-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 32
New issue
Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.
By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.
Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account
EM patch 75.1 #73
base: main
Are you sure you want to change the base?
EM patch 75.1 #73
Conversation
Project_1tr 3.0
Project #2_tr
EM Project#3_tf
|
||
The first thing to note is that there is a great degree of ambiguity in how this expression ought to be interpreted, with interpreting being a pre-requisite for modeling it. (One could write a story or novel with this much ambiguity...) | ||
|
||
'Sally' could be a person, or a robot, or a computer program (or something else). When dealing with such ambiguous expressions in natural language, we should, I think, consider at least three levels of semantic determinacy (as well as their respective associated risks): (1) natural language writ-large, (2) ordinary-use language, and (3) common sense use. An example/definition of (1) is natural human language that is definable in relation to all forms of human language, so this level entails the most inherent ambiguity and interpretative risks. With the main risk here being that we'll be told the expression means something else than we thought. |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
Liking what I'm reading so far...
|
||
Ordinarily, that would seem fine. We could put aside whether Tuesday and Wednesday are references to days of the week, but even in ordinary uses of languages Tuesday and Wednesday could be proper names. (Think, e.g., Wednesday Addams. Maybe she has a cousin named Tuesday...?) Tuesday and Wednesday could also be the names of Sally's dogs. Under an open-world assumption, none of this possibilities could be ruled out right away. The dog names possibility, however, doesn't quite work without the preposition 'on.' So, we are back to Sally having an arm on one day, but not on the other. (Notice, interestingly, that the preposition 'on' could be in this expression even if we are referring to days of the week, but isn't.) Back to the logical ambiguity at play in the expression, one may note that Sally could be a person that only has one arm; the cause doesn't much matter. It would be true that Sally is an one-arm person in both instances asserted in the expression: Sally would have an arm on Tuesday, because Sally doesn't have two arms; and, by the same logic, it would be true that Sally does not have an arm on Wednesday if she only has one arm (and doesn't have two arms), because the expression is referring to the arm that Sally is missing on Wednesday, and referring to the arm that she is not missing on Tuesday. | ||
|
||
Even with ordinary language use, there is still another ambiguity inherent in the expression. Namely, how one goes about defining 'has.' There are at least three relevant layers of meaning possible here. Sally the arms-dealer *has* arms that she sells for profit. Sally the person who is missing an arm *has* one arm that came attached with her phsyical body. This same Sally might have a prosthetic arm that she puts on and takes off at will, so perhaps the expression could be interpreted to be referring to her taking on the prosthetic arm from one day to the next. (She could also be missing both arms, and the expression refers to the one prosthetic arm she got from her insurance.) She would still own the prosthetic arm, but not 'have' it with her or on her, when she takes the arm off, on Wednesdays, for whatever reason. Sally could also be a mannequin at the local retail store... (again, one could write a novel with so much ambiguity...) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
Very extensive, enjoyable read :)
|
||
(d) An organization may have no members as part. | ||
|
||
True and False. Again, this answer hinges on how on defines 'organization.' The 'perspectivalism' we read about a few weeks back seems to be useful here. So, for example, take the debate team of a college. The debate team is an organization. If (a) one defines organization relative to the entity being recognized by another entity/organization for its role, the debate club will exist even if it has no members as part provided that it continues to be recognized by the college according to its role. If, however, (b) one defines organization relative to the performance of some activity then it might make sense to view the debate team as an object aggregate, then without members as part the debate team there would be no activity performed, for it would have no performers, and therefore the object aggregate would not exist. So, according to (a) the debate team, grounded in institutional recognition of its role, may exist even while having no members as part. The answer according to (a) is, therefore, true. According to (b), however, the answer is false. If the debate club is viewed as an object aggregate because as object aggregate is the sum of its parts, it loses its necessary parts to being an object aggregate by virtue of having no members as pars. |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
Strictly, we allow for organizations to have no members assuming they at some point had members. Nevertheless, excellent conceptual analysis.
Dear Professor Beverley, I've addressed your comments and made some edits. Thanks very much for your feedback! Best, |
No description provided.