Adding button press flag and organizing jd2 code #1

fdmendez · 2016-01-07T01:53:22Z

T100 device has not support for button press from headset
a flag is added to avoid trying to enable unsupported gpios
and avoid some initializing errors.

When jack detection 2 pin is used (T100) some registers needs
to be configured. This code has been changed to a function
to clean up it a little.

MICBIAS1 has been fixed from lowercase

Signed-off-by: Francisco Mendez [email protected]

T100 device has not support for button press from headset a flag is added to avoid trying to enable unsupported gpios and avoid some initializing errors. When jack detection 2 pin is used (T100) some registers needs to be configured. This code has been changed to a function to clean up it a little. MICBIAS1 has been fixed from lowercase Signed-off-by: Francisco Mendez <[email protected]>

the current interrupt functions are a little weird, because int1 is used sometimes for jack detection but other for bp. This definitions has been changed and now there are only 2 interruptions functions, only for jack always and the other for but as well. INT1 and INT2 flags have been removed and all the logic is only using MICBIAS or CODEC button press flags. Signed-off-by: Francisco Mendez <[email protected]>

In this atomic age, we can't trust the plane->fb pointer anymore. It might get update too late. Instead we are supposed to use the plane_state->fb pointer instead. Let's do that in intel_plane_obj_offset() and avoid problems from dereferencing the potentially stale plane->fb pointer. Paulo found this with 'kms_frontbuffer_tracking --show-hidden --run-subtest nop-1p-rte' but it can be reproduced with just plain old kms_setplane. I was too lazy to bisect this, so not sure exactly when it broke. The most obvious candidate commit ce7f172 ("drm/i915: Fix i915_ggtt_view_equal to handle rotation correctly") was actually still fine, so it must have broken some time after that. Here's the resulting fireworks: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [<ffffffffa02d2d9a>] intel_fill_fb_ggtt_view+0x1b/0x15a [i915] PGD 8a5f6067 PUD 8a5f5067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm intel_gtt agpgart netconsole mousedev hid_generic psmouse usbhid atkbd libps2 coretemp hwmon efi_pstore intel_rapl iosf_mbi x86_pkg_temp_thermal efivars pcspkr e1000e sdhci_pci ptp pps_core sdhci i2c_i801 mmc_core i2c_hid hid i8042 serio evdev sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables ipv6 autofs4 CPU: 1 PID: 260 Comm: kms_plane Not tainted 4.4.0-skl+ torvalds#171 Hardware name: Intel Corporation Skylake Client platform/Skylake Y LPDDR3 RVP3, BIOS SKLSE2R1.R00.B104.B00.1511030553 11/03/2015 task: ffff88008bde2d80 ti: ffff88008a6ec000 task.ti: ffff88008a6ec000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa02d2d9a>] [<ffffffffa02d2d9a>] intel_fill_fb_ggtt_view+0x1b/0x15a [i915] RSP: 0018:ffff88008a6efa10 EFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff8801674f4240 RCX: 0000000000000014 RDX: ffff88008a7440c0 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88008a6efa40 RBP: ffff88008a6efa30 R08: ffff88008bde3598 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffff88008b782000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff88008a7440c0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88008a7449c0 FS: 00007fa0c07a28c0(0000) GS:ffff88016ec40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000008a6ff000 CR4: 00000000003406e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Stack: ffff8801674f4240 0000000000000000 ffff88008a7440c0 0000000000000000 ffff88008a6efaa0 ffffffffa02daf25 ffffffff814ec80e 0000000000070298 ffff8800850d0000 ffff88008a6efaa0 ffffffffa02c49c2 0000000000000002 Call Trace: [<ffffffffa02daf25>] intel_plane_obj_offset+0x2d/0xa9 [i915] [<ffffffff814ec80e>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4b/0x60 [<ffffffffa02c49c2>] ? gen9_write32+0x2e8/0x3b8 [i915] [<ffffffffa02eecfc>] skl_update_plane+0x203/0x4c5 [i915] [<ffffffffa02ca1ab>] intel_plane_atomic_update+0x53/0x6a [i915] [<ffffffffa02494a4>] drm_atomic_helper_commit_planes_on_crtc+0x142/0x1d5 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa02de44b>] intel_atomic_commit+0x1262/0x1350 [i915] [<ffffffffa024a0ee>] ? __drm_atomic_helper_crtc_duplicate_state+0x2f/0x41 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa01ef089>] ? drm_atomic_check_only+0x3e3/0x552 [drm] [<ffffffffa01ef245>] drm_atomic_commit+0x4d/0x52 [drm] [<ffffffffa024996b>] drm_atomic_helper_update_plane+0xcb/0x118 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa01e42e8>] __setplane_internal+0x1c8/0x224 [drm] [<ffffffffa01e477f>] drm_mode_setplane+0x14e/0x172 [drm] [<ffffffffa01d8117>] drm_ioctl+0x265/0x3ad [drm] [<ffffffffa01e4631>] ? drm_mode_cursor_common+0x158/0x158 [drm] [<ffffffff810d00ab>] ? current_kernel_time64+0x5e/0x98 [<ffffffff810a76ea>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x17a/0x196 [<ffffffff8119880f>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x42b/0x4ea [<ffffffff811a2b72>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x71 [<ffffffff81198911>] SyS_ioctl+0x43/0x61 [<ffffffff814ed057>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f Cc: [email protected] Cc: Paulo Zanoni <[email protected]> Testcase: igt/kms_plane Reported-by: Paulo Zanoni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]> Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>

This reverts commit 1803c03. It seems to blow up on module unload due to a use-after free hitting a BUG_ON with CONFIG_DEBUG_SG. Quoting from Tvrtko's mail: "I've decoded the instructions and it pointed to SG_MAGIC checking: 488b8098010000 mov 0x198(%rax),%rax ba21436587 mov $0x87654321,%edx 488b00 mov (%rax),%rax *** CRASH "Grep showed 0x87654321 is SG_MAGIC, so likely candidate for this code pattern is: static inline struct page *sg_page(struct scatterlist *sg) { BUG_ON(sg->sg_magic != SG_MAGIC); BUG_ON(sg_is_chain(sg)); return (struct page *)((sg)->page_link & ~0x3); } "Which would mean the offender is in intel_logical_ring_cleanup is most likely: ... if (ring->status_page.obj) { kunmap(sg_page(ring->status_page.obj->pages->sgl)); ring->status_page.obj = NULL; } ... "I think that the i915_gem_context_fini will do a final unref on dev_priv->kernel_context and then the ring buff has a copy which is left dangling because: lrc_setup_hardware_status_page(ring, dev_priv->kernel_context->engine[ring->id].state); and: ring->status_page.obj = default_ctx_obj; "Where default_ctx_obj == dev_priv->kernel_context->engine[ring->id].state So indeed looks like the unload ordering is the trigger. In fact it is almost the same fragility wrt/ kernel_context hidden dependency I expressed my worry about in an e-mail yesterday or so. It only shows if CONFIG_DEBUG_SG is set, otherwise it accesses freed memory and probably just survives." This causes serious trouble in our CI system since it took out all gen8+ machines. Not yet clear why this wasn't caught in pre-merge testing. Backtrace from CI, for posterity: [ 163.737836] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 163.737849] Modules linked in: ax88179_178a usbnet mii snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic i915(-) x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm mei_me mei i2c_hid e1000e ptp pps_core [last unloaded: snd_hda_intel] [ 163.737902] CPU: 0 PID: 5812 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G U W 4.5.0-rc1-gfxbench+ #1 [ 163.737911] Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/Z170M-PLUS, BIOS 0505 11/16/2015 [ 163.737920] task: ffff8800bb99cf80 ti: ffff88022ff2c000 task.ti: ffff88022ff2c000 [ 163.737928] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa018f723>] [<ffffffffa018f723>] intel_logical_ring_cleanup+0x83/0x100 [i915] [ 163.737969] RSP: 0018:ffff88022ff2fd30 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 163.737975] RAX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RBX: ffff8800bb2f31b8 RCX: 0000000000000002 [ 163.737982] RDX: 0000000087654321 RSI: 000000000000000d RDI: ffff8800bb2f31f0 [ 163.737989] RBP: ffff88022ff2fd40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 163.737996] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8800bb2f0000 [ 163.738003] R13: ffff8800bb2f8fc8 R14: ffff8800bb285668 R15: 000055af1ae55210 [ 163.738010] FS: 00007f187014b700(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 163.738021] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 163.738030] CR2: 0000558f84e4cbc8 CR3: 000000022cd55000 CR4: 00000000003406f0 [ 163.738039] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 163.738048] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 163.738057] Stack: [ 163.738062] ffff8800bb2f31b8 ffff8800bb2f0000 ffff88022ff2fd70 ffffffffa0180414 [ 163.738079] ffff8800bb2f0000 ffff8800bb285668 ffff8800bb2856c8 ffffffffa0242460 [ 163.738094] ffff88022ff2fd98 ffffffffa0202d30 ffff8800bb285668 ffff8800bb285668 [ 163.738109] Call Trace: [ 163.738140] [<ffffffffa0180414>] i915_gem_cleanup_engines+0x34/0x60 [i915] [ 163.738185] [<ffffffffa0202d30>] i915_driver_unload+0x150/0x270 [i915] [ 163.738198] [<ffffffff815100f4>] drm_dev_unregister+0x24/0xa0 [ 163.738208] [<ffffffff815106ce>] drm_put_dev+0x1e/0x60 [ 163.738225] [<ffffffffa01412a0>] i915_pci_remove+0x10/0x20 [i915] [ 163.738237] [<ffffffff8143d9b4>] pci_device_remove+0x34/0xb0 [ 163.738249] [<ffffffff81533d15>] __device_release_driver+0x95/0x140 [ 163.738259] [<ffffffff81533eb6>] driver_detach+0xb6/0xc0 [ 163.738268] [<ffffffff81532de3>] bus_remove_driver+0x53/0xd0 [ 163.738278] [<ffffffff815348d7>] driver_unregister+0x27/0x50 [ 163.738289] [<ffffffff8143ca15>] pci_unregister_driver+0x25/0x70 [ 163.738299] [<ffffffff81511de4>] drm_pci_exit+0x74/0x90 [ 163.738337] [<ffffffffa02034a9>] i915_exit+0x20/0x1a5 [i915] [ 163.738349] [<ffffffff8110400f>] SyS_delete_module+0x18f/0x1f0 [ 163.738361] [<ffffffff817b8a9b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x73 [ 163.738370] Code: ff d0 48 89 df e8 de a1 fd ff 48 8d 7b 38 e8 25 ab fd ff 48 8b 83 90 00 00 00 48 85 c0 74 25 48 8b 80 98 01 00 00 ba 21 43 65 87 <48> 8b 00 48 39 10 75 3c f6 40 08 01 75 38 48 c7 83 90 00 00 00 [ 163.738459] RIP [<ffffffffa018f723>] intel_logical_ring_cleanup+0x83/0x100 [i915] [ 163.738498] RSP <ffff88022ff2fd30> [ 163.738507] ---[ end trace 68f69ce4740fa44f ]--- Cc: Nick Hoath <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Gordon <[email protected]> Cc: Chris Wilson <[email protected]> Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]> Cc: Mika Kuoppala <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mika Kuoppala <[email protected]> Tested-by: Mika Kuoppala <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>

[ 1841.243670] divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN [ 1841.243994] Modules linked in: em28xx_rc rc_core tda18271 drxk em28xx_dvb dvb_core em28xx_alsa mt9v011 em28xx_v4l videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_core em28xx tveeprom v4l2_common videodev media cpufreq_powersave cpufreq_conservative cpufreq_userspace cpufreq_stats parport_pc ppdev lp parport snd_hda_codec_hdmi intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel sha256_ssse3 sha256_generic hmac drbg i915 snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic aesni_intel aes_x86_64 lrw gf128mul glue_helper ablk_helper cryptd btusb i2c_algo_bit snd_hda_intel btrtl drm_kms_helper btbcm evdev snd_hda_codec btintel psmouse bluetooth pcspkr snd_hwdep sg drm serio_raw [ 1841.244845] snd_hda_core snd_pcm mei_me rfkill snd_timer mei snd lpc_ich soundcore shpchp i2c_i801 mfd_core battery dw_dmac i2c_designware_platform i2c_designware_core dw_dmac_core video acpi_pad button tpm_tis tpm ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod hid_generic usbhid sd_mod ahci libahci libata ehci_pci e1000e xhci_pci ptp scsi_mod ehci_hcd xhci_hcd pps_core fan thermal sdhci_acpi sdhci mmc_core i2c_hid hid [last unloaded: tveeprom] [ 1841.245342] CPU: 2 PID: 38 Comm: kworker/2:1 Tainted: G W 4.5.0-rc1+ torvalds#43 [ 1841.245413] Hardware name: /NUC5i7RYB, BIOS RYBDWi35.86A.0350.2015.0812.1722 08/12/2015 [ 1841.245503] Workqueue: events request_module_async [em28xx] [ 1841.245557] task: ffff88009df10000 ti: ffff88009df18000 task.ti: ffff88009df18000 [ 1841.245626] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa135a0ad>] [<ffffffffa135a0ad>] size_to_scale+0xed/0x2c0 [em28xx_v4l] [ 1841.245714] RSP: 0018:ffff88009df1faa8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 1841.245756] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff8803bb933b38 [ 1841.245815] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8803bb933b00 [ 1841.245879] RBP: ffff88009df1fad8 R08: ffff8803bb933b3c R09: 1ffff10077726760 [ 1841.245944] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 1841.246006] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff8803b391a130 [ 1841.246071] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8803c6900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1841.246141] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1841.246194] CR2: 0000000001d97008 CR3: 00000003bdd85000 CR4: 00000000003406e0 [ 1841.246256] Stack: [ 1841.246278] 0000000000000246 ffff8803bb9321f0 ffff8803bb932270 ffffffffa136f7a0 [ 1841.246359] 0000000000000000 ffff8803bb932130 ffff88009df1fb20 ffffffffa13646a0 [ 1841.246439] ffffffffa127f206 ffff8803bb932130 ffff8803bb932130 ffff8803b391a130 [ 1841.246517] Call Trace: [ 1841.246548] [<ffffffffa13646a0>] em28xx_set_video_format+0x140/0x1e0 [em28xx_v4l] Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>

The Camera Adaptation Layer (CAL) is a block which consists of a dual port CSI2/MIPI camera capture engine. Port #0 can handle CSI2 camera connected to up to 4 data lanes. Port #1 can handle CSI2 camera connected to up to 2 data lanes. The driver implements the required API/ioctls to be V4L2 compliant. Driver supports the following: - V4L2 API using DMABUF/MMAP buffer access based on videobuf2 api - Asynchronous sensor sub device registration - DT support Signed-off-by: Benoit Parrot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>

It's safe to assume cxsr is already disabled when the crtc is off. This prevents an unclaimed register warning when the required power wells are not enabled. [ 262.864984] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 262.865025] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 6799 at drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_uncore.c:638 __unclaimed_reg_debug+0x68/0x80 [i915]() [ 262.865029] Unclaimed register detected before reading register 0x186500 [ 262.865032] Modules linked in: i915 intel_powerclamp [ 262.865057] CPU: 1 PID: 6799 Comm: kms_pipe_crc_ba Tainted: G U W 4.4.0-gfxbench+ #1 [ 262.865060] Hardware name: DN2820FYK, BIOS FYBYT10H.86A.0038.2014.0717.1455 07/17/2014 [ 262.865064] ffffffffa0338cf8 ffff88007448ba78 ffffffff813df90c ffff88007448bac0 [ 262.865071] ffff88007448bab0 ffffffff810746e1 0000000000186500 0000000000000001 [ 262.865077] 0000000000000001 ffff880074420000 0000000000000000 ffff88007448bb10 [ 262.865083] Call Trace: [ 262.865092] [<ffffffff813df90c>] dump_stack+0x4e/0x82 [ 262.865098] [<ffffffff810746e1>] warn_slowpath_common+0x81/0xc0 [ 262.865102] [<ffffffff81074767>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x47/0x50 [ 262.865128] [<ffffffffa02a07e8>] __unclaimed_reg_debug+0x68/0x80 [i915] [ 262.865154] [<ffffffffa02a0e4e>] vlv_read32+0x2de/0x370 [i915] [ 262.865173] [<ffffffffa0256837>] intel_set_memory_cxsr+0x87/0x1a0 [i915] [ 262.865200] [<ffffffffa02c4cb3>] intel_pre_plane_update+0xb3/0xf0 [i915] [ 262.865228] [<ffffffffa02c54b5>] intel_atomic_commit+0x3b5/0x17c0 [i915] [ 262.865234] [<ffffffff8150dc45>] ? drm_atomic_check_only+0x145/0x660 [ 262.865239] [<ffffffff8150d75a>] ? drm_atomic_set_crtc_for_connector+0x6a/0xe0 [ 262.865243] [<ffffffff8150e192>] drm_atomic_commit+0x32/0x50 [ 262.865249] [<ffffffff814eb155>] drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0x75/0xb0 [ 262.865253] [<ffffffff814fd090>] drm_mode_set_config_internal+0x60/0x110 [ 262.865258] [<ffffffff81501e26>] drm_mode_setcrtc+0x186/0x4f0 [ 262.865263] [<ffffffff814f3eed>] drm_ioctl+0x13d/0x590 [ 262.865267] [<ffffffff81501ca0>] ? drm_mode_setplane+0x1b0/0x1b0 [ 262.865273] [<ffffffff811d4c4c>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x2fc/0x550 [ 262.865278] [<ffffffff8118d5ea>] ? vm_munmap+0x4a/0x60 [ 262.865283] [<ffffffff811e06ba>] ? __fget_light+0x6a/0x90 [ 262.865287] [<ffffffff811d4edc>] SyS_ioctl+0x3c/0x70 [ 262.865292] [<ffffffff8179a75b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x73 [ 262.865296] ---[ end trace 6387a0ad001bb39f ]--- Testcase: kms_flip.basic-flip-vs-wf_vblank Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=93698 Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <[email protected]> Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/1454514805-10595-4-git-send-email-maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>

We receoved a bug report from someone using vmware: WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 660 at kernel/sched/core.c:7389 __might_sleep+0x7d/0x90() do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at [<ffffffff810fa68d>] prepare_to_wait+0x2d/0x90 Modules linked in: vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event snd_ens1371 iosf_mbi gameport snd_rawmidi snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_seq coretemp snd_seq_device snd_pcm snd_timer snd soundcore ppdev crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel vmw_vmci vmw_balloon i2c_piix4 shpchp parport_pc parport acpi_cpufreq nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc btrfs xor raid6_pq 8021q garp stp llc mrp crc32c_intel serio_raw mptspi vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm scsi_transport_spi mptscsih e1000 ata_generic mptbase pata_acpi CPU: 3 PID: 660 Comm: vmtoolsd Not tainted 4.2.0-0.rc1.git3.1.fc23.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014 0000000000000000 0000000049e617f3 ffff88006ac37ac8 ffffffff818641f5 0000000000000000 ffff88006ac37b20 ffff88006ac37b08 ffffffff810ab446 ffff880068009f40 ffffffff81c63bc0 0000000000000061 0000000000000000 Call Trace: [<ffffffff818641f5>] dump_stack+0x4c/0x65 [<ffffffff810ab446>] warn_slowpath_common+0x86/0xc0 [<ffffffff810ab4d5>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x55/0x70 [<ffffffff8112551d>] ? debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled+0x1d/0x20 [<ffffffff810fa68d>] ? prepare_to_wait+0x2d/0x90 [<ffffffff810fa68d>] ? prepare_to_wait+0x2d/0x90 [<ffffffff810da2bd>] __might_sleep+0x7d/0x90 [<ffffffff812163b3>] __might_fault+0x43/0xa0 [<ffffffff81430477>] copy_from_iter+0x87/0x2a0 [<ffffffffa039460a>] __qp_memcpy_to_queue+0x9a/0x1b0 [vmw_vmci] [<ffffffffa0394740>] ? qp_memcpy_to_queue+0x20/0x20 [vmw_vmci] [<ffffffffa0394757>] qp_memcpy_to_queue_iov+0x17/0x20 [vmw_vmci] [<ffffffffa0394d50>] qp_enqueue_locked+0xa0/0x140 [vmw_vmci] [<ffffffffa039593f>] vmci_qpair_enquev+0x4f/0xd0 [vmw_vmci] [<ffffffffa04847bb>] vmci_transport_stream_enqueue+0x1b/0x20 [vmw_vsock_vmci_transport] [<ffffffffa047ae05>] vsock_stream_sendmsg+0x2c5/0x320 [vsock] [<ffffffff810fabd0>] ? wake_atomic_t_function+0x70/0x70 [<ffffffff81702af8>] sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x50 [<ffffffff81702ff4>] SYSC_sendto+0x104/0x190 [<ffffffff8126e25a>] ? vfs_read+0x8a/0x140 [<ffffffff817042ee>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffff8186d9ae>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76 transport->stream_enqueue may call copy_to_user so it should not be called inside a prepare_to_wait. Narrow the scope of the prepare_to_wait to avoid the bad call. This also applies to vsock_stream_recvmsg as well. Reported-by: Vinson Lee <[email protected]> Tested-by: Vinson Lee <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

Commit c0eb454 ("hv_netvsc: Don't ask for additional head room in the skb") got rid of needed_headroom setting for the driver. With the change I hit the following issue trying to use ptkgen module: [ 57.522021] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:1128! [ 57.522021] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ... [ 58.721068] Call Trace: [ 58.721068] [<ffffffffa0144e86>] netvsc_start_xmit+0x4c6/0x8e0 [hv_netvsc] ... [ 58.721068] [<ffffffffa02f87fc>] ? pktgen_finalize_skb+0x25c/0x2a0 [pktgen] [ 58.721068] [<ffffffff814f5760>] ? __netdev_alloc_skb+0xc0/0x100 [ 58.721068] [<ffffffffa02f9907>] pktgen_thread_worker+0x257/0x1920 [pktgen] Basically, we're calling skb_cow_head(skb, RNDIS_AND_PPI_SIZE) and crash on if (skb_shared(skb)) BUG(); We probably need to restore needed_headroom setting (but shrunk to RNDIS_AND_PPI_SIZE as we don't need more) to request the required headroom space. In theory, it should not give us performance penalty. Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

The mutex lock at rc_register_device() was added by commit 08aeb7c ("[media] rc: add locking to fix register/show race"). It is meant to avoid race issues when trying to open a sysfs file while the RC register didn't complete. Adding a lock there causes troubles, as detected by the Kernel lock debug instrumentation at the Kernel: ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 4.5.0-rc3+ torvalds#46 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- systemd-udevd/2681 is trying to acquire lock: (s_active#171){++++.+}, at: [<ffffffff8171a115>] kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x45/0xa0 but task is already holding lock: (&dev->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa0724def>] rc_register_device+0xb2f/0x1450 [rc_core] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&dev->lock){+.+.+.}: [<ffffffff8124817d>] lock_acquire+0x13d/0x320 [<ffffffff822de966>] mutex_lock_nested+0xb6/0x860 [<ffffffffa0721f2b>] show_protocols+0x3b/0x3f0 [rc_core] [<ffffffff81cdaba5>] dev_attr_show+0x45/0xc0 [<ffffffff8171f1b3>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x203/0x3c0 [<ffffffff8171a6a1>] kernfs_seq_show+0x121/0x1b0 [<ffffffff81617c71>] seq_read+0x2f1/0x1160 [<ffffffff8171c911>] kernfs_fop_read+0x321/0x460 [<ffffffff815abc20>] __vfs_read+0xe0/0x3d0 [<ffffffff815ae90e>] vfs_read+0xde/0x2d0 [<ffffffff815b1d01>] SyS_read+0x111/0x230 [<ffffffff822e8636>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76 -> #0 (s_active#171){++++.+}: [<ffffffff81244f24>] __lock_acquire+0x4304/0x5990 [<ffffffff8124817d>] lock_acquire+0x13d/0x320 [<ffffffff81717d3a>] __kernfs_remove+0x58a/0x810 [<ffffffff8171a115>] kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x45/0xa0 [<ffffffff81721592>] remove_files.isra.0+0x72/0x190 [<ffffffff8172174b>] sysfs_remove_group+0x9b/0x150 [<ffffffff81721854>] sysfs_remove_groups+0x54/0xa0 [<ffffffff81cd97d0>] device_remove_attrs+0xb0/0x140 [<ffffffff81cdb27c>] device_del+0x38c/0x6b0 [<ffffffffa0724b8b>] rc_register_device+0x8cb/0x1450 [rc_core] [<ffffffffa1326a7b>] dvb_usb_remote_init+0x66b/0x14d0 [dvb_usb] [<ffffffffa1321c81>] dvb_usb_device_init+0xf21/0x1860 [dvb_usb] [<ffffffffa13517dc>] dib0700_probe+0x14c/0x410 [dvb_usb_dib0700] [<ffffffff81dbb1dd>] usb_probe_interface+0x45d/0x940 [<ffffffff81ce7e7a>] driver_probe_device+0x21a/0xc30 [<ffffffff81ce89b1>] __driver_attach+0x121/0x160 [<ffffffff81ce21bf>] bus_for_each_dev+0x11f/0x1a0 [<ffffffff81ce6cdd>] driver_attach+0x3d/0x50 [<ffffffff81ce5df9>] bus_add_driver+0x4c9/0x770 [<ffffffff81cea39c>] driver_register+0x18c/0x3b0 [<ffffffff81db6e98>] usb_register_driver+0x1f8/0x440 [<ffffffffa074001e>] dib0700_driver_init+0x1e/0x1000 [dvb_usb_dib0700] [<ffffffff810021b1>] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300 [<ffffffff8144d8eb>] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad [<ffffffff812f27b6>] load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0 [<ffffffff812f5fe8>] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130 [<ffffffff822e8636>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&dev->lock); lock(s_active#171); lock(&dev->lock); lock(s_active#171); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by systemd-udevd/2681: #0: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<ffffffff81ce8933>] __driver_attach+0xa3/0x160 #1: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<ffffffff81ce8941>] __driver_attach+0xb1/0x160 #2: (&dev->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa0724def>] rc_register_device+0xb2f/0x1450 [rc_core] In this specific case, some error happened during device init, causing IR to be disabled. Let's fix it by adding a var that will tell when the device is initialized. Any calls before that will return a -EINVAL. That should prevent the race issues. Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>

Unfortunately i915 is still not fully atomic, and expects mode_config.mutex to be held during modeset until we finally fix it. This fixes the following WARN when resuming: [ 425.208983] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 425.208990] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6828 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_edid.c:3555 drm_select_eld+0xa5/0xd0() [ 425.209015] Modules linked in: pl2303 usbserial snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic intel_powerclamp coretemp i915 crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep lpc_ich snd_hda_core snd_pcm i2c_hid i2c_designware_platform i2c_designware_core r8169 mii sdhci_acpi sdhci mmc_core [ 425.209018] CPU: 0 PID: 6828 Comm: kworker/u4:5 Tainted: G U W 4.5.0-rc4-gfxbench+ #1 [ 425.209020] Hardware name: \xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff \xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff\xffffffff/DN2820FYK, BIOS FYBYT10H.86A.0038.2014.0717.1455 07/17/2014 [ 425.209027] Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn [ 425.209032] 0000000000000000 ffff880072433958 ffffffff813f6b05 0000000000000000 [ 425.209036] ffffffff81aaef2d ffff880072433990 ffffffff81078291 ffff880036b933d8 [ 425.209039] ffff88006d528000 ffff88006d52b3d8 ffff88006d52b3d8 ffff88007315b6f8 [ 425.209040] Call Trace: [ 425.209045] [<ffffffff813f6b05>] dump_stack+0x67/0x92 [ 425.209049] [<ffffffff81078291>] warn_slowpath_common+0x81/0xc0 [ 425.209052] [<ffffffff81078385>] warn_slowpath_null+0x15/0x20 [ 425.209054] [<ffffffff8151e195>] drm_select_eld+0xa5/0xd0 [ 425.209101] [<ffffffffa01f34f4>] intel_audio_codec_enable+0x44/0x160 [i915] [ 425.209135] [<ffffffffa023eac7>] intel_enable_hdmi_audio+0x87/0x90 [i915] [ 425.209169] [<ffffffffa023eb5a>] g4x_enable_hdmi+0x8a/0xa0 [i915] [ 425.209202] [<ffffffffa023f41b>] vlv_hdmi_pre_enable+0x1cb/0x240 [i915] [ 425.209236] [<ffffffffa020edcf>] valleyview_crtc_enable+0x10f/0x290 [i915] [ 425.209270] [<ffffffffa020ba49>] intel_atomic_commit+0x769/0x17a0 [i915] [ 425.209274] [<ffffffff81526ad5>] ? drm_atomic_check_only+0x145/0x660 [ 425.209276] [<ffffffff81527022>] drm_atomic_commit+0x32/0x50 [ 425.209310] [<ffffffffa0215fa0>] intel_display_resume+0xa0/0x130 [i915] [ 425.209338] [<ffffffffa018c1bb>] i915_drm_resume+0xcb/0x160 [i915] [ 425.209366] [<ffffffffa018c272>] i915_pm_resume+0x22/0x30 [i915] [ 425.209370] [<ffffffff8143d91e>] pci_pm_resume+0x6e/0xe0 [ 425.209373] [<ffffffff8143d8b0>] ? pci_pm_resume_noirq+0xa0/0xa0 [ 425.209375] [<ffffffff815409ae>] dpm_run_callback+0x6e/0x280 [ 425.209378] [<ffffffff815410b2>] device_resume+0x92/0x250 [ 425.209380] [<ffffffff81541288>] async_resume+0x18/0x40 [ 425.209382] [<ffffffff8109c7a5>] async_run_entry_fn+0x45/0x140 [ 425.209386] [<ffffffff81093293>] process_one_work+0x1e3/0x620 [ 425.209388] [<ffffffff810931f7>] ? process_one_work+0x147/0x620 [ 425.209391] [<ffffffff81093719>] worker_thread+0x49/0x490 [ 425.209393] [<ffffffff810936d0>] ? process_one_work+0x620/0x620 [ 425.209396] [<ffffffff81099e0a>] kthread+0xea/0x100 [ 425.209400] [<ffffffff81099d20>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1f0/0x1f0 [ 425.209404] [<ffffffff817ba03f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 [ 425.209407] [<ffffffff81099d20>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1f0/0x1f0 [ 425.209409] ---[ end trace d1b247107f34a8b2 ]--- Fixes: e2c8b87 ("drm/i915: Use atomic helpers for suspend, v2.") Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <[email protected]> Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/1455632862-18557-1-git-send-email-maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>

There is a race between arc_emac_tx() and arc_emac_tx_clean(). sk_buff got freed by arc_emac_tx_clean() while arc_emac_tx() submitting sk_buff. In order to free sk_buff arc_emac_tx_clean() checks: if ((info & FOR_EMAC) || !txbd->data) break; ... dev_kfree_skb_irq(skb); If condition false, arc_emac_tx_clean() free sk_buff. In order to submit txbd, arc_emac_tx() do: priv->tx_buff[*txbd_curr].skb = skb; ... priv->txbd[*txbd_curr].data = cpu_to_le32(addr); ... ... <== arc_emac_tx_clean() check condition here ... <== (info & FOR_EMAC) is false ... <== !txbd->data is false ... *info = cpu_to_le32(FOR_EMAC | FIRST_OR_LAST_MASK | len); In order to reproduce the situation, run device: # iperf -s run on host: # iperf -t 600 -c <device-ip-addr> [ 28.396284] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 28.400912] kernel BUG at .../net/core/skbuff.c:1355! [ 28.414019] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP ARM [ 28.419150] Modules linked in: [ 28.422219] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G B 4.4.0+ torvalds#120 [ 28.429516] Hardware name: Rockchip (Device Tree) [ 28.434216] task: c0665070 ti: c0660000 task.ti: c0660000 [ 28.439622] PC is at skb_put+0x10/0x54 [ 28.443381] LR is at arc_emac_poll+0x260/0x474 [ 28.447821] pc : [<c03af580>] lr : [<c028fec4>] psr: a0070113 [ 28.447821] sp : c0661e58 ip : eea68502 fp : ef377000 [ 28.459280] r10: 0000012c r9 : f08b2000 r8 : eeb57100 [ 28.464498] r7 : 00000000 r6 : ef376594 r5 : 00000077 r4 : ef376000 [ 28.471015] r3 : 0030488b r2 : ef13e880 r1 : 000005ee r0 : eeb57100 [ 28.477534] Flags: NzCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none [ 28.484658] Control: 10c5387d Table: 8eaf004a DAC: 00000051 [ 28.490396] Process swapper/0 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0xc0660210) [ 28.496393] Stack: (0xc0661e58 to 0xc0662000) [ 28.500745] 1e40: 00000002 00000000 [ 28.508913] 1e60: 00000000 ef376520 00000028 f08b23b8 00000000 ef376520 ef7b6900 c028fc64 [ 28.517082] 1e80: 2f158000 c0661ea8 c0661eb0 0000012c c065e900 c03bdeac ffff95e9 c0662100 [ 28.525250] 1ea0: c0663924 00000028 c0661ea8 c0661ea8 c0661eb0 c0661eb0 0000001e c0660000 [ 28.533417] 1ec0: 40000003 00000008 c0695a00 0000000a c066208c 00000100 c0661ee0 c0027410 [ 28.541584] 1ee0: ef0fb700 2f158000 00200000 ffff95e8 00000004 c0662100 c0662080 00000003 [ 28.549751] 1f00: 00000000 00000000 00000000 c065b45c 0000001e ef005000 c0647a30 00000000 [ 28.557919] 1f20: 00000000 c0027798 00000000 c005cf40 f0802100 c0662ffc c0661f60 f0803100 [ 28.566088] 1f40: c0661fb8 c00093bc c000ffb4 60070013 ffffffff c0661f94 c0661fb8 c00137d4 [ 28.574267] 1f60: 00000001 00000000 00000000 c001ffa0 00000000 c0660000 00000000 c065a364 [ 28.582441] 1f80: c0661fb8 c0647a30 00000000 00000000 00000000 c0661fb0 c000ffb0 c000ffb4 [ 28.590608] 1fa0: 60070013 ffffffff 00000051 00000000 00000000 c005496c c0662400 c061bc40 [ 28.598776] 1fc0: ffffffff ffffffff 00000000 c061b680 00000000 c0647a30 00000000 c0695294 [ 28.606943] 1fe0: c0662488 c0647a2c c066619c 6000406a 413fc090 6000807c 00000000 00000000 [ 28.615127] [<c03af580>] (skb_put) from [<ef376520>] (0xef376520) [ 28.621218] Code: e5902054 e590c090 e3520000 0a000000 (e7f001f2) [ 28.627307] ---[ end trace 4824734e2243fdb6 ]--- [ 34.377068] Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] SMP ARM [ 34.382854] Modules linked in: [ 34.385947] CPU: 0 PID: 3 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Not tainted 4.4.0+ torvalds#120 [ 34.392219] Hardware name: Rockchip (Device Tree) [ 34.396937] task: ef02d040 ti: ef05c000 task.ti: ef05c000 [ 34.402376] PC is at __dev_kfree_skb_irq+0x4/0x80 [ 34.407121] LR is at arc_emac_poll+0x130/0x474 [ 34.411583] pc : [<c03bb640>] lr : [<c028fd94>] psr: 60030013 [ 34.411583] sp : ef05de68 ip : 0008e83c fp : ef377000 [ 34.423062] r10: c001bec4 r9 : 00000000 r8 : f08b24c8 [ 34.428296] r7 : f08b2400 r6 : 00000075 r5 : 00000019 r4 : ef376000 [ 34.434827] r3 : 00060000 r2 : 00000042 r1 : 00000001 r0 : 00000000 [ 34.441365] Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none [ 34.448507] Control: 10c5387d Table: 8f25c04a DAC: 00000051 [ 34.454262] Process ksoftirqd/0 (pid: 3, stack limit = 0xef05c210) [ 34.460449] Stack: (0xef05de68 to 0xef05e000) [ 34.464827] de60: ef376000 c028fd94 00000000 c0669480 c0669480 ef376520 [ 34.473022] de80: 00000028 00000001 00002ae ef376520 ef7b6900 c028fc64 2f158000 ef05dec0 [ 34.481215] dea0: ef05dec8 0000012c c065e900 c03bdeac ffff983f c0662100 c0663924 00000028 [ 34.489409] dec0: ef05dec0 ef05dec0 ef05dec8 ef05dec8 ef7b6000 ef05c000 40000003 00000008 [ 34.497600] dee0: c0695a00 0000000a c066208c 00000100 ef05def8 c0027410 ef7b6000 40000000 [ 34.505795] df00: 04208040 ffff983e 00000004 c0662100 c0662080 00000003 ef05c000 ef027340 [ 34.513985] df20: ef05c000 c0666c2c 00000000 00000001 00000002 00000000 00000000 c0027568 [ 34.522176] df40: ef027340 c003ef48 ef027300 00000000 ef027340 c003edd4 00000000 00000000 [ 34.530367] df60: 00000000 c003c37c ffffff7f 00000001 00000000 ef027340 00000000 00030003 [ 34.538559] df80: ef05df80 ef05df80 00000000 00000000 ef05df90 ef05df90 ef05dfac ef027300 [ 34.546750] dfa0: c003c2a4 00000000 00000000 c000f578 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 34.554939] dfc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 34.563129] dfe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 ffffffff dfff7fff [ 34.571360] [<c03bb640>] (__dev_kfree_skb_irq) from [<c028fd94>] (arc_emac_poll+0x130/0x474) [ 34.579840] [<c028fd94>] (arc_emac_poll) from [<c03bdeac>] (net_rx_action+0xdc/0x28c) [ 34.587712] [<c03bdeac>] (net_rx_action) from [<c0027410>] (__do_softirq+0xcc/0x1f8) [ 34.595482] [<c0027410>] (__do_softirq) from [<c0027568>] (run_ksoftirqd+0x2c/0x50) [ 34.603168] [<c0027568>] (run_ksoftirqd) from [<c003ef48>] (smpboot_thread_fn+0x174/0x18c) [ 34.611466] [<c003ef48>] (smpboot_thread_fn) from [<c003c37c>] (kthread+0xd8/0xec) [ 34.619075] [<c003c37c>] (kthread) from [<c000f578>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c) [ 34.626317] Code: e8bd8010 e3a00000 e12fff1e e92d4010 (e59030a4) [ 34.632572] ---[ end trace cca5a3d86a82249a ]--- Signed-off-by: Alexander Kochetkov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

Or Gerlitz says: ==================== Mellanox 10/40G mlx4 driver fixes for 4.5-rc Bunch of fixes from the team to the mlx4 Eth and core drivers. Series generated against net commit aac8d3c "qmi_wwan: add "4G LTE usb-modem U901"" Please push patches 1,2 and 6 to -stable as well changes from v0: - handled another wrongly accounted HW counter in patch #1 (Rick) - fixed coding style issues in patch #4 (Sergei) ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

Ilya reported following lockdep splat: kernel: ========================= kernel: [ BUG: held lock freed! ] kernel: 4.5.0-rc1-ceph-00026-g5e0a311 #1 Not tainted kernel: ------------------------- kernel: swapper/5/0 is freeing memory ffff880035c9d200-ffff880035c9dbff, with a lock still held there! kernel: (&(&queue->rskq_lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff816f6a88>] inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add+0x28/0xa0 kernel: 4 locks held by swapper/5/0: kernel: #0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8169ef6b>] netif_receive_skb_internal+0x4b/0x1f0 kernel: #1: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff816e977f>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x3f/0x380 kernel: #2: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff81685ffb>] sk_clone_lock+0x19b/0x440 kernel: #3: (&(&queue->rskq_lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff816f6a88>] inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add+0x28/0xa0 To properly fix this issue, inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add() needs to return to its callers if the child as been queued into accept queue. We also need to make sure listener is still there before calling sk->sk_data_ready(), by holding a reference on it, since the reference carried by the child can disappear as soon as the child is put on accept queue. Reported-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]> Fixes: ebb516a ("tcp/dccp: fix race at listener dismantle phase") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

When I used netdev_for_each_lower_dev in commit bad5316 ("vrf: remove slave queue and private slave struct") I thought that it acts like netdev_for_each_lower_private and can be used to remove the current device from the list while walking, but unfortunately it acts more like netdev_for_each_lower_private_rcu and doesn't allow it. The difference is where the "iter" points to, right now it points to the current element and that makes it impossible to remove it. Change the logic to be similar to netdev_for_each_lower_private and make it point to the "next" element so we can safely delete the current one. VRF is the only such user right now, there's no change for the read-only users. Here's what can happen now: [98423.249858] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP [98423.250175] Modules linked in: vrf bridge(O) stp llc nfsd auth_rpcgss oid_registry nfs_acl nfs lockd grace sunrpc crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel jitterentropy_rng sha256_generic hmac drbg ppdev aesni_intel aes_x86_64 glue_helper lrw gf128mul ablk_helper cryptd evdev serio_raw pcspkr virtio_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 i2c_core virtio_console acpi_cpufreq button 9pnet_virtio 9p 9pnet fscache ipv6 autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 sg virtio_blk virtio_net sr_mod cdrom e1000 ata_generic ehci_pci uhci_hcd ehci_hcd usbcore usb_common virtio_pci ata_piix libata floppy virtio_ring virtio scsi_mod [last unloaded: bridge] [98423.255040] CPU: 1 PID: 14173 Comm: ip Tainted: G O 4.5.0-rc2+ torvalds#81 [98423.255386] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.8.1-20150318_183358- 04/01/2014 [98423.255777] task: ffff8800547f5540 ti: ffff88003428c000 task.ti: ffff88003428c000 [98423.256123] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81514f3e>] [<ffffffff81514f3e>] netdev_lower_get_next+0x1e/0x30 [98423.256534] RSP: 0018:ffff88003428f940 EFLAGS: 00010207 [98423.256766] RAX: 0002000100000004 RBX: ffff880054ff9000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [98423.257039] RDX: ffff88003428f8b8 RSI: ffff88003428f950 RDI: ffff880054ff90c0 [98423.257287] RBP: ffff88003428f940 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [98423.257537] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88003428f9e0 [98423.257802] R13: ffff880054a5fd00 R14: ffff88003428f970 R15: 0000000000000001 [98423.258055] FS: 00007f3d76881700(0000) GS:ffff88005d000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [98423.258418] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [98423.258650] CR2: 00007ffe5951ffa8 CR3: 0000000052077000 CR4: 00000000000406e0 [98423.258902] Stack: [98423.259075] ffff88003428f960 ffffffffa0442636 0002000100000004 ffff880054ff9000 [98423.259647] ffff88003428f9b0 ffffffff81518205 ffff880054ff9000 ffff88003428f978 [98423.260208] ffff88003428f978 ffff88003428f9e0 ffff88003428f9e0 ffff880035b35f00 [98423.260739] Call Trace: [98423.260920] [<ffffffffa0442636>] vrf_dev_uninit+0x76/0xa0 [vrf] [98423.261156] [<ffffffff81518205>] rollback_registered_many+0x205/0x390 [98423.261401] [<ffffffff815183ec>] unregister_netdevice_many+0x1c/0x70 [98423.261641] [<ffffffff8153223c>] rtnl_delete_link+0x3c/0x50 [98423.271557] [<ffffffff815335bb>] rtnl_dellink+0xcb/0x1d0 [98423.271800] [<ffffffff811cd7da>] ? __inc_zone_state+0x4a/0x90 [98423.272049] [<ffffffff815337b4>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x84/0x200 [98423.272279] [<ffffffff810cfe7d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [98423.272513] [<ffffffff8153370b>] ? rtnetlink_rcv+0x1b/0x40 [98423.272755] [<ffffffff81533730>] ? rtnetlink_rcv+0x40/0x40 [98423.272983] [<ffffffff8155d6e7>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x97/0xb0 [98423.273209] [<ffffffff8153371a>] rtnetlink_rcv+0x2a/0x40 [98423.273476] [<ffffffff8155ce8b>] netlink_unicast+0x11b/0x1a0 [98423.273710] [<ffffffff8155d2f1>] netlink_sendmsg+0x3e1/0x610 [98423.273947] [<ffffffff814fbc98>] sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x70 [98423.274175] [<ffffffff814fc253>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x2e3/0x2f0 [98423.274416] [<ffffffff810d841e>] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xbe/0x140 [98423.274658] [<ffffffff811e1bec>] ? handle_mm_fault+0x26c/0x2210 [98423.274894] [<ffffffff811e19cd>] ? handle_mm_fault+0x4d/0x2210 [98423.275130] [<ffffffff81269611>] ? __fget_light+0x91/0xb0 [98423.275365] [<ffffffff814fcd42>] __sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x80 [98423.275595] [<ffffffff814fcd92>] SyS_sendmsg+0x12/0x20 [98423.275827] [<ffffffff81611bb6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a [98423.276073] Code: c3 31 c0 5d c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 48 8b 06 55 48 81 c7 c0 00 00 00 48 89 e5 48 8b 00 48 39 f8 74 09 48 89 06 <48> 8b 40 e8 5d c3 31 c0 5d c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 66 [98423.279639] RIP [<ffffffff81514f3e>] netdev_lower_get_next+0x1e/0x30 [98423.279920] RSP <ffff88003428f940> CC: David Ahern <[email protected]> CC: David S. Miller <[email protected]> CC: Roopa Prabhu <[email protected]> CC: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]> Fixes: bad5316 ("vrf: remove slave queue and private slave struct") Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <[email protected]> Tested-by: David Ahern <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

If we use USB ID pin as wakeup source, and there is a USB block device on this USB OTG (ID) cable, the system will be deadlock after system resume. The root cause for this problem is: the workqueue ci_otg may try to remove hcd before the driver resume has finished, and hcd will disconnect the device on it, then, it will call device_release_driver, and holds the device lock "dev->mutex", but it is never unlocked since it waits workqueue writeback to run to flush the block information, but the workqueue writeback is freezable, it is not thawed before driver resume has finished. When the driver (device: sd 0:0:0:0:) resume goes to dpm_complete, it tries to get its device lock "dev->mutex", but it can't get it forever, then the deadlock occurs. Below call stacks show the situation. So, in order to fix this problem, we need to change workqueue ci_otg as freezable, then the work item in this workqueue will be run after driver's resume, this workqueue will not be blocked forever like above case since the workqueue writeback has been thawed too. Tested at: i.mx6qdl-sabresd and i.mx6sx-sdb. [ 555.178869] kworker/u2:13 D c07de74c 0 826 2 0x00000000 [ 555.185310] Workqueue: ci_otg ci_otg_work [ 555.189353] Backtrace: [ 555.191849] [<c07de4fc>] (__schedule) from [<c07dec6c>] (schedule+0x48/0xa0) [ 555.198912] r10:ee471ba0 r9:00000000 r8:00000000 r7:00000002 r6:ee470000 r5:ee471ba4 [ 555.206867] r4:ee470000 [ 555.209453] [<c07dec24>] (schedule) from [<c07e2fc4>] (schedule_timeout+0x15c/0x1e0) [ 555.217212] r4:7fffffff r3:edc2b000 [ 555.220862] [<c07e2e68>] (schedule_timeout) from [<c07df6c8>] (wait_for_common+0x94/0x144) [ 555.229140] r8:00000000 r7:00000002 r6:ee470000 r5:ee471ba4 r4:7fffffff [ 555.235980] [<c07df634>] (wait_for_common) from [<c07df790>] (wait_for_completion+0x18/0x1c) [ 555.244430] r10:00000001 r9:c0b5563c r8:c0042e48 r7:ef086000 r6:eea4372c r5:ef131b00 [ 555.252383] r4:00000000 [ 555.254970] [<c07df778>] (wait_for_completion) from [<c0043cb8>] (flush_work+0x19c/0x234) [ 555.263177] [<c0043b1c>] (flush_work) from [<c0043fac>] (flush_delayed_work+0x48/0x4c) [ 555.271106] r8:ed5b5000 r7:c0b38a3c r6:eea439cc r5:eea4372c r4:eea4372c [ 555.277958] [<c0043f64>] (flush_delayed_work) from [<c00eae18>] (bdi_unregister+0x84/0xec) [ 555.286236] r4:eea43520 r3:20000153 [ 555.289885] [<c00ead94>] (bdi_unregister) from [<c02c2154>] (blk_cleanup_queue+0x180/0x29c) [ 555.298250] r5:eea43808 r4:eea43400 [ 555.301909] [<c02c1fd4>] (blk_cleanup_queue) from [<c0417914>] (__scsi_remove_device+0x48/0xb8) [ 555.310623] r7:00000000 r6:20000153 r5:ededa950 r4:ededa800 [ 555.316403] [<c04178cc>] (__scsi_remove_device) from [<c0415e90>] (scsi_forget_host+0x64/0x68) [ 555.325028] r5:ededa800 r4:ed5b5000 [ 555.328689] [<c0415e2c>] (scsi_forget_host) from [<c0409828>] (scsi_remove_host+0x78/0x104) [ 555.337054] r5:ed5b5068 r4:ed5b5000 [ 555.340709] [<c04097b0>] (scsi_remove_host) from [<c04cdfcc>] (usb_stor_disconnect+0x50/0xb4) [ 555.349247] r6:ed5b56e4 r5:ed5b5818 r4:ed5b5690 r3:00000008 [ 555.355025] [<c04cdf7c>] (usb_stor_disconnect) from [<c04b3bc8>] (usb_unbind_interface+0x78/0x25c) [ 555.363997] r8:c13919b4 r7:edd3c000 r6:edd3c020 r5:ee551c68 r4:ee551c00 r3:c04cdf7c [ 555.371892] [<c04b3b50>] (usb_unbind_interface) from [<c03dc248>] (__device_release_driver+0x8c/0x118) [ 555.381213] r10:00000001 r9:edd90c00 r8:c13919b4 r7:ee551c68 r6:c0b546e0 r5:c0b5563c [ 555.389167] r4:edd3c020 [ 555.391752] [<c03dc1bc>] (__device_release_driver) from [<c03dc2fc>] (device_release_driver+0x28/0x34) [ 555.401071] r5:edd3c020 r4:edd3c054 [ 555.404721] [<c03dc2d4>] (device_release_driver) from [<c03db304>] (bus_remove_device+0xe0/0x110) [ 555.413607] r5:edd3c020 r4:ef17f04c [ 555.417253] [<c03db224>] (bus_remove_device) from [<c03d8128>] (device_del+0x114/0x21c) [ 555.425270] r6:edd3c028 r5:edd3c020 r4:ee551c00 r3:00000000 [ 555.431045] [<c03d8014>] (device_del) from [<c04b1560>] (usb_disable_device+0xa4/0x1e8) [ 555.439061] r8:edd3c000 r7:eded8000 r6:00000000 r5:00000001 r4:ee551c00 [ 555.445906] [<c04b14bc>] (usb_disable_device) from [<c04a8e54>] (usb_disconnect+0x74/0x224) [ 555.454271] r9:edd90c00 r8:ee551000 r7:ee551c68 r6:ee551c9c r5:ee551c00 r4:00000001 [ 555.462156] [<c04a8de0>] (usb_disconnect) from [<c04a8fb8>] (usb_disconnect+0x1d8/0x224) [ 555.470259] r10:00000001 r9:edd90000 r8:ee471e2c r7:ee551468 r6:ee55149c r5:ee551400 [ 555.478213] r4:00000001 [ 555.480797] [<c04a8de0>] (usb_disconnect) from [<c04ae5ec>] (usb_remove_hcd+0xa0/0x1ac) [ 555.488813] r10:00000001 r9:ee471eb0 r8:00000000 r7:ef3d9500 r6:eded810c r5:eded80b0 [ 555.496765] r4:eded8000 [ 555.499351] [<c04ae54c>] (usb_remove_hcd) from [<c04d4158>] (host_stop+0x28/0x64) [ 555.506847] r6:eeb50010 r5:eded8000 r4:eeb51010 [ 555.511563] [<c04d4130>] (host_stop) from [<c04d09b8>] (ci_otg_work+0xc4/0x124) [ 555.518885] r6:00000001 r5:eeb50010 r4:eeb502a0 r3:c04d4130 [ 555.524665] [<c04d08f4>] (ci_otg_work) from [<c00454f0>] (process_one_work+0x194/0x420) [ 555.532682] r6:ef086000 r5:eeb502a0 r4:edc44480 [ 555.537393] [<c004535c>] (process_one_work) from [<c00457b0>] (worker_thread+0x34/0x514) [ 555.545496] r10:edc44480 r9:ef086000 r8:c0b1a100 r7:ef086034 r6:00000088 r5:edc44498 [ 555.553450] r4:ef086000 [ 555.556032] [<c004577c>] (worker_thread) from [<c004bab4>] (kthread+0xdc/0xf8) [ 555.563268] r10:00000000 r9:00000000 r8:00000000 r7:c004577c r6:edc44480 r5:eddc15c0 [ 555.571221] r4:00000000 [ 555.573804] [<c004b9d8>] (kthread) from [<c000fef0>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24) [ 555.581040] r7:00000000 r6:00000000 r5:c004b9d8 r4:eddc15c0 [ 553.429383] sh D c07de74c 0 694 691 0x00000000 [ 553.435801] Backtrace: [ 553.438295] [<c07de4fc>] (__schedule) from [<c07dec6c>] (schedule+0x48/0xa0) [ 553.445358] r10:edd3c054 r9:edd3c078 r8:edddbd50 r7:edcbbc00 r6:c1377c34 r5:60000153 [ 553.453313] r4:eddda000 [ 553.455896] [<c07dec24>] (schedule) from [<c07deff8>] (schedule_preempt_disabled+0x10/0x14) [ 553.464261] r4:edd3c058 r3:0000000a [ 553.467910] [<c07defe8>] (schedule_preempt_disabled) from [<c07e0bbc>] (mutex_lock_nested+0x1a0/0x3e8) [ 553.477254] [<c07e0a1c>] (mutex_lock_nested) from [<c03e927c>] (dpm_complete+0xc0/0x1b0) [ 553.485358] r10:00561408 r9:edd3c054 r8:c0b4863c r7:edddbd90 r6:c0b485d8 r5:edd3c020 [ 553.493313] r4:edd3c0d0 [ 553.495896] [<c03e91bc>] (dpm_complete) from [<c03e9388>] (dpm_resume_end+0x1c/0x20) [ 553.503652] r9:00000000 r8:c0b1a9d0 r7:c1334ec0 r6:c1334edc r5:00000003 r4:00000010 [ 553.511544] [<c03e936c>] (dpm_resume_end) from [<c0079894>] (suspend_devices_and_enter+0x158/0x504) [ 553.520604] r4:00000000 r3:c1334efc [ 553.524250] [<c007973c>] (suspend_devices_and_enter) from [<c0079e74>] (pm_suspend+0x234/0x2cc) [ 553.532961] r10:00561408 r9:ed6b7300 r8:00000004 r7:c1334eec r6:00000000 r5:c1334ee8 [ 553.540914] r4:00000003 [ 553.543493] [<c0079c40>] (pm_suspend) from [<c0078a6c>] (state_store+0x6c/0xc0) [ 555.703684] 7 locks held by kworker/u2:13/826: [ 555.708140] #0: ("%s""ci_otg"){++++.+}, at: [<c0045484>] process_one_work+0x128/0x420 [ 555.716277] #1: ((&ci->work)){+.+.+.}, at: [<c0045484>] process_one_work+0x128/0x420 [ 555.724317] #2: (usb_bus_list_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<c04ae5e4>] usb_remove_hcd+0x98/0x1ac [ 555.732626] #3: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c04a8e28>] usb_disconnect+0x48/0x224 [ 555.740403] #4: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c04a8e28>] usb_disconnect+0x48/0x224 [ 555.748179] #5: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c03dc2f4>] device_release_driver+0x20/0x34 [ 555.756487] #6: (&shost->scan_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c04097d0>] scsi_remove_host+0x20/0x104 Cc: <[email protected]> #v3.14+ Cc: Jun Li <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Peter Chen <[email protected]>

When opening a file, SMB2_open() attempts to parse the lease state from the SMB2 CREATE Response. However, the parsing code was not careful to ensure that the create contexts are not empty or invalid, which can lead to out- of-bounds memory access. This can be seen easily by trying to read a file from a OSX 10.11 SMB3 server. Here is sample crash output: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff8800a1a77cc6 IP: [<ffffffff8828a734>] SMB2_open+0x804/0x960 PGD 8f77067 PUD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 2876 Comm: cp Not tainted 4.5.0-rc3.x86_64.1+ #14 Hardware name: NETGEAR ReadyNAS 314 /ReadyNAS 314 , BIOS 4.6.5 10/11/2012 task: ffff880073cdc080 ti: ffff88005b31c000 task.ti: ffff88005b31c000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8828a734>] [<ffffffff8828a734>] SMB2_open+0x804/0x960 RSP: 0018:ffff88005b31fa08 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000015 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000006 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffff88007eb8c8b0 RBP: ffff88005b31fad8 R08: 666666203d206363 R09: 6131613030383866 R10: 3030383866666666 R11: 00000000000002b0 R12: ffff8800660fd800 R13: ffff8800a1a77cc2 R14: 00000000424d53fe R15: ffff88005f5a28c0 FS: 00007f7c8a2897c0(0000) GS:ffff88007eb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: ffff8800a1a77cc6 CR3: 000000005b281000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: ffff88005b31fa70 ffffffff88278789 00000000000001d3 ffff88005f5a2a80 ffffffff00000003 ffff88005d029d00 ffff88006fde05a0 0000000000000000 ffff88005b31fc78 ffff88006fde0780 ffff88005b31fb2f 0000000100000fe0 Call Trace: [<ffffffff88278789>] ? cifsConvertToUTF16+0x159/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8828cf68>] smb2_open_file+0x98/0x210 [<ffffffff8811e80c>] ? __kmalloc+0x1c/0xe0 [<ffffffff882685f4>] cifs_open+0x2a4/0x720 [<ffffffff88122cef>] do_dentry_open+0x1ff/0x310 [<ffffffff88268350>] ? cifsFileInfo_get+0x30/0x30 [<ffffffff88123d92>] vfs_open+0x52/0x60 [<ffffffff88131dd0>] path_openat+0x170/0xf70 [<ffffffff88097d48>] ? remove_wait_queue+0x48/0x50 [<ffffffff88133a29>] do_filp_open+0x79/0xd0 [<ffffffff8813f2ca>] ? __alloc_fd+0x3a/0x170 [<ffffffff881240c4>] do_sys_open+0x114/0x1e0 [<ffffffff881241a9>] SyS_open+0x19/0x20 [<ffffffff8896e257>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a Code: 4d 8d 6c 07 04 31 c0 4c 89 ee e8 47 6f e5 ff 31 c9 41 89 ce 44 89 f1 48 c7 c7 28 b1 bd 88 31 c0 49 01 cd 4c 89 ee e8 2b 6f e5 ff <45> 0f b7 75 04 48 c7 c7 31 b1 bd 88 31 c0 4d 01 ee 4c 89 f6 e8 RIP [<ffffffff8828a734>] SMB2_open+0x804/0x960 RSP <ffff88005b31fa08> CR2: ffff8800a1a77cc6 ---[ end trace d9f69ba64feee469 ]--- Signed-off-by: Justin Maggard <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]> CC: Stable <[email protected]>

Commit cbce790 ("PCI: designware: Make driver arch-agnostic") changed the host bridge sysdata pointer from the ARM pci_sys_data to the DesignWare pcie_port structure, and changed pcie-designware.c to reflect that. But it did not change the corresponding code in pci-keystone-dw.c, so it caused crashes on Keystone: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000030 pgd = c0003000 [00000030] *pgd=80000800004003, *pmd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 206 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.4.2-00139-gb74f926 #2 Hardware name: Keystone PC is at ks_dw_pcie_msi_irq_unmask+0x24/0x58 Change pci-keystone-dw.c to expect sysdata to be the struct pcie_port pointer. [bhelgaas: changelog] Fixes: cbce790 ("PCI: designware: Make driver arch-agnostic") Signed-off-by: Murali Karicheri <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]> CC: [email protected] # v4.4+ CC: Zhou Wang <[email protected]>

When looking for orphan roots during mount we can end up hitting a BUG_ON() (at root-item.c:btrfs_find_orphan_roots()) if a log tree is replayed and qgroups are enabled. This is because after a log tree is replayed, a transaction commit is made, which triggers qgroup extent accounting which in turn does backref walking which ends up reading and inserting all roots in the radix tree fs_info->fs_root_radix, including orphan roots (deleted snapshots). So after the log tree is replayed, when finding orphan roots we hit the BUG_ON with the following trace: [118209.182438] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [118209.183279] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/root-tree.c:314! [118209.184074] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC [118209.185123] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_flakey dm_mod crc32c_generic ppdev xor raid6_pq evdev sg parport_pc parport acpi_cpufreq tpm_tis tpm psmouse processor i2c_piix4 serio_raw pcspkr i2c_core button loop autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 sd_mod sr_mod cdrom ata_generic virtio_scsi ata_piix libata virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio scsi_mod e1000 floppy [last unloaded: btrfs] [118209.186318] CPU: 14 PID: 28428 Comm: mount Tainted: G W 4.5.0-rc5-btrfs-next-24+ #1 [118209.186318] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [118209.186318] task: ffff8801ec131040 ti: ffff8800af34c000 task.ti: ffff8800af34c000 [118209.186318] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa04237d7>] [<ffffffffa04237d7>] btrfs_find_orphan_roots+0x1fc/0x244 [btrfs] [118209.186318] RSP: 0018:ffff8800af34faa8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [118209.186318] RAX: 00000000ffffffef RBX: 00000000ffffffef RCX: 0000000000000001 [118209.186318] RDX: 0000000080000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [118209.186318] RBP: ffff8800af34fb08 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [118209.186318] R10: ffff8800af34f9f0 R11: 6db6db6db6db6db7 R12: ffff880171b97000 [118209.186318] R13: ffff8801ca9d65e0 R14: ffff8800afa2e000 R15: 0000160000000000 [118209.186318] FS: 00007f5bcb914840(0000) GS:ffff88023edc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [118209.186318] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [118209.186318] CR2: 00007f5bcaceb5d9 CR3: 00000000b49b5000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [118209.186318] Stack: [118209.186318] fffffbffffffffff 010230ffffffffff 0101000000000000 ff84000000000000 [118209.186318] fbffffffffffffff 30ffffffffffffff 0000000000000101 ffff880082348000 [118209.186318] 0000000000000000 ffff8800afa2e000 ffff8800afa2e000 0000000000000000 [118209.186318] Call Trace: [118209.186318] [<ffffffffa042e2db>] open_ctree+0x1e37/0x21b9 [btrfs] [118209.186318] [<ffffffffa040a753>] btrfs_mount+0x97e/0xaed [btrfs] [118209.186318] [<ffffffff8108e1c0>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0xf [118209.186318] [<ffffffff8117b87e>] mount_fs+0x67/0x131 [118209.186318] [<ffffffff81192d2b>] vfs_kern_mount+0x6c/0xde [118209.186318] [<ffffffffa0409f81>] btrfs_mount+0x1ac/0xaed [btrfs] [118209.186318] [<ffffffff8108e1c0>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0xf [118209.186318] [<ffffffff8108c26b>] ? lockdep_init_map+0xb9/0x1b3 [118209.186318] [<ffffffff8117b87e>] mount_fs+0x67/0x131 [118209.186318] [<ffffffff81192d2b>] vfs_kern_mount+0x6c/0xde [118209.186318] [<ffffffff81195637>] do_mount+0x8a6/0x9e8 [118209.186318] [<ffffffff8119598d>] SyS_mount+0x77/0x9f [118209.186318] [<ffffffff81493017>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6b [118209.186318] Code: 64 00 00 85 c0 89 c3 75 24 f0 41 80 4c 24 20 20 49 8b bc 24 f0 01 00 00 4c 89 e6 e8 e8 65 00 00 85 c0 89 c3 74 11 83 f8 ef 75 02 <0f> 0b 4c 89 e7 e8 da 72 00 00 eb 1c 41 83 bc 24 00 01 00 00 00 [118209.186318] RIP [<ffffffffa04237d7>] btrfs_find_orphan_roots+0x1fc/0x244 [btrfs] [118209.186318] RSP <ffff8800af34faa8> [118209.230735] ---[ end trace 83938f987d85d477 ]--- So fix this by not treating the error -EEXIST, returned when attempting to insert a root already inserted by the backref walking code, as an error. The following test case for xfstests reproduces the bug: seq=`basename $0` seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq echo "QA output created by $seq" tmp=/tmp/$$ status=1 # failure is the default! trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15 _cleanup() { _cleanup_flakey cd / rm -f $tmp.* } # get standard environment, filters and checks . ./common/rc . ./common/filter . ./common/dmflakey # real QA test starts here _supported_fs btrfs _supported_os Linux _require_scratch _require_dm_target flakey _require_metadata_journaling $SCRATCH_DEV rm -f $seqres.full _scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1 _init_flakey _mount_flakey _run_btrfs_util_prog quota enable $SCRATCH_MNT # Create 2 directories with one file in one of them. # We use these just to trigger a transaction commit later, moving the file from # directory a to directory b and doing an fsync against directory a. mkdir $SCRATCH_MNT/a mkdir $SCRATCH_MNT/b touch $SCRATCH_MNT/a/f sync # Create our test file with 2 4K extents. $XFS_IO_PROG -f -s -c "pwrite -S 0xaa 0 8K" $SCRATCH_MNT/foobar | _filter_xfs_io # Create a snapshot and delete it. This doesn't really delete the snapshot # immediately, just makes it inaccessible and invisible to user space, the # snapshot is deleted later by a dedicated kernel thread (cleaner kthread) # which is woke up at the next transaction commit. # A root orphan item is inserted into the tree of tree roots, so that if a # power failure happens before the dedicated kernel thread does the snapshot # deletion, the next time the filesystem is mounted it resumes the snapshot # deletion. _run_btrfs_util_prog subvolume snapshot $SCRATCH_MNT $SCRATCH_MNT/snap _run_btrfs_util_prog subvolume delete $SCRATCH_MNT/snap # Now overwrite half of the extents we wrote before. Because we made a snapshpot # before, which isn't really deleted yet (since no transaction commit happened # after we did the snapshot delete request), the non overwritten extents get # referenced twice, once by the default subvolume and once by the snapshot. $XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 4K 8K" $SCRATCH_MNT/foobar | _filter_xfs_io # Now move file f from directory a to directory b and fsync directory a. # The fsync on the directory a triggers a transaction commit (because a file # was moved from it to another directory) and the file fsync leaves a log tree # with file extent items to replay. mv $SCRATCH_MNT/a/f $SCRATCH_MNT/a/b $XFS_IO_PROG -c "fsync" $SCRATCH_MNT/a $XFS_IO_PROG -c "fsync" $SCRATCH_MNT/foobar echo "File digest before power failure:" md5sum $SCRATCH_MNT/foobar | _filter_scratch # Now simulate a power failure and mount the filesystem to replay the log tree. # After the log tree was replayed, we used to hit a BUG_ON() when processing # the root orphan item for the deleted snapshot. This is because when processing # an orphan root the code expected to be the first code inserting the root into # the fs_info->fs_root_radix radix tree, while in reallity it was the second # caller attempting to do it - the first caller was the transaction commit that # took place after replaying the log tree, when updating the qgroup counters. _flakey_drop_and_remount echo "File digest before after failure:" # Must match what he got before the power failure. md5sum $SCRATCH_MNT/foobar | _filter_scratch _unmount_flakey status=0 exit Fixes: 2d9e977 ("Btrfs: use btrfs_get_fs_root in resolve_indirect_ref") Cc: [email protected] # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]>

…hain" reverts commit 94153e3 ("tipc: use existing sk_write_queue for outgoing packet chain") In Commit 94153e3, we assume that we fill & empty the socket's sk_write_queue within the same lock_sock() session. This is not true if the link is congested. During congestion, the socket lock is released while we wait for the congestion to cease. This implementation causes a nullptr exception, if the user space program has several threads accessing the same socket descriptor. Consider two threads of the same program performing the following: Thread1 Thread2 -------------------- ---------------------- Enter tipc_sendmsg() Enter tipc_sendmsg() lock_sock() lock_sock() Enter tipc_link_xmit(), ret=ELINKCONG spin on socket lock.. sk_wait_event() : release_sock() grab socket lock : Enter tipc_link_xmit(), ret=0 : release_sock() Wakeup after congestion lock_sock() skb = skb_peek(pktchain); !! TIPC_SKB_CB(skb)->wakeup_pending = tsk->link_cong; In this case, the second thread transmits the buffers belonging to both thread1 and thread2 successfully. When the first thread wakeup after the congestion it assumes that the pktchain is intact and operates on the skb's in it, which leads to the following exception: [2102.439969] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000d0 [2102.440074] IP: [<ffffffffa005f330>] __tipc_link_xmit+0x2b0/0x4d0 [tipc] [2102.440074] PGD 3fa3f067 PUD 3fa6b067 PMD 0 [2102.440074] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [2102.440074] CPU: 2 PID: 244 Comm: sender Not tainted 3.12.28 #1 [2102.440074] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa005f330>] [<ffffffffa005f330>] __tipc_link_xmit+0x2b0/0x4d0 [tipc] [...] [2102.440074] Call Trace: [2102.440074] [<ffffffff8163f0b9>] ? schedule+0x29/0x70 [2102.440074] [<ffffffffa006a756>] ? tipc_node_unlock+0x46/0x170 [tipc] [2102.440074] [<ffffffffa005f761>] tipc_link_xmit+0x51/0xf0 [tipc] [2102.440074] [<ffffffffa006d8ae>] tipc_send_stream+0x11e/0x4f0 [tipc] [2102.440074] [<ffffffff8106b150>] ? __wake_up_sync+0x20/0x20 [2102.440074] [<ffffffffa006dc9c>] tipc_send_packet+0x1c/0x20 [tipc] [2102.440074] [<ffffffff81502478>] sock_sendmsg+0xa8/0xd0 [2102.440074] [<ffffffff81507895>] ? release_sock+0x145/0x170 [2102.440074] [<ffffffff815030d8>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3d8/0x3e0 [2102.440074] [<ffffffff816426ae>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x10 [2102.440074] [<ffffffff81115c2a>] ? handle_mm_fault+0x6ca/0x9d0 [2102.440074] [<ffffffff8107dd65>] ? set_next_entity+0x85/0xa0 [2102.440074] [<ffffffff816426de>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0xe/0x20 [2102.440074] [<ffffffff8107463c>] ? finish_task_switch+0x5c/0xc0 [2102.440074] [<ffffffff8163ea8c>] ? __schedule+0x34c/0x950 [2102.440074] [<ffffffff81504e12>] __sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x80 [2102.440074] [<ffffffff81504e62>] SyS_sendmsg+0x12/0x20 [2102.440074] [<ffffffff8164aed2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b In this commit, we maintain the skb list always in the stack. Signed-off-by: Parthasarathy Bhuvaragan <[email protected]> Acked-by: Ying Xue <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jon Maloy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

vmxnet3 has a function vmxnet3_parse_and_copy_hdr which, among other operations, uses pskb_may_pull to linearize the header portion of an skb. That operation eventually uses local_bh_disable/enable to ensure that it doesn't race with the drivers bottom half handler. Unfortunately, vmxnet3 preforms this parse_and_copy operation with a spinlock held and interrupts disabled. This causes us to run afoul of the WARN_ON_ONCE(irqs_disabled()) warning in local_bh_enable, resulting in this: WARNING: at kernel/softirq.c:159 local_bh_enable+0x59/0x90() (Not tainted) Hardware name: VMware Virtual Platform Modules linked in: ipv6 ppdev parport_pc parport microcode e1000 vmware_balloon vmxnet3 i2c_piix4 sg ext4 jbd2 mbcache sd_mod crc_t10dif sr_mod cdrom mptspi mptscsih mptbase scsi_transport_spi pata_acpi ata_generic ata_piix vmwgfx ttm drm_kms_helper drm i2c_core dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: mperf] Pid: 6229, comm: sshd Not tainted 2.6.32-616.el6.i686 #1 Call Trace: [<c04624d9>] ? warn_slowpath_common+0x89/0xe0 [<c0469e99>] ? local_bh_enable+0x59/0x90 [<c046254b>] ? warn_slowpath_null+0x1b/0x20 [<c0469e99>] ? local_bh_enable+0x59/0x90 [<c07bb936>] ? skb_copy_bits+0x126/0x210 [<f8d1d9fe>] ? ext4_ext_find_extent+0x24e/0x2d0 [ext4] [<c07bc49e>] ? __pskb_pull_tail+0x6e/0x2b0 [<f95a6164>] ? vmxnet3_xmit_frame+0xba4/0xef0 [vmxnet3] [<c05d15a6>] ? selinux_ip_postroute+0x56/0x320 [<c0615988>] ? cfq_add_rq_rb+0x98/0x110 [<c0852df8>] ? packet_rcv+0x48/0x350 [<c07c5839>] ? dev_queue_xmit_nit+0xc9/0x140 ... Fix it by splitting vmxnet3_parse_and_copy_hdr into two functions: vmxnet3_parse_hdr, which sets up the internal/on stack ctx datastructure, and pulls the skb (both of which can be done without holding the spinlock with irqs disabled and vmxnet3_copy_header, which just copies the skb to the tx ring under the lock safely. tested and shown to correct the described problem. Applies cleanly to the head of the net tree Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]> CC: Shrikrishna Khare <[email protected]> CC: "VMware, Inc." <[email protected]> CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]> Acked-by: Shrikrishna Khare <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

This fixes BUG triggered when fwnode->secondary is not NULL, but has ERR_PTR(-ENODEV) instead. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffffffffed IP: [<ffffffff81677b86>] __fwnode_property_read_string+0x26/0x160 PGD 200e067 PUD 2010067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Modules linked in: dwc3_pci(+) dwc3 CPU: 0 PID: 1138 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 4.5.0-rc5+ torvalds#61 task: ffff88015aaf5b00 ti: ffff88007b958000 task.ti: ffff88007b958000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81677b86>] [<ffffffff81677b86>] __fwnode_property_read_string+0x26/0x160 RSP: 0018:ffff88007b95eff8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: fffffbfffffffffd RBX: ffffffffffffffed RCX: ffff88015999cd37 RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffffffff81e11bc0 RDI: ffffffffffffffed RBP: ffff88007b95f020 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff88007b90f7cf R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88007b95f0a0 R13: 00000000fffffffa R14: ffffffff81e11bc0 R15: ffff880159ea37a0 FS: 00007ff35f46c700(0000) GS:ffff88015b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: ffffffffffffffed CR3: 000000007b8be000 CR4: 00000000001006f0 Stack: ffff88015999cd20 ffffffff81e11bc0 ffff88007b95f0a0 ffff88007b383dd8 ffff880159ea37a0 ffff88007b95f048 ffffffff81677d03 ffff88007b952460 ffffffff81e11bc0 ffff88007b95f0a0 ffff88007b95f070 ffffffff81677d40 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81677d03>] fwnode_property_read_string+0x43/0x50 [<ffffffff81677d40>] device_property_read_string+0x30/0x40 ... Fixes: 362c0b3 (device property: Fallback to secondary fwnode if primary misses the property) Signed-off-by: Heikki Krogerus <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>

Commit 66b3923 ("arm64: hugetlb: add support for PTE contiguous bit") introduced support for huge pages using the contiguous bit in the PTE as opposed to block mappings, which may be slightly unwieldy (512M) in 64k page configurations. Unfortunately, this support has resulted in some late regressions when running the libhugetlbfs test suite with 64k pages and CONFIG_DEBUG_VM as a result of a BUG: | readback (2M: 64): ------------[ cut here ]------------ | kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:446! | Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP | Modules linked in: | CPU: 7 PID: 1448 Comm: readback Not tainted 4.5.0-rc7 torvalds#148 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | task: fffffe0040964b00 ti: fffffe00c2668000 task.ti: fffffe00c2668000 | PC is at remove_inode_hugepages+0x44c/0x480 | LR is at remove_inode_hugepages+0x264/0x480 Rather than revert the entire patch, simply avoid advertising the contiguous huge page sizes for now while people are actively working on a fix. This patch can then be reverted once things have been sorted out. Cc: David Woods <[email protected]> Reported-by: Steve Capper <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>

To keep consistent with kfree, which tolerate ptr is NULL. We do this because sometimes we may use goto statement, so that success and failure case can share parts of the code. But unfortunately, dma_free_coherent called with parameter cpu_addr is null will cause oops, such as showed below: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffffc020d3b2b8 pgd = ffffffc083a61000 [ffffffc020d3b2b8] *pgd=0000000000000000, *pud=0000000000000000 CPU: 4 PID: 1489 Comm: malloc_dma_1 Tainted: G O 4.1.12 #1 Hardware name: ARM64 (DT) PC is at __dma_free_coherent.isra.10+0x74/0xc8 LR is at __dma_free+0x9c/0xb0 Process malloc_dma_1 (pid: 1489, stack limit = 0xffffffc0837fc020) [...] Call trace: __dma_free_coherent.isra.10+0x74/0xc8 __dma_free+0x9c/0xb0 malloc_dma+0x104/0x158 [dma_alloc_coherent_mtmalloc] kthread+0xec/0xfc Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

When the Crypto SRAM mappings were added to the Device Tree files describing the Armada XP boards in commit c466d99 ("ARM: mvebu: define crypto SRAM ranges for all armada-xp boards"), the fact that those mappings were overlaping with the PCIe memory aperture was overlooked. Due to this, we currently have for all Armada XP platforms a situation that looks like this: Memory mapping on Armada XP boards with internal registers at 0xf1000000: - 0x00000000 -> 0xf0000000 3.75G RAM - 0xf0000000 -> 0xf1000000 16M NOR flashes (AXP GP / AXP DB) - 0xf1000000 -> 0xf1100000 1M internal registers - 0xf8000000 -> 0xffe0000 126M PCIe memory aperture - 0xf8100000 -> 0xf8110000 64KB Crypto SRAM #0 => OVERLAPS WITH PCIE ! - 0xf8110000 -> 0xf8120000 64KB Crypto SRAM #1 => OVERLAPS WITH PCIE ! - 0xffe00000 -> 0xfff00000 1M PCIe I/O aperture - 0xfff0000 -> 0xffffffff 1M BootROM The overlap means that when PCIe devices are added, depending on their memory window needs, they might or might not be mapped into the physical address space. Indeed, they will not be mapped if the area allocated in the PCIe memory aperture by the PCI core overlaps with one of the Crypto SRAM. Typically, a Intel IGB PCIe NIC that needs 8MB of PCIe memory will see its PCIe memory window allocated from 0xf80000000 for 8MB, which overlaps with the Crypto SRAM windows. Due to this, the PCIe window is not created, and any attempt to access the PCIe window makes the kernel explode: [ 3.302213] igb: Copyright (c) 2007-2014 Intel Corporation. [ 3.307841] pci 0000:00:09.0: enabling device (0140 -> 0143) [ 3.313539] mvebu_mbus: cannot add window '4:f8', conflicts with another window [ 3.320870] mvebu-pcie soc:pcie-controller: Could not create MBus window at [mem 0xf8000000-0xf87fffff]: -22 [ 3.330811] Unhandled fault: external abort on non-linefetch (0x1008) at 0xf08c0018 This problem does not occur on Armada 370 boards, because we use the following memory mapping (for boards that have internal registers at 0xf1000000): - 0x00000000 -> 0xf0000000 3.75G RAM - 0xf0000000 -> 0xf1000000 16M NOR flashes (AXP GP / AXP DB) - 0xf1000000 -> 0xf1100000 1M internal registers - 0xf1100000 -> 0xf1110000 64KB Crypto SRAM #0 => OK ! - 0xf8000000 -> 0xffe0000 126M PCIe memory - 0xffe00000 -> 0xfff00000 1M PCIe I/O - 0xfff0000 -> 0xffffffff 1M BootROM Obviously, the solution is to align the location of the Crypto SRAM mappings of Armada XP to be similar with the ones on Armada 370, i.e have them between the "internal registers" area and the beginning of the PCIe aperture. However, we have a special case with the OpenBlocks AX3-4 platform, which has a 128 MB NOR flash. Currently, this NOR flash is mapped from 0xf0000000 to 0xf8000000. This is possible because on OpenBlocks AX3-4, the internal registers are not at 0xf1000000. And this explains why the Crypto SRAM mappings were not configured at the same place on Armada XP. Hence, the solution is two-fold: (1) Move the NOR flash mapping on Armada XP OpenBlocks AX3-4 from 0xe8000000 to 0xf0000000. This frees the 0xf0000000 -> 0xf80000000 space. (2) Move the Crypto SRAM mappings on Armada XP to be similar to Armada 370 (except of course that Armada XP has two Crypto SRAM and not one). After this patch, the memory mapping on Armada XP boards with registers at 0xf1 is: - 0x00000000 -> 0xf0000000 3.75G RAM - 0xf0000000 -> 0xf1000000 16M NOR flashes (AXP GP / AXP DB) - 0xf1000000 -> 0xf1100000 1M internal registers - 0xf1100000 -> 0xf1110000 64KB Crypto SRAM #0 - 0xf1110000 -> 0xf1120000 64KB Crypto SRAM #1 - 0xf8000000 -> 0xffe0000 126M PCIe memory - 0xffe00000 -> 0xfff00000 1M PCIe I/O - 0xfff0000 -> 0xffffffff 1M BootROM And the memory mapping for the special case of the OpenBlocks AX3-4 (internal registers at 0xd0000000, NOR of 128 MB): - 0x00000000 -> 0xc0000000 3G RAM - 0xd0000000 -> 0xd1000000 1M internal registers - 0xe800000 -> 0xf0000000 128M NOR flash - 0xf1100000 -> 0xf1110000 64KB Crypto SRAM #0 - 0xf1110000 -> 0xf1120000 64KB Crypto SRAM #1 - 0xf8000000 -> 0xffe0000 126M PCIe memory - 0xffe00000 -> 0xfff00000 1M PCIe I/O - 0xfff0000 -> 0xffffffff 1M BootROM Fixes: c466d99 ("ARM: mvebu: define crypto SRAM ranges for all armada-xp boards") Reported-by: Phil Sutter <[email protected]> Cc: Phil Sutter <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <[email protected]> Acked-by: Gregory CLEMENT <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <[email protected]>

…kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm Pull libnvdimm fixes from Ross Zwisler: "Two fixes: - Fix memcpy_from_pmem() to fallback to memcpy() for architectures where CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API=n. - Add a comment explaining why we write data twice when clearing poison in pmem_do_bvec(). This has passed a boot test on an X86_32 config, which was the architecture where issue #1 above was first noticed" Dan Williams adds: "We're giving this multi-maintainer setup a shot, so expect libnvdimm pull requests from either Ross or I going forward" * 'libnvdimm-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm: libnvdimm, pmem: clarify the write+clear_poison+write flow pmem: fix BUG() error in pmem.h:48 on X86_32

intel_pipe_will_have_type() doesn't just look at the passied in pipe_config, instead it expects there to be a full atomic state behind it. Obviously that won't go so well when vlv_force_pll_on() just uses a temp pipe_config. Fix things by using pipe_config->has_dsi_encoder instead intel_pipe_will_have_type(INTEL_OUTPUT_DSI) to check if we need to actually enable the DPLL. Here's an example oops for reference: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000030 IP: [<ffffffffa0389a5b>] intel_pipe_will_have_type+0x15/0x7b [i915] PGD 7acda067 PUD 72696067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm intel_gtt agpgart netconsole psmouse atkbd iTCO_wdt libps2 coretemp hwmon efi_pstore intel_rapl punit_atom_debug efivars pcspkr i2c_i801 r8169 lpc_ich mii processor_thermal_device snd_soc_rt5670 intel_soc_dts_iosf snd_soc_rl6231 i2c_hid hid snd_intel_sst_acpi snd_intel_sst_core snd_soc_sst_mfld_platform snd_soc_sst_match snd_soc_core i8042 serio snd_compress snd_pcm snd_timer snd i2c_designware_platform sdhci_acpi i2c_designware_core soundcore sdhci pwm_lpss_platform mmc_core pwm_lpss spi_pxa2xx_platform evdev int3403_thermal int3400_thermal int340x_thermal_zone acpi_thermal_rel sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables ipv6 autofs4 CPU: 3 PID: 290 Comm: Xorg Tainted: G U 4.6.0-rc4-bsw+ #2876 Hardware name: Intel Corporation CHERRYVIEW C0 PLATFORM/Braswell CRB, BIOS BRAS.X64.X088.R00.1510270350 10/27/2015 task: ffff88007a8dd200 ti: ffff880173ac4000 task.ti: ffff880173ac4000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0389a5b>] [<ffffffffa0389a5b>] intel_pipe_will_have_type+0x15/0x7b [i915] RSP: 0018:ffff880173ac7928 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880176594000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000009 RDI: ffff880176594000 RBP: ffff880173ac7930 R08: 0000000000019290 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff880173ac7890 R11: 00000000000080cf R12: ffff88017fbd4000 R13: ffffffffa03e3c44 R14: ffff88007492c000 R15: ffff88007492c000 FS: 00007ff8936a6940(0000) GS:ffff88017ef80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 0000000177e08000 CR4: 00000000001006e0 Stack: ffff880176594000 ffff880173ac7948 ffffffffa0389b42 ffff880176594000 ffff880173ac7978 ffffffffa0396e02 ffff8801765b0000 ffff88007af660d8 0000000000000000 0000000000000004 ffff880173ac79c0 ffffffffa03b6b64 Call Trace: [<ffffffffa0389b42>] chv_compute_dpll.isra.39+0x33/0x55 [i915] [<ffffffffa0396e02>] vlv_force_pll_on+0x80/0xc6 [i915] [<ffffffffa03b6b64>] vlv_power_sequencer_pipe+0x29b/0x3dd [i915] [<ffffffffa03b6cd4>] _pp_stat_reg+0x2e/0x38 [i915] [<ffffffffa03b6dc1>] wait_panel_status+0x4c/0x1ec [i915] [<ffffffffa03b6fcb>] wait_panel_power_cycle+0x6a/0xb4 [i915] [<ffffffffa03b70da>] edp_panel_vdd_on+0xc5/0x1d1 [i915] [<ffffffffa03b861b>] intel_dp_aux_ch+0x55/0x572 [i915] [<ffffffff810af5c8>] ? mark_held_locks+0x5d/0x74 [<ffffffff81518e61>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x321/0x346 [<ffffffff81094007>] ? preempt_count_sub+0xf2/0x102 [<ffffffffa03b8cb4>] intel_dp_aux_transfer+0x17c/0x1b5 [i915] [<ffffffffa03028ef>] drm_dp_dpcd_access+0x62/0xed [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa0302995>] drm_dp_dpcd_read+0x1b/0x1f [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa03b5147>] intel_dp_dpcd_read_wake+0x31/0x69 [i915] [<ffffffffa03bb36a>] intel_dp_long_pulse+0x15f/0x5ed [i915] [<ffffffffa03bbb09>] intel_dp_detect+0x79/0x95 [i915] [<ffffffffa030340e>] drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0xc7/0x3db [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa029de23>] drm_mode_getconnector+0xe9/0x333 [drm] [<ffffffff810b1cfb>] ? lock_acquire+0x137/0x1df [<ffffffffa0292364>] drm_ioctl+0x266/0x3ae [drm] [<ffffffffa029dd3a>] ? drm_mode_getcrtc+0x126/0x126 [drm] [<ffffffff811af082>] vfs_ioctl+0x18/0x34 [<ffffffff811af682>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x547/0x5fe [<ffffffff811b9acb>] ? __fget_light+0x62/0x71 [<ffffffff811af77c>] SyS_ioctl+0x43/0x61 [<ffffffff81001a82>] do_syscall_64+0x63/0xf8 [<ffffffff8151bc9a>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Code: 35 00 40 a0 e8 97 4b ce e0 b8 17 00 00 00 5d c3 b8 17 00 00 00 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 31 c0 31 d2 48 89 e5 53 48 8b 8f e8 01 00 00 <44> 8b 49 30 41 39 c1 7e 2d 4c 8b 51 38 4c 8b 41 40 49 83 3c c2 RIP [<ffffffffa0389a5b>] intel_pipe_will_have_type+0x15/0x7b [i915] RSP <ffff880173ac7928> CR2: 0000000000000030 The regressing patch wasn't exactly new (as in first posted more than six months ago), so I'm a bit baffled how I didn't manage to hit this myself so far. Cc: Jani Nikula <[email protected]> Cc: Marius Vlad <[email protected]> Reported-by: Marius Vlad <[email protected]> Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=94995 Fixes: cd2d34d ("drm/i915: Setup DPLL/DPLLMD for DSI too on VLV/CHV") Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]> Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Tested-by: Marius Vlad <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jani Nikula <[email protected]>

Xiao Ni reported below crash: [26396.335146] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000002a8 [26396.342990] IP: [<ffffffffa0425b00>] super_written+0x20/0x80 [md_mod] [26396.349449] PGD 0 [26396.351468] Oops: 0002 [plbossart#1] SMP [26396.354898] Modules linked in: ext4 mbcache jbd2 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor xor async_td [26396.408404] CPU: 5 PID: 3261 Comm: loop0 Not tainted 4.5.0 plbossart#1 [26396.414140] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R715/0G2DP3, BIOS 3.2.2 09/15/2014 [26396.421608] task: ffff8808339be680 ti: ffff8808365f4000 task.ti: ffff8808365f4000 [26396.429074] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0425b00>] [<ffffffffa0425b00>] super_written+0x20/0x80 [md_mod] [26396.437952] RSP: 0018:ffff8808365f7c38 EFLAGS: 00010046 [26396.443252] RAX: ffffffffa0425ae0 RBX: ffff8804336a7900 RCX: ffffe8f9f7b41198 [26396.450371] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8804336a7900 [26396.457489] RBP: ffff8808365f7c50 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 00001801e02ce3d7 [26396.464608] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [26396.471728] R13: ffff8808338d9a00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff880833f9fe00 [26396.478849] FS: 00007f9e5066d740(0000) GS:ffff880237b40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [26396.486922] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [26396.492656] CR2: 00000000000002a8 CR3: 00000000019ea000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [26396.499775] Stack: [26396.501781] ffff8804336a7900 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff8808365f7c68 [26396.509199] ffffffff81308cd0 ffff8804336a7900 ffff8808365f7ca8 ffffffff81310637 [26396.516618] 00000000a0233a00 ffff880833f9fe00 0000000000000000 ffff880833fb0000 [26396.524038] Call Trace: [26396.526485] [<ffffffff81308cd0>] bio_endio+0x40/0x60 [26396.531529] [<ffffffff81310637>] blk_update_request+0x87/0x320 [26396.537439] [<ffffffff8131a20a>] blk_mq_end_request+0x1a/0x70 [26396.543261] [<ffffffff81313889>] blk_flush_complete_seq+0xd9/0x2a0 [26396.549517] [<ffffffff81313ccf>] flush_end_io+0x15f/0x240 [26396.554993] [<ffffffff8131a22a>] blk_mq_end_request+0x3a/0x70 [26396.560815] [<ffffffff8131a314>] __blk_mq_complete_request+0xb4/0xe0 [26396.567246] [<ffffffff8131a35c>] blk_mq_complete_request+0x1c/0x20 [26396.573506] [<ffffffffa04182df>] loop_queue_work+0x6f/0x72c [loop] [26396.579764] [<ffffffff81697844>] ? __schedule+0x2b4/0x8f0 [26396.585242] [<ffffffff810a7812>] kthread_worker_fn+0x52/0x170 [26396.591065] [<ffffffff810a77c0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1a0/0x1a0 [26396.597582] [<ffffffff810a7238>] kthread+0xd8/0xf0 [26396.602453] [<ffffffff810a7160>] ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60 [26396.607929] [<ffffffff8169bdcf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 [26396.613319] [<ffffffff810a7160>] ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60 md_super_write() and corresponding md_super_wait() generally are called with reconfig_mutex locked, which prevents disk disappears. There is one case this rule is broken. write_sb_page of bitmap.c doesn't hold the mutex. next_active_rdev does increase rdev reference, but it decreases the reference too early (eg, before IO finish). disk can disappear at the window. We unconditionally increase rdev reference in md_super_write() to avoid the race. Reported-and-tested-by: Xiao Ni <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Neil Brown <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <[email protected]>

If we rename an inode A (be it a file or a directory), create a new inode B with the old name of inode A and under the same parent directory, fsync inode B and then power fail, at log tree replay time we end up removing inode A completely. If inode A is a directory then all its files are gone too. Example scenarios where this happens: This is reproducible with the following steps, taken from a couple of test cases written for fstests which are going to be submitted upstream soon: # Scenario 1 mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdc mount /dev/sdc /mnt mkdir -p /mnt/a/x echo "hello" > /mnt/a/x/foo echo "world" > /mnt/a/x/bar sync mv /mnt/a/x /mnt/a/y mkdir /mnt/a/x xfs_io -c fsync /mnt/a/x <power failure happens> The next time the fs is mounted, log tree replay happens and the directory "y" does not exist nor do the files "foo" and "bar" exist anywhere (neither in "y" nor in "x", nor the root nor anywhere). # Scenario 2 mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdc mount /dev/sdc /mnt mkdir /mnt/a echo "hello" > /mnt/a/foo sync mv /mnt/a/foo /mnt/a/bar echo "world" > /mnt/a/foo xfs_io -c fsync /mnt/a/foo <power failure happens> The next time the fs is mounted, log tree replay happens and the file "bar" does not exists anymore. A file with the name "foo" exists and it matches the second file we created. Another related problem that does not involve file/data loss is when a new inode is created with the name of a deleted snapshot and we fsync it: mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdc mount /dev/sdc /mnt mkdir /mnt/testdir btrfs subvolume snapshot /mnt /mnt/testdir/snap btrfs subvolume delete /mnt/testdir/snap rmdir /mnt/testdir mkdir /mnt/testdir xfs_io -c fsync /mnt/testdir # or fsync some file inside /mnt/testdir <power failure> The next time the fs is mounted the log replay procedure fails because it attempts to delete the snapshot entry (which has dir item key type of BTRFS_ROOT_ITEM_KEY) as if it were a regular (non-root) entry, resulting in the following error that causes mount to fail: [52174.510532] BTRFS info (device dm-0): failed to delete reference to snap, inode 257 parent 257 [52174.512570] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [52174.513278] WARNING: CPU: 12 PID: 28024 at fs/btrfs/inode.c:3986 __btrfs_unlink_inode+0x178/0x351 [btrfs]() [52174.514681] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -2) [52174.515630] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_flakey dm_mod overlay crc32c_generic ppdev xor raid6_pq acpi_cpufreq parport_pc tpm_tis sg parport tpm evdev i2c_piix4 proc [52174.521568] CPU: 12 PID: 28024 Comm: mount Tainted: G W 4.5.0-rc6-btrfs-next-27+ plbossart#1 [52174.522805] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [52174.524053] 0000000000000000 ffff8801df2a7710 ffffffff81264e93 ffff8801df2a7758 [52174.524053] 0000000000000009 ffff8801df2a7748 ffffffff81051618 ffffffffa03591cd [52174.524053] 00000000fffffffe ffff88015e6e5000 ffff88016dbc3c88 ffff88016dbc3c88 [52174.524053] Call Trace: [52174.524053] [<ffffffff81264e93>] dump_stack+0x67/0x90 [52174.524053] [<ffffffff81051618>] warn_slowpath_common+0x99/0xb2 [52174.524053] [<ffffffffa03591cd>] ? __btrfs_unlink_inode+0x178/0x351 [btrfs] [52174.524053] [<ffffffff81051679>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x48/0x50 [52174.524053] [<ffffffffa03591cd>] __btrfs_unlink_inode+0x178/0x351 [btrfs] [52174.524053] [<ffffffff8118f5e9>] ? iput+0xb0/0x284 [52174.524053] [<ffffffffa0359fe8>] btrfs_unlink_inode+0x1c/0x3d [btrfs] [52174.524053] [<ffffffffa038631e>] check_item_in_log+0x1fe/0x29b [btrfs] [52174.524053] [<ffffffffa0386522>] replay_dir_deletes+0x167/0x1cf [btrfs] [52174.524053] [<ffffffffa038739e>] fixup_inode_link_count+0x289/0x2aa [btrfs] [52174.524053] [<ffffffffa038748a>] fixup_inode_link_counts+0xcb/0x105 [btrfs] [52174.524053] [<ffffffffa038a5ec>] btrfs_recover_log_trees+0x258/0x32c [btrfs] [52174.524053] [<ffffffffa03885b2>] ? replay_one_extent+0x511/0x511 [btrfs] [52174.524053] [<ffffffffa034f288>] open_ctree+0x1dd4/0x21b9 [btrfs] [52174.524053] [<ffffffffa032b753>] btrfs_mount+0x97e/0xaed [btrfs] [52174.524053] [<ffffffff8108e1b7>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0xf [52174.524053] [<ffffffff8117bafa>] mount_fs+0x67/0x131 [52174.524053] [<ffffffff81193003>] vfs_kern_mount+0x6c/0xde [52174.524053] [<ffffffffa032af81>] btrfs_mount+0x1ac/0xaed [btrfs] [52174.524053] [<ffffffff8108e1b7>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0xf [52174.524053] [<ffffffff8108c262>] ? lockdep_init_map+0xb9/0x1b3 [52174.524053] [<ffffffff8117bafa>] mount_fs+0x67/0x131 [52174.524053] [<ffffffff81193003>] vfs_kern_mount+0x6c/0xde [52174.524053] [<ffffffff8119590f>] do_mount+0x8a6/0x9e8 [52174.524053] [<ffffffff811358dd>] ? strndup_user+0x3f/0x59 [52174.524053] [<ffffffff81195c65>] SyS_mount+0x77/0x9f [52174.524053] [<ffffffff814935d7>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6b [52174.561288] ---[ end trace 6b53049efb1a3ea6 ]--- Fix this by forcing a transaction commit when such cases happen. This means we check in the commit root of the subvolume tree if there was any other inode with the same reference when the inode we are fsync'ing is a new inode (created in the current transaction). Test cases for fstests, covering all the scenarios given above, were submitted upstream for fstests: * fstests: generic test for fsync after renaming directory https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/8694281/ * fstests: generic test for fsync after renaming file https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/8694301/ * fstests: add btrfs test for fsync after snapshot deletion https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/8670671/ Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]>

commit e2c8b87 moved modeset locking inside resume/suspend functions, but missed a code path only executed on lid close/open on older hardware. The result was a deadlock when closing and opening the lid without suspending on such hardware: ============================================= [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 4.6.0-rc1 torvalds#385 Not tainted --------------------------------------------- kworker/0:3/88 is trying to acquire lock: (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa063e6a4>] intel_display_resume+0x4a/0x12f [i915] but task is already holding lock: (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa02d0d4f>] drm_modeset_lock_all+0x3e/0xa6 [drm] other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex); lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 7 locks held by kworker/0:3/88: #0: ("kacpi_notify"){++++.+}, at: [<ffffffff81068dfc>] process_one_work+0x14a/0x50b plbossart#1: ((&dpc->work)plbossart#2){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81068dfc>] process_one_work+0x14a/0x50b plbossart#2: ((acpi_lid_notifier).rwsem){++++.+}, at: [<ffffffff8106f874>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x34/0x65 plbossart#3: (&dev_priv->modeset_restore_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa0664cf6>] intel_lid_notify+0x3c/0xd9 [i915] plbossart#4: (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa02d0d4f>] drm_modeset_lock_all+0x3e/0xa6 [drm] plbossart#5: (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa02d0d59>] drm_modeset_lock_all+0x48/0xa6 [drm] plbossart#6: (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa02d0b2a>] modeset_lock+0x13c/0x1cd [drm] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 88 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 4.6.0-rc1 torvalds#385 Hardware name: LENOVO 2776LEG/2776LEG, BIOS 6EET55WW (3.15 ) 12/19/2011 Workqueue: kacpi_notify acpi_os_execute_deferred 0000000000000000 ffff88022fd5f990 ffffffff8124af06 ffffffff825b39c0 ffffffff825b39c0 ffff88022fd5fa60 ffffffff8108f547 ffff88022fd5fa70 000000008108e817 ffff880230236cc0 0000000000000000 ffffffff825b39c0 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8124af06>] dump_stack+0x67/0x90 [<ffffffff8108f547>] __lock_acquire+0xdb5/0xf71 [<ffffffff8108bd2c>] ? look_up_lock_class+0xbe/0x10a [<ffffffff8108fae2>] lock_acquire+0x137/0x1cb [<ffffffff8108fae2>] ? lock_acquire+0x137/0x1cb [<ffffffffa063e6a4>] ? intel_display_resume+0x4a/0x12f [i915] [<ffffffff8148202f>] mutex_lock_nested+0x7e/0x3a4 [<ffffffffa063e6a4>] ? intel_display_resume+0x4a/0x12f [i915] [<ffffffffa063e6a4>] ? intel_display_resume+0x4a/0x12f [i915] [<ffffffffa02d0b2a>] ? modeset_lock+0x13c/0x1cd [drm] [<ffffffffa063e6a4>] intel_display_resume+0x4a/0x12f [i915] [<ffffffffa063e6a4>] ? intel_display_resume+0x4a/0x12f [i915] [<ffffffffa02d0b2a>] ? modeset_lock+0x13c/0x1cd [drm] [<ffffffffa02d0b2a>] ? modeset_lock+0x13c/0x1cd [drm] [<ffffffffa02d0bf7>] ? drm_modeset_lock+0x17/0x24 [drm] [<ffffffffa02d0c8b>] ? drm_modeset_lock_all_ctx+0x87/0xa1 [drm] [<ffffffffa0664d6a>] intel_lid_notify+0xb0/0xd9 [i915] [<ffffffff8106f4c6>] notifier_call_chain+0x4a/0x6c [<ffffffff8106f88d>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x4d/0x65 [<ffffffff8106f8b9>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x14/0x16 [<ffffffffa0011215>] acpi_lid_send_state+0x83/0xad [button] [<ffffffffa00112a6>] acpi_button_notify+0x41/0x132 [button] [<ffffffff812b07df>] acpi_device_notify+0x19/0x1b [<ffffffff812c8570>] acpi_ev_notify_dispatch+0x49/0x64 [<ffffffff812ab9fb>] acpi_os_execute_deferred+0x14/0x20 [<ffffffff81068f17>] process_one_work+0x265/0x50b [<ffffffff810696f5>] worker_thread+0x1fc/0x2dd [<ffffffff810694f9>] ? rescuer_thread+0x309/0x309 [<ffffffff810694f9>] ? rescuer_thread+0x309/0x309 [<ffffffff8106e2d6>] kthread+0xe0/0xe8 [<ffffffff8107bc47>] ? local_clock+0x19/0x22 [<ffffffff81484f42>] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x40 [<ffffffff8106e1f6>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1b5/0x1b5 Fixes: e2c8b87 ("drm/i915: Use atomic helpers for suspend, v2.") Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <[email protected]> Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 9f54d4b) Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <[email protected]>

If a BUG_ON() can be hit in the wild, it shouldn't be a BUG_ON() For reference, this has popped up once in the CI, and we'll need more info to debug it: 03240 ------------[ cut here ]------------ 03240 kernel BUG at lib/closure.c:21! 03240 kernel BUG at lib/closure.c:21! 03240 Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP 03240 Modules linked in: 03240 CPU: 15 PID: 40534 Comm: kworker/u80:1 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc4-ktest-ga56da69799bd #25570 03240 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) 03240 Workqueue: btree_update btree_interior_update_work 03240 pstate: 00001005 (nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT +SSBS BTYPE=--) 03240 pc : closure_put+0x224/0x2a0 03240 lr : closure_put+0x24/0x2a0 03240 sp : ffff0000d12071c0 03240 x29: ffff0000d12071c0 x28: dfff800000000000 x27: ffff0000d1207360 03240 x26: 0000000000000040 x25: 0000000000000040 x24: 0000000000000040 03240 x23: ffff0000c1f20180 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff0000c1f20168 03240 x20: 0000000040000000 x19: ffff0000c1f20140 x18: 0000000000000001 03240 x17: 0000000000003aa0 x16: 0000000000003ad0 x15: 1fffe0001c326974 03240 x14: 0000000000000a1e x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 1fffe000183e402d 03240 x11: ffff6000183e402d x10: dfff800000000000 x9 : ffff6000183e402e 03240 x8 : 0000000000000001 x7 : 00009fffe7c1bfd3 x6 : ffff0000c1f2016b 03240 x5 : ffff0000c1f20168 x4 : ffff6000183e402e x3 : ffff800081391954 03240 x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 00000000a8000000 03240 Call trace: 03240 closure_put+0x224/0x2a0 03240 bch2_check_for_deadlock+0x910/0x1028 03240 bch2_six_check_for_deadlock+0x1c/0x30 03240 six_lock_slowpath.isra.0+0x29c/0xed0 03240 six_lock_ip_waiter+0xa8/0xf8 03240 __bch2_btree_node_lock_write+0x14c/0x298 03240 bch2_trans_lock_write+0x6d4/0xb10 03240 __bch2_trans_commit+0x135c/0x5520 03240 btree_interior_update_work+0x1248/0x1c10 03240 process_scheduled_works+0x53c/0xd90 03240 worker_thread+0x370/0x8c8 03240 kthread+0x258/0x2e8 03240 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 03240 Code: aa1303e0 d63f0020 a94363f7 17ffff8c (d4210000) 03240 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- 03240 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception 03240 SMP: stopping secondary CPUs 03241 SMP: failed to stop secondary CPUs 13,15 03241 Kernel Offset: disabled 03241 CPU features: 0x00,00000003,80000008,4240500b 03241 Memory Limit: none 03241 ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception ]--- 03246 ========= FAILED TIMEOUT copygc_torture_no_checksum in 7200s Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <[email protected]>

8efcd48 ("ASoC: Intel: sof_rt5682: use common module for sof_card_private initialization") migrated the pin assignment in the context struct up to soc-acpi-intel-ssp-common.c. This uses a lookup table to see if a device has a amp/codec before assigning the pin. The issue here arises when combination parts that serve both (with 2 ports) are used. sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1f.3/adl_rt5682_def/SSP0-Codec' CPU: 1 PID: 2079 Comm: udevd Tainted: G U 6.6.36-03391-g744739e00023 #1 3be1a2880a0970f65545a957db7d08ef4b3e2c0d Hardware name: Google Anraggar/Anraggar, BIOS Google_Anraggar.15217.552.0 05/07/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x69/0xa0 sysfs_warn_dup+0x5b/0x70 sysfs_create_dir_ns+0xb0/0x100 kobject_add_internal+0x133/0x3c0 kobject_add+0x66/0xb0 ? device_add+0x65/0x780 device_add+0x164/0x780 snd_soc_add_pcm_runtimes+0x2fa/0x800 snd_soc_bind_card+0x35e/0xc20 devm_snd_soc_register_card+0x48/0x90 platform_probe+0x7b/0xb0 really_probe+0xf7/0x2a0 ... kobject: kobject_add_internal failed for SSP0-Codec with -EEXIST, don't try to register things with the same name in the same directory. The issue is that the ALC5650 was only defined in the codec table and not the amp table which left the pin unassigned but the dai link was still created by the machine driver. Also patch the suffix filename code for the topology to prevent double suffix names as a result of this change. Fixes: 8efcd48 ("ASoC: Intel: sof_rt5682: use common module for sof_card_private initialization") Signed-off-by: Curtis Malainey <[email protected]>

The panic below is observed when receiving ICMP packets with secmark set while an ICMP raw socket is being created. SK_CTX(sk)->label is updated in apparmor_socket_post_create(), but the packet is delivered to the socket before that, causing the null pointer dereference. Drop the packet if label context is not set. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000004c #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 407 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.4.12-arch1-1 #1 3e6fa2753a2d75925c34ecb78e22e85a65d083df Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/28/2020 RIP: 0010:aa_label_next_confined+0xb/0x40 Code: 00 00 48 89 ef e8 d5 25 0c 00 e9 66 ff ff ff 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 66 0f 1f 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 89 f0 <8b> 77 4c 39 c6 7e 1f 48 63 d0 48 8d 14 d7 eb 0b 83 c0 01 48 83 c2 RSP: 0018:ffffa92940003b08 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000000000e RDX: ffffa92940003be8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff8b57471e7800 R08: ffff8b574c642400 R09: 0000000000000002 R10: ffffffffbd820eeb R11: ffffffffbeb7ff00 R12: ffff8b574c642400 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fb092ea7640(0000) GS:ffff8b577bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000000004c CR3: 00000001020f2005 CR4: 00000000007706f0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? __die+0x23/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4e0 ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x180 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? aa_label_next_confined+0xb/0x40 apparmor_secmark_check+0xec/0x330 security_sock_rcv_skb+0x35/0x50 sk_filter_trim_cap+0x47/0x250 sock_queue_rcv_skb_reason+0x20/0x60 raw_rcv+0x13c/0x210 raw_local_deliver+0x1f3/0x250 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x4f/0x2f0 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x76/0xa0 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x89/0xa0 netif_receive_skb+0x119/0x170 ? __netdev_alloc_skb+0x3d/0x140 vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete+0xb23/0x1010 [vmxnet3 56a84f9c97178c57a43a24ec073b45a9d6f01f3a] vmxnet3_poll_rx_only+0x36/0xb0 [vmxnet3 56a84f9c97178c57a43a24ec073b45a9d6f01f3a] __napi_poll+0x28/0x1b0 net_rx_action+0x2a4/0x380 __do_softirq+0xd1/0x2c8 __irq_exit_rcu+0xbb/0xf0 common_interrupt+0x86/0xa0 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40 RIP: 0010:apparmor_socket_post_create+0xb/0x200 Code: 08 48 85 ff 75 a1 eb b1 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 <55> 48 89 fd 53 45 85 c0 0f 84 b2 00 00 00 48 8b 1d 80 56 3f 02 48 RSP: 0018:ffffa92940ce7e50 EFLAGS: 00000286 RAX: ffffffffbc756440 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffff8b574eaab740 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff8b57444cec70 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000003 R13: 0000000000000002 R14: ffff8b574eaab740 R15: ffffffffbd8e4748 ? __pfx_apparmor_socket_post_create+0x10/0x10 security_socket_post_create+0x4b/0x80 __sock_create+0x176/0x1f0 __sys_socket+0x89/0x100 __x64_sys_socket+0x17/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc Fixes: ab9f211 ("apparmor: Allow filtering based on secmark policy") Signed-off-by: Xiao Liang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>

Commit 8efcd48 ("ASoC: Intel: sof_rt5682: use common module for sof_card_private initialization") migrated the pin assignment in the context struct up to soc-acpi-intel-ssp-common.c. This uses a lookup table to see if a device has a amp/codec before assigning the pin. The issue here arises when combination parts that serve both (with 2 ports) are used. sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1f.3/adl_rt5682_def/SSP0-Codec' CPU: 1 PID: 2079 Comm: udevd Tainted: G U 6.6.36-03391-g744739e00023 #1 3be1a2880a0970f65545a957db7d08ef4b3e2c0d Hardware name: Google Anraggar/Anraggar, BIOS Google_Anraggar.15217.552.0 05/07/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x69/0xa0 sysfs_warn_dup+0x5b/0x70 sysfs_create_dir_ns+0xb0/0x100 kobject_add_internal+0x133/0x3c0 kobject_add+0x66/0xb0 ? device_add+0x65/0x780 device_add+0x164/0x780 snd_soc_add_pcm_runtimes+0x2fa/0x800 snd_soc_bind_card+0x35e/0xc20 devm_snd_soc_register_card+0x48/0x90 platform_probe+0x7b/0xb0 really_probe+0xf7/0x2a0 ... kobject: kobject_add_internal failed for SSP0-Codec with -EEXIST, don't try to register things with the same name in the same directory. The issue is that the ALC5650 was only defined in the codec table and not the amp table which left the pin unassigned but the dai link was still created by the machine driver. Also patch the suffix filename code for the topology to prevent double suffix names as a result of this change. Fixes: 8efcd48 ("ASoC: Intel: sof_rt5682: use common module for sof_card_private initialization") Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Curtis Malainey <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>

This just standardizes the use of MIN() and MAX() macros, with the very traditional semantics. The goal is to use these for C constant expressions and for top-level / static initializers, and so be able to simplify the min()/max() macros. These macro names were used by various kernel code - they are very traditional, after all - and all such users have been fixed up, with a few different approaches: - trivial duplicated macro definitions have been removed Note that 'trivial' here means that it's obviously kernel code that already included all the major kernel headers, and thus gets the new generic MIN/MAX macros automatically. - non-trivial duplicated macro definitions are guarded with #ifndef This is the "yes, they define their own versions, but no, the include situation is not entirely obvious, and maybe they don't get the generic version automatically" case. - strange use case #1 A couple of drivers decided that the way they want to describe their versioning is with #define MAJ 1 #define MIN 2 #define DRV_VERSION __stringify(MAJ) "." __stringify(MIN) which adds zero value and I just did my Alexander the Great impersonation, and rewrote that pointless Gordian knot as #define DRV_VERSION "1.2" instead. - strange use case #2 A couple of drivers thought that it's a good idea to have a random 'MIN' or 'MAX' define for a value or index into a table, rather than the traditional macro that takes arguments. These values were re-written as C enum's instead. The new function-line macros only expand when followed by an open parenthesis, and thus don't clash with enum use. Happily, there weren't really all that many of these cases, and a lot of users already had the pattern of using '#ifndef' guarding (or in one case just using '#undef MIN') before defining their own private version that does the same thing. I left such cases alone. Cc: David Laight <[email protected]> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

…pinlock_t' This lock is acquired under irq_desc::lock with interrupts disabled. When PREEMPT_RT is enabled, 'spinlock_t' becomes preemptible, which results in invalid lock acquire context; [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] swapper/0/1 is trying to lock: ffff0000008fed30 (&ctl->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: meson_gpio_irq_update_bits0 other info that might help us debug this: context-{5:5} 3 locks held by swapper/0/1: #0: ffff0000003cd0f8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __driver_attach+0x90c #1: ffff000004714650 (&desc->request_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq0 #2: ffff0000047144c8 (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq0 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.9.9-sdkernel #1 Call trace: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x60/0x88 meson_gpio_irq_update_bits+0x34/0x70 meson8_gpio_irq_set_type+0x78/0xc4 meson_gpio_irq_set_type+0x30/0x60 __irq_set_trigger+0x60/0x180 __setup_irq+0x30c/0x6e0 request_threaded_irq+0xec/0x1a4 Fixes: 215f4cc ("irqchip/meson: Add support for gpio interrupt controller") Signed-off-by: Arseniy Krasnov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]

The btrfs buffered write path runs through __extent_writepage() which has some tricky return value handling for writepage_delalloc(). Specifically, when that returns 1, we exit, but for other return values we continue and end up calling btrfs_folio_end_all_writers(). If the folio has been unlocked (note that we check the PageLocked bit at the start of __extent_writepage()), this results in an assert panic like this one from syzbot: BTRFS: error (device loop0 state EAL) in free_log_tree:3267: errno=-5 IO failure BTRFS warning (device loop0 state EAL): Skipping commit of aborted transaction. BTRFS: error (device loop0 state EAL) in cleanup_transaction:2018: errno=-5 IO failure assertion failed: folio_test_locked(folio), in fs/btrfs/subpage.c:871 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/subpage.c:871! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 1 PID: 5090 Comm: syz-executor225 Not tainted 6.10.0-syzkaller-05505-gb1bc554e009e #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/27/2024 RIP: 0010:btrfs_folio_end_all_writers+0x55b/0x610 fs/btrfs/subpage.c:871 Code: e9 d3 fb ff ff e8 25 22 c2 fd 48 c7 c7 c0 3c 0e 8c 48 c7 c6 80 3d 0e 8c 48 c7 c2 60 3c 0e 8c b9 67 03 00 00 e8 66 47 ad 07 90 <0f> 0b e8 6e 45 b0 07 4c 89 ff be 08 00 00 00 e8 21 12 25 fe 4c 89 RSP: 0018:ffffc900033d72e0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000045 RBX: 00fff0000000402c RCX: 663b7a08c50a0a00 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffc900033d73b0 R08: ffffffff8176b98c R09: 1ffff9200067adfc R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff5200067adfd R12: 0000000000000001 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffea0001cbee80 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f5f076012f8 CR3: 000000000e134000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> __extent_writepage fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:1597 [inline] extent_write_cache_pages fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:2251 [inline] btrfs_writepages+0x14d7/0x2760 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:2373 do_writepages+0x359/0x870 mm/page-writeback.c:2656 filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x125/0x180 mm/filemap.c:397 __filemap_fdatawrite_range mm/filemap.c:430 [inline] __filemap_fdatawrite mm/filemap.c:436 [inline] filemap_flush+0xdf/0x130 mm/filemap.c:463 btrfs_release_file+0x117/0x130 fs/btrfs/file.c:1547 __fput+0x24a/0x8a0 fs/file_table.c:422 task_work_run+0x24f/0x310 kernel/task_work.c:222 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:40 [inline] do_exit+0xa2f/0x27f0 kernel/exit.c:877 do_group_exit+0x207/0x2c0 kernel/exit.c:1026 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1037 [inline] __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1035 [inline] __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1035 x64_sys_call+0x2634/0x2640 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:232 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f5f075b70c9 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f5f075b709f. I was hitting the same issue by doing hundreds of accelerated runs of generic/475, which also hits IO errors by design. I instrumented that reproducer with bpftrace and found that the undesirable folio_unlock was coming from the following callstack: folio_unlock+5 __process_pages_contig+475 cow_file_range_inline.constprop.0+230 cow_file_range+803 btrfs_run_delalloc_range+566 writepage_delalloc+332 __extent_writepage # inlined in my stacktrace, but I added it here extent_write_cache_pages+622 Looking at the bisected-to patch in the syzbot report, Josef realized that the logic of the cow_file_range_inline error path subtly changing. In the past, on error, it jumped to out_unlock in cow_file_range(), which honors the locked_page, so when we ultimately call folio_end_all_writers(), the folio of interest is still locked. After the change, we always unlocked ignoring the locked_page, on both success and error. On the success path, this all results in returning 1 to __extent_writepage(), which skips the folio_end_all_writers() call, which makes it OK to have unlocked. Fix the bug by wiring the locked_page into cow_file_range_inline() and only setting locked_page to NULL on success. Reported-by: [email protected] Fixes: 0586d0a ("btrfs: move extent bit and page cleanup into cow_file_range_inline") CC: [email protected] # 6.10+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Boris Burkov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

In commit 15d9da3 ("binder: use bitmap for faster descriptor lookup"), it was incorrectly assumed that references to the context manager node should always get descriptor zero assigned to them. However, if the context manager dies and a new process takes its place, then assigning descriptor zero to the new context manager might lead to collisions, as there could still be references to the older node. This issue was reported by syzbot with the following trace: kernel BUG at drivers/android/binder.c:1173! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 447 Comm: binder-util Not tainted 6.10.0-rc6-00348-g31643d84b8c3 #10 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : binder_inc_ref_for_node+0x500/0x544 lr : binder_inc_ref_for_node+0x1e4/0x544 sp : ffff80008112b940 x29: ffff80008112b940 x28: ffff0e0e40310780 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000001 x25: ffff0e0e40310738 x24: ffff0e0e4089ba34 x23: ffff0e0e40310b00 x22: ffff80008112bb50 x21: ffffaf7b8f246970 x20: ffffaf7b8f773f08 x19: ffff0e0e4089b800 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 000000002de4aa60 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 2de4acf000000000 x12: 0000000000000020 x11: 0000000000000018 x10: 0000000000000020 x9 : ffffaf7b90601000 x8 : ffff0e0e48739140 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f x5 : ffff0e0e40310b28 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff0e0e40310720 x2 : ffff0e0e40310728 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0e0e40310710 Call trace: binder_inc_ref_for_node+0x500/0x544 binder_transaction+0xf68/0x2620 binder_thread_write+0x5bc/0x139c binder_ioctl+0xef4/0x10c8 [...] This patch adds back the previous behavior of assigning the next non-zero descriptor if references to previous context managers still exist. It amends both strategies, the newer dbitmap code and also the legacy slow_desc_lookup_olocked(), by allowing them to start looking for available descriptors at a given offset. Fixes: 15d9da3 ("binder: use bitmap for faster descriptor lookup") Cc: [email protected] Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

@Dev-

uevent_show() wants to de-reference dev->driver->name. There is no clean way for a device attribute to de-reference dev->driver unless that attribute is defined via (struct device_driver).dev_groups. Instead, the anti-pattern of taking the device_lock() in the attribute handler risks deadlocks with code paths that remove device attributes while holding the lock. This deadlock is typically invisible to lockdep given the device_lock() is marked lockdep_set_novalidate_class(), but some subsystems allocate a local lockdep key for @Dev->mutex to reveal reports of the form: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.10.0-rc7+ torvalds#275 Tainted: G OE N ------------------------------------------------------ modprobe/2374 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8c2270070de0 (kn->active#6){++++}-{0:0}, at: __kernfs_remove+0xde/0x220 but task is already holding lock: ffff8c22016e88f8 (&cxl_root_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x39/0x210 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&cxl_root_key){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x99/0xc30 uevent_show+0xac/0x130 dev_attr_show+0x18/0x40 sysfs_kf_seq_show+0xac/0xf0 seq_read_iter+0x110/0x450 vfs_read+0x25b/0x340 ksys_read+0x67/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x75/0x190 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #0 (kn->active#6){++++}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x121a/0x1fa0 lock_acquire+0xd6/0x2e0 kernfs_drain+0x1e9/0x200 __kernfs_remove+0xde/0x220 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x5e/0xa0 device_del+0x168/0x410 device_unregister+0x13/0x60 devres_release_all+0xb8/0x110 device_unbind_cleanup+0xe/0x70 device_release_driver_internal+0x1c7/0x210 driver_detach+0x47/0x90 bus_remove_driver+0x6c/0xf0 cxl_acpi_exit+0xc/0x11 [cxl_acpi] __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x181/0x260 do_syscall_64+0x75/0x190 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The observation though is that driver objects are typically much longer lived than device objects. It is reasonable to perform lockless de-reference of a @driver pointer even if it is racing detach from a device. Given the infrequency of driver unregistration, use synchronize_rcu() in module_remove_driver() to close any potential races. It is potentially overkill to suffer synchronize_rcu() just to handle the rare module removal racing uevent_show() event. Thanks to Tetsuo Handa for the debug analysis of the syzbot report [1]. Fixes: c0a4009 ("drivers: core: synchronize really_probe() and dev_uevent()") Reported-by: [email protected] Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]> Closes: http://lore.kernel.org/[email protected] [1] Link: http://lore.kernel.org/[email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: Ashish Sangwan <[email protected]> Cc: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]> Cc: Dirk Behme <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/172081332794.577428.9738802016494057132.stgit@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

We had a report that iptables-restore sometimes triggered null-ptr-deref at boot time. [0] The problem is that iptable_nat_table_init() is exposed to user space before the kernel fully initialises netns. In the small race window, a user could call iptable_nat_table_init() that accesses net_generic(net, iptable_nat_net_id), which is available only after registering iptable_nat_net_ops. Let's call register_pernet_subsys() before xt_register_template(). [0]: bpfilter: Loaded bpfilter_umh pid 11702 Started bpfilter BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000013 PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 2 PID: 11879 Comm: iptables-restor Not tainted 6.1.92-99.174.amzn2023.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Amazon EC2 c6i.4xlarge/, BIOS 1.0 10/16/2017 RIP: 0010:iptable_nat_table_init (net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_nat.c:87 net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_nat.c:121) iptable_nat Code: 10 4c 89 f6 48 89 ef e8 0b 19 bb ff 41 89 c4 85 c0 75 38 41 83 c7 01 49 83 c6 28 41 83 ff 04 75 dc 48 8b 44 24 08 48 8b 0c 24 <48> 89 08 4c 89 ef e8 a2 3b a2 cf 48 83 c4 10 44 89 e0 5b 5d 41 5c RSP: 0018:ffffbef902843cd0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000013 RBX: ffff9f4b052caa20 RCX: ffff9f4b20988d80 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000064 RDI: ffffffffc04201c0 RBP: ffff9f4b29394000 R08: ffff9f4b07f77258 R09: ffff9f4b07f77240 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff9f4b09635388 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff9f4b1a3c6c00 R14: ffff9f4b20988e20 R15: 0000000000000004 FS: 00007f6284340000(0000) GS:ffff9f51fe280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000013 CR3: 00000001d10a6005 CR4: 00000000007706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_trace_log_lvl (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:259) ? show_trace_log_lvl (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:259) ? xt_find_table_lock (net/netfilter/x_tables.c:1259) ? __die_body.cold (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:478 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:420) ? page_fault_oops (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:727) ? exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:40 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:75 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1470 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1518) ? asm_exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:570) ? iptable_nat_table_init (net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_nat.c:87 net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_nat.c:121) iptable_nat xt_find_table_lock (net/netfilter/x_tables.c:1259) xt_request_find_table_lock (net/netfilter/x_tables.c:1287) get_info (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:965) ? security_capable (security/security.c:809 (discriminator 13)) ? ns_capable (kernel/capability.c:376 kernel/capability.c:397) ? do_ipt_get_ctl (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1656) ? bpfilter_send_req (net/bpfilter/bpfilter_kern.c:52) bpfilter nf_getsockopt (net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:116) ip_getsockopt (net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1827) __sys_getsockopt (net/socket.c:2327) __x64_sys_getsockopt (net/socket.c:2342 net/socket.c:2339 net/socket.c:2339) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) RIP: 0033:0x7f62844685ee Code: 48 8b 0d 45 28 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 37 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 0a c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 15 09 RSP: 002b:00007ffd1f83d638 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000037 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd1f83d680 RCX: 00007f62844685ee RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 00007ffd1f83d670 R09: 0000558798ffa2a0 R10: 00007ffd1f83d680 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd1f83e3b2 R13: 00007f628455baa0 R14: 00007ffd1f83d7b0 R15: 00007f628457a008 </TASK> Modules linked in: iptable_nat(+) bpfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache veth xt_state xt_connmark xt_nat xt_statistic xt_MASQUERADE xt_mark xt_addrtype ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_chain_nat nf_nat xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_comment nft_compat nf_tables nfnetlink overlay nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel ena crypto_simd ptp cryptd i8042 pps_core serio button sunrpc sch_fq_codel configfs loop dm_mod fuse dax dmi_sysfs crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel efivarfs CR2: 0000000000000013 Fixes: fdacd57 ("netfilter: x_tables: never register tables by default") Reported-by: Takahiro Kawahara <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>

The carrier_lock spinlock protects the carrier detection. While it is held, framer_get_status() is called which in turn takes a mutex. This is not correct and can lead to a deadlock. A run with PROVE_LOCKING enabled detected the issue: [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] ... c204ddbc (&framer->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: framer_get_status+0x40/0x78 other info that might help us debug this: context-{4:4} 2 locks held by ifconfig/146: #0: c0926a38 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: devinet_ioctl+0x12c/0x664 #1: c2006a40 (&qmc_hdlc->carrier_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: qmc_hdlc_framer_set_carrier+0x30/0x98 Avoid the spinlock usage and convert carrier_lock to a mutex. Fixes: 5476291 ("net: wan: fsl_qmc_hdlc: Add framer support") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Herve Codina <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

…git/netfilter/nf Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net: Fix a possible null-ptr-deref sometimes triggered by iptables-restore at boot time. Register iptables {ipv4,ipv6} nat table pernet in first place to fix this issue. Patch #1 and #2 from Kuniyuki Iwashima. netfilter pull request 24-07-31 * tag 'nf-24-07-31' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf: netfilter: iptables: Fix potential null-ptr-deref in ip6table_nat_table_init(). netfilter: iptables: Fix null-ptr-deref in iptable_nat_table_init(). ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

The RISC-V kernel already has checks to ensure that memory which would lie outside of the linear mapping is not used. However those checks use memory_limit, which is used to implement the mem= kernel command line option (to limit the total amount of memory, not its address range). When memory is made up of two or more non-contiguous memory banks this check is incorrect. Two changes are made here: - add a call in setup_bootmem() to memblock_cap_memory_range() which will cause any memory which falls outside the linear mapping to be removed from the memory regions. - remove the check in create_linear_mapping_page_table() which was intended to remove memory which is outside the liner mapping based on memory_limit, as it is no longer needed. Note a check for mapping more memory than memory_limit (to implement mem=) is unnecessary because of the existing call to memblock_enforce_memory_limit(). This issue was seen when booting on a SV39 platform with two memory banks: 0x00,80000000 1GiB 0x20,00000000 32GiB This memory range is 158GiB from top to bottom, but the linear mapping is limited to 128GiB, so the lower block of RAM will be mapped at PAGE_OFFSET, and the upper block straddles the top of the linear mapping. This causes the following Oops: [ 0.000000] Linux version 6.10.0-rc2-gd3b8dd5b51dd-dirty ([email protected]) (riscv64-codasip-linux-gcc (GCC) 13.2.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils) 2.41.0.20231213) #20 SMP Sat Jun 22 11:34:22 BST 2024 [ 0.000000] memblock_add: [0x0000000080000000-0x00000000bfffffff] early_init_dt_add_memory_arch+0x4a/0x52 [ 0.000000] memblock_add: [0x0000002000000000-0x00000027ffffffff] early_init_dt_add_memory_arch+0x4a/0x52 ... [ 0.000000] memblock_alloc_try_nid: 23724 bytes align=0x8 nid=-1 from=0x0000000000000000 max_addr=0x0000000000000000 early_init_dt_alloc_memory_arch+0x1e/0x48 [ 0.000000] memblock_reserve: [0x00000027ffff5350-0x00000027ffffaffb] memblock_alloc_range_nid+0xb8/0x132 [ 0.000000] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffffffe7fff5350 [ 0.000000] Oops [#1] [ 0.000000] Modules linked in: [ 0.000000] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-gd3b8dd5b51dd-dirty #20 [ 0.000000] Hardware name: codasip,a70x (DT) [ 0.000000] epc : __memset+0x8c/0x104 [ 0.000000] ra : memblock_alloc_try_nid+0x74/0x84 [ 0.000000] epc : ffffffff805e88c8 ra : ffffffff806148f6 sp : ffffffff80e03d50 [ 0.000000] gp : ffffffff80ec4158 tp : ffffffff80e0bec0 t0 : fffffffe7fff52f8 [ 0.000000] t1 : 00000027ffffb000 t2 : 5f6b636f6c626d65 s0 : ffffffff80e03d90 [ 0.000000] s1 : 0000000000005cac a0 : fffffffe7fff5350 a1 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.000000] a2 : 0000000000005cac a3 : fffffffe7fffaff8 a4 : 000000000000002c [ 0.000000] a5 : ffffffff805e88c8 a6 : 0000000000005cac a7 : 0000000000000030 [ 0.000000] s2 : fffffffe7fff5350 s3 : ffffffffffffffff s4 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.000000] s5 : ffffffff8062347e s6 : 0000000000000000 s7 : 0000000000000001 [ 0.000000] s8 : 0000000000002000 s9 : 00000000800226d0 s10: 0000000000000000 [ 0.000000] s11: 0000000000000000 t3 : ffffffff8080a928 t4 : ffffffff8080a928 [ 0.000000] t5 : ffffffff8080a928 t6 : ffffffff8080a940 [ 0.000000] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: fffffffe7fff5350 cause: 000000000000000f [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff805e88c8>] __memset+0x8c/0x104 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8062349c>] early_init_dt_alloc_memory_arch+0x1e/0x48 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8043e892>] __unflatten_device_tree+0x52/0x114 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8062441e>] unflatten_device_tree+0x9e/0xb8 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff806046fe>] setup_arch+0xd4/0x5bc [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff806007aa>] start_kernel+0x76/0x81a [ 0.000000] Code: b823 02b2 bc23 02b2 b023 04b2 b423 04b2 b823 04b2 (bc23) 04b2 [ 0.000000] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 0.000000] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill the idle task! [ 0.000000] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill the idle task! ]--- The problem is that memblock (unaware that some physical memory cannot be used) has allocated memory from the top of memory but which is outside the linear mapping region. Signed-off-by: Stuart Menefy <[email protected]> Fixes: c99127c ("riscv: Make sure the linear mapping does not use the kernel mapping") Reviewed-by: David McKay <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>

into HEAD KVM/riscv fixes for 6.11, take #1 - Fix compile error in get-reg-list selftests

syzbot reported a null-ptr-deref while accessing sk2->sk_reuseport_cb in reuseport_add_sock(). [0] The repro first creates a listener with SO_REUSEPORT. Then, it creates another listener on the same port and concurrently closes the first listener. The second listen() calls reuseport_add_sock() with the first listener as sk2, where sk2->sk_reuseport_cb is not expected to be cleared concurrently, but the close() does clear it by reuseport_detach_sock(). The problem is SCTP does not properly synchronise reuseport_alloc(), reuseport_add_sock(), and reuseport_detach_sock(). The caller of reuseport_alloc() and reuseport_{add,detach}_sock() must provide synchronisation for sockets that are classified into the same reuseport group. Otherwise, such sockets form multiple identical reuseport groups, and all groups except one would be silently dead. 1. Two sockets call listen() concurrently 2. No socket in the same group found in sctp_ep_hashtable[] 3. Two sockets call reuseport_alloc() and form two reuseport groups 4. Only one group hit first in __sctp_rcv_lookup_endpoint() receives incoming packets Also, the reported null-ptr-deref could occur. TCP/UDP guarantees that would not happen by holding the hash bucket lock. Let's apply the locking strategy to __sctp_hash_endpoint() and __sctp_unhash_endpoint(). [0]: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 10230 Comm: syz-executor119 Not tainted 6.10.0-syzkaller-12585-g301927d2d2eb #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/27/2024 RIP: 0010:reuseport_add_sock+0x27e/0x5e0 net/core/sock_reuseport.c:350 Code: 00 0f b7 5d 00 bf 01 00 00 00 89 de e8 1b a4 ff f7 83 fb 01 0f 85 a3 01 00 00 e8 6d a0 ff f7 49 8d 7e 12 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 28 84 c0 0f 85 4b 02 00 00 41 0f b7 5e 12 49 8d 7e 14 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b947c98 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff8880252ddf98 RCX: ffff888079478000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000012 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffff8993e18d R09: 1ffffffff1fef385 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1fef386 R12: ffff8880252ddac0 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f24e45b96c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007ffcced5f7b8 CR3: 00000000241be000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> __sctp_hash_endpoint net/sctp/input.c:762 [inline] sctp_hash_endpoint+0x52a/0x600 net/sctp/input.c:790 sctp_listen_start net/sctp/socket.c:8570 [inline] sctp_inet_listen+0x767/0xa20 net/sctp/socket.c:8625 __sys_listen_socket net/socket.c:1883 [inline] __sys_listen+0x1b7/0x230 net/socket.c:1894 __do_sys_listen net/socket.c:1902 [inline] __se_sys_listen net/socket.c:1900 [inline] __x64_sys_listen+0x5a/0x70 net/socket.c:1900 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f24e46039b9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 91 1a 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f24e45b9228 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000032 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f24e468e428 RCX: 00007f24e46039b9 RDX: 00007f24e46039b9 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f24e468e420 R08: 00007f24e45b96c0 R09: 00007f24e45b96c0 R10: 00007f24e45b96c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f24e468e42c R13: 00007f24e465a5dc R14: 0020000000000001 R15: 00007ffcced5f7d8 </TASK> Modules linked in: Fixes: 6ba8457 ("sctp: process sk_reuseport in sctp_get_port_local") Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e6979a5d2f10ecb700e4 Tested-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Acked-by: Xin Long <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

The lifetime of TCP-AO static_key is the same as the last tcp_ao_info. On the socket destruction tcp_ao_info ceases to be with RCU grace period, while tcp-ao static branch is currently deferred destructed. The static key definition is : DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_DEFERRED_FALSE(tcp_ao_needed, HZ); which means that if RCU grace period is delayed by more than a second and tcp_ao_needed is in the process of disablement, other CPUs may yet see tcp_ao_info which atent dead, but soon-to-be. And that breaks the assumption of static_key_fast_inc_not_disabled(). See the comment near the definition: > * The caller must make sure that the static key can't get disabled while > * in this function. It doesn't patch jump labels, only adds a user to > * an already enabled static key. Originally it was introduced in commit eb8c507 ("jump_label: Prevent key->enabled int overflow"), which is needed for the atomic contexts, one of which would be the creation of a full socket from a request socket. In that atomic context, it's known by the presence of the key (md5/ao) that the static branch is already enabled. So, the ref counter for that static branch is just incremented instead of holding the proper mutex. static_key_fast_inc_not_disabled() is just a helper for such usage case. But it must not be used if the static branch could get disabled in parallel as it's not protected by jump_label_mutex and as a result, races with jump_label_update() implementation details. Happened on netdev test-bot[1], so not a theoretical issue: [] jump_label: Fatal kernel bug, unexpected op at tcp_inbound_hash+0x1a7/0x870 [ffffffffa8c4e9b7] (eb 50 0f 1f 44 != 66 90 0f 1f 00)) size:2 type:1 [] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [] kernel BUG at arch/x86/kernel/jump_label.c:73! [] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [] CPU: 3 PID: 243 Comm: kworker/3:3 Not tainted 6.10.0-virtme #1 [] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [] Workqueue: events jump_label_update_timeout [] RIP: 0010:__jump_label_patch+0x2f6/0x350 ... [] Call Trace: [] <TASK> [] arch_jump_label_transform_queue+0x6c/0x110 [] __jump_label_update+0xef/0x350 [] __static_key_slow_dec_cpuslocked.part.0+0x3c/0x60 [] jump_label_update_timeout+0x2c/0x40 [] process_one_work+0xe3b/0x1670 [] worker_thread+0x587/0xce0 [] kthread+0x28a/0x350 [] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x70 [] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [] </TASK> [] Modules linked in: veth [] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [] RIP: 0010:__jump_label_patch+0x2f6/0x350 [1]: https://netdev-3.bots.linux.dev/vmksft-tcp-ao-dbg/results/696681/5-connect-deny-ipv6/stderr Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 67fa83f ("net/tcp: Add static_key for TCP-AO") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

linkwatch_event() grabs possibly very contended RTNL mutex. system_wq is not suitable for such work. Inspired by many noisy syzbot reports. 3 locks held by kworker/0:7/5266: #0: ffff888015480948 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3206 [inline] #0: ffff888015480948 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x90a/0x1830 kernel/workqueue.c:3312 #1: ffffc90003f6fd00 ((linkwatch_work).work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3207 [inline] , at: process_scheduled_works+0x945/0x1830 kernel/workqueue.c:3312 #2: ffffffff8fa6f208 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: linkwatch_event+0xe/0x60 net/core/link_watch.c:276 Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

[why] Encounter NULL pointer dereference uner mst + dsc setup. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 4 PID: 917 Comm: sway Not tainted 6.3.9-arch1-1 #1 124dc55df4f5272ccb409f39ef4872fc2b3376a2 Hardware name: LENOVO 20NKS01Y00/20NKS01Y00, BIOS R12ET61W(1.31 ) 07/28/2022 RIP: 0010:drm_dp_atomic_find_time_slots+0x5e/0x260 [drm_display_helper] Code: 01 00 00 48 8b 85 60 05 00 00 48 63 80 88 00 00 00 3b 43 28 0f 8d 2e 01 00 00 48 8b 53 30 48 8d 04 80 48 8d 04 c2 48 8b 40 18 <48> 8> RSP: 0018:ffff960cc2df77d8 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8afb87e81280 RCX: 0000000000000224 RDX: ffff8afb9ee37c00 RSI: ffff8afb8da1a578 RDI: ffff8afb87e81280 RBP: ffff8afb83d67000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8afb9652f850 R10: ffff960cc2df7908 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff8afb8d7688a0 R14: ffff8afb8da1a578 R15: 0000000000000224 FS: 00007f4dac35ce00(0000) GS:ffff8afe30b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000010ddc6000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x23/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4e0 ? plist_add+0xbe/0x100 ? exc_page_fault+0x7c/0x180 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? drm_dp_atomic_find_time_slots+0x5e/0x260 [drm_display_helper 0e67723696438d8e02b741593dd50d80b44c2026] ? drm_dp_atomic_find_time_slots+0x28/0x260 [drm_display_helper 0e67723696438d8e02b741593dd50d80b44c2026] compute_mst_dsc_configs_for_link+0x2ff/0xa40 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054] ? fill_plane_buffer_attributes+0x419/0x510 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054] compute_mst_dsc_configs_for_state+0x1e1/0x250 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054] amdgpu_dm_atomic_check+0xecd/0x1190 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054] drm_atomic_check_only+0x5c5/0xa40 drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x76e/0xbc0 [how] dsc recompute should be skipped if no mode change detected on the new request. If detected, keep checking whether the stream is already on current state or not. Cc: Mario Limonciello <[email protected]> Cc: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Siqueira <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Fangzhi Zuo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Wayne Lin <[email protected]> Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 8151a6c)

When ftrace_graph_ret_addr() is invoked to convert a found stack return address to its original value, the function can end up producing the following crash: [ 95.442712] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028 [ 95.442720] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 95.442724] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 95.442727] PGD 0 P4D 0- [ 95.442731] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 95.442736] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2214 Comm: insmod Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE K 6.11.0-rc1-default #1 67c62a3b3720562f7e7db5f11c1fdb40b7a2857c [ 95.442747] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE, [K]=LIVEPATCH [ 95.442750] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 [ 95.442754] RIP: 0010:ftrace_graph_ret_addr+0x42/0xc0 [ 95.442766] Code: [...] [ 95.442773] RSP: 0018:ffff979b80ff7718 EFLAGS: 00010006 [ 95.442776] RAX: ffffffff8ca99b10 RBX: ffff979b80ff7760 RCX: ffff979b80167dc0 [ 95.442780] RDX: ffffffff8ca99b10 RSI: ffff979b80ff7790 RDI: 0000000000000005 [ 95.442783] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 95.442786] R10: 0000000000000005 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff8e9491e0 [ 95.442790] R13: ffffffff8d6f70f0 R14: ffff979b80167da8 R15: ffff979b80167dc8 [ 95.442793] FS: 00007fbf83895740(0000) GS:ffff8a0afdd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 95.442797] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 95.442800] CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 0000000005070002 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 [ 95.442806] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 95.442809] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 95.442816] Call Trace: [ 95.442823] <TASK> [ 95.442896] unwind_next_frame+0x20d/0x830 [ 95.442905] arch_stack_walk_reliable+0x94/0xe0 [ 95.442917] stack_trace_save_tsk_reliable+0x7d/0xe0 [ 95.442922] klp_check_and_switch_task+0x55/0x1a0 [ 95.442931] task_call_func+0xd3/0xe0 [ 95.442938] klp_try_switch_task.part.5+0x37/0x150 [ 95.442942] klp_try_complete_transition+0x79/0x2d0 [ 95.442947] klp_enable_patch+0x4db/0x890 [ 95.442960] do_one_initcall+0x41/0x2e0 [ 95.442968] do_init_module+0x60/0x220 [ 95.442975] load_module+0x1ebf/0x1fb0 [ 95.443004] init_module_from_file+0x88/0xc0 [ 95.443010] idempotent_init_module+0x190/0x240 [ 95.443015] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x5b/0xc0 [ 95.443019] do_syscall_64+0x74/0x160 [ 95.443232] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 95.443236] RIP: 0033:0x7fbf82f2c709 [ 95.443241] Code: [...] [ 95.443247] RSP: 002b:00007fffd5ea3b88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [ 95.443253] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000056359c48e750 RCX: 00007fbf82f2c709 [ 95.443257] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000056356ed4efc5 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 95.443260] RBP: 000056356ed4efc5 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007fffd5ea3c10 [ 95.443263] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 95.443267] R13: 000056359c48e6f0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 95.443272] </TASK> [ 95.443274] Modules linked in: [...] [ 95.443385] Unloaded tainted modules: intel_uncore_frequency(E):1 isst_if_common(E):1 skx_edac(E):1 [ 95.443414] CR2: 0000000000000028 The bug can be reproduced with kselftests: cd linux/tools/testing/selftests make TARGETS='ftrace livepatch' (cd ftrace; ./ftracetest test.d/ftrace/fgraph-filter.tc) (cd livepatch; ./test-livepatch.sh) The problem is that ftrace_graph_ret_addr() is supposed to operate on the ret_stack of a selected task but wrongly accesses the ret_stack of the current task. Specifically, the above NULL dereference occurs when task->curr_ret_stack is non-zero, but current->ret_stack is NULL. Correct ftrace_graph_ret_addr() to work with the right ret_stack. Cc: [email protected] Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <[email protected]> Reported-by: Miroslav Benes <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected] Fixes: 7aa1eae ("function_graph: Allow multiple users to attach to function graph") Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>

With structure layout randomization enabled for 'struct inode' we need to avoid overlapping any of the RCU-used / initialized-only-once members, e.g. i_lru or i_sb_list to not corrupt related list traversals when making use of the rcu_head. For an unlucky structure layout of 'struct inode' we may end up with the following splat when running the ftrace selftests: [<...>] list_del corruption, ffff888103ee2cb0->next (tracefs_inode_cache+0x0/0x4e0 [slab object]) is NULL (prev is tracefs_inode_cache+0x78/0x4e0 [slab object]) [<...>] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [<...>] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:54! [<...>] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN [<...>] CPU: 3 PID: 2550 Comm: mount Tainted: G N 6.8.12-grsec+ torvalds#122 ed2f536ca62f28b087b90e3cc906a8d25b3ddc65 [<...>] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 [<...>] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff84656018>] __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x138/0x3e0 [<...>] Code: 48 b8 99 fb 65 f2 ff ff ff ff e9 03 5c d9 fc cc 48 b8 99 fb 65 f2 ff ff ff ff e9 33 5a d9 fc cc 48 b8 99 fb 65 f2 ff ff ff ff <0f> 0b 4c 89 e9 48 89 ea 48 89 ee 48 c7 c7 60 8f dd 89 31 c0 e8 2f [<...>] RSP: 0018:fffffe80416afaf0 EFLAGS: 00010283 [<...>] RAX: 0000000000000098 RBX: ffff888103ee2cb0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [<...>] RDX: ffffffff84655fe8 RSI: ffffffff89dd8b60 RDI: 0000000000000001 [<...>] RBP: ffff888103ee2cb0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbd0082d5f25 [<...>] R10: fffffe80416af92f R11: 0000000000000001 R12: fdf99c16731d9b6d [<...>] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88819ad4b8b8 R15: 0000000000000000 [<...>] RBX: tracefs_inode_cache+0x0/0x4e0 [slab object] [<...>] RDX: __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x108/0x3e0 [<...>] RSI: __func__.47+0x4340/0x4400 [<...>] RBP: tracefs_inode_cache+0x0/0x4e0 [slab object] [<...>] RSP: process kstack fffffe80416afaf0+0x7af0/0x8000 [mount 2550 2550] [<...>] R09: kasan shadow of process kstack fffffe80416af928+0x7928/0x8000 [mount 2550 2550] [<...>] R10: process kstack fffffe80416af92f+0x792f/0x8000 [mount 2550 2550] [<...>] R14: tracefs_inode_cache+0x78/0x4e0 [slab object] [<...>] FS: 00006dcb380c1840(0000) GS:ffff8881e0600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [<...>] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [<...>] CR2: 000076ab72b30e84 CR3: 000000000b088004 CR4: 0000000000360ef0 shadow CR4: 0000000000360ef0 [<...>] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [<...>] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [<...>] ASID: 0003 [<...>] Stack: [<...>] ffffffff818a2315 00000000f5c856ee ffffffff896f1840 ffff888103ee2cb0 [<...>] ffff88812b6b9750 0000000079d714b6 fffffbfff1e9280b ffffffff8f49405f [<...>] 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 ffff888104457280 ffffffff8248b392 [<...>] Call Trace: [<...>] <TASK> [<...>] [<ffffffff818a2315>] ? lock_release+0x175/0x380 fffffe80416afaf0 [<...>] [<ffffffff8248b392>] list_lru_del+0x152/0x740 fffffe80416afb48 [<...>] [<ffffffff8248ba93>] list_lru_del_obj+0x113/0x280 fffffe80416afb88 [<...>] [<ffffffff8940fd19>] ? _atomic_dec_and_lock+0x119/0x200 fffffe80416afb90 [<...>] [<ffffffff8295b244>] iput_final+0x1c4/0x9a0 fffffe80416afbb8 [<...>] [<ffffffff8293a52b>] dentry_unlink_inode+0x44b/0xaa0 fffffe80416afbf8 [<...>] [<ffffffff8293fefc>] __dentry_kill+0x23c/0xf00 fffffe80416afc40 [<...>] [<ffffffff8953a85f>] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x1f/0xa0 fffffe80416afc48 [<...>] [<ffffffff82949ce5>] ? shrink_dentry_list+0x1c5/0x760 fffffe80416afc70 [<...>] [<ffffffff82949b71>] ? shrink_dentry_list+0x51/0x760 fffffe80416afc78 [<...>] [<ffffffff82949da8>] shrink_dentry_list+0x288/0x760 fffffe80416afc80 [<...>] [<ffffffff8294ae75>] shrink_dcache_sb+0x155/0x420 fffffe80416afcc8 [<...>] [<ffffffff8953a7c3>] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x23/0xa0 fffffe80416afce0 [<...>] [<ffffffff8294ad20>] ? do_one_tree+0x140/0x140 fffffe80416afcf8 [<...>] [<ffffffff82997349>] ? do_remount+0x329/0xa00 fffffe80416afd18 [<...>] [<ffffffff83ebf7a1>] ? security_sb_remount+0x81/0x1c0 fffffe80416afd38 [<...>] [<ffffffff82892096>] reconfigure_super+0x856/0x14e0 fffffe80416afd70 [<...>] [<ffffffff815d1327>] ? ns_capable_common+0xe7/0x2a0 fffffe80416afd90 [<...>] [<ffffffff82997436>] do_remount+0x416/0xa00 fffffe80416afdd0 [<...>] [<ffffffff829b2ba4>] path_mount+0x5c4/0x900 fffffe80416afe28 [<...>] [<ffffffff829b25e0>] ? finish_automount+0x13a0/0x13a0 fffffe80416afe60 [<...>] [<ffffffff82903812>] ? user_path_at_empty+0xb2/0x140 fffffe80416afe88 [<...>] [<ffffffff829b2ff5>] do_mount+0x115/0x1c0 fffffe80416afeb8 [<...>] [<ffffffff829b2ee0>] ? path_mount+0x900/0x900 fffffe80416afed8 [<...>] [<ffffffff8272461c>] ? __kasan_check_write+0x1c/0xa0 fffffe80416afee0 [<...>] [<ffffffff829b31cf>] __do_sys_mount+0x12f/0x280 fffffe80416aff30 [<...>] [<ffffffff829b36cd>] __x64_sys_mount+0xcd/0x2e0 fffffe80416aff70 [<...>] [<ffffffff819f8818>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x218/0x380 fffffe80416aff88 [<...>] [<ffffffff8111655e>] x64_sys_call+0x5d5e/0x6720 fffffe80416affa8 [<...>] [<ffffffff8952756d>] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x3c0 fffffe80416affb8 [<...>] [<ffffffff8100119b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_safe_stack+0x4c/0x87 fffffe80416affe8 [<...>] </TASK> [<...>] <PTREGS> [<...>] RIP: 0033:[<00006dcb382ff66a>] vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 file 6dcb38225000-6dcb3837e000 22 55(read|exec|mayread|mayexec)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] Code: 48 8b 0d 29 18 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f6 17 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [<...>] RSP: 002b:0000763d68192558 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [<...>] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00006dcb38433264 RCX: 00006dcb382ff66a [<...>] RDX: 000017c3e0d11210 RSI: 000017c3e0d1a5a0 RDI: 000017c3e0d1ae70 [<...>] RBP: 000017c3e0d10fb0 R08: 000017c3e0d11260 R09: 00006dcb383d1be0 [<...>] R10: 000000000020002e R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [<...>] R13: 000017c3e0d1ae70 R14: 000017c3e0d11210 R15: 000017c3e0d10fb0 [<...>] RBX: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 file 6dcb38433000-6dcb38434000 5b 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] RCX: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 file 6dcb38225000-6dcb3837e000 22 55(read|exec|mayread|mayexec)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] RDX: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 17c3e0d0f000-17c3e0d31000 17c3e0d0f 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] RSI: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 17c3e0d0f000-17c3e0d31000 17c3e0d0f 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] RDI: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 17c3e0d0f000-17c3e0d31000 17c3e0d0f 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] RBP: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 17c3e0d0f000-17c3e0d31000 17c3e0d0f 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] RSP: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 763d68173000-763d68195000 7ffffffdd 100133(read|write|mayread|maywrite|growsdown|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] R08: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 17c3e0d0f000-17c3e0d31000 17c3e0d0f 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] R09: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 file 6dcb383d1000-6dcb383d3000 1cd 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] R13: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 17c3e0d0f000-17c3e0d31000 17c3e0d0f 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] R14: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 17c3e0d0f000-17c3e0d31000 17c3e0d0f 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] R15: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 17c3e0d0f000-17c3e0d31000 17c3e0d0f 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] </PTREGS> [<...>] Modules linked in: [<...>] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The list debug message as well as RBX's symbolic value point out that the object in question was allocated from 'tracefs_inode_cache' and that the list's '->next' member is at offset 0. Dumping the layout of the relevant parts of 'struct tracefs_inode' gives the following: struct tracefs_inode { union { struct inode { struct list_head { struct list_head * next; /* 0 8 */ struct list_head * prev; /* 8 8 */ } i_lru; [...] } vfs_inode; struct callback_head { void (*func)(struct callback_head *); /* 0 8 */ struct callback_head * next; /* 8 8 */ } rcu; }; [...] }; Above shows that 'vfs_inode.i_lru' overlaps with 'rcu' which will destroy the 'i_lru' list as soon as the 'rcu' member gets used, e.g. in call_rcu() or later when calling the RCU callback. This will disturb concurrent list traversals as well as object reuse which assumes these list heads will keep their integrity. For reproduction, the following diff manually overlays 'i_lru' with 'rcu' as, otherwise, one would require some good portion of luck for gambling an unlucky RANDSTRUCT seed: --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -629,6 +629,7 @@ struct inode { umode_t i_mode; unsigned short i_opflags; kuid_t i_uid; + struct list_head i_lru; /* inode LRU list */ kgid_t i_gid; unsigned int i_flags; @@ -690,7 +691,6 @@ struct inode { u16 i_wb_frn_avg_time; u16 i_wb_frn_history; #endif - struct list_head i_lru; /* inode LRU list */ struct list_head i_sb_list; struct list_head i_wb_list; /* backing dev writeback list */ union { The tracefs inode does not need to supply its own RCU delayed destruction of its inode. The inode code itself offers both a "destroy_inode()" callback that gets called when the last reference of the inode is released, and the "free_inode()" which is called after a RCU synchronization period from the "destroy_inode()". The tracefs code can unlink the inode from its list in the destroy_inode() callback, and the simply free it from the free_inode() callback. This should provide the same protection. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Cc: [email protected] Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <[email protected]> Cc: Ajay Kaher <[email protected]> Cc: Ilkka =?utf-8?b?TmF1bGFww6TDpA==?= <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected] Fixes: baa23a8 ("tracefs: Reset permissions on remount if permissions are options") Reported-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]> Reported-by: Brad Spengler <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>

We are hit with a not easily reproducible divide-by-0 panic in padata.c at bootup time. [ 10.017908] Oops: divide error: 0000 1 PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 10.017908] CPU: 26 PID: 2627 Comm: kworker/u1666:1 Not tainted 6.10.0-15.el10.x86_64 #1 [ 10.017908] Hardware name: Lenovo ThinkSystem SR950 [7X12CTO1WW]/[7X12CTO1WW], BIOS [PSE140J-2.30] 07/20/2021 [ 10.017908] Workqueue: events_unbound padata_mt_helper [ 10.017908] RIP: 0010:padata_mt_helper+0x39/0xb0 : [ 10.017963] Call Trace: [ 10.017968] <TASK> [ 10.018004] ? padata_mt_helper+0x39/0xb0 [ 10.018084] process_one_work+0x174/0x330 [ 10.018093] worker_thread+0x266/0x3a0 [ 10.018111] kthread+0xcf/0x100 [ 10.018124] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 [ 10.018138] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 10.018147] </TASK> Looking at the padata_mt_helper() function, the only way a divide-by-0 panic can happen is when ps->chunk_size is 0. The way that chunk_size is initialized in padata_do_multithreaded(), chunk_size can be 0 when the min_chunk in the passed-in padata_mt_job structure is 0. Fix this divide-by-0 panic by making sure that chunk_size will be at least 1 no matter what the input parameters are. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 004ed42 ("padata: add basic support for multithreaded jobs") Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Jordan <[email protected]> Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]> Cc: Waiman Long <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

When l2tp tunnels use a socket provided by userspace, we can hit lockdep splats like the below when data is transmitted through another (unrelated) userspace socket which then gets routed over l2tp. This issue was previously discussed here: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ The solution is to have lockdep treat socket locks of l2tp tunnel sockets separately than those of standard INET sockets. To do so, use a different lockdep subclass where lock nesting is possible. ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.10.0+ torvalds#34 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- iperf3/771 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8881027601d8 (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0 but task is already holding lock: ffff888102650d98 (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: tcp_v4_rcv+0x1848/0x1e10 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(slock-AF_INET/1); lock(slock-AF_INET/1); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 10 locks held by iperf3/771: #0: ffff888102650258 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: tcp_sendmsg+0x1a/0x40 #1: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __ip_queue_xmit+0x4b/0xbc0 #2: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x17a/0x1130 #3: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: process_backlog+0x28b/0x9f0 #4: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_local_deliver_finish+0xf9/0x260 #5: ffff888102650d98 (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: tcp_v4_rcv+0x1848/0x1e10 #6: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __ip_queue_xmit+0x4b/0xbc0 #7: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x17a/0x1130 #8: ffffffff822ac1e0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0xcc/0x1450 #9: ffff888101f33258 (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock#2){+...}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x513/0x1450 stack backtrace: CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 771 Comm: iperf3 Not tainted 6.10.0+ torvalds#34 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x69/0xa0 dump_stack+0xc/0x20 __lock_acquire+0x135d/0x2600 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2a0 ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0 ? __skb_checksum+0xa3/0x540 _raw_spin_lock_nested+0x35/0x50 ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0 l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0 l2tp_eth_dev_xmit+0x3c/0xc0 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x11e/0x420 sch_direct_xmit+0xc3/0x640 __dev_queue_xmit+0x61c/0x1450 ? ip_finish_output2+0xf4c/0x1130 ip_finish_output2+0x6b6/0x1130 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380 ip_output+0x99/0x120 __ip_queue_xmit+0xae4/0xbc0 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? tcp_options_write.constprop.0+0xcb/0x3e0 ip_queue_xmit+0x34/0x40 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1625/0x1890 __tcp_send_ack+0x1b8/0x340 tcp_send_ack+0x23/0x30 __tcp_ack_snd_check+0xa8/0x530 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 tcp_rcv_established+0x412/0xd70 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x299/0x420 tcp_v4_rcv+0x1991/0x1e10 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x50/0x220 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x158/0x260 ip_local_deliver+0xc8/0xe0 ip_rcv+0xe5/0x1d0 ? __pfx_ip_rcv+0x10/0x10 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xce/0xe0 ? process_backlog+0x28b/0x9f0 __netif_receive_skb+0x34/0xd0 ? process_backlog+0x28b/0x9f0 process_backlog+0x2cb/0x9f0 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x61/0x280 net_rx_action+0x332/0x670 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 handle_softirqs+0xda/0x480 ? __dev_queue_xmit+0xa2c/0x1450 do_softirq+0xa1/0xd0 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0xc8/0xe0 ? __dev_queue_xmit+0xa2c/0x1450 __dev_queue_xmit+0xa48/0x1450 ? ip_finish_output2+0xf4c/0x1130 ip_finish_output2+0x6b6/0x1130 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380 ip_output+0x99/0x120 __ip_queue_xmit+0xae4/0xbc0 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? tcp_options_write.constprop.0+0xcb/0x3e0 ip_queue_xmit+0x34/0x40 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1625/0x1890 tcp_write_xmit+0x766/0x2fb0 ? __entry_text_end+0x102ba9/0x102bad ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __might_fault+0x74/0xc0 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x56/0x190 tcp_push+0x117/0x310 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x14c1/0x1740 tcp_sendmsg+0x28/0x40 inet_sendmsg+0x5d/0x90 sock_write_iter+0x242/0x2b0 vfs_write+0x68d/0x800 ? __pfx_sock_write_iter+0x10/0x10 ksys_write+0xc8/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x3d/0x50 x64_sys_call+0xfaf/0x1f50 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f4d143af992 Code: c3 8b 07 85 c0 75 24 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> e9 01 cc ff ff 41 54 b8 02 00 00 0 RSP: 002b:00007ffd65032058 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007f4d143af992 RDX: 0000000000000025 RSI: 00007f4d143f3bcc RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007f4d143f2b28 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f4d143f3bcc R13: 0000000000000005 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffd650323f0 </TASK> Fixes: 0b2c597 ("l2tp: close all race conditions in l2tp_tunnel_register()") Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=6acef9e0a4d1f46c83d4 CC: [email protected] CC: [email protected] Signed-off-by: James Chapman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tom Parkin <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

The queue stats API queries the queues according to the real_num_[tr]x_queues, in case the device is down and channels were not yet created, don't try to query their statistics. To trigger the panic, run this command before the interface is brought up: ./cli.py --spec ../../../Documentation/netlink/specs/netdev.yaml --dump qstats-get --json '{"ifindex": 4}' BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000c00 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 977 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.10.0+ torvalds#40 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:mlx5e_get_queue_stats_rx+0x3c/0xb0 [mlx5_core] Code: fc 55 48 63 ee 53 48 89 d3 e8 40 3d 70 e1 85 c0 74 58 4c 89 ef e8 d4 07 04 00 84 c0 75 41 49 8b 84 24 f8 39 00 00 48 8b 04 e8 <48> 8b 90 00 0c 00 00 48 03 90 40 0a 00 00 48 89 53 08 48 8b 90 08 RSP: 0018:ffff888116be37d0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888116be3868 RCX: 0000000000000004 RDX: ffff88810ada4000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888109df09c0 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000004 R10: ffff88813461901c R11: ffffffffffffffff R12: ffff888109df0000 R13: ffff888109df09c0 R14: ffff888116be38d0 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f4375d5c740(0000) GS:ffff88852c980000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000c00 CR3: 0000000106ada006 CR4: 0000000000370eb0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x1f/0x60 ? page_fault_oops+0x14e/0x3d0 ? exc_page_fault+0x73/0x130 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? mlx5e_get_queue_stats_rx+0x3c/0xb0 [mlx5_core] netdev_nl_stats_by_netdev+0x2a6/0x4c0 ? __rmqueue_pcplist+0x351/0x6f0 netdev_nl_qstats_get_dumpit+0xc4/0x1b0 genl_dumpit+0x2d/0x80 netlink_dump+0x199/0x410 __netlink_dump_start+0x1aa/0x2c0 genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x94/0xf0 ? __pfx_genl_start+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_genl_dumpit+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_genl_done+0x10/0x10 genl_rcv_msg+0x116/0x2b0 ? __pfx_netdev_nl_qstats_get_dumpit+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x21a/0x340 netlink_sendmsg+0x1f4/0x440 __sys_sendto+0x1b6/0x1c0 ? do_sock_setsockopt+0xc3/0x180 ? __sys_setsockopt+0x60/0xb0 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x110 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f43757132b0 Code: c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 1d 45 31 c9 45 31 c0 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 68 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 41 54 48 83 ec 20 RSP: 002b:00007ffd258da048 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd258da0f8 RCX: 00007f43757132b0 RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 00007f437464b850 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f4375085de0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffffffffc4653600 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00007f43751a6147 </TASK> Modules linked in: netconsole xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core zram zsmalloc mlx5_core fuse [last unloaded: netconsole] CR2: 0000000000000c00 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:mlx5e_get_queue_stats_rx+0x3c/0xb0 [mlx5_core] Code: fc 55 48 63 ee 53 48 89 d3 e8 40 3d 70 e1 85 c0 74 58 4c 89 ef e8 d4 07 04 00 84 c0 75 41 49 8b 84 24 f8 39 00 00 48 8b 04 e8 <48> 8b 90 00 0c 00 00 48 03 90 40 0a 00 00 48 89 53 08 48 8b 90 08 RSP: 0018:ffff888116be37d0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888116be3868 RCX: 0000000000000004 RDX: ffff88810ada4000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888109df09c0 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000004 R10: ffff88813461901c R11: ffffffffffffffff R12: ffff888109df0000 R13: ffff888109df09c0 R14: ffff888116be38d0 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f4375d5c740(0000) GS:ffff88852c980000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000c00 CR3: 0000000106ada006 CR4: 0000000000370eb0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Fixes: 7b66ae5 ("net/mlx5e: Add per queue netdev-genl stats") Signed-off-by: Gal Pressman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Joe Damato <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

This fixes a NULL pointer dereference bug due to a data race which looks like this: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 33 PID: 16573 Comm: kworker/u97:799 Not tainted 6.8.7-cm4all1-hp+ torvalds#43 Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL380 Gen9/ProLiant DL380 Gen9, BIOS P89 10/17/2018 Workqueue: events_unbound netfs_rreq_write_to_cache_work RIP: 0010:cachefiles_prepare_write+0x30/0xa0 Code: 57 41 56 45 89 ce 41 55 49 89 cd 41 54 49 89 d4 55 53 48 89 fb 48 83 ec 08 48 8b 47 08 48 83 7f 10 00 48 89 34 24 48 8b 68 20 <48> 8b 45 08 4c 8b 38 74 45 49 8b 7f 50 e8 4e a9 b0 ff 48 8b 73 10 RSP: 0018:ffffb4e78113bde0 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: ffff976126be6d10 RBX: ffff97615cdb8438 RCX: 0000000000020000 RDX: ffff97605e6c4c68 RSI: ffff97605e6c4c60 RDI: ffff97615cdb8438 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000278333 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffff97605e6c4600 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff97605e6c4c68 R13: 0000000000020000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff976064fe2c00 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9776dfd40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000005942c002 CR4: 00000000001706f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x1f/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x15d/0x440 ? search_module_extables+0xe/0x40 ? fixup_exception+0x22/0x2f0 ? exc_page_fault+0x5f/0x100 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? cachefiles_prepare_write+0x30/0xa0 netfs_rreq_write_to_cache_work+0x135/0x2e0 process_one_work+0x137/0x2c0 worker_thread+0x2e9/0x400 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xcc/0x100 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: 0000000000000008 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- This happened because fscache_cookie_state_machine() was slow and was still running while another process invoked fscache_unuse_cookie(); this led to a fscache_cookie_lru_do_one() call, setting the FSCACHE_COOKIE_DO_LRU_DISCARD flag, which was picked up by fscache_cookie_state_machine(), withdrawing the cookie via cachefiles_withdraw_cookie(), clearing cookie->cache_priv. At the same time, yet another process invoked cachefiles_prepare_write(), which found a NULL pointer in this code line: struct cachefiles_object *object = cachefiles_cres_object(cres); The next line crashes, obviously: struct cachefiles_cache *cache = object->volume->cache; During cachefiles_prepare_write(), the "n_accesses" counter is non-zero (via fscache_begin_operation()). The cookie must not be withdrawn until it drops to zero. The counter is checked by fscache_cookie_state_machine() before switching to FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_RELINQUISHING and FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_WITHDRAWING (in "case FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_FAILED"), but not for FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_LRU_DISCARDING ("case FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_ACTIVE"). This patch adds the missing check. With a non-zero access counter, the function returns and the next fscache_end_cookie_access() call will queue another fscache_cookie_state_machine() call to handle the still-pending FSCACHE_COOKIE_DO_LRU_DISCARD. Fixes: 12bb21a ("fscache: Implement cookie user counting and resource pinning") Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] cc: Jeff Layton <[email protected]> cc: [email protected] cc: [email protected] cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.11, round #1 - Use kvfree() for the kvmalloc'd nested MMUs array - Set of fixes to address warnings in W=1 builds - Make KVM depend on assembler support for ARMv8.4 - Fix for vgic-debug interface for VMs without LPIs - Actually check ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1.S1PIE in get-reg-list selftest - Minor code / comment cleanups for configuring PAuth traps - Take kvm->arch.config_lock to prevent destruction / initialization race for a vCPU's CPUIF which may lead to a UAF

When of_irq_parse_raw() is invoked with a device address smaller than the interrupt parent node (from #address-cells property), KASAN detects the following out-of-bounds read when populating the initial match table (dyndbg="func of_irq_parse_* +p"): OF: of_irq_parse_one: dev=/soc@0/picasso/watchdog, index=0 OF: parent=/soc@0/pci@878000000000/gpio0@17,0, intsize=2 OF: intspec=4 OF: of_irq_parse_raw: ipar=/soc@0/pci@878000000000/gpio0@17,0, size=2 OF: -> addrsize=3 ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in of_irq_parse_raw+0x2b8/0x8d0 Read of size 4 at addr ffffff81beca5608 by task bash/764 CPU: 1 PID: 764 Comm: bash Tainted: G O 6.1.67-484c613561-nokia_sm_arm64 #1 Hardware name: Unknown Unknown Product/Unknown Product, BIOS 2023.01-12.24.03-dirty 01/01/2023 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xdc/0x130 show_stack+0x1c/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x84 print_report+0x150/0x448 kasan_report+0x98/0x140 __asan_load4+0x78/0xa0 of_irq_parse_raw+0x2b8/0x8d0 of_irq_parse_one+0x24c/0x270 parse_interrupts+0xc0/0x120 of_fwnode_add_links+0x100/0x2d0 fw_devlink_parse_fwtree+0x64/0xc0 device_add+0xb38/0xc30 of_device_add+0x64/0x90 of_platform_device_create_pdata+0xd0/0x170 of_platform_bus_create+0x244/0x600 of_platform_notify+0x1b0/0x254 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x9c/0xd0 __of_changeset_entry_notify+0x1b8/0x230 __of_changeset_apply_notify+0x54/0xe4 of_overlay_fdt_apply+0xc04/0xd94 ... The buggy address belongs to the object at ffffff81beca5600 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128 The buggy address is located 8 bytes inside of 128-byte region [ffffff81beca5600, ffffff81beca5680) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:00000000230d3d03 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1beca4 head:00000000230d3d03 order:1 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x8000000000010200(slab|head|zone=2) raw: 8000000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffffff810000c300 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffffff81beca5500: 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffffff81beca5580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffffff81beca5600: 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffffff81beca5680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffffff81beca5700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== OF: -> got it ! Prevent the out-of-bounds read by copying the device address into a buffer of sufficient size. Signed-off-by: Stefan Wiehler <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <[email protected]>

re-enumerating full-speed devices after a failed address device command can trigger a NULL pointer dereference. Full-speed devices may need to reconfigure the endpoint 0 Max Packet Size value during enumeration. Usb core calls usb_ep0_reinit() in this case, which ends up calling xhci_configure_endpoint(). On Panther point xHC the xhci_configure_endpoint() function will additionally check and reserve bandwidth in software. Other hosts do this in hardware If xHC address device command fails then a new xhci_virt_device structure is allocated as part of re-enabling the slot, but the bandwidth table pointers are not set up properly here. This triggers the NULL pointer dereference the next time usb_ep0_reinit() is called and xhci_configure_endpoint() tries to check and reserve bandwidth [46710.713538] usb 3-1: new full-speed USB device number 5 using xhci_hcd [46710.713699] usb 3-1: Device not responding to setup address. [46710.917684] usb 3-1: Device not responding to setup address. [46711.125536] usb 3-1: device not accepting address 5, error -71 [46711.125594] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 [46711.125600] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [46711.125603] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [46711.125606] PGD 0 P4D 0 [46711.125610] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [46711.125615] CPU: 1 PID: 25760 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 6.10.3_2 #1 [46711.125620] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. [46711.125623] Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event [usbcore] [46711.125668] RIP: 0010:xhci_reserve_bandwidth (drivers/usb/host/xhci.c Fix this by making sure bandwidth table pointers are set up correctly after a failed address device command, and additionally by avoiding checking for bandwidth in cases like this where no actual endpoints are added or removed, i.e. only context for default control endpoint 0 is evaluated. Reported-by: Karel Balej <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/[email protected]/ Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 651aaf3 ("usb: xhci: Handle USB transaction error on address command") Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

Lockdep reported a warning in Linux version 6.6: [ 414.344659] ================================ [ 414.345155] WARNING: inconsistent lock state [ 414.345658] 6.6.0-07439-gba2303cacfda #6 Not tainted [ 414.346221] -------------------------------- [ 414.346712] inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. [ 414.347545] kworker/u10:3/1152 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] takes: [ 414.349245] ffff88810edd1098 (&sbq->ws[i].wait){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x131c/0x1ee0 [ 414.351204] {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at: [ 414.351751] lock_acquire+0x18d/0x460 [ 414.352218] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x39/0x60 [ 414.352769] __wake_up_common_lock+0x22/0x60 [ 414.353289] sbitmap_queue_wake_up+0x375/0x4f0 [ 414.353829] sbitmap_queue_clear+0xdd/0x270 [ 414.354338] blk_mq_put_tag+0xdf/0x170 [ 414.354807] __blk_mq_free_request+0x381/0x4d0 [ 414.355335] blk_mq_free_request+0x28b/0x3e0 [ 414.355847] __blk_mq_end_request+0x242/0xc30 [ 414.356367] scsi_end_request+0x2c1/0x830 [ 414.345155] WARNING: inconsistent lock state [ 414.345658] 6.6.0-07439-gba2303cacfda #6 Not tainted [ 414.346221] -------------------------------- [ 414.346712] inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. [ 414.347545] kworker/u10:3/1152 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] takes: [ 414.349245] ffff88810edd1098 (&sbq->ws[i].wait){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x131c/0x1ee0 [ 414.351204] {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at: [ 414.351751] lock_acquire+0x18d/0x460 [ 414.352218] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x39/0x60 [ 414.352769] __wake_up_common_lock+0x22/0x60 [ 414.353289] sbitmap_queue_wake_up+0x375/0x4f0 [ 414.353829] sbitmap_queue_clear+0xdd/0x270 [ 414.354338] blk_mq_put_tag+0xdf/0x170 [ 414.354807] __blk_mq_free_request+0x381/0x4d0 [ 414.355335] blk_mq_free_request+0x28b/0x3e0 [ 414.355847] __blk_mq_end_request+0x242/0xc30 [ 414.356367] scsi_end_request+0x2c1/0x830 [ 414.356863] scsi_io_completion+0x177/0x1610 [ 414.357379] scsi_complete+0x12f/0x260 [ 414.357856] blk_complete_reqs+0xba/0xf0 [ 414.358338] __do_softirq+0x1b0/0x7a2 [ 414.358796] irq_exit_rcu+0x14b/0x1a0 [ 414.359262] sysvec_call_function_single+0xaf/0xc0 [ 414.359828] asm_sysvec_call_function_single+0x1a/0x20 [ 414.360426] default_idle+0x1e/0x30 [ 414.360873] default_idle_call+0x9b/0x1f0 [ 414.361390] do_idle+0x2d2/0x3e0 [ 414.361819] cpu_startup_entry+0x55/0x60 [ 414.362314] start_secondary+0x235/0x2b0 [ 414.362809] secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x18f/0x19b [ 414.363413] irq event stamp: 428794 [ 414.363825] hardirqs last enabled at (428793): [<ffffffff816bfd1c>] ktime_get+0x1dc/0x200 [ 414.364694] hardirqs last disabled at (428794): [<ffffffff85470177>] _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x47/0x50 [ 414.365629] softirqs last enabled at (428444): [<ffffffff85474780>] __do_softirq+0x540/0x7a2 [ 414.366522] softirqs last disabled at (428419): [<ffffffff813f65ab>] irq_exit_rcu+0x14b/0x1a0 [ 414.367425] other info that might help us debug this: [ 414.368194] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 414.368900] CPU0 [ 414.369225] ---- [ 414.369548] lock(&sbq->ws[i].wait); [ 414.370000] <Interrupt> [ 414.370342] lock(&sbq->ws[i].wait); [ 414.370802] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 414.371569] 5 locks held by kworker/u10:3/1152: [ 414.372088] #0: ffff88810130e938 ((wq_completion)writeback){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x357/0x13f0 [ 414.373180] #1: ffff88810201fdb8 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x3a3/0x13f0 [ 414.374384] #2: ffffffff86ffbdc0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x637/0xa00 [ 414.375342] #3: ffff88810edd1098 (&sbq->ws[i].wait){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x131c/0x1ee0 [ 414.376377] #4: ffff888106205a08 (&hctx->dispatch_wait_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x1337/0x1ee0 [ 414.378607] stack backtrace: [ 414.379177] CPU: 0 PID: 1152 Comm: kworker/u10:3 Not tainted 6.6.0-07439-gba2303cacfda #6 [ 414.380032] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 414.381177] Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-253:0) [ 414.381805] Call Trace: [ 414.382136] <TASK> [ 414.382429] dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 [ 414.382884] mark_lock_irq+0xb3b/0x1260 [ 414.383367] ? __pfx_mark_lock_irq+0x10/0x10 [ 414.383889] ? stack_trace_save+0x8e/0xc0 [ 414.384373] ? __pfx_stack_trace_save+0x10/0x10 [ 414.384903] ? graph_lock+0xcf/0x410 [ 414.385350] ? save_trace+0x3d/0xc70 [ 414.385808] mark_lock.part.20+0x56d/0xa90 [ 414.386317] mark_held_locks+0xb0/0x110 [ 414.386791] ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 414.387320] lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x297/0x3f0 [ 414.387901] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 [ 414.388422] trace_hardirqs_on+0x58/0x100 [ 414.388917] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 [ 414.389422] __blk_mq_tag_busy+0x1d6/0x2a0 [ 414.389920] __blk_mq_get_driver_tag+0x761/0x9f0 [ 414.390899] blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x1780/0x1ee0 [ 414.391473] ? __pfx_blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x10/0x10 [ 414.392070] ? sbitmap_get+0x2b8/0x450 [ 414.392533] ? __blk_mq_get_driver_tag+0x210/0x9f0 [ 414.393095] __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0xd99/0x1690 [ 414.393730] ? elv_attempt_insert_merge+0x1b1/0x420 [ 414.394302] ? __pfx___blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x10/0x10 [ 414.394970] ? lock_acquire+0x18d/0x460 [ 414.395456] ? blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x637/0xa00 [ 414.395986] ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 [ 414.396499] blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x109/0x190 [ 414.397100] blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x66e/0xa00 [ 414.397616] blk_mq_flush_plug_list.part.17+0x614/0x2030 [ 414.398244] ? __pfx_blk_mq_flush_plug_list.part.17+0x10/0x10 [ 414.398897] ? writeback_sb_inodes+0x241/0xcc0 [ 414.399429] blk_mq_flush_plug_list+0x65/0x80 [ 414.399957] __blk_flush_plug+0x2f1/0x530 [ 414.400458] ? __pfx___blk_flush_plug+0x10/0x10 [ 414.400999] blk_finish_plug+0x59/0xa0 [ 414.401467] wb_writeback+0x7cc/0x920 [ 414.401935] ? __pfx_wb_writeback+0x10/0x10 [ 414.402442] ? mark_held_locks+0xb0/0x110 [ 414.402931] ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 414.403462] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x297/0x3f0 [ 414.404062] wb_workfn+0x2b3/0xcf0 [ 414.404500] ? __pfx_wb_workfn+0x10/0x10 [ 414.404989] process_scheduled_works+0x432/0x13f0 [ 414.405546] ? __pfx_process_scheduled_works+0x10/0x10 [ 414.406139] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x101/0x2a0 [ 414.406641] ? assign_work+0x19b/0x240 [ 414.407106] ? lock_is_held_type+0x9d/0x110 [ 414.407604] worker_thread+0x6f2/0x1160 [ 414.408075] ? __kthread_parkme+0x62/0x210 [ 414.408572] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x297/0x3f0 [ 414.409168] ? __kthread_parkme+0x13c/0x210 [ 414.409678] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 414.410191] kthread+0x33c/0x440 [ 414.410602] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 414.411068] ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 [ 414.411526] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 414.411993] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 [ 414.412489] </TASK> When interrupt is turned on while a lock holding by spin_lock_irq it throws a warning because of potential deadlock. blk_mq_prep_dispatch_rq blk_mq_get_driver_tag __blk_mq_get_driver_tag __blk_mq_alloc_driver_tag blk_mq_tag_busy -> tag is already busy // failed to get driver tag blk_mq_mark_tag_wait spin_lock_irq(&wq->lock) -> lock A (&sbq->ws[i].wait) __add_wait_queue(wq, wait) -> wait queue active blk_mq_get_driver_tag __blk_mq_tag_busy -> 1) tag must be idle, which means there can't be inflight IO spin_lock_irq(&tags->lock) -> lock B (hctx->tags) spin_unlock_irq(&tags->lock) -> unlock B, turn on interrupt accidentally -> 2) context must be preempt by IO interrupt to trigger deadlock. As shown above, the deadlock is not possible in theory, but the warning still need to be fixed. Fix it by using spin_lock_irqsave to get lockB instead of spin_lock_irq. Fixes: 4f1731d ("blk-mq: fix potential io hang by wrong 'wake_batch'") Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>

We recently made GUP's common page table walking code to also walk hugetlb VMAs without most hugetlb special-casing, preparing for the future of having less hugetlb-specific page table walking code in the codebase. Turns out that we missed one page table locking detail: page table locking for hugetlb folios that are not mapped using a single PMD/PUD. Assume we have hugetlb folio that spans multiple PTEs (e.g., 64 KiB hugetlb folios on arm64 with 4 KiB base page size). GUP, as it walks the page tables, will perform a pte_offset_map_lock() to grab the PTE table lock. However, hugetlb that concurrently modifies these page tables would actually grab the mm->page_table_lock: with USE_SPLIT_PTE_PTLOCKS, the locks would differ. Something similar can happen right now with hugetlb folios that span multiple PMDs when USE_SPLIT_PMD_PTLOCKS. This issue can be reproduced [1], for example triggering: [ 3105.936100] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 3105.939323] WARNING: CPU: 31 PID: 2732 at mm/gup.c:142 try_grab_folio+0x11c/0x188 [ 3105.944634] Modules linked in: [...] [ 3105.974841] CPU: 31 PID: 2732 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 6.10.0-64.eln141.aarch64 #1 [ 3105.980406] Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-20240524-4.fc40 05/24/2024 [ 3105.986185] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 3105.991108] pc : try_grab_folio+0x11c/0x188 [ 3105.994013] lr : follow_page_pte+0xd8/0x430 [ 3105.996986] sp : ffff80008eafb8f0 [ 3105.999346] x29: ffff80008eafb900 x28: ffffffe8d481f380 x27: 00f80001207cff43 [ 3106.004414] x26: 0000000000000001 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff80008eafba48 [ 3106.009520] x23: 0000ffff9372f000 x22: ffff7a54459e2000 x21: ffff7a546c1aa978 [ 3106.014529] x20: ffffffe8d481f3c0 x19: 0000000000610041 x18: 0000000000000001 [ 3106.019506] x17: 0000000000000001 x16: ffffffffffffffff x15: 0000000000000000 [ 3106.024494] x14: ffffb85477fdfe08 x13: 0000ffff9372ffff x12: 0000000000000000 [ 3106.029469] x11: 1fffef4a88a96be1 x10: ffff7a54454b5f0c x9 : ffffb854771b12f0 [ 3106.034324] x8 : 0008000000000000 x7 : ffff7a546c1aa980 x6 : 0008000000000080 [ 3106.038902] x5 : 00000000001207cf x4 : 0000ffff9372f000 x3 : ffffffe8d481f000 [ 3106.043420] x2 : 0000000000610041 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 3106.047957] Call trace: [ 3106.049522] try_grab_folio+0x11c/0x188 [ 3106.051996] follow_pmd_mask.constprop.0.isra.0+0x150/0x2e0 [ 3106.055527] follow_page_mask+0x1a0/0x2b8 [ 3106.058118] __get_user_pages+0xf0/0x348 [ 3106.060647] faultin_page_range+0xb0/0x360 [ 3106.063651] do_madvise+0x340/0x598 Let's make huge_pte_lockptr() effectively use the same PT locks as any core-mm page table walker would. Add ptep_lockptr() to obtain the PTE page table lock using a pte pointer -- unfortunately we cannot convert pte_lockptr() because virt_to_page() doesn't work with kmap'ed page tables we can have with CONFIG_HIGHPTE. Handle CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS correctly by checking in reverse order, such that when e.g., CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS==2 with PGDIR_SIZE==P4D_SIZE==PUD_SIZE==PMD_SIZE will work as expected. Document why that works. There is one ugly case: powerpc 8xx, whereby we have an 8 MiB hugetlb folio being mapped using two PTE page tables. While hugetlb wants to take the PMD table lock, core-mm would grab the PTE table lock of one of both PTE page tables. In such corner cases, we have to make sure that both locks match, which is (fortunately!) currently guaranteed for 8xx as it does not support SMP and consequently doesn't use split PT locks. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 9cb28da ("mm/gup: handle hugetlb in the generic follow_page_mask code") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Acked-by: Peter Xu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Baolin Wang <[email protected]> Tested-by: Baolin Wang <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Xu <[email protected]> Cc: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Cc: Muchun Song <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

Fix invalid access to pgdat during hot-remove operation: ndctl users reported a GPF when trying to destroy a namespace: $ ndctl destroy-namespace all -r all -f Segmentation fault dmesg: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000005650: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x000000000002b280-0x000000000002b287] CPU: 26 UID: 0 PID: 1868 Comm: ndctl Not tainted 6.11.0-rc1 #1 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R640/08HT8T, BIOS 2.20.1 09/13/2023 RIP: 0010:mod_node_page_state+0x2a/0x110 cxl-test users report a GPF when trying to unload the test module: $ modrpobe -r cxl-test dmesg BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000004200 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1076 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G O N 6.11.0-rc1 torvalds#197 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [N]=TEST Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/15 RIP: 0010:mod_node_page_state+0x6/0x90 Currently, when memory is hot-plugged or hot-removed the accounting is done based on the assumption that memmap is allocated from the same node as the hot-plugged/hot-removed memory, which is not always the case. In addition, there are challenges with keeping the node id of the memory that is being remove to the time when memmap accounting is actually performed: since this is done after remove_pfn_range_from_zone(), and also after remove_memory_block_devices(). Meaning that we cannot use pgdat nor walking though memblocks to get the nid. Given all of that, account the memmap overhead system wide instead. For this we are going to be using global atomic counters, but given that memmap size is rarely modified, and normally is only modified either during early boot when there is only one CPU, or under a hotplug global mutex lock, therefore there is no need for per-cpu optimizations. Also, while we are here rename nr_memmap to nr_memmap_pages, and nr_memmap_boot to nr_memmap_boot_pages to be self explanatory that the units are in page count. [[email protected]: address a few nits from David Hildenbrand] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 15995a3 ("mm: report per-page metadata information") Signed-off-by: Pasha Tatashin <[email protected]> Reported-by: Yi Zhang <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cxl/CAHj4cs9Ax1=CoJkgBGP_+sNu6-6=6v=_L-ZBZY0bVLD3wUWZQg@mail.gmail.com Reported-by: Alison Schofield <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/Zq0tPd2h6alFz8XF@aschofie-mobl2/#t Tested-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Tested-by: Alison Schofield <[email protected]> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Acked-by: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Tested-by: Yi Zhang <[email protected]> Cc: Domenico Cerasuolo <[email protected]> Cc: Fan Ni <[email protected]> Cc: Joel Granados <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]> Cc: Li Zhijian <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Cc: Muchun Song <[email protected]> Cc: Nhat Pham <[email protected]> Cc: Sourav Panda <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Cc: Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

fdmendez added 2 commits January 6, 2016 19:51

plbossart pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 12, 2024

Merge tag 'kvm-riscv-fixes-6.11-1' of https://github.com/kvm-riscv/linux

29b5bbf

into HEAD KVM/riscv fixes for 6.11, take #1 - Fix compile error in get-reg-list selftests

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Adding button press flag and organizing jd2 code #1

Adding button press flag and organizing jd2 code #1

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fdmendez commented Jan 7, 2016