Fix code scanning alert no. 8: Uncontrolled data used in path expression #15
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Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: gitworkflows <[email protected]>
Reviewer's Guide by SourceryThis pull request addresses a code scanning alert related to uncontrolled data used in path expressions. The implementation focuses on improving the security of file path handling in the server.js file, specifically for serving .yml files. Sequence diagram for serving .yml files with path validationsequenceDiagram
actor User
participant Server
User->>Server: Request .yml file
Server->>Server: Extract ymlFile from request path
Server->>Server: Resolve userDataDir
Server->>Server: Resolve resolvedPath
alt Path is within userDataDir
Server->>User: Send file
else Path is outside userDataDir
Server->>User: Return 403 Forbidden
end
File-Level Changes
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WalkthroughThe changes in this pull request focus on enhancing the security of Changes
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Hey @gitworkflows - I've reviewed your changes and they look great!
Here's what I looked at during the review
- 🟡 General issues: 1 issue found
- 🟡 Security: 1 issue found
- 🟢 Testing: all looks good
- 🟢 Complexity: all looks good
- 🟢 Documentation: all looks good
Help me be more useful! Please click 👍 or 👎 on each comment and I'll use the feedback to improve your reviews.
| // Middleware to serve any .yml files in USER_DATA_DIR with optional protection | ||
| .get('/*.yml', protectConfig, (req, res) => { | ||
| const ymlFile = req.path.split('/').pop(); | ||
| res.sendFile(path.join(__dirname, process.env.USER_DATA_DIR || 'user-data', ymlFile)); | ||
| const userDataDir = path.resolve(__dirname, process.env.USER_DATA_DIR || 'user-data'); |
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suggestion: Extract repeated USER_DATA_DIR logic into a constant
The process.env.USER_DATA_DIR || 'user-data' logic is used in multiple places. Consider extracting this into a constant at the top of the file to improve maintainability and ensure consistency.
const USER_DATA_DIR = path.resolve(__dirname, process.env.USER_DATA_DIR || 'user-data');
// Later in the code:
const userDataDir = USER_DATA_DIR;
| const userDataDir = path.resolve(__dirname, process.env.USER_DATA_DIR || 'user-data'); | ||
| const resolvedPath = path.resolve(userDataDir, ymlFile); | ||
| if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(userDataDir)) { | ||
| res.status(403).send('Forbidden'); |
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🚨 suggestion (security): Enhance error handling with logging for security monitoring
While sending a 403 status is appropriate, consider adding logging for these access attempts. This can help with security monitoring and detecting potential attacks.
const logger = require('./logger'); // Assume a logger is set up
logger.warn(`Forbidden access attempt: ${resolvedPath}`);
res.status(403).send('Forbidden');
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Actionable comments posted: 3
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (1)
server.js (1)
204-209: Approve path traversal protection with suggestions for enhancementThe implementation correctly prevents path traversal attacks by resolving paths and checking directory boundaries. However, consider these enhancements:
- Normalize paths first to handle
.and..- Add logging for security monitoring
- Use more specific error messages
Apply these improvements:
const userDataDir = path.resolve(__dirname, process.env.USER_DATA_DIR || 'user-data'); -const resolvedPath = path.resolve(userDataDir, ymlFile); +const normalizedFile = path.normalize(ymlFile); +const resolvedPath = path.resolve(userDataDir, normalizedFile); if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(userDataDir)) { - res.status(403).send('Forbidden'); + console.warn(`[Security] Path traversal attempt blocked for: ${ymlFile}`); + res.status(403).send('Access denied: Invalid path'); return; }
| @@ -199,10 +199,16 @@ | |||
| } | |||
| }) | |||
| // Middleware to serve any .yml files in USER_DATA_DIR with optional protection | |||
| .get('/*.yml', protectConfig, (req, res) => { | |||
| const ymlFile = req.path.split('/').pop(); | |||
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Enhance input validation for yml file paths
The current implementation extracts the filename without proper sanitization, which could potentially allow malicious filenames. Consider adding these security measures:
- Validate file extension
- Sanitize filename
- Check for null/undefined values
Apply this improvement:
-const ymlFile = req.path.split('/').pop();
+const ymlFile = req.path.split('/').pop();
+if (!ymlFile || !ymlFile.endsWith('.yml')) {
+ return res.status(400).send('Invalid file type');
+}
+// Sanitize: Remove any characters that aren't alphanumeric, dash, underscore or dot
+const sanitizedFile = ymlFile.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9\-_.]/g, '');
+if (sanitizedFile !== ymlFile) {
+ return res.status(400).send('Invalid filename');
+}📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| const ymlFile = req.path.split('/').pop(); | |
| const ymlFile = req.path.split('/').pop(); | |
| if (!ymlFile || !ymlFile.endsWith('.yml')) { | |
| return res.status(400).send('Invalid file type'); | |
| } | |
| // Sanitize: Remove any characters that aren't alphanumeric, dash, underscore or dot | |
| const sanitizedFile = ymlFile.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9\-_.]/g, ''); | |
| if (sanitizedFile !== ymlFile) { | |
| return res.status(400).send('Invalid filename'); | |
| } |
| res.status(403).send('Forbidden'); | ||
| return; | ||
| } | ||
| res.sendFile(resolvedPath); |
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Add error handling and security controls for file sending
The current implementation lacks error handling and additional security controls for file sending.
Apply these security improvements:
-res.sendFile(resolvedPath);
+res.sendFile(resolvedPath, {
+ headers: {
+ 'Content-Type': 'application/x-yaml',
+ 'X-Content-Type-Options': 'nosniff'
+ },
+ maxAge: '1h',
+ lastModified: true
+}, (err) => {
+ if (err) {
+ console.error(`[Error] Failed to send file ${ymlFile}:`, err);
+ if (err.code === 'ENOENT') {
+ res.status(404).send('File not found');
+ } else {
+ res.status(500).send('Internal server error');
+ }
+ }
+});📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| res.sendFile(resolvedPath); | |
| res.sendFile(resolvedPath, { | |
| headers: { | |
| 'Content-Type': 'application/x-yaml', | |
| 'X-Content-Type-Options': 'nosniff' | |
| }, | |
| maxAge: '1h', | |
| lastModified: true | |
| }, (err) => { | |
| if (err) { | |
| console.error(`[Error] Failed to send file ${ymlFile}:`, err); | |
| if (err.code === 'ENOENT') { | |
| res.status(404).send('File not found'); | |
| } else { | |
| res.status(500).send('Internal server error'); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| }); |
| const userDataDir = path.resolve(__dirname, process.env.USER_DATA_DIR || 'user-data'); | ||
| const resolvedPath = path.resolve(userDataDir, ymlFile); | ||
| if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(userDataDir)) { | ||
| res.status(403).send('Forbidden'); | ||
| return; | ||
| } | ||
| res.sendFile(resolvedPath); |
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💡 Codebase verification
Based on the analysis of the results, I can now provide a final response:
Path traversal protection needed for static file serving middleware
The codebase has multiple file access patterns that require attention:
- The reviewed endpoint correctly implements path traversal protection using
startsWithcheck - However, there are three
express.staticmiddleware configurations in server.js (lines 213-215) serving files from:user-datadirectorydistdirectorypublicdirectory
- These static middleware configurations don't have explicit path traversal protection, relying solely on Express's built-in security
Other file operations in the codebase are either:
- Reading configuration files using absolute paths (services/ssl-server.js, services/config-validator.js)
- Writing to specific configuration files (services/save-config.js)
- Serving the index.html fallback (server.js line 219)
🔗 Analysis chain
Verify similar file handling patterns across the codebase
Let's verify if there are other endpoints that might need similar path traversal protection.
Let me analyze the findings and generate additional verification scripts to better understand the file access patterns and security measures.
This will help us understand:
- The context around file operations to see if they have proper security checks
- The configuration of static file serving middleware
- Other route handlers that might be serving files
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Find other potential file access patterns that might need similar protection
# Look for file system operations
echo "Searching for file system operations..."
rg -n "(?:readFile|writeFile|readdir|sendFile|createReadStream)" --type js
# Look for path manipulation
echo "\nSearching for path manipulation..."
rg -n "(?:path\.join|path\.resolve|req\.path)" --type js
# Look for static file serving
echo "\nSearching for static file serving..."
rg -n "(?:express\.static|res\.sendFile)" --type js
Length of output: 2413
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's examine the context around file operations to understand security measures
# Check file access patterns in server.js
echo "Examining server.js file operations context..."
rg -B 5 -A 5 "(?:readFile|writeFile|sendFile)" server.js
# Check static file serving middleware setup
echo "\nExamining static file serving setup..."
rg -B 3 -A 3 "express\.static" server.js
# Check if there are any other routes handling files
echo "\nChecking for route handlers with file operations..."
ast-grep --pattern 'app.$_($_, function ($_, $_) {
$$$
res.sendFile($_);
$$$
}'
Length of output: 2105
User description
Fixes https://github.com/khulnasoft/shipyard/security/code-scanning/8
To fix the problem, we need to ensure that the constructed file path is contained within a safe root directory. This can be achieved by normalizing the path using
path.resolveand then checking that the normalized path starts with the root directory. If the path is not within the root directory, we should return a 403 Forbidden response.ymlFilepath usingpath.resolve.Suggested fixes powered by Copilot Autofix. Review carefully before merging.
Summary by Sourcery
Bug Fixes:
PR Type
Bug fix
Description
Changes walkthrough 📝
server.js
Secure file path resolution to prevent uncontrolled data usageserver.js
ymlFilepath usingpath.resolve.directory.
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
.ymlfiles by implementing checks to prevent unauthorized file access outside the designated user data directory.Bug Fixes