID: 3248 Comm: mpi Kdump: loaded Tainted: G           OE     5.10.0 #1
  pc : copy_page+0xc/0xbc
  lr : copy_user_highpage+0x50/0x9c
  Call trace:
    copy_page+0xc/0xbc
    do_cow_fault+0x118/0x2bc
    do_fault+0x40/0x1a4
    handle_pte_fault+0x154/0x230
    __handle_mm_fault+0x1a8/0x38c
    handle_mm_fault+0xf0/0x250
    do_page_fault+0x184/0x454
    do_translation_fault+0xac/0xd4
    do_mem_abort+0x44/0xbc

Fix it by using copy_mc_user_highpage() to handle this case and return
VM_FAULT_HWPOISON for cow fault.

[[email protected]: unlock/put vmf->page, per Miaohe]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jane Chu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiaqi Yan <[email protected]>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]>
Cc: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
frank-w pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 30, 2024
Use a dedicated mutex to guard kvm_usage_count to fix a potential deadlock
on x86 due to a chain of locks and SRCU synchronizations.  Translating the
below lockdep splat, CPU1 #6 will wait on CPU0 #1, CPU0 #8 will wait on
CPU2 #3, and CPU2 #7 will wait on CPU1 #4 (if there's a writer, due to the
fairness of r/w semaphores).

    CPU0                     CPU1                     CPU2
1   lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
2                                                     lock(&vcpu->mutex);
3                                                     lock(&kvm->srcu);
4                            lock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
5                            lock(kvm_lock);
6                            lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
7                                                     lock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
8   sync(&kvm->srcu);

Note, there are likely more potential deadlocks in KVM x86, e.g. the same
pattern of taking cpu_hotplug_lock outside of kvm_lock likely exists with
__kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier():

  cpuhp_cpufreq_online()
  |
  -> cpufreq_online()
     |
     -> cpufreq_gov_performance_limits()
        |
        -> __cpufreq_driver_target()
           |
           -> __target_index()
              |
              -> cpufreq_freq_transition_begin()
                 |
                 -> cpufreq_notify_transition()
                    |
                    -> ... __kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier()

But, actually triggering such deadlocks is beyond rare due to the
combination of dependencies and timings involved.  E.g. the cpufreq
notifier is only used on older CPUs without a constant TSC, mucking with
the NX hugepage mitigation while VMs are running is very uncommon, and
doing so while also onlining/offlining a CPU (necessary to generate
contention on cpu_hotplug_lock) would be even more unusual.

The most robust solution to the general cpu_hotplug_lock issue is likely
to switch vm_list to be an RCU-protected list, e.g. so that x86's cpufreq
notifier doesn't to take kvm_lock.  For now, settle for fixing the most
blatant deadlock, as switching to an RCU-protected list is a much more
involved change, but add a comment in locking.rst to call out that care
needs to be taken when walking holding kvm_lock and walking vm_list.

  ======================================================
  WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  6.10.0-smp--c257535a0c9d-pip #330 Tainted: G S         O
  ------------------------------------------------------
  tee/35048 is trying to acquire lock:
  ff6a80eced71e0a8 (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: set_nx_huge_pages+0x179/0x1e0 [kvm]

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffffffffc07abb08 (kvm_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: set_nx_huge_pages+0x14a/0x1e0 [kvm]

  which lock already depends on the new lock.

   the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

  -> #3 (kvm_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
         __mutex_lock+0x6a/0xb40
         mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30
         kvm_dev_ioctl+0x4fb/0xe50 [kvm]
         __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0
         __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30
         x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60
         do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

  -> #2 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}:
         cpus_read_lock+0x2e/0xb0
         static_key_slow_inc+0x16/0x30
         kvm_lapic_set_base+0x6a/0x1c0 [kvm]
         kvm_set_apic_base+0x8f/0xe0 [kvm]
         kvm_set_msr_common+0x9ae/0xf80 [kvm]
         vmx_set_msr+0xa54/0xbe0 [kvm_intel]
         __kvm_set_msr+0xb6/0x1a0 [kvm]
         kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0xeca/0x10c0 [kvm]
         kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x485/0x5b0 [kvm]
         __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0
         __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30
         x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60
         do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

  -> #1 (&kvm->srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}:
         __synchronize_srcu+0x44/0x1a0
         synchronize_srcu_expedited+0x21/0x30
         kvm_swap_active_memslots+0x110/0x1c0 [kvm]
         kvm_set_memslot+0x360/0x620 [kvm]
         __kvm_set_memory_region+0x27b/0x300 [kvm]
         kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region+0x43/0x60 [kvm]
         kvm_vm_ioctl+0x295/0x650 [kvm]
         __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0
         __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30
         x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60
         do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

  -> #0 (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
         __lock_acquire+0x15ef/0x2e30
         lock_acquire+0xe0/0x260
         __mutex_lock+0x6a/0xb40
         mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30
         set_nx_huge_pages+0x179/0x1e0 [kvm]
         param_attr_store+0x93/0x100
         module_attr_store+0x22/0x40
         sysfs_kf_write+0x81/0xb0
         kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x133/0x1d0
         vfs_write+0x28d/0x380
         ksys_write+0x70/0xe0
         __x64_sys_write+0x1f/0x30
         x64_sys_call+0x281b/0x2e60
         do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Cc: Chao Gao <[email protected]>
Fixes: 0bf5049 ("KVM: Drop kvm_count_lock and instead protect kvm_usage_count with kvm_lock")
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Farrah Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
BtbN pushed a commit to BtbN/BPI-Router-Linux that referenced this pull request Oct 4, 2024
[ Upstream commit 47d40d9 ]

With the latest Linux-6.11-rc3, the below NULL pointer crash is observed
when SBI PMU snapshot is enabled for the guest and the guest is forcefully
powered-off.

  Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000508
  Oops [frank-w#1]
  Modules linked in: kvm
  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 61 Comm: term-poll Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-00018-g44d7178dd77a frank-w#3
  Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
  epc : __kvm_write_guest_page+0x94/0xa6 [kvm]
   ra : __kvm_write_guest_page+0x54/0xa6 [kvm]
  epc : ffffffff01590e98 ra : ffffffff01590e58 sp : ffff8f80001f39b0
   gp : ffffffff81512a60 tp : ffffaf80024872c0 t0 : ffffaf800247e000
   t1 : 00000000000007e0 t2 : 0000000000000000 s0 : ffff8f80001f39f0
   s1 : 00007fff89ac4000 a0 : ffffffff015dd7e8 a1 : 0000000000000086
   a2 : 0000000000000000 a3 : ffffaf8000000000 a4 : ffffaf80024882c0
   a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : ffffaf800328d780 a7 : 00000000000001cc
   s2 : ffffaf800197bd00 s3 : 00000000000828c4 s4 : ffffaf800248c000
   s5 : ffffaf800247d000 s6 : 0000000000001000 s7 : 0000000000001000
   s8 : 0000000000000000 s9 : 00007fff861fd500 s10: 0000000000000001
   s11: 0000000000800000 t3 : 00000000000004d3 t4 : 00000000000004d3
   t5 : ffffffff814126e0 t6 : ffffffff81412700
  status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: 0000000000000508 cause: 000000000000000d
  [<ffffffff01590e98>] __kvm_write_guest_page+0x94/0xa6 [kvm]
  [<ffffffff015943a6>] kvm_vcpu_write_guest+0x56/0x90 [kvm]
  [<ffffffff015a175c>] kvm_pmu_clear_snapshot_area+0x42/0x7e [kvm]
  [<ffffffff015a1972>] kvm_riscv_vcpu_pmu_deinit.part.0+0xe0/0x14e [kvm]
  [<ffffffff015a2ad0>] kvm_riscv_vcpu_pmu_deinit+0x1a/0x24 [kvm]
  [<ffffffff0159b344>] kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy+0x28/0x4c [kvm]
  [<ffffffff0158e420>] kvm_destroy_vcpus+0x5a/0xda [kvm]
  [<ffffffff0159930c>] kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x14/0x28 [kvm]
  [<ffffffff01593260>] kvm_destroy_vm+0x168/0x2a0 [kvm]
  [<ffffffff015933d4>] kvm_put_kvm+0x3c/0x58 [kvm]
  [<ffffffff01593412>] kvm_vm_release+0x22/0x2e [kvm]

Clearly, the kvm_vcpu_write_guest() function is crashing because it is
being called from kvm_pmu_clear_snapshot_area() upon guest tear down.

To address the above issue, simplify the kvm_pmu_clear_snapshot_area() to
not zero-out PMU snapshot area from kvm_pmu_clear_snapshot_area() because
the guest is anyway being tore down.

The kvm_pmu_clear_snapshot_area() is also called when guest changes
PMU snapshot area of a VCPU but even in this case the previous PMU
snaphsot area must not be zeroed-out because the guest might have
reclaimed the pervious PMU snapshot area for some other purpose.

Fixes: c2f41dd ("RISC-V: KVM: Implement SBI PMU Snapshot feature")
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
BtbN pushed a commit to BtbN/BPI-Router-Linux that referenced this pull request Oct 4, 2024
[ Upstream commit 89a906d ]

Floating point instructions in userspace can crash some arm kernels
built with clang/LLD 17.0.6:

    BUG: unsupported FP instruction in kernel mode
    FPEXC == 0xc0000780
    Internal error: Oops - undefined instruction: 0 [frank-w#1] ARM
    CPU: 0 PID: 196 Comm: vfp-reproducer Not tainted 6.10.0 frank-w#1
    Hardware name: BCM2835
    PC is at vfp_support_entry+0xc8/0x2cc
    LR is at do_undefinstr+0xa8/0x250
    pc : [<c0101d50>]    lr : [<c010a80c>]    psr: a0000013
    sp : dc8d1f68  ip : 60000013  fp : bedea19c
    r10: ec532b17  r9 : 00000010  r8 : 0044766c
    r7 : c0000780  r6 : ec532b17  r5 : c1c13800  r4 : dc8d1fb0
    r3 : c10072c4  r2 : c0101c88  r1 : ec532b17  r0 : 0044766c
    Flags: NzCv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment none
    Control: 00c5387d  Table: 0251c008  DAC: 00000051
    Register r0 information: non-paged memory
    Register r1 information: vmalloc memory
    Register r2 information: non-slab/vmalloc memory
    Register r3 information: non-slab/vmalloc memory
    Register r4 information: 2-page vmalloc region
    Register r5 information: slab kmalloc-cg-2k
    Register r6 information: vmalloc memory
    Register r7 information: non-slab/vmalloc memory
    Register r8 information: non-paged memory
    Register r9 information: zero-size pointer
    Register r10 information: vmalloc memory
    Register r11 information: non-paged memory
    Register r12 information: non-paged memory
    Process vfp-reproducer (pid: 196, stack limit = 0x61aaaf8b)
    Stack: (0xdc8d1f68 to 0xdc8d2000)
    1f60:                   0000081f b6f69300 0000000f c10073f4 c10072c4 dc8d1fb0
    1f80: ec532b17 0c532b17 0044766c b6f9ccd8 00000000 c010a80c 00447670 60000010
    1fa0: ffffffff c1c13800 00c5387d c0100f10 b6f68af8 00448fc0 00000000 bedea188
    1fc0: bedea314 00000001 00448ebc b6f9d000 00447608 b6f9ccd8 00000000 bedea19c
    1fe0: bede9198 bedea188 b6e1061c 0044766c 60000010 ffffffff 00000000 00000000
    Call trace:
    [<c0101d50>] (vfp_support_entry) from [<c010a80c>] (do_undefinstr+0xa8/0x250)
    [<c010a80c>] (do_undefinstr) from [<c0100f10>] (__und_usr+0x70/0x80)
    Exception stack(0xdc8d1fb0 to 0xdc8d1ff8)
    1fa0:                                     b6f68af8 00448fc0 00000000 bedea188
    1fc0: bedea314 00000001 00448ebc b6f9d000 00447608 b6f9ccd8 00000000 bedea19c
    1fe0: bede9198 bedea188 b6e1061c 0044766c 60000010 ffffffff
    Code: 0a000061 e3877202 e594003c e3a09010 (eef16a10)
    ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
    Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
    ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]---

This is a minimal userspace reproducer on a Raspberry Pi Zero W:

    #include <stdio.h>
    #include <math.h>

    int main(void)
    {
            double v = 1.0;
            printf("%fn", NAN + *(volatile double *)&v);
            return 0;
    }

Another way to consistently trigger the oops is:

    calvin@raspberry-pi-zero-w ~$ python -c "import json"

The bug reproduces only when the kernel is built with DYNAMIC_DEBUG=n,
because the pr_debug() calls act as barriers even when not activated.

This is the output from the same kernel source built with the same
compiler and DYNAMIC_DEBUG=y, where the userspace reproducer works as
expected:

    VFP: bounce: trigger ec532b17 fpexc c0000780
    VFP: emulate: INST=0xee377b06 SCR=0x00000000
    VFP: bounce: trigger eef1fa10 fpexc c0000780
    VFP: emulate: INST=0xeeb40b40 SCR=0x00000000
    VFP: raising exceptions 30000000

    calvin@raspberry-pi-zero-w ~$ ./vfp-reproducer
    nan

Crudely grepping for vmsr/vmrs instructions in the otherwise nearly
idential text for vfp_support_entry() makes the problem obvious:

    vmlinux.llvm.good [0xc0101cb8] <+48>:  vmrs   r7, fpexc
    vmlinux.llvm.good [0xc0101cd8] <+80>:  vmsr   fpexc, r0
    vmlinux.llvm.good [0xc0101d20] <+152>: vmsr   fpexc, r7
    vmlinux.llvm.good [0xc0101d38] <+176>: vmrs   r4, fpexc
    vmlinux.llvm.good [0xc0101d6c] <+228>: vmrs   r0, fpscr
    vmlinux.llvm.good [0xc0101dc4] <+316>: vmsr   fpexc, r0
    vmlinux.llvm.good [0xc0101dc8] <+320>: vmrs   r0, fpsid
    vmlinux.llvm.good [0xc0101dcc] <+324>: vmrs   r6, fpscr
    vmlinux.llvm.good [0xc0101e10] <+392>: vmrs   r10, fpinst
    vmlinux.llvm.good [0xc0101eb8] <+560>: vmrs   r10, fpinst2

    vmlinux.llvm.bad  [0xc0101cb8] <+48>:  vmrs   r7, fpexc
    vmlinux.llvm.bad  [0xc0101cd8] <+80>:  vmsr   fpexc, r0
    vmlinux.llvm.bad  [0xc0101d20] <+152>: vmsr   fpexc, r7
    vmlinux.llvm.bad  [0xc0101d30] <+168>: vmrs   r0, fpscr
    vmlinux.llvm.bad  [0xc0101d50] <+200>: vmrs   r6, fpscr  <== BOOM!
    vmlinux.llvm.bad  [0xc0101d6c] <+228>: vmsr   fpexc, r0
    vmlinux.llvm.bad  [0xc0101d70] <+232>: vmrs   r0, fpsid
    vmlinux.llvm.bad  [0xc0101da4] <+284>: vmrs   r10, fpinst
    vmlinux.llvm.bad  [0xc0101df8] <+368>: vmrs   r4, fpexc
    vmlinux.llvm.bad  [0xc0101e5c] <+468>: vmrs   r10, fpinst2

I think LLVM's reordering is valid as the code is currently written: the
compiler doesn't know the instructions have side effects in hardware.

Fix by using "asm volatile" in fmxr() and fmrx(), so they cannot be
reordered with respect to each other. The original compiler now produces
working kernels on my hardware with DYNAMIC_DEBUG=n.

This is the relevant piece of the diff of the vfp_support_entry() text,
from the original oopsing kernel to a working kernel with this patch:

         vmrs r0, fpscr
         tst r0, #4096
         bne 0xc0101d48
         tst r0, #458752
         beq 0xc0101ecc
         orr r7, r7, #536870912
         ldr r0, [r4, #0x3c]
         mov r9, frank-w#16
        -vmrs r6, fpscr
         orr r9, r9, #251658240
         add r0, r0, frank-w#4
         str r0, [r4, #0x3c]
         mvn r0, #159
         sub r0, r0, #-1207959552
         and r0, r7, r0
         vmsr fpexc, r0
         vmrs r0, fpsid
        +vmrs r6, fpscr
         and r0, r0, #983040
         cmp r0, #65536
         bne 0xc0101d88

Fixes: 4708fb0 ("ARM: vfp: Reimplement VFP exception entry in C code")
Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
BtbN pushed a commit to BtbN/BPI-Router-Linux that referenced this pull request Oct 4, 2024
[ Upstream commit 862bf7c ]

mt7915_band_config() sets band_idx = 1 on the main phy for mt7986
with MT7975_ONE_ADIE or MT7976_ONE_ADIE.

Commit 0335c03 ("wifi: mt76: fix race condition related to
checking tx queue fill status") introduced a dereference of the
phys array indirectly indexed by band_idx via wcid->phy_idx in
mt76_wcid_cleanup(). This caused the following Oops on affected
mt7986 devices:

 Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address 0000000000000024
 Mem abort info:
   ESR = 0x0000000096000005
   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
   SET = 0, FnV = 0
   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
   FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault
 Data abort info:
   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005
   CM = 0, WnR = 0
 user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000042545000
 [0000000000000024] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000
 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [frank-w#1] SMP
 Modules linked in: ... mt7915e mt76_connac_lib mt76 mac80211 cfg80211 ...
 CPU: 2 PID: 1631 Comm: hostapd Not tainted 5.15.150 #0
 Hardware name: ZyXEL EX5700 (Telenor) (DT)
 pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
 pc : mt76_wcid_cleanup+0x84/0x22c [mt76]
 lr : mt76_wcid_cleanup+0x64/0x22c [mt76]
 sp : ffffffc00a803700
 x29: ffffffc00a803700 x28: ffffff80008f7300 x27: ffffff80003f3c00
 x26: ffffff80000a7880 x25: ffffffc008c26e00 x24: 0000000000000001
 x23: ffffffc000a68114 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffffff8004172cc8
 x20: ffffffc00a803748 x19: ffffff8004152020 x18: 0000000000000000
 x17: 00000000000017c0 x16: ffffffc008ef5000 x15: 0000000000000be0
 x14: ffffff8004172e28 x13: ffffff8004172e28 x12: 0000000000000000
 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffffff8004172e30 x9 : ffffff8004172e28
 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : ffffff8004156020 x6 : 0000000000000000
 x5 : 0000000000000031 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000001
 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffffff80008f7300 x0 : 0000000000000024
 Call trace:
  mt76_wcid_cleanup+0x84/0x22c [mt76]
  __mt76_sta_remove+0x70/0xbc [mt76]
  mt76_sta_state+0x8c/0x1a4 [mt76]
  mt7915_eeprom_get_power_delta+0x11e4/0x23a0 [mt7915e]
  drv_sta_state+0x144/0x274 [mac80211]
  sta_info_move_state+0x1cc/0x2a4 [mac80211]
  sta_set_sinfo+0xaf8/0xc24 [mac80211]
  sta_info_destroy_addr_bss+0x4c/0x6c [mac80211]

  ieee80211_color_change_finish+0x1c08/0x1e70 [mac80211]
  cfg80211_check_station_change+0x1360/0x4710 [cfg80211]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xb4/0x110
  genl_rcv_msg+0xd0/0x1bc
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x58/0x120
  genl_rcv+0x34/0x50
  netlink_unicast+0x1f0/0x2ec
  netlink_sendmsg+0x198/0x3d0
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x1b0/0x210
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x80/0xf0
  __sys_sendmsg+0x44/0xa0
  __arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x20/0x30
  invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x4c/0xe0
  do_el0_svc+0x40/0xd0
  el0_svc+0x14/0x4c
  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x110
  el0t_64_sync+0x15c/0x160
 Code: d2800002 910092c0 52800023 f9800011 (885f7c01)
 ---[ end trace 7e42dd9a39ed2281 ]---

Fix by using mt76_dev_phy() which will map band_idx to the correct phy
for all hardware combinations.

Fixes: 0335c03 ("wifi: mt76: fix race condition related to checking tx queue fill status")
Link: openwrt/openwrt#14548
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
BtbN pushed a commit to BtbN/BPI-Router-Linux that referenced this pull request Oct 4, 2024
[ Upstream commit 04ccecf ]

Blamed commit accidentally removed a check for rt->rt6i_idev being NULL,
as spotted by syzbot:

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [frank-w#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 10998 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-00208-g625403177711 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024
 RIP: 0010:rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev net/ipv6/route.c:177 [inline]
 RIP: 0010:rt6_disable_ip+0x33e/0x7e0 net/ipv6/route.c:4914
Code: 41 80 3c 04 00 74 0a e8 90 d0 9b f7 48 8b 7c 24 08 48 8b 07 48 89 44 24 10 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 48 b9 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df <80> 3c 08 00 74 08 4c 89 f7 e8 64 d0 9b f7 48 8b 44 24 18 49 39 06
RSP: 0018:ffffc900047374e0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff1100fdf8f33 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff88807efc78c0
RBP: ffffc900047375d0 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: fffff520008e6e8c
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff520008e6e8c R12: 1ffff1100fdf8f18
R13: ffff88807efc7998 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88807efc7930
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b8900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020002a80 CR3: 0000000022f62000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
  addrconf_ifdown+0x15d/0x1bd0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3856
 addrconf_notify+0x3cb/0x1020
  notifier_call_chain+0x19f/0x3e0 kernel/notifier.c:93
  call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2032 [inline]
  call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2046 [inline]
  unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0xd81/0x1c40 net/core/dev.c:11352
  unregister_netdevice_many net/core/dev.c:11414 [inline]
  unregister_netdevice_queue+0x303/0x370 net/core/dev.c:11289
  unregister_netdevice include/linux/netdevice.h:3129 [inline]
  __tun_detach+0x6b9/0x1600 drivers/net/tun.c:685
  tun_detach drivers/net/tun.c:701 [inline]
  tun_chr_close+0x108/0x1b0 drivers/net/tun.c:3510
  __fput+0x24a/0x8a0 fs/file_table.c:422
  task_work_run+0x24f/0x310 kernel/task_work.c:228
  exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:40 [inline]
  do_exit+0xa2f/0x27f0 kernel/exit.c:882
  do_group_exit+0x207/0x2c0 kernel/exit.c:1031
  __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1042 [inline]
  __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1040 [inline]
  __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1040
  x64_sys_call+0x2634/0x2640 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:232
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f1acc77def9
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f1acc77decf.
RSP: 002b:00007ffeb26fa738 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f1acc77def9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000043
RBP: 00007f1acc7dd508 R08: 00007ffeb26f84d7 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: 00007ffeb26fa8e0
 </TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
 RIP: 0010:rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev net/ipv6/route.c:177 [inline]
 RIP: 0010:rt6_disable_ip+0x33e/0x7e0 net/ipv6/route.c:4914
Code: 41 80 3c 04 00 74 0a e8 90 d0 9b f7 48 8b 7c 24 08 48 8b 07 48 89 44 24 10 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 48 b9 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df <80> 3c 08 00 74 08 4c 89 f7 e8 64 d0 9b f7 48 8b 44 24 18 49 39 06
RSP: 0018:ffffc900047374e0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff1100fdf8f33 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff88807efc78c0
RBP: ffffc900047375d0 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: fffff520008e6e8c
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff520008e6e8c R12: 1ffff1100fdf8f18
R13: ffff88807efc7998 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88807efc7930
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b8900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020002a80 CR3: 0000000022f62000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400

Fixes: e332bc6 ("ipv6: Don't call with rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
BtbN pushed a commit to BtbN/BPI-Router-Linux that referenced this pull request Oct 4, 2024
[ Upstream commit 1a0bd28 ]

Case frank-w#1:
SQLite App		GC Thread		Kworker		Shrinker
- f2fs_ioc_start_atomic_write

- f2fs_ioc_commit_atomic_write
 - f2fs_commit_atomic_write
  - filemap_write_and_wait_range
  : write atomic_file's data to cow_inode
								echo 3 > drop_caches
								to drop atomic_file's
								cache.
			- f2fs_gc
			 - gc_data_segment
			  - move_data_page
			   - set_page_dirty

						- writepages
						 - f2fs_do_write_data_page
						 : overwrite atomic_file's data
						   to cow_inode
  - f2fs_down_write(&fi->i_gc_rwsem[WRITE])
  - __f2fs_commit_atomic_write
  - f2fs_up_write(&fi->i_gc_rwsem[WRITE])

Case frank-w#2:
SQLite App		GC Thread		Kworker
- f2fs_ioc_start_atomic_write

						- __writeback_single_inode
						 - do_writepages
						  - f2fs_write_cache_pages
						   - f2fs_write_single_data_page
						    - f2fs_do_write_data_page
						    : write atomic_file's data to cow_inode
			- f2fs_gc
			 - gc_data_segment
			  - move_data_page
			   - set_page_dirty

						- writepages
						 - f2fs_do_write_data_page
						 : overwrite atomic_file's data to cow_inode
- f2fs_ioc_commit_atomic_write

In above cases racing in between atomic_write and GC, previous
data in atomic_file may be overwrited to cow_file, result in
data corruption.

This patch introduces PAGE_PRIVATE_ATOMIC_WRITE bit flag in page.private,
and use it to indicate that there is last dirty data in atomic file,
and the data should be writebacked into cow_file, if the flag is not
tagged in page, we should never write data across files.

Fixes: 3db1de0 ("f2fs: change the current atomic write way")
Cc: Daeho Jeong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
BtbN pushed a commit to BtbN/BPI-Router-Linux that referenced this pull request Oct 4, 2024
[ Upstream commit 18ec12c ]

Inject fault while probing of-fpga-region, if kasprintf() fails in
module_add_driver(), the second sysfs_remove_link() in exit path will cause
null-ptr-deref as below because kernfs_name_hash() will call strlen() with
NULL driver_name.

Fix it by releasing resources based on the exit path sequence.

	 KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
	 Mem abort info:
	   ESR = 0x0000000096000005
	   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
	   SET = 0, FnV = 0
	   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
	   FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault
	 Data abort info:
	   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000
	   CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
	   GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
	 [dfffffc000000000] address between user and kernel address ranges
	 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [frank-w#1] PREEMPT SMP
	 Dumping ftrace buffer:
	    (ftrace buffer empty)
	 Modules linked in: of_fpga_region(+) fpga_region fpga_bridge cfg80211 rfkill 8021q garp mrp stp llc ipv6 [last unloaded: of_fpga_region]
	 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 2036 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.11.0-rc2-g6a0e38264012 #295
	 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
	 pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
	 pc : strlen+0x24/0xb0
	 lr : kernfs_name_hash+0x1c/0xc4
	 sp : ffffffc081f97380
	 x29: ffffffc081f97380 x28: ffffffc081f97b90 x27: ffffff80c821c2a0
	 x26: ffffffedac0be418 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffffff80c09d2000
	 x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000000
	 x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000001840
	 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 1ffffff8103f2e42
	 x14: 00000000f1f1f1f1 x13: 0000000000000004 x12: ffffffb01812d61d
	 x11: 1ffffff01812d61c x10: ffffffb01812d61c x9 : dfffffc000000000
	 x8 : 0000004fe7ed29e4 x7 : ffffff80c096b0e7 x6 : 0000000000000001
	 x5 : ffffff80c096b0e0 x4 : 1ffffffdb990efa2 x3 : 0000000000000000
	 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : dfffffc000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
	 Call trace:
	  strlen+0x24/0xb0
	  kernfs_name_hash+0x1c/0xc4
	  kernfs_find_ns+0x118/0x2e8
	  kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x80/0x100
	  sysfs_remove_link+0x74/0xa8
	  module_add_driver+0x278/0x394
	  bus_add_driver+0x1f0/0x43c
	  driver_register+0xf4/0x3c0
	  __platform_driver_register+0x60/0x88
	  of_fpga_region_init+0x20/0x1000 [of_fpga_region]
	  do_one_initcall+0x110/0x788
	  do_init_module+0x1dc/0x5c8
	  load_module+0x3c38/0x4cac
	  init_module_from_file+0xd4/0x128
	  idempotent_init_module+0x2cc/0x528
	  __arm64_sys_finit_module+0xac/0x100
	  invoke_syscall+0x6c/0x258
	  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x160/0x22c
	  do_el0_svc+0x44/0x5c
	  el0_svc+0x48/0xb8
	  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x13c/0x158
	  el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
	 Code: f2fbffe1 a90157f4 12000802 aa0003f5 (38e16861)
	 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
	 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception

Fixes: 85d2b0a ("module: don't ignore sysfs_create_link() failures")
Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
BtbN pushed a commit to BtbN/BPI-Router-Linux that referenced this pull request Oct 4, 2024
[ Upstream commit dc12502 ]

Certain error paths from mlx5_vdpa_dev_add() can end up releasing mr
resources which never got initialized in the first place.

This patch adds the missing check in mlx5_vdpa_destroy_mr_resources()
to block releasing non-initialized mr resources.

Reference trace:

  mlx5_core 0000:08:00.2: mlx5_vdpa_dev_add:3274:(pid 2700) warning: No mac address provisioned?
  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  PGD 140216067 P4D 0
  Oops: 0000 [frank-w#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 8 PID: 2700 Comm: vdpa Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0-496.el9.x86_64 frank-w#1
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:vhost_iotlb_del_range+0xf/0xe0 [vhost_iotlb]
  Code: [...]
  RSP: 0018:ff1c823ac23077f0 EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: ffffffffc1a21a60 RBX: ffffffff899567a0 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: ffffffffffffffff RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
  RBP: ff1bda1f7c21e800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ff1c823ac2307670
  R10: ff1c823ac2307668 R11: ffffffff8a9e7b68 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ff1bda1f43e341a0 R15: 00000000ffffffea
  FS:  00007f56eba7c740(0000) GS:ff1bda269f800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000104d90001 CR4: 0000000000771ef0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  PKRU: 55555554
  Call Trace:

   ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
   ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
   ? mlx5_vdpa_free+0x3d/0x150 [mlx5_vdpa]
   ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd
   ? page_fault_oops+0x134/0x170
   ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x2b/0xc0
   ? irq_work_queue+0x2c/0x50
   ? exc_page_fault+0x62/0x150
   ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
   ? __pfx_mlx5_vdpa_free+0x10/0x10 [mlx5_vdpa]
   ? vhost_iotlb_del_range+0xf/0xe0 [vhost_iotlb]
   mlx5_vdpa_free+0x3d/0x150 [mlx5_vdpa]
   vdpa_release_dev+0x1e/0x50 [vdpa]
   device_release+0x31/0x90
   kobject_cleanup+0x37/0x130
   mlx5_vdpa_dev_add+0x2d2/0x7a0 [mlx5_vdpa]
   vdpa_nl_cmd_dev_add_set_doit+0x277/0x4c0 [vdpa]
   genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd9/0x130
   genl_family_rcv_msg+0x14d/0x220
   ? __pfx_vdpa_nl_cmd_dev_add_set_doit+0x10/0x10 [vdpa]
   ? _copy_to_user+0x1a/0x30
   ? move_addr_to_user+0x4b/0xe0
   genl_rcv_msg+0x47/0xa0
   ? __import_iovec+0x46/0x150
   ? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
   netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100
   genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
   netlink_unicast+0x245/0x370
   netlink_sendmsg+0x206/0x440
   __sys_sendto+0x1dc/0x1f0
   ? do_read_fault+0x10c/0x1d0
   ? do_pte_missing+0x10d/0x190
   __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30
   do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xf0
   ? __count_memcg_events+0x4f/0xb0
   ? mm_account_fault+0x6c/0x100
   ? handle_mm_fault+0x116/0x270
   ? do_user_addr_fault+0x1d6/0x6a0
   ? do_syscall_64+0x6b/0xf0
   ? clear_bhb_loop+0x25/0x80
   ? clear_bhb_loop+0x25/0x80
   ? clear_bhb_loop+0x25/0x80
   ? clear_bhb_loop+0x25/0x80
   ? clear_bhb_loop+0x25/0x80
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80

Fixes: 512c0cd ("vdpa/mlx5: Decouple cvq iotlb handling from hw mapping code")
Signed-off-by: Dragos Tatulea <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Cosmin Ratiu <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Si-Wei Liu <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Shannon Nelson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
BtbN pushed a commit to BtbN/BPI-Router-Linux that referenced this pull request Oct 4, 2024
[ Upstream commit c8770db ]

We have some machines running stock Ubuntu 20.04.6 which is their 5.4.0-174-generic
kernel that are running ceph and recently hit a null ptr dereference in
tcp_rearm_rto(). Initially hitting it from the TLP path, but then later we also
saw it getting hit from the RACK case as well. Here are examples of the oops
messages we saw in each of those cases:

Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.780353] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.787572] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.792971] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.798362] PGD 0 P4D 0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.801164] Oops: 0000 [frank-w#1] SMP NOPTI
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.805091] CPU: 0 PID: 9180 Comm: msgr-worker-1 Tainted: G W 5.4.0-174-generic #193-Ubuntu
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.814996] Hardware name: Supermicro SMC 2x26 os-gen8 64C NVME-Y 256G/H12SSW-NTR, BIOS 2.5.V1.2U.NVMe.UEFI 05/09/2023
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.825952] RIP: 0010:tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.830656] Code: 87 ca 04 00 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d c3 c3 49 8b bc 24 40 06 00 00 eb 8d 48 bb cf f7 53 e3 a5 9b c4 20 4c 89 ef e8 0c fe 0e 00 <48> 8b 78 20 48 c1 ef 03 48 89 f8 41 8b bc 24 80 04 00 00 48 f7 e3
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.849665] RSP: 0018:ffffb75d40003e08 EFLAGS: 00010246
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.855149] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 20c49ba5e353f7cf RCX: 0000000000000000
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.862542] RDX: 0000000062177c30 RSI: 000000000000231c RDI: ffff9874ad283a60
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.869933] RBP: ffffb75d40003e20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff987605e20aa8
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.877318] R10: ffffb75d40003f00 R11: ffffb75d4460f740 R12: ffff9874ad283900
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.884710] R13: ffff9874ad283a60 R14: ffff9874ad283980 R15: ffff9874ad283d30
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.892095] FS: 00007f1ef4a2e700(0000) GS:ffff987605e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.900438] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.906435] CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000003e450ba003 CR4: 0000000000760ef0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.913822] PKRU: 55555554
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.916786] Call Trace:
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.919488]
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.921765] ? show_regs.cold+0x1a/0x1f
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.925859] ? __die+0x90/0xd9
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.929169] ? no_context+0x196/0x380
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.933088] ? ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x4e0/0x4e0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.938216] ? ip6_sublist_rcv_finish+0x3d/0x50
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.943000] ? __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x50/0x1a0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.947873] ? bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16/0x20
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.952486] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x267/0x450
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.957104] ? ipv6_list_rcv+0x112/0x140
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.961279] ? __do_page_fault+0x58/0x90
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.965458] ? do_page_fault+0x2c/0xe0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.969465] ? page_fault+0x34/0x40
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.973217] ? tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.977313] ? tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.981408] tcp_send_loss_probe+0x10b/0x220
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.985937] tcp_write_timer_handler+0x1b4/0x240
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.990809] tcp_write_timer+0x9e/0xe0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.994814] ? tcp_write_timer_handler+0x240/0x240
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.999866] call_timer_fn+0x32/0x130
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.003782] __run_timers.part.0+0x180/0x280
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.008309] ? recalibrate_cpu_khz+0x10/0x10
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.012841] ? native_x2apic_icr_write+0x30/0x30
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.017718] ? lapic_next_event+0x21/0x30
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.021984] ? clockevents_program_event+0x8f/0xe0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.027035] run_timer_softirq+0x2a/0x50
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.031212] __do_softirq+0xd1/0x2c1
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.035044] do_softirq_own_stack+0x2a/0x40
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.039480]
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.041840] do_softirq.part.0+0x46/0x50
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.046022] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x50/0x60
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.050460] _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x1e/0x20
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.054817] nf_conntrack_tcp_packet+0x29e/0xbe0 [nf_conntrack]
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.060994] ? get_l4proto+0xe7/0x190 [nf_conntrack]
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.066220] nf_conntrack_in+0xe9/0x670 [nf_conntrack]
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.071618] ipv6_conntrack_local+0x14/0x20 [nf_conntrack]
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.077356] nf_hook_slow+0x45/0xb0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.081098] ip6_xmit+0x3f0/0x5d0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.084670] ? ipv6_anycast_cleanup+0x50/0x50
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.089282] ? __sk_dst_check+0x38/0x70
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.093381] ? inet6_csk_route_socket+0x13b/0x200
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.098346] inet6_csk_xmit+0xa7/0xf0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.102263] __tcp_transmit_skb+0x550/0xb30
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.106701] tcp_write_xmit+0x3c6/0xc20
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.110792] ? __alloc_skb+0x98/0x1d0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.114708] __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x37/0x100
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.119667] tcp_push+0xfd/0x100
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.123150] tcp_sendmsg_locked+0xc70/0xdd0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.127588] tcp_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.131245] inet6_sendmsg+0x43/0x70
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.135075] __sock_sendmsg+0x48/0x70
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.138994] ____sys_sendmsg+0x212/0x280
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.143172] ___sys_sendmsg+0x88/0xd0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.147098] ? __seccomp_filter+0x7e/0x6b0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.151446] ? __switch_to+0x39c/0x460
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.155453] ? __switch_to_asm+0x42/0x80
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.159636] ? __switch_to_asm+0x5a/0x80
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.163816] __sys_sendmsg+0x5c/0xa0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.167647] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1f/0x30
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.171832] do_syscall_64+0x57/0x190
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.175748] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x5c/0xc1
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.181055] RIP: 0033:0x7f1ef692618d
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.184893] Code: 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 ca ee ff ff 8b 54 24 1c 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 2f 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 fe ee ff ff 48
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.203889] RSP: 002b:00007f1ef4a26aa0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.211708] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000084b RCX: 00007f1ef692618d
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.219091] RDX: 0000000000004000 RSI: 00007f1ef4a26b10 RDI: 0000000000000275
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.226475] RBP: 0000000000004000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000020
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.233859] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 000000000000084b
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.241243] R13: 00007f1ef4a26b10 R14: 0000000000000275 R15: 000055592030f1e8
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.248628] Modules linked in: vrf bridge stp llc vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel nls_iso8859_1 amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd kvm_amd kvm crct10dif_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper wmi_bmof ipmi_ssif input_leds joydev rndis_host cdc_ether usbnet mii ast drm_vram_helper ttm drm_kms_helper i2c_algo_bit fb_sys_fops syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt ccp mac_hid ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler nft_ct sch_fq_codel nf_tables_set nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables nfnetlink ramoops reed_solomon efi_pstore drm ip_tables x_tables autofs4 raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid0 multipath linear mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core raid1 mlx5_core hid_generic pci_hyperv_intf crc32_pclmul tls usbhid ahci mlxfw bnxt_en libahci hid nvme i2c_piix4 nvme_core wmi
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.324334] CR2: 0000000000000020
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.327944] ---[ end trace 68a2b679d1cfb4f1 ]---
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.433435] RIP: 0010:tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.438137] Code: 87 ca 04 00 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d c3 c3 49 8b bc 24 40 06 00 00 eb 8d 48 bb cf f7 53 e3 a5 9b c4 20 4c 89 ef e8 0c fe 0e 00 <48> 8b 78 20 48 c1 ef 03 48 89 f8 41 8b bc 24 80 04 00 00 48 f7 e3
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.457144] RSP: 0018:ffffb75d40003e08 EFLAGS: 00010246
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.462629] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 20c49ba5e353f7cf RCX: 0000000000000000
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.470012] RDX: 0000000062177c30 RSI: 000000000000231c RDI: ffff9874ad283a60
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.477396] RBP: ffffb75d40003e20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff987605e20aa8
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.484779] R10: ffffb75d40003f00 R11: ffffb75d4460f740 R12: ffff9874ad283900
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.492164] R13: ffff9874ad283a60 R14: ffff9874ad283980 R15: ffff9874ad283d30
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.499547] FS: 00007f1ef4a2e700(0000) GS:ffff987605e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.507886] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.513884] CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000003e450ba003 CR4: 0000000000760ef0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.521267] PKRU: 55555554
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.524230] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.530885] Kernel Offset: 0x1b200000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)
Jul 26 15:05:03 rx [11061396.660181] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal
 exception in interrupt ]---

After we hit this we disabled TLP by setting tcp_early_retrans to 0 and then hit the crash in the RACK case:

Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.265582] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.272719] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.278030] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.283343] PGD 0 P4D 0
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.286057] Oops: 0000 [frank-w#1] SMP NOPTI
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.289896] CPU: 5 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/5 Tainted: G W 5.4.0-174-generic #193-Ubuntu
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.299107] Hardware name: Supermicro SMC 2x26 os-gen8 64C NVME-Y 256G/H12SSW-NTR, BIOS 2.5.V1.2U.NVMe.UEFI 05/09/2023
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.309970] RIP: 0010:tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.314584] Code: 87 ca 04 00 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d c3 c3 49 8b bc 24 40 06 00 00 eb 8d 48 bb cf f7 53 e3 a5 9b c4 20 4c 89 ef e8 0c fe 0e 00 <48> 8b 78 20 48 c1 ef 03 48 89 f8 41 8b bc 24 80 04 00 00 48 f7 e3
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.333499] RSP: 0018:ffffb42600a50960 EFLAGS: 00010246
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.338895] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 20c49ba5e353f7cf RCX: 0000000000000000
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.346193] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff92d687ed8160
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.353489] RBP: ffffb42600a50978 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000cd896dcc
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.360786] R10: ffff92dc3404f400 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff92d687ed8000
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.368084] R13: ffff92d687ed8160 R14: 00000000cd896dcc R15: 00000000cd8fca81
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.375381] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff93158ad40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.383632] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.389544] CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000003e775ce006 CR4: 0000000000760ee0
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.396839] PKRU: 55555554
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.399717] Call Trace:
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.402335]
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.404525] ? show_regs.cold+0x1a/0x1f
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.408532] ? __die+0x90/0xd9
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.411760] ? no_context+0x196/0x380
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.415599] ? __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x50/0x1a0
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.420392] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x1e/0x30
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.424401] ? bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16/0x20
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.428927] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x267/0x450
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.433450] ? __do_page_fault+0x58/0x90
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.437542] ? do_page_fault+0x2c/0xe0
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.441470] ? page_fault+0x34/0x40
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.445134] ? tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.449145] tcp_ack+0xa32/0xb30
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.452542] tcp_rcv_established+0x13c/0x670
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.456981] ? sk_filter_trim_cap+0x48/0x220
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.461419] tcp_v6_do_rcv+0xdb/0x450
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.465257] tcp_v6_rcv+0xc2b/0xd10
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.468918] ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xd3/0x4e0
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.473706] ip6_input_finish+0x15/0x20
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.477710] ip6_input+0xa2/0xb0
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.481109] ? ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x4e0/0x4e0
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.486151] ip6_sublist_rcv_finish+0x3d/0x50
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.490679] ip6_sublist_rcv+0x1aa/0x250
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.494779] ? ip6_rcv_finish_core.isra.0+0xa0/0xa0
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.499828] ipv6_list_rcv+0x112/0x140
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.503748] __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x1a4/0x250
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.509057] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1a1/0x2b0
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.514538] gro_normal_list.part.0+0x1e/0x40
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.519068] napi_complete_done+0x91/0x130
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.523352] mlx5e_napi_poll+0x18e/0x610 [mlx5_core]
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.528481] net_rx_action+0x142/0x390
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.532398] __do_softirq+0xd1/0x2c1
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.536142] irq_exit+0xae/0xb0
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.539452] do_IRQ+0x5a/0xf0
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.542590] common_interrupt+0xf/0xf
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.546421]
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.548695] RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0xe/0x10
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.553399] Code: 7b ff ff ff eb bd 90 90 90 90 90 90 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 36 2c 50 00 f4 c3 66 90 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 26 2c 50 00 fb f4 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 55 41 54 53 e8 dd 5e 61 ff 65
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.572309] RSP: 0018:ffffb42600177e70 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffc2
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.580040] RAX: ffffffff8ed08b20 RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 0000000000000001
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.587337] RDX: 00000000f48eeca2 RSI: 0000000000000082 RDI: 0000000000000082
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.594635] RBP: ffffb42600177e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000020f
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.601931] R10: 0000000000100000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000005
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.609229] R13: ffff93157deb5f00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.616530] ? __cpuidle_text_start+0x8/0x8
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.620886] ? default_idle+0x20/0x140
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.624804] arch_cpu_idle+0x15/0x20
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.628545] default_idle_call+0x23/0x30
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.632640] do_idle+0x1fb/0x270
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.636035] cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x30
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.640126] start_secondary+0x178/0x1d0
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.644218] secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0
Aug 7 07:26:17 rx [1006006.648568] Modules linked in: vrf bridge stp llc vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel nls_iso8859_1 nft_ct amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd kvm_amd kvm crct10dif_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper wmi_bmof ipmi_ssif input_leds joydev rndis_host cdc_ether usbnet ast mii drm_vram_helper ttm drm_kms_helper i2c_algo_bit fb_sys_fops syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt ccp mac_hid ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler sch_fq_codel nf_tables_set nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables nfnetlink ramoops reed_solomon efi_pstore drm ip_tables x_tables autofs4 raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid0 multipath linear mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core raid1 hid_generic mlx5_core pci_hyperv_intf crc32_pclmul usbhid ahci tls mlxfw bnxt_en hid libahci nvme i2c_piix4 nvme_core wmi [last unloaded: cpuid]
Aug 7 07:26:17 rx [1006006.726180] CR2: 0000000000000020
Aug 7 07:26:17 rx [1006006.729718] ---[ end trace e0e2e37e4e612984 ]---

Prior to seeing the first crash and on other machines we also see the warning in
tcp_send_loss_probe() where packets_out is non-zero, but both transmit and retrans
queues are empty so we know the box is seeing some accounting issue in this area:

Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ------------[ cut here ]------------
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: invalid inflight: 2 state 1 cwnd 68 mss 8988
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: WARNING: CPU: 16 PID: 0 at net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2605 tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: Modules linked in: vrf bridge stp llc vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel nls_iso8859_1 nft_ct amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd kvm_amd kvm crct10dif_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper wmi_bmof ipmi_ssif joydev input_leds rndis_host cdc_ether usbnet mii ast drm_vram_helper ttm drm_kms_he>
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: CPU: 16 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/16 Not tainted 5.4.0-174-generic #193-Ubuntu
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: Hardware name: Supermicro SMC 2x26 os-gen8 64C NVME-Y 256G/H12SSW-NTR, BIOS 2.5.V1.2U.NVMe.UEFI 05/09/2023
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RIP: 0010:tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: Code: 08 26 01 00 75 e2 41 0f b6 54 24 12 41 8b 8c 24 c0 06 00 00 45 89 f0 48 c7 c7 e0 b4 20 a7 c6 05 8d 08 26 01 01 e8 4a c0 0f 00 <0f> 0b eb ba 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffb7838088ce00 EFLAGS: 00010286
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9b84b5630430 RCX: 0000000000000006
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000096 RDI: ffff9b8e4621c8c0
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RBP: ffffb7838088ce18 R08: 0000000000000927 R09: 0000000000000004
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff9b84b5630000
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000000231c R15: ffff9b84b5630430
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9b8e46200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: CR2: 000056238cec2380 CR3: 0000003e49ede005 CR4: 0000000000760ee0
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: PKRU: 55555554
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: Call Trace:
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: <IRQ>
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? show_regs.cold+0x1a/0x1f
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? __warn+0x98/0xe0
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? report_bug+0xd1/0x100
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? do_error_trap+0x9b/0xc0
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? do_invalid_op+0x3c/0x50
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? invalid_op+0x1e/0x30
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: tcp_write_timer_handler+0x1b4/0x240
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: tcp_write_timer+0x9e/0xe0
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_write_timer_handler+0x240/0x240
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: call_timer_fn+0x32/0x130
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: __run_timers.part.0+0x180/0x280
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? timerqueue_add+0x9b/0xb0
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? enqueue_hrtimer+0x3d/0x90
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? do_error_trap+0x9b/0xc0
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? do_invalid_op+0x3c/0x50
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? invalid_op+0x1e/0x30
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: tcp_write_timer_handler+0x1b4/0x240
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: tcp_write_timer+0x9e/0xe0
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_write_timer_handler+0x240/0x240
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: call_timer_fn+0x32/0x130
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: __run_timers.part.0+0x180/0x280
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? timerqueue_add+0x9b/0xb0
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? enqueue_hrtimer+0x3d/0x90
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? recalibrate_cpu_khz+0x10/0x10
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? ktime_get+0x3e/0xa0
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? native_x2apic_icr_write+0x30/0x30
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: run_timer_softirq+0x2a/0x50
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: __do_softirq+0xd1/0x2c1
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: irq_exit+0xae/0xb0
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x7b/0x140
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: </IRQ>
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0xe/0x10
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: Code: 7b ff ff ff eb bd 90 90 90 90 90 90 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 36 2c 50 00 f4 c3 66 90 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 26 2c 50 00 fb f4 <c3> 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 55 41 54 53 e8 dd 5e 61 ff 65
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffb783801cfe70 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RAX: ffffffffa6908b20 RBX: 0000000000000010 RCX: 0000000000000001
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RDX: 000000006fc0c97e RSI: 0000000000000082 RDI: 0000000000000082
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RBP: ffffb783801cfe90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000225
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: R10: 0000000000100000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000010
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: R13: ffff9b8e390b0000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? __cpuidle_text_start+0x8/0x8
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? default_idle+0x20/0x140
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: arch_cpu_idle+0x15/0x20
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: default_idle_call+0x23/0x30
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: do_idle+0x1fb/0x270
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x30
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: start_secondary+0x178/0x1d0
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ---[ end trace e7ac822987e33be1 ]---

The NULL ptr deref is coming from tcp_rto_delta_us() attempting to pull an skb
off the head of the retransmit queue and then dereferencing that skb to get the
skb_mstamp_ns value via tcp_skb_timestamp_us(skb).

The crash is the same one that was reported a # of years ago here:
https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/T/#t

and the kernel we're running has the fix which was added to resolve this issue.

Unfortunately we've been unsuccessful so far in reproducing this problem in the
lab and do not have the luxury of pushing out a new kernel to try and test if
newer kernels resolve this issue at the moment. I realize this is a report
against both an Ubuntu kernel and also an older 5.4 kernel. I have reported this
issue to Ubuntu here: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/2077657
however I feel like since this issue has possibly cropped up again it makes
sense to build in some protection in this path (even on the latest kernel
versions) since the code in question just blindly assumes there's a valid skb
without testing if it's NULL b/f it looks at the timestamp.

Given we have seen crashes in this path before and now this case it seems like
we should protect ourselves for when packets_out accounting is incorrect.
While we should fix that root cause we should also just make sure the skb
is not NULL before dereferencing it. Also add a warn once here to capture
some information if/when the problem case is hit again.

Fixes: e1a10ef ("tcp: introduce tcp_rto_delta_us() helper for xmit timer fix")
Signed-off-by: Josh Hunt <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
BtbN pushed a commit to BtbN/BPI-Router-Linux that referenced this pull request Oct 4, 2024
commit 44d1745 upstream.

Use a dedicated mutex to guard kvm_usage_count to fix a potential deadlock
on x86 due to a chain of locks and SRCU synchronizations.  Translating the
below lockdep splat, CPU1 frank-w#6 will wait on CPU0 frank-w#1, CPU0 frank-w#8 will wait on
CPU2 frank-w#3, and CPU2 frank-w#7 will wait on CPU1 frank-w#4 (if there's a writer, due to the
fairness of r/w semaphores).

    CPU0                     CPU1                     CPU2
1   lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
2                                                     lock(&vcpu->mutex);
3                                                     lock(&kvm->srcu);
4                            lock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
5                            lock(kvm_lock);
6                            lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
7                                                     lock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
8   sync(&kvm->srcu);

Note, there are likely more potential deadlocks in KVM x86, e.g. the same
pattern of taking cpu_hotplug_lock outside of kvm_lock likely exists with
__kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier():

  cpuhp_cpufreq_online()
  |
  -> cpufreq_online()
     |
     -> cpufreq_gov_performance_limits()
        |
        -> __cpufreq_driver_target()
           |
           -> __target_index()
              |
              -> cpufreq_freq_transition_begin()
                 |
                 -> cpufreq_notify_transition()
                    |
                    -> ... __kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier()

But, actually triggering such deadlocks is beyond rare due to the
combination of dependencies and timings involved.  E.g. the cpufreq
notifier is only used on older CPUs without a constant TSC, mucking with
the NX hugepage mitigation while VMs are running is very uncommon, and
doing so while also onlining/offlining a CPU (necessary to generate
contention on cpu_hotplug_lock) would be even more unusual.

The most robust solution to the general cpu_hotplug_lock issue is likely
to switch vm_list to be an RCU-protected list, e.g. so that x86's cpufreq
notifier doesn't to take kvm_lock.  For now, settle for fixing the most
blatant deadlock, as switching to an RCU-protected list is a much more
involved change, but add a comment in locking.rst to call out that care
needs to be taken when walking holding kvm_lock and walking vm_list.

  ======================================================
  WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  6.10.0-smp--c257535a0c9d-pip #330 Tainted: G S         O
  ------------------------------------------------------
  tee/35048 is trying to acquire lock:
  ff6a80eced71e0a8 (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: set_nx_huge_pages+0x179/0x1e0 [kvm]

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffffffffc07abb08 (kvm_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: set_nx_huge_pages+0x14a/0x1e0 [kvm]

  which lock already depends on the new lock.

   the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

  -> frank-w#3 (kvm_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
         __mutex_lock+0x6a/0xb40
         mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30
         kvm_dev_ioctl+0x4fb/0xe50 [kvm]
         __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0
         __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30
         x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60
         do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

  -> frank-w#2 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}:
         cpus_read_lock+0x2e/0xb0
         static_key_slow_inc+0x16/0x30
         kvm_lapic_set_base+0x6a/0x1c0 [kvm]
         kvm_set_apic_base+0x8f/0xe0 [kvm]
         kvm_set_msr_common+0x9ae/0xf80 [kvm]
         vmx_set_msr+0xa54/0xbe0 [kvm_intel]
         __kvm_set_msr+0xb6/0x1a0 [kvm]
         kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0xeca/0x10c0 [kvm]
         kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x485/0x5b0 [kvm]
         __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0
         __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30
         x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60
         do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

  -> frank-w#1 (&kvm->srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}:
         __synchronize_srcu+0x44/0x1a0
         synchronize_srcu_expedited+0x21/0x30
         kvm_swap_active_memslots+0x110/0x1c0 [kvm]
         kvm_set_memslot+0x360/0x620 [kvm]
         __kvm_set_memory_region+0x27b/0x300 [kvm]
         kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region+0x43/0x60 [kvm]
         kvm_vm_ioctl+0x295/0x650 [kvm]
         __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0
         __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30
         x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60
         do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

  -> #0 (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
         __lock_acquire+0x15ef/0x2e30
         lock_acquire+0xe0/0x260
         __mutex_lock+0x6a/0xb40
         mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30
         set_nx_huge_pages+0x179/0x1e0 [kvm]
         param_attr_store+0x93/0x100
         module_attr_store+0x22/0x40
         sysfs_kf_write+0x81/0xb0
         kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x133/0x1d0
         vfs_write+0x28d/0x380
         ksys_write+0x70/0xe0
         __x64_sys_write+0x1f/0x30
         x64_sys_call+0x281b/0x2e60
         do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Cc: Chao Gao <[email protected]>
Fixes: 0bf5049 ("KVM: Drop kvm_count_lock and instead protect kvm_usage_count with kvm_lock")
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Farrah Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
BtbN pushed a commit to BtbN/BPI-Router-Linux that referenced this pull request Oct 4, 2024
commit 8151a6c upstream.

[why]
Encounter NULL pointer dereference uner mst + dsc setup.

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
    PGD 0 P4D 0
    Oops: 0000 [frank-w#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
    CPU: 4 PID: 917 Comm: sway Not tainted 6.3.9-arch1-1 frank-w#1 124dc55df4f5272ccb409f39ef4872fc2b3376a2
    Hardware name: LENOVO 20NKS01Y00/20NKS01Y00, BIOS R12ET61W(1.31 ) 07/28/2022
    RIP: 0010:drm_dp_atomic_find_time_slots+0x5e/0x260 [drm_display_helper]
    Code: 01 00 00 48 8b 85 60 05 00 00 48 63 80 88 00 00 00 3b 43 28 0f 8d 2e 01 00 00 48 8b 53 30 48 8d 04 80 48 8d 04 c2 48 8b 40 18 <48> 8>
    RSP: 0018:ffff960cc2df77d8 EFLAGS: 00010293
    RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8afb87e81280 RCX: 0000000000000224
    RDX: ffff8afb9ee37c00 RSI: ffff8afb8da1a578 RDI: ffff8afb87e81280
    RBP: ffff8afb83d67000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8afb9652f850
    R10: ffff960cc2df7908 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: ffff8afb8d7688a0 R14: ffff8afb8da1a578 R15: 0000000000000224
    FS:  00007f4dac35ce00(0000) GS:ffff8afe30b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000010ddc6000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
    Call Trace:
<TASK>
     ? __die+0x23/0x70
     ? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4e0
     ? plist_add+0xbe/0x100
     ? exc_page_fault+0x7c/0x180
     ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
     ? drm_dp_atomic_find_time_slots+0x5e/0x260 [drm_display_helper 0e67723696438d8e02b741593dd50d80b44c2026]
     ? drm_dp_atomic_find_time_slots+0x28/0x260 [drm_display_helper 0e67723696438d8e02b741593dd50d80b44c2026]
     compute_mst_dsc_configs_for_link+0x2ff/0xa40 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054]
     ? fill_plane_buffer_attributes+0x419/0x510 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054]
     compute_mst_dsc_configs_for_state+0x1e1/0x250 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054]
     amdgpu_dm_atomic_check+0xecd/0x1190 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054]
     drm_atomic_check_only+0x5c5/0xa40
     drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x76e/0xbc0

[how]
dsc recompute should be skipped if no mode change detected on the new
request. If detected, keep checking whether the stream is already on
current state or not.

Cc: Mario Limonciello <[email protected]>
Cc: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Siqueira <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Fangzhi Zuo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Wayne Lin <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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