Decentralization: Using Pledge as a Bidding Param

Dear Community,

It is a pleasure to have this chance to contribute to the Cardano ecosystem, and I am glad that this chance is open for everyone even to contributors like I am who is not a developer by profession. I do have a terminal degree in the sciences, so I can understand quite a bit of mathematics (this CIP is somewhat mathematically oriented). I must reveal that I am using a pseudonym as I am still not sure at this point what I am getting into. Here, I proposed a CIP that will hopefully address the steadily increasing stake centralization in the Cardano ecosystem. I am also aware that there is another proposed CIP by Casey Gibson (cardano-foundation#163) which is similar to mine. I discussed the differences of these two proposals in the Rational section of my CIP. Finally, I gave a very simple scenario below that may help orient the reader as to what the CIP is trying to achieve. 

Alice, Bob, and Charlie are pool operators, and each is entitled to 3 saturation limits (SL). However, they need to make a pledge to get any SL in a 1:1 ratio. The ecosystem has a total of 9 ADA in circulation, and the proposed CIP requires that the “total SL is always equal to ADA in circulation” regardless of pools’ pledge status.

Scenario:
a. Alice pledged 3, Bob 3, Charlie 3 (ecosystem is in equilibrium, total SL = ADA in circulation). Since all SL were claimed and no one is under-pledged, additional pledges from Alice, Bob, and Charlie will no longer allow them to gain any more SL nor will it decrease their current SL.
b. Alice withdrew 1 pledge due to an unforeseen circumstance, and this makes the ecosystem under-pledged (Alice has 2 SL, Bob 3, and Charlie 3). The proposal always require that “total SL = ADA in circulation”, so the unclaimed SL must be redistributed. The redistribution uses pool accumulated time as the parameter instead of pledge so as not to disadvantage Alice even more by having the lowest pledge. Assuming they all started at the same time as pool operators, Alice, Bob, and Charlie deserve equal proportion to the unclaimed SL, and each will receive 0.33 SL. So, Alice has 2.33 SL, Bob 3.33 and Charlie 3.33. “total SL = ADA in circulation” is re-stablished.
c. Eventhough, Alice’s unclaimed SL was re-distributed, it can still be claimed by anybody. So, Bob decided to pledge 1. Alice now has 2 SL, Bob 4 and Charlie 3. Since all SL were claimed but only Alice is under-pledged, only Alice can pledge at this point. Additional pledges from Bob and Charlie will no longer allow them to gain any more SL nor will it decrease their current SL
d. Alice decided to pledge 1 to reclaim her SL. Now, Alice has 3 SL, Bob 3, and Charlie 3. Since all SL were claimed and no one is under-pledged, additional pledges from Alice, Bob, and Charlie will no longer allow them to gain any more SL nor will it decrease their current SL.
e. Under the new proposal, the only way any one of them can take away SL from the other pools is to set up more pools. However, one will need to pay a pledge to take away only a tiny fraction of SL, which makes this strategy unrewarding.

To illustrate scenario (e) even better, a current MPO that has 60 pools and controls 2.8B ADA in stake without any pledge must now pledge 12.8M and set up 282 pools to retain all 2.8B ADA in stake under the proposed CIP.