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A couple of requests. DRBD and REALTEK RTL8192CU #96
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We were initially not keen on importing this module for two reasons. On 26/08/2012, zardoz99 [email protected] wrote:
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"There are a lot of people who are wanting to use the Edimax EW-7811Un Wifi adapter" For example: me. Its very frustrating reading tutorials about setting up Edimax EW-7811Un (RTL8192CU) to find out these drivers will break every kernel update. I understand your reasons, but there is a large number of people out there needing a solution. Thank you very much! |
@Simanova I think perhaps you misread my response. I was explaining why we were initially not too keen, but the conclusion is that it benefits a large number of people and we'd happily accept a pull request. |
RTL8192CU driver is added. See: |
That is excellent news. All that I personally require now is for the drbd modules and dependencies to be enabled by default as modules. Any chance of that happening please? |
Yep, I'm going to go through all outstanding config requests shortly. |
drbd is added. |
Closing as this option is added. Please reopen if there is a problem. |
…ing the objects in debugfs commit 5b5ffff upstream. Fixes an issue whereby we may race with the table updates (before the core takes the struct_mutex) and so risk dereferencing a stale pointer in the iterator for /debugfs/.../i915_gem_objects. For example, [ 1524.757545] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at f53af748 [ 1524.757572] IP: [<c1406982>] per_file_stats+0x12/0x100 [ 1524.757599] *pdpt = 0000000001b13001 *pde = 00000000379fb067 *pte = 80000000353af060 [ 1524.757621] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC [ 1524.757637] Modules linked in: ctr ccm arc4 ath9k ath9k_common ath9k_hw ath snd_hda_codec_conexant mac80211 snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_controller snd_hda_codec bnep snd_hwdep rfcomm snd_pcm gpio_ich dell_wmi sparse_keymap snd_seq_midi hid_multitouch uvcvideo snd_seq_midi_event dell_laptop snd_rawmidi dcdbas snd_seq videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops videobuf2_core usbhid videodev snd_seq_device coretemp snd_timer hid joydev kvm_intel cfg80211 ath3k kvm btusb bluetooth serio_raw snd microcode soundcore lpc_ich wmi mac_hid parport_pc ppdev lp parport psmouse ahci libahci [ 1524.757825] CPU: 3 PID: 1911 Comm: intel-gpu-overl Tainted: G W OE 3.15.0-rc3+ #96 [ 1524.757840] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Inspiron 1090/Inspiron 1090, BIOS A06 08/23/2011 [ 1524.757855] task: f52f36c0 ti: f4cbc000 task.ti: f4cbc000 [ 1524.757869] EIP: 0060:[<c1406982>] EFLAGS: 00210202 CPU: 3 [ 1524.757884] EIP is at per_file_stats+0x12/0x100 [ 1524.757896] EAX: 0000002d EBX: 00000000 ECX: f4cbdefc EDX: f53af700 [ 1524.757909] ESI: c1406970 EDI: f53af700 EBP: f4cbde6c ESP: f4cbde5c [ 1524.757922] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 [ 1524.757934] CR0: 80050033 CR2: f53af748 CR3: 356af000 CR4: 000007f0 [ 1524.757945] Stack: [ 1524.757957] f4cbdefc 00000000 c1406970 f53af700 f4cbdea8 c12e5f15 f4cbdefc c1406970 [ 1524.757993] 0000ffff f4cbde90 0000002d f5dc5cd0 e4e80438 c1181d59 f4cbded8 f4d89900 [ 1524.758027] f5631b40 e5131074 c1903f37 f4cbdf28 c14068e6 f52648a0 c1927748 c1903f37 [ 1524.758062] Call Trace: [ 1524.758084] [<c1406970>] ? i915_gem_object_info+0x510/0x510 [ 1524.758106] [<c12e5f15>] idr_for_each+0xa5/0x100 [ 1524.758126] [<c1406970>] ? i915_gem_object_info+0x510/0x510 [ 1524.758148] [<c1181d59>] ? seq_vprintf+0x29/0x50 [ 1524.758168] [<c14068e6>] i915_gem_object_info+0x486/0x510 [ 1524.758189] [<c11823a6>] seq_read+0xd6/0x380 [ 1524.758208] [<c116d11d>] ? final_putname+0x1d/0x40 [ 1524.758227] [<c11822d0>] ? seq_hlist_next_percpu+0x90/0x90 [ 1524.758246] [<c1163e52>] vfs_read+0x82/0x150 [ 1524.758265] [<c11645d6>] SyS_read+0x46/0x90 [ 1524.758285] [<c16b8d8c>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x22 [ 1524.758298] Code: f5 8f 2a 00 83 c4 6c 31 c0 5b 5e 5f 5d c3 8d 74 26 00 8d bc 27 00 00 00 00 55 89 e5 57 56 53 83 ec 04 3e 8d 74 26 00 83 41 04 01 <8b> 42 48 01 41 08 8b 42 4c 89 d7 85 c0 75 07 8b 42 60 85 c0 74 [ 1524.758461] EIP: [<c1406982>] per_file_stats+0x12/0x100 SS:ESP 0068:f4cbde5c [ 1524.758485] CR2: 00000000f53af748 Reported-by: Sam Jansen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <[email protected]> Cc: Sam Jansen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
…ing the objects in debugfs Fixes an issue whereby we may race with the table updates (before the core takes the struct_mutex) and so risk dereferencing a stale pointer in the iterator for /debugfs/.../i915_gem_objects. For example, [ 1524.757545] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at f53af748 [ 1524.757572] IP: [<c1406982>] per_file_stats+0x12/0x100 [ 1524.757599] *pdpt = 0000000001b13001 *pde = 00000000379fb067 *pte = 80000000353af060 [ 1524.757621] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC [ 1524.757637] Modules linked in: ctr ccm arc4 ath9k ath9k_common ath9k_hw ath snd_hda_codec_conexant mac80211 snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_controller snd_hda_codec bnep snd_hwdep rfcomm snd_pcm gpio_ich dell_wmi sparse_keymap snd_seq_midi hid_multitouch uvcvideo snd_seq_midi_event dell_laptop snd_rawmidi dcdbas snd_seq videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops videobuf2_core usbhid videodev snd_seq_device coretemp snd_timer hid joydev kvm_intel cfg80211 ath3k kvm btusb bluetooth serio_raw snd microcode soundcore lpc_ich wmi mac_hid parport_pc ppdev lp parport psmouse ahci libahci [ 1524.757825] CPU: 3 PID: 1911 Comm: intel-gpu-overl Tainted: G W OE 3.15.0-rc3+ #96 [ 1524.757840] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Inspiron 1090/Inspiron 1090, BIOS A06 08/23/2011 [ 1524.757855] task: f52f36c0 ti: f4cbc000 task.ti: f4cbc000 [ 1524.757869] EIP: 0060:[<c1406982>] EFLAGS: 00210202 CPU: 3 [ 1524.757884] EIP is at per_file_stats+0x12/0x100 [ 1524.757896] EAX: 0000002d EBX: 00000000 ECX: f4cbdefc EDX: f53af700 [ 1524.757909] ESI: c1406970 EDI: f53af700 EBP: f4cbde6c ESP: f4cbde5c [ 1524.757922] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 [ 1524.757934] CR0: 80050033 CR2: f53af748 CR3: 356af000 CR4: 000007f0 [ 1524.757945] Stack: [ 1524.757957] f4cbdefc 00000000 c1406970 f53af700 f4cbdea8 c12e5f15 f4cbdefc c1406970 [ 1524.757993] 0000ffff f4cbde90 0000002d f5dc5cd0 e4e80438 c1181d59 f4cbded8 f4d89900 [ 1524.758027] f5631b40 e5131074 c1903f37 f4cbdf28 c14068e6 f52648a0 c1927748 c1903f37 [ 1524.758062] Call Trace: [ 1524.758084] [<c1406970>] ? i915_gem_object_info+0x510/0x510 [ 1524.758106] [<c12e5f15>] idr_for_each+0xa5/0x100 [ 1524.758126] [<c1406970>] ? i915_gem_object_info+0x510/0x510 [ 1524.758148] [<c1181d59>] ? seq_vprintf+0x29/0x50 [ 1524.758168] [<c14068e6>] i915_gem_object_info+0x486/0x510 [ 1524.758189] [<c11823a6>] seq_read+0xd6/0x380 [ 1524.758208] [<c116d11d>] ? final_putname+0x1d/0x40 [ 1524.758227] [<c11822d0>] ? seq_hlist_next_percpu+0x90/0x90 [ 1524.758246] [<c1163e52>] vfs_read+0x82/0x150 [ 1524.758265] [<c11645d6>] SyS_read+0x46/0x90 [ 1524.758285] [<c16b8d8c>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x22 [ 1524.758298] Code: f5 8f 2a 00 83 c4 6c 31 c0 5b 5e 5f 5d c3 8d 74 26 00 8d bc 27 00 00 00 00 55 89 e5 57 56 53 83 ec 04 3e 8d 74 26 00 83 41 04 01 <8b> 42 48 01 41 08 8b 42 4c 89 d7 85 c0 75 07 8b 42 60 85 c0 74 [ 1524.758461] EIP: [<c1406982>] per_file_stats+0x12/0x100 SS:ESP 0068:f4cbde5c [ 1524.758485] CR2: 00000000f53af748 Reported-by: Sam Jansen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <[email protected]> Cc: Sam Jansen <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <[email protected]>
…g boot. [ Upstream commit ef3e035 ] Meelis Roos reported that kernels built with gcc-4.9 do not boot, we eventually narrowed this down to only impacting machines using UltraSPARC-III and derivitive cpus. The crash happens right when the first user process is spawned: [ 54.451346] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000004 [ 54.451346] [ 54.571516] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 3.16.0-rc2-00211-gd7933ab #96 [ 54.666431] Call Trace: [ 54.698453] [0000000000762f8c] panic+0xb0/0x224 [ 54.759071] [000000000045cf68] do_exit+0x948/0x960 [ 54.823123] [000000000042cbc0] fault_in_user_windows+0xe0/0x100 [ 54.902036] [0000000000404ad0] __handle_user_windows+0x0/0x10 [ 54.978662] Press Stop-A (L1-A) to return to the boot prom [ 55.050713] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000004 Further investigation showed that compiling only per_cpu_patch() with an older compiler fixes the boot. Detailed analysis showed that the function is not being miscompiled by gcc-4.9, but it is using a different register allocation ordering. With the gcc-4.9 compiled function, something during the code patching causes some of the %i* input registers to get corrupted. Perhaps we have a TLB miss path into the firmware that is deep enough to cause a register window spill and subsequent restore when we get back from the TLB miss trap. Let's plug this up by doing two things: 1) Stop using the firmware stack for client interface calls into the firmware. Just use the kernel's stack. 2) As soon as we can, call into a new function "start_early_boot()" to put a one-register-window buffer between the firmware's deepest stack frame and the top-most initial kernel one. Reported-by: Meelis Roos <[email protected]> Tested-by: Meelis Roos <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
…g boot. [ Upstream commit ef3e035 ] Meelis Roos reported that kernels built with gcc-4.9 do not boot, we eventually narrowed this down to only impacting machines using UltraSPARC-III and derivitive cpus. The crash happens right when the first user process is spawned: [ 54.451346] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000004 [ 54.451346] [ 54.571516] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 3.16.0-rc2-00211-gd7933ab #96 [ 54.666431] Call Trace: [ 54.698453] [0000000000762f8c] panic+0xb0/0x224 [ 54.759071] [000000000045cf68] do_exit+0x948/0x960 [ 54.823123] [000000000042cbc0] fault_in_user_windows+0xe0/0x100 [ 54.902036] [0000000000404ad0] __handle_user_windows+0x0/0x10 [ 54.978662] Press Stop-A (L1-A) to return to the boot prom [ 55.050713] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000004 Further investigation showed that compiling only per_cpu_patch() with an older compiler fixes the boot. Detailed analysis showed that the function is not being miscompiled by gcc-4.9, but it is using a different register allocation ordering. With the gcc-4.9 compiled function, something during the code patching causes some of the %i* input registers to get corrupted. Perhaps we have a TLB miss path into the firmware that is deep enough to cause a register window spill and subsequent restore when we get back from the TLB miss trap. Let's plug this up by doing two things: 1) Stop using the firmware stack for client interface calls into the firmware. Just use the kernel's stack. 2) As soon as we can, call into a new function "start_early_boot()" to put a one-register-window buffer between the firmware's deepest stack frame and the top-most initial kernel one. Reported-by: Meelis Roos <[email protected]> Tested-by: Meelis Roos <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
…g boot. [ Upstream commit ef3e035 ] Meelis Roos reported that kernels built with gcc-4.9 do not boot, we eventually narrowed this down to only impacting machines using UltraSPARC-III and derivitive cpus. The crash happens right when the first user process is spawned: [ 54.451346] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000004 [ 54.451346] [ 54.571516] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 3.16.0-rc2-00211-gd7933ab #96 [ 54.666431] Call Trace: [ 54.698453] [0000000000762f8c] panic+0xb0/0x224 [ 54.759071] [000000000045cf68] do_exit+0x948/0x960 [ 54.823123] [000000000042cbc0] fault_in_user_windows+0xe0/0x100 [ 54.902036] [0000000000404ad0] __handle_user_windows+0x0/0x10 [ 54.978662] Press Stop-A (L1-A) to return to the boot prom [ 55.050713] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000004 Further investigation showed that compiling only per_cpu_patch() with an older compiler fixes the boot. Detailed analysis showed that the function is not being miscompiled by gcc-4.9, but it is using a different register allocation ordering. With the gcc-4.9 compiled function, something during the code patching causes some of the %i* input registers to get corrupted. Perhaps we have a TLB miss path into the firmware that is deep enough to cause a register window spill and subsequent restore when we get back from the TLB miss trap. Let's plug this up by doing two things: 1) Stop using the firmware stack for client interface calls into the firmware. Just use the kernel's stack. 2) As soon as we can, call into a new function "start_early_boot()" to put a one-register-window buffer between the firmware's deepest stack frame and the top-most initial kernel one. Reported-by: Meelis Roos <[email protected]> Tested-by: Meelis Roos <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
…g boot. [ Upstream commit ef3e035 ] Meelis Roos reported that kernels built with gcc-4.9 do not boot, we eventually narrowed this down to only impacting machines using UltraSPARC-III and derivitive cpus. The crash happens right when the first user process is spawned: [ 54.451346] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000004 [ 54.451346] [ 54.571516] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 3.16.0-rc2-00211-gd7933ab raspberrypi#96 [ 54.666431] Call Trace: [ 54.698453] [0000000000762f8c] panic+0xb0/0x224 [ 54.759071] [000000000045cf68] do_exit+0x948/0x960 [ 54.823123] [000000000042cbc0] fault_in_user_windows+0xe0/0x100 [ 54.902036] [0000000000404ad0] __handle_user_windows+0x0/0x10 [ 54.978662] Press Stop-A (L1-A) to return to the boot prom [ 55.050713] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000004 Further investigation showed that compiling only per_cpu_patch() with an older compiler fixes the boot. Detailed analysis showed that the function is not being miscompiled by gcc-4.9, but it is using a different register allocation ordering. With the gcc-4.9 compiled function, something during the code patching causes some of the %i* input registers to get corrupted. Perhaps we have a TLB miss path into the firmware that is deep enough to cause a register window spill and subsequent restore when we get back from the TLB miss trap. Let's plug this up by doing two things: 1) Stop using the firmware stack for client interface calls into the firmware. Just use the kernel's stack. 2) As soon as we can, call into a new function "start_early_boot()" to put a one-register-window buffer between the firmware's deepest stack frame and the top-most initial kernel one. Reported-by: Meelis Roos <[email protected]> Tested-by: Meelis Roos <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
I have tried every thread i could find on the internet. still i cant get rtl8192cu to monitor mode on my new raspberry pi 2. uname -a = (Linux raspberrypi 4.1.18-v7+ #846 SMP Thu Feb 25 14:22:53 GMT 2016 armv7l GNU/Linux) |
seq_read() is a nasty piece of work, not to mention buggy. It has (I think) an old bug which allows unprivileged userspace to read beyond the end of m->buf. I was getting these: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in seq_read+0xcd2/0x1480 at addr ffff880116889880 Read of size 2713 by task trinity-c2/1329 CPU: 2 PID: 1329 Comm: trinity-c2 Not tainted 4.8.0-rc1+ #96 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x80 kasan_report_error+0x2cb/0x7e0 kasan_report+0x4e/0x80 check_memory_region+0x13e/0x1a0 kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 seq_read+0xcd2/0x1480 proc_reg_read+0x10b/0x260 do_loop_readv_writev.part.5+0x140/0x2c0 do_readv_writev+0x589/0x860 vfs_readv+0x7b/0xd0 do_readv+0xd8/0x2c0 SyS_readv+0xb/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x1b3/0x4b0 entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Object at ffff880116889100, in cache kmalloc-4096 size: 4096 Allocated: PID = 1329 save_stack_trace+0x26/0x80 save_stack+0x46/0xd0 kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 __kmalloc+0x1aa/0x4a0 seq_buf_alloc+0x35/0x40 seq_read+0x7d8/0x1480 proc_reg_read+0x10b/0x260 do_loop_readv_writev.part.5+0x140/0x2c0 do_readv_writev+0x589/0x860 vfs_readv+0x7b/0xd0 do_readv+0xd8/0x2c0 SyS_readv+0xb/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x1b3/0x4b0 return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a Freed: PID = 0 (stack is not available) Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88011688a000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff88011688a080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff88011688a100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff88011688a180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88011688a200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint This seems to be the same thing that Dave Jones was seeing here: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/8/12/334 There are multiple issues here: 1) If we enter the function with a non-empty buffer, there is an attempt to flush it. But it was not clearing m->from after doing so, which means that if we try to do this flush twice in a row without any call to traverse() in between, we are going to be reading from the wrong place -- the splat above, fixed by this patch. 2) If there's a short write to userspace because of page faults, the buffer may already contain multiple lines (i.e. pos has advanced by more than 1), but we don't save the progress that was made so the next call will output what we've already returned previously. Since that is a much less serious issue (and I have a headache after staring at seq_read() for the past 8 hours), I'll leave that for now. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]> Reported-by: Dave Jones <[email protected]> Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
commit 088bf2f upstream. seq_read() is a nasty piece of work, not to mention buggy. It has (I think) an old bug which allows unprivileged userspace to read beyond the end of m->buf. I was getting these: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in seq_read+0xcd2/0x1480 at addr ffff880116889880 Read of size 2713 by task trinity-c2/1329 CPU: 2 PID: 1329 Comm: trinity-c2 Not tainted 4.8.0-rc1+ #96 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x80 kasan_report_error+0x2cb/0x7e0 kasan_report+0x4e/0x80 check_memory_region+0x13e/0x1a0 kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 seq_read+0xcd2/0x1480 proc_reg_read+0x10b/0x260 do_loop_readv_writev.part.5+0x140/0x2c0 do_readv_writev+0x589/0x860 vfs_readv+0x7b/0xd0 do_readv+0xd8/0x2c0 SyS_readv+0xb/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x1b3/0x4b0 entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Object at ffff880116889100, in cache kmalloc-4096 size: 4096 Allocated: PID = 1329 save_stack_trace+0x26/0x80 save_stack+0x46/0xd0 kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 __kmalloc+0x1aa/0x4a0 seq_buf_alloc+0x35/0x40 seq_read+0x7d8/0x1480 proc_reg_read+0x10b/0x260 do_loop_readv_writev.part.5+0x140/0x2c0 do_readv_writev+0x589/0x860 vfs_readv+0x7b/0xd0 do_readv+0xd8/0x2c0 SyS_readv+0xb/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x1b3/0x4b0 return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a Freed: PID = 0 (stack is not available) Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88011688a000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff88011688a080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff88011688a100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff88011688a180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88011688a200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint This seems to be the same thing that Dave Jones was seeing here: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/8/12/334 There are multiple issues here: 1) If we enter the function with a non-empty buffer, there is an attempt to flush it. But it was not clearing m->from after doing so, which means that if we try to do this flush twice in a row without any call to traverse() in between, we are going to be reading from the wrong place -- the splat above, fixed by this patch. 2) If there's a short write to userspace because of page faults, the buffer may already contain multiple lines (i.e. pos has advanced by more than 1), but we don't save the progress that was made so the next call will output what we've already returned previously. Since that is a much less serious issue (and I have a headache after staring at seq_read() for the past 8 hours), I'll leave that for now. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]> Reported-by: Dave Jones <[email protected]> Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 088bf2f upstream. seq_read() is a nasty piece of work, not to mention buggy. It has (I think) an old bug which allows unprivileged userspace to read beyond the end of m->buf. I was getting these: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in seq_read+0xcd2/0x1480 at addr ffff880116889880 Read of size 2713 by task trinity-c2/1329 CPU: 2 PID: 1329 Comm: trinity-c2 Not tainted 4.8.0-rc1+ #96 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x80 kasan_report_error+0x2cb/0x7e0 kasan_report+0x4e/0x80 check_memory_region+0x13e/0x1a0 kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 seq_read+0xcd2/0x1480 proc_reg_read+0x10b/0x260 do_loop_readv_writev.part.5+0x140/0x2c0 do_readv_writev+0x589/0x860 vfs_readv+0x7b/0xd0 do_readv+0xd8/0x2c0 SyS_readv+0xb/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x1b3/0x4b0 entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Object at ffff880116889100, in cache kmalloc-4096 size: 4096 Allocated: PID = 1329 save_stack_trace+0x26/0x80 save_stack+0x46/0xd0 kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 __kmalloc+0x1aa/0x4a0 seq_buf_alloc+0x35/0x40 seq_read+0x7d8/0x1480 proc_reg_read+0x10b/0x260 do_loop_readv_writev.part.5+0x140/0x2c0 do_readv_writev+0x589/0x860 vfs_readv+0x7b/0xd0 do_readv+0xd8/0x2c0 SyS_readv+0xb/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x1b3/0x4b0 return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a Freed: PID = 0 (stack is not available) Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88011688a000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff88011688a080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff88011688a100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff88011688a180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88011688a200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint This seems to be the same thing that Dave Jones was seeing here: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/8/12/334 There are multiple issues here: 1) If we enter the function with a non-empty buffer, there is an attempt to flush it. But it was not clearing m->from after doing so, which means that if we try to do this flush twice in a row without any call to traverse() in between, we are going to be reading from the wrong place -- the splat above, fixed by this patch. 2) If there's a short write to userspace because of page faults, the buffer may already contain multiple lines (i.e. pos has advanced by more than 1), but we don't save the progress that was made so the next call will output what we've already returned previously. Since that is a much less serious issue (and I have a headache after staring at seq_read() for the past 8 hours), I'll leave that for now. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]> Reported-by: Dave Jones <[email protected]> Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f8ba22a ] Pipe clock comes out of the phy and is available as long as the phy is turned on. Clock controller fails to gate this clock after the phy is turned off and generates a warning. / # [ 33.048561] gcc_usb3_phy_pipe_clk status stuck at 'on' [ 33.048585] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 33.052621] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 18 at ../drivers/clk/qcom/clk-branch.c:97 clk_branch_wait+0xf0/0x108 [ 33.057384] Modules linked in: [ 33.066497] CPU: 1 PID: 18 Comm: kworker/1:0 Tainted: G W 4.12.0-rc7-00024-gfe926e34c36d-dirty raspberrypi#96 [ 33.069451] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. DB820c (DT) ... [ 33.278565] [<ffff00000849b27c>] clk_branch_wait+0xf0/0x108 [ 33.286375] [<ffff00000849b2f4>] clk_branch2_disable+0x28/0x34 [ 33.291761] [<ffff0000084868dc>] clk_core_disable+0x5c/0x88 [ 33.297660] [<ffff000008487d68>] clk_core_disable_lock+0x20/0x34 [ 33.303129] [<ffff000008487d98>] clk_disable+0x1c/0x24 [ 33.309384] [<ffff0000083ccd78>] qcom_qmp_phy_poweroff+0x20/0x48 [ 33.314328] [<ffff0000083c53f4>] phy_power_off+0x80/0xdc [ 33.320492] [<ffff00000875c950>] dwc3_core_exit+0x94/0xa0 [ 33.325784] [<ffff00000875c9ac>] dwc3_suspend_common+0x50/0x60 [ 33.331080] [<ffff00000875ca04>] dwc3_runtime_suspend+0x48/0x6c [ 33.336810] [<ffff0000085b82f4>] pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x28/0x38 [ 33.342627] [<ffff0000085bace0>] __rpm_callback+0x150/0x254 [ 33.349222] [<ffff0000085bae08>] rpm_callback+0x24/0x78 [ 33.354604] [<ffff0000085b9fd8>] rpm_suspend+0xe0/0x4e4 [ 33.359813] [<ffff0000085bb784>] pm_runtime_work+0xdc/0xf0 [ 33.365028] [<ffff0000080d7b30>] process_one_work+0x12c/0x28c [ 33.370576] [<ffff0000080d7ce8>] worker_thread+0x58/0x3b8 [ 33.376393] [<ffff0000080dd4a8>] kthread+0x100/0x12c [ 33.381776] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50 Fix this by disabling it as the first thing in phy_exit(). Fixes: e78f3d1 ("phy: qcom-qmp: new qmp phy driver for qcom-chipsets") Signed-off-by: Vivek Gautam <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Manu Gautam <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f8ba22a ] Pipe clock comes out of the phy and is available as long as the phy is turned on. Clock controller fails to gate this clock after the phy is turned off and generates a warning. / # [ 33.048561] gcc_usb3_phy_pipe_clk status stuck at 'on' [ 33.048585] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 33.052621] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 18 at ../drivers/clk/qcom/clk-branch.c:97 clk_branch_wait+0xf0/0x108 [ 33.057384] Modules linked in: [ 33.066497] CPU: 1 PID: 18 Comm: kworker/1:0 Tainted: G W 4.12.0-rc7-00024-gfe926e34c36d-dirty #96 [ 33.069451] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. DB820c (DT) ... [ 33.278565] [<ffff00000849b27c>] clk_branch_wait+0xf0/0x108 [ 33.286375] [<ffff00000849b2f4>] clk_branch2_disable+0x28/0x34 [ 33.291761] [<ffff0000084868dc>] clk_core_disable+0x5c/0x88 [ 33.297660] [<ffff000008487d68>] clk_core_disable_lock+0x20/0x34 [ 33.303129] [<ffff000008487d98>] clk_disable+0x1c/0x24 [ 33.309384] [<ffff0000083ccd78>] qcom_qmp_phy_poweroff+0x20/0x48 [ 33.314328] [<ffff0000083c53f4>] phy_power_off+0x80/0xdc [ 33.320492] [<ffff00000875c950>] dwc3_core_exit+0x94/0xa0 [ 33.325784] [<ffff00000875c9ac>] dwc3_suspend_common+0x50/0x60 [ 33.331080] [<ffff00000875ca04>] dwc3_runtime_suspend+0x48/0x6c [ 33.336810] [<ffff0000085b82f4>] pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x28/0x38 [ 33.342627] [<ffff0000085bace0>] __rpm_callback+0x150/0x254 [ 33.349222] [<ffff0000085bae08>] rpm_callback+0x24/0x78 [ 33.354604] [<ffff0000085b9fd8>] rpm_suspend+0xe0/0x4e4 [ 33.359813] [<ffff0000085bb784>] pm_runtime_work+0xdc/0xf0 [ 33.365028] [<ffff0000080d7b30>] process_one_work+0x12c/0x28c [ 33.370576] [<ffff0000080d7ce8>] worker_thread+0x58/0x3b8 [ 33.376393] [<ffff0000080dd4a8>] kthread+0x100/0x12c [ 33.381776] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50 Fix this by disabling it as the first thing in phy_exit(). Fixes: e78f3d1 ("phy: qcom-qmp: new qmp phy driver for qcom-chipsets") Signed-off-by: Vivek Gautam <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Manu Gautam <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 0dfe452 upstream. [ 61.182439] UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c:5366:34 [ 61.183673] shift exponent 4294967288 is too large for 32-bit type 'unsigned int' [ 61.185530] CPU: 0 PID: 639 Comm: qp Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1-00037-g4aa1d69a9c60-dirty #96 [ 61.186981] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-2.fc27 04/01/2014 [ 61.188315] Call Trace: [ 61.188661] dump_stack+0xc7/0x13b [ 61.190427] ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x49 [ 61.190899] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x1ea/0x22f [ 61.197040] mlx5_ib_create_wq+0x1c99/0x1d50 [ 61.206632] ib_uverbs_ex_create_wq+0x499/0x820 [ 61.213892] ib_uverbs_write+0x77e/0xae0 [ 61.248018] vfs_write+0x121/0x3b0 [ 61.249831] ksys_write+0xa1/0x120 [ 61.254024] do_syscall_64+0x7c/0x2a0 [ 61.256178] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 61.259211] RIP: 0033:0x7f54bab70e99 [ 61.262125] Code: 00 f3 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 [ 61.268678] RSP: 002b:00007ffe1541c318 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 61.271076] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f54bab70e99 [ 61.273795] RDX: 0000000000000070 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 61.276982] RBP: 00007ffe1541c330 R08: 00000000200078e0 R09: 0000000000000002 [ 61.280035] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004005c0 [ 61.283279] R13: 00007ffe1541c420 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Cc: <[email protected]> # 4.7 Fixes: 79b20a6 ("IB/mlx5: Add receive Work Queue verbs") Cc: syzkaller <[email protected]> Reported-by: Noa Osherovich <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
… fault The userspace can ask kprobe to intercept strings at any memory address, including invalid kernel address. In this case, fetch_store_strlen() would crash since it uses general usercopy function, and user access functions are no longer allowed to access kernel memory. For example, we can crash the kernel by doing something as below: $ sudo kprobe 'p:do_sys_open +0(+0(%si)):string' [ 103.620391] BUG: GPF in non-whitelisted uaccess (non-canonical address?) [ 103.622104] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 103.623424] CPU: 10 PID: 1046 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.0.0-rc3-00130-gd73aba1-dirty #96 [ 103.625321] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.12.0-2-g628b2e6-dirty-20190104_103505-linux 04/01/2014 [ 103.628284] RIP: 0010:process_fetch_insn+0x1ab/0x4b0 [ 103.629518] Code: 10 83 80 28 2e 00 00 01 31 d2 31 ff 48 8b 74 24 28 eb 0c 81 fa ff 0f 00 00 7f 1c 85 c0 75 18 66 66 90 0f ae e8 48 63 ca 89 f8 <8a> 0c 31 66 66 90 83 c2 01 84 c9 75 dc 89 54 24 34 89 44 24 28 48 [ 103.634032] RSP: 0018:ffff88845eb37ce0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 103.635312] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888456c4e5a8 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 103.637057] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 2e646c2f6374652f RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 103.638795] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 103.640556] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 103.642297] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 103.644040] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88846f000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 103.646019] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 103.647436] CR2: 00007ffc79758038 CR3: 0000000463360006 CR4: 0000000000020ee0 [ 103.649147] Call Trace: [ 103.649781] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xa0 [ 103.650747] ? do_sys_open+0x5/0x220 [ 103.651635] kprobe_trace_func+0x303/0x380 [ 103.652645] ? do_sys_open+0x5/0x220 [ 103.653528] kprobe_dispatcher+0x45/0x50 [ 103.654682] ? do_sys_open+0x1/0x220 [ 103.655875] kprobe_ftrace_handler+0x90/0xf0 [ 103.657282] ftrace_ops_assist_func+0x54/0xf0 [ 103.658564] ? __call_rcu+0x1dc/0x280 [ 103.659482] 0xffffffffc00000bf [ 103.660384] ? __ia32_sys_open+0x20/0x20 [ 103.661682] ? do_sys_open+0x1/0x220 [ 103.662863] do_sys_open+0x5/0x220 [ 103.663988] do_syscall_64+0x60/0x210 [ 103.665201] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 103.666862] RIP: 0033:0x7fc22fadccdd [ 103.668034] Code: 48 89 54 24 e0 41 83 e2 40 75 32 89 f0 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 24 89 f2 b8 01 01 00 00 48 89 fe bf 9c ff ff ff 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 33 f3 c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8d 44 [ 103.674029] RSP: 002b:00007ffc7972c3a8 EFLAGS: 00000287 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 [ 103.676512] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000562f86147a21 RCX: 00007fc22fadccdd [ 103.678853] RDX: 0000000000080000 RSI: 00007fc22fae1428 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c [ 103.681151] RBP: ffffffffffffffff R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 103.683489] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000287 R12: 00007fc22fce90a8 [ 103.685774] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 103.688056] Modules linked in: [ 103.689131] ---[ end trace 43792035c28984a1 ]--- This can be fixed by using probe_mem_read() instead, as it can handle faulting kernel memory addresses, which kprobes can legitimately do. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 9da3f2b ("x86/fault: BUG() when uaccess helpers fault on kernel addresses") Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>
… fault commit 2c4f1fc upstream. The userspace can ask kprobe to intercept strings at any memory address, including invalid kernel address. In this case, fetch_store_strlen() would crash since it uses general usercopy function, and user access functions are no longer allowed to access kernel memory. For example, we can crash the kernel by doing something as below: $ sudo kprobe 'p:do_sys_open +0(+0(%si)):string' [ 103.620391] BUG: GPF in non-whitelisted uaccess (non-canonical address?) [ 103.622104] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 103.623424] CPU: 10 PID: 1046 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.0.0-rc3-00130-gd73aba1-dirty #96 [ 103.625321] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.12.0-2-g628b2e6-dirty-20190104_103505-linux 04/01/2014 [ 103.628284] RIP: 0010:process_fetch_insn+0x1ab/0x4b0 [ 103.629518] Code: 10 83 80 28 2e 00 00 01 31 d2 31 ff 48 8b 74 24 28 eb 0c 81 fa ff 0f 00 00 7f 1c 85 c0 75 18 66 66 90 0f ae e8 48 63 ca 89 f8 <8a> 0c 31 66 66 90 83 c2 01 84 c9 75 dc 89 54 24 34 89 44 24 28 48 [ 103.634032] RSP: 0018:ffff88845eb37ce0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 103.635312] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888456c4e5a8 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 103.637057] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 2e646c2f6374652f RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 103.638795] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 103.640556] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 103.642297] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 103.644040] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88846f000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 103.646019] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 103.647436] CR2: 00007ffc79758038 CR3: 0000000463360006 CR4: 0000000000020ee0 [ 103.649147] Call Trace: [ 103.649781] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xa0 [ 103.650747] ? do_sys_open+0x5/0x220 [ 103.651635] kprobe_trace_func+0x303/0x380 [ 103.652645] ? do_sys_open+0x5/0x220 [ 103.653528] kprobe_dispatcher+0x45/0x50 [ 103.654682] ? do_sys_open+0x1/0x220 [ 103.655875] kprobe_ftrace_handler+0x90/0xf0 [ 103.657282] ftrace_ops_assist_func+0x54/0xf0 [ 103.658564] ? __call_rcu+0x1dc/0x280 [ 103.659482] 0xffffffffc00000bf [ 103.660384] ? __ia32_sys_open+0x20/0x20 [ 103.661682] ? do_sys_open+0x1/0x220 [ 103.662863] do_sys_open+0x5/0x220 [ 103.663988] do_syscall_64+0x60/0x210 [ 103.665201] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 103.666862] RIP: 0033:0x7fc22fadccdd [ 103.668034] Code: 48 89 54 24 e0 41 83 e2 40 75 32 89 f0 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 24 89 f2 b8 01 01 00 00 48 89 fe bf 9c ff ff ff 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 33 f3 c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8d 44 [ 103.674029] RSP: 002b:00007ffc7972c3a8 EFLAGS: 00000287 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 [ 103.676512] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000562f86147a21 RCX: 00007fc22fadccdd [ 103.678853] RDX: 0000000000080000 RSI: 00007fc22fae1428 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c [ 103.681151] RBP: ffffffffffffffff R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 103.683489] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000287 R12: 00007fc22fce90a8 [ 103.685774] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 103.688056] Modules linked in: [ 103.689131] ---[ end trace 43792035c28984a1 ]--- This can be fixed by using probe_mem_read() instead, as it can handle faulting kernel memory addresses, which kprobes can legitimately do. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 9da3f2b ("x86/fault: BUG() when uaccess helpers fault on kernel addresses") Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit f16eb8a upstream. If SSDT overlay is loaded via ConfigFS and then unloaded the device, we would like to have OF modalias for, already gone. Thus, acpi_get_name() returns no allocated buffer for such case and kernel crashes afterwards: ACPI: Host-directed Dynamic ACPI Table Unload ads7950 spi-PRP0001:00: Dropping the link to regulator.0 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000 #PF error: [normal kernel read fault] PGD 80000000070d6067 P4D 80000000070d6067 PUD 70d0067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 40 Comm: kworker/u4:2 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #96 Hardware name: Intel Corporation Merrifield/BODEGA BAY, BIOS 542 2015.01.21:18.19.48 Workqueue: kacpi_hotplug acpi_device_del_work_fn RIP: 0010:create_of_modalias.isra.1+0x4c/0x150 Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 54 24 08 48 c7 44 24 10 00 00 00 00 48 c7 44 24 08 ff ff ff ff e8 7a b0 03 00 48 8b 4c 24 10 <0f> b6 01 84 c0 74 27 48 c7 c7 00 09 f4 a5 0f b6 f0 8d 50 20 f6 04 RSP: 0000:ffffa51040297c10 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000001001 RBX: 0000000000000785 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000001001 RSI: 0000000000000286 RDI: ffffa2163dc042e0 RBP: ffffa216062b1196 R08: 0000000000001001 R09: ffffa21639873000 R10: ffffffffa606761d R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffa21639873218 R13: ffffa2163deb5060 R14: ffffa216063d1010 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa2163e000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000007114000 CR4: 00000000001006f0 Call Trace: __acpi_device_uevent_modalias+0xb0/0x100 spi_uevent+0xd/0x40 ... In order to fix above let create_of_modalias() check the status returned by acpi_get_name() and bail out in case of failure. Fixes: 8765c5b ("ACPI / scan: Rework modalias creation when "compatible" is present") Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201381 Reported-by: Ferry Toth <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ferry Toth<[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mika Westerberg <[email protected]> Cc: 4.1+ <[email protected]> # 4.1+ Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit f16eb8a upstream. If SSDT overlay is loaded via ConfigFS and then unloaded the device, we would like to have OF modalias for, already gone. Thus, acpi_get_name() returns no allocated buffer for such case and kernel crashes afterwards: ACPI: Host-directed Dynamic ACPI Table Unload ads7950 spi-PRP0001:00: Dropping the link to regulator.0 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000 #PF error: [normal kernel read fault] PGD 80000000070d6067 P4D 80000000070d6067 PUD 70d0067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 40 Comm: kworker/u4:2 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #96 Hardware name: Intel Corporation Merrifield/BODEGA BAY, BIOS 542 2015.01.21:18.19.48 Workqueue: kacpi_hotplug acpi_device_del_work_fn RIP: 0010:create_of_modalias.isra.1+0x4c/0x150 Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 54 24 08 48 c7 44 24 10 00 00 00 00 48 c7 44 24 08 ff ff ff ff e8 7a b0 03 00 48 8b 4c 24 10 <0f> b6 01 84 c0 74 27 48 c7 c7 00 09 f4 a5 0f b6 f0 8d 50 20 f6 04 RSP: 0000:ffffa51040297c10 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000001001 RBX: 0000000000000785 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000001001 RSI: 0000000000000286 RDI: ffffa2163dc042e0 RBP: ffffa216062b1196 R08: 0000000000001001 R09: ffffa21639873000 R10: ffffffffa606761d R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffa21639873218 R13: ffffa2163deb5060 R14: ffffa216063d1010 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa2163e000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000007114000 CR4: 00000000001006f0 Call Trace: __acpi_device_uevent_modalias+0xb0/0x100 spi_uevent+0xd/0x40 ... In order to fix above let create_of_modalias() check the status returned by acpi_get_name() and bail out in case of failure. Fixes: 8765c5b ("ACPI / scan: Rework modalias creation when "compatible" is present") Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201381 Reported-by: Ferry Toth <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ferry Toth<[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mika Westerberg <[email protected]> Cc: 4.1+ <[email protected]> # 4.1+ Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
syzbot was able to crash host by sending UDP packets with a 0 payload. TCP does not have this issue since we do not aggregate packets without payload. Since dev_gro_receive() sets gso_size based on skb_gro_len(skb) it seems not worth trying to cope with padded packets. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in skb_gro_receive+0xf5f/0x10e0 net/core/skbuff.c:3826 Read of size 16 at addr ffff88808893fff0 by task syz-executor612/7889 CPU: 0 PID: 7889 Comm: syz-executor612 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc7+ #96 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187 kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 __asan_report_load16_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:133 skb_gro_receive+0xf5f/0x10e0 net/core/skbuff.c:3826 udp_gro_receive_segment net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:382 [inline] call_gro_receive include/linux/netdevice.h:2349 [inline] udp_gro_receive+0xb61/0xfd0 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:414 udp4_gro_receive+0x763/0xeb0 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:478 inet_gro_receive+0xe72/0x1110 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1510 dev_gro_receive+0x1cd0/0x23c0 net/core/dev.c:5581 napi_gro_frags+0x36b/0xd10 net/core/dev.c:5843 tun_get_user+0x2f24/0x3fb0 drivers/net/tun.c:1981 tun_chr_write_iter+0xbd/0x156 drivers/net/tun.c:2027 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1866 [inline] do_iter_readv_writev+0x5e1/0x8e0 fs/read_write.c:681 do_iter_write fs/read_write.c:957 [inline] do_iter_write+0x184/0x610 fs/read_write.c:938 vfs_writev+0x1b3/0x2f0 fs/read_write.c:1002 do_writev+0x15e/0x370 fs/read_write.c:1037 __do_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1110 [inline] __se_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1107 [inline] __x64_sys_writev+0x75/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1107 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x441cc0 Code: 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 9d 09 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 83 3d 51 93 29 00 00 75 14 b8 14 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 74 09 fc ff c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 ba 2b 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffe8c716118 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe8c716150 RCX: 0000000000441cc0 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007ffe8c716170 RDI: 00000000000000f0 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000ffff R09: 0000000000a64668 R10: 0000000020000040 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000c2d9 R13: 0000000000402b50 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Allocated by task 5143: save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:75 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:497 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:470 kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:505 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:437 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3393 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x11a/0x6f0 mm/slab.c:3555 mm_alloc+0x1d/0xd0 kernel/fork.c:1030 bprm_mm_init fs/exec.c:363 [inline] __do_execve_file.isra.0+0xaa3/0x23f0 fs/exec.c:1791 do_execveat_common fs/exec.c:1865 [inline] do_execve fs/exec.c:1882 [inline] __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1958 [inline] __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1953 [inline] __x64_sys_execve+0x8f/0xc0 fs/exec.c:1953 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 5351: save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:75 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:459 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:467 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3499 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x260 mm/slab.c:3765 __mmdrop+0x238/0x320 kernel/fork.c:677 mmdrop include/linux/sched/mm.h:49 [inline] finish_task_switch+0x47b/0x780 kernel/sched/core.c:2746 context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:2880 [inline] __schedule+0x81b/0x1cc0 kernel/sched/core.c:3518 preempt_schedule_irq+0xb5/0x140 kernel/sched/core.c:3745 retint_kernel+0x1b/0x2d arch_local_irq_restore arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:767 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0xab/0x260 mm/slab.c:3766 anon_vma_chain_free mm/rmap.c:134 [inline] unlink_anon_vmas+0x2ba/0x870 mm/rmap.c:401 free_pgtables+0x1af/0x2f0 mm/memory.c:394 exit_mmap+0x2d1/0x530 mm/mmap.c:3144 __mmput kernel/fork.c:1046 [inline] mmput+0x15f/0x4c0 kernel/fork.c:1067 exec_mmap fs/exec.c:1046 [inline] flush_old_exec+0x8d9/0x1c20 fs/exec.c:1279 load_elf_binary+0x9bc/0x53f0 fs/binfmt_elf.c:864 search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1656 [inline] search_binary_handler+0x17f/0x570 fs/exec.c:1634 exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1698 [inline] __do_execve_file.isra.0+0x1394/0x23f0 fs/exec.c:1818 do_execveat_common fs/exec.c:1865 [inline] do_execve fs/exec.c:1882 [inline] __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1958 [inline] __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1953 [inline] __x64_sys_execve+0x8f/0xc0 fs/exec.c:1953 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88808893f7c0 which belongs to the cache mm_struct of size 1496 The buggy address is located 600 bytes to the right of 1496-byte region [ffff88808893f7c0, ffff88808893fd98) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0002224f80 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88821bc40ac0 index:0xffff88808893f7c0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x1fffc0000010200(slab|head) raw: 01fffc0000010200 ffffea00025b4f08 ffffea00027b9d08 ffff88821bc40ac0 raw: ffff88808893f7c0 ffff88808893e440 0000000100000001 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88808893fe80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88808893ff00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88808893ff80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff888088940000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888088940080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Fixes: e20cf8d ("udp: implement GRO for plain UDP sockets.") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4dd2b82 ] syzbot was able to crash host by sending UDP packets with a 0 payload. TCP does not have this issue since we do not aggregate packets without payload. Since dev_gro_receive() sets gso_size based on skb_gro_len(skb) it seems not worth trying to cope with padded packets. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in skb_gro_receive+0xf5f/0x10e0 net/core/skbuff.c:3826 Read of size 16 at addr ffff88808893fff0 by task syz-executor612/7889 CPU: 0 PID: 7889 Comm: syz-executor612 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc7+ #96 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187 kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 __asan_report_load16_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:133 skb_gro_receive+0xf5f/0x10e0 net/core/skbuff.c:3826 udp_gro_receive_segment net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:382 [inline] call_gro_receive include/linux/netdevice.h:2349 [inline] udp_gro_receive+0xb61/0xfd0 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:414 udp4_gro_receive+0x763/0xeb0 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:478 inet_gro_receive+0xe72/0x1110 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1510 dev_gro_receive+0x1cd0/0x23c0 net/core/dev.c:5581 napi_gro_frags+0x36b/0xd10 net/core/dev.c:5843 tun_get_user+0x2f24/0x3fb0 drivers/net/tun.c:1981 tun_chr_write_iter+0xbd/0x156 drivers/net/tun.c:2027 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1866 [inline] do_iter_readv_writev+0x5e1/0x8e0 fs/read_write.c:681 do_iter_write fs/read_write.c:957 [inline] do_iter_write+0x184/0x610 fs/read_write.c:938 vfs_writev+0x1b3/0x2f0 fs/read_write.c:1002 do_writev+0x15e/0x370 fs/read_write.c:1037 __do_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1110 [inline] __se_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1107 [inline] __x64_sys_writev+0x75/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1107 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x441cc0 Code: 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 9d 09 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 83 3d 51 93 29 00 00 75 14 b8 14 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 74 09 fc ff c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 ba 2b 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffe8c716118 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe8c716150 RCX: 0000000000441cc0 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007ffe8c716170 RDI: 00000000000000f0 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000ffff R09: 0000000000a64668 R10: 0000000020000040 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000c2d9 R13: 0000000000402b50 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Allocated by task 5143: save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:75 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:497 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:470 kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:505 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:437 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3393 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x11a/0x6f0 mm/slab.c:3555 mm_alloc+0x1d/0xd0 kernel/fork.c:1030 bprm_mm_init fs/exec.c:363 [inline] __do_execve_file.isra.0+0xaa3/0x23f0 fs/exec.c:1791 do_execveat_common fs/exec.c:1865 [inline] do_execve fs/exec.c:1882 [inline] __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1958 [inline] __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1953 [inline] __x64_sys_execve+0x8f/0xc0 fs/exec.c:1953 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 5351: save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:75 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:459 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:467 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3499 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x260 mm/slab.c:3765 __mmdrop+0x238/0x320 kernel/fork.c:677 mmdrop include/linux/sched/mm.h:49 [inline] finish_task_switch+0x47b/0x780 kernel/sched/core.c:2746 context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:2880 [inline] __schedule+0x81b/0x1cc0 kernel/sched/core.c:3518 preempt_schedule_irq+0xb5/0x140 kernel/sched/core.c:3745 retint_kernel+0x1b/0x2d arch_local_irq_restore arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:767 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0xab/0x260 mm/slab.c:3766 anon_vma_chain_free mm/rmap.c:134 [inline] unlink_anon_vmas+0x2ba/0x870 mm/rmap.c:401 free_pgtables+0x1af/0x2f0 mm/memory.c:394 exit_mmap+0x2d1/0x530 mm/mmap.c:3144 __mmput kernel/fork.c:1046 [inline] mmput+0x15f/0x4c0 kernel/fork.c:1067 exec_mmap fs/exec.c:1046 [inline] flush_old_exec+0x8d9/0x1c20 fs/exec.c:1279 load_elf_binary+0x9bc/0x53f0 fs/binfmt_elf.c:864 search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1656 [inline] search_binary_handler+0x17f/0x570 fs/exec.c:1634 exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1698 [inline] __do_execve_file.isra.0+0x1394/0x23f0 fs/exec.c:1818 do_execveat_common fs/exec.c:1865 [inline] do_execve fs/exec.c:1882 [inline] __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1958 [inline] __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1953 [inline] __x64_sys_execve+0x8f/0xc0 fs/exec.c:1953 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88808893f7c0 which belongs to the cache mm_struct of size 1496 The buggy address is located 600 bytes to the right of 1496-byte region [ffff88808893f7c0, ffff88808893fd98) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0002224f80 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88821bc40ac0 index:0xffff88808893f7c0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x1fffc0000010200(slab|head) raw: 01fffc0000010200 ffffea00025b4f08 ffffea00027b9d08 ffff88821bc40ac0 raw: ffff88808893f7c0 ffff88808893e440 0000000100000001 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88808893fe80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88808893ff00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88808893ff80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff888088940000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888088940080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Fixes: e20cf8d ("udp: implement GRO for plain UDP sockets.") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Current code doesn't limit the number of nested devices. Nested devices would be handled recursively and this needs huge stack memory. So, unlimited nested devices could make stack overflow. This patch adds upper_level and lower_level, they are common variables and represent maximum lower/upper depth. When upper/lower device is attached or dettached, {lower/upper}_level are updated. and if maximum depth is bigger than 8, attach routine fails and returns -EMLINK. In addition, this patch converts recursive routine of netdev_walk_all_{lower/upper} to iterator routine. Test commands: ip link add dummy0 type dummy ip link add link dummy0 name vlan1 type vlan id 1 ip link set vlan1 up for i in {2..55} do let A=$i-1 ip link add vlan$i link vlan$A type vlan id $i done ip link del dummy0 Splat looks like: [ 155.513226][ T908] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __unwind_start+0x71/0x850 [ 155.514162][ T908] Write of size 88 at addr ffff8880608a6cc0 by task ip/908 [ 155.515048][ T908] [ 155.515333][ T908] CPU: 0 PID: 908 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #96 [ 155.516147][ T908] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 155.517233][ T908] Call Trace: [ 155.517627][ T908] [ 155.517918][ T908] Allocated by task 0: [ 155.518412][ T908] (stack is not available) [ 155.518955][ T908] [ 155.519228][ T908] Freed by task 0: [ 155.519885][ T908] (stack is not available) [ 155.520452][ T908] [ 155.520729][ T908] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880608a6ac0 [ 155.520729][ T908] which belongs to the cache names_cache of size 4096 [ 155.522387][ T908] The buggy address is located 512 bytes inside of [ 155.522387][ T908] 4096-byte region [ffff8880608a6ac0, ffff8880608a7ac0) [ 155.523920][ T908] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 155.524552][ T908] page:ffffea0001822800 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88806c657cc0 index:0x0 compound_mapcount:0 [ 155.525836][ T908] flags: 0x100000000010200(slab|head) [ 155.526445][ T908] raw: 0100000000010200 ffffea0001813808 ffffea0001a26c08 ffff88806c657cc0 [ 155.527424][ T908] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000070007 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 155.528429][ T908] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 155.529158][ T908] [ 155.529410][ T908] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 155.530060][ T908] ffff8880608a6b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 155.530971][ T908] ffff8880608a6c00: fb fb fb fb fb f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f2 f2 f2 f3 f3 f3 [ 155.531889][ T908] >ffff8880608a6c80: f3 fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 155.532806][ T908] ^ [ 155.533509][ T908] ffff8880608a6d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 [ 155.534436][ T908] ffff8880608a6d80: f2 f3 f3 f3 f3 fb fb fb 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ ... ] Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
The IFF_BONDING means bonding master or bonding slave device. ->ndo_add_slave() sets IFF_BONDING flag and ->ndo_del_slave() unsets IFF_BONDING flag. bond0<--bond1 Both bond0 and bond1 are bonding device and these should keep having IFF_BONDING flag until they are removed. But bond1 would lose IFF_BONDING at ->ndo_del_slave() because that routine do not check whether the slave device is the bonding type or not. This patch adds the interface type check routine before removing IFF_BONDING flag. Test commands: ip link add bond0 type bond ip link add bond1 type bond ip link set bond1 master bond0 ip link set bond1 nomaster ip link del bond1 type bond ip link add bond1 type bond Splat looks like: [ 226.665555] proc_dir_entry 'bonding/bond1' already registered [ 226.666440] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 737 at fs/proc/generic.c:361 proc_register+0x2a9/0x3e0 [ 226.667571] Modules linked in: bonding af_packet sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables unix [ 226.668662] CPU: 0 PID: 737 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #96 [ 226.669508] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 226.670652] RIP: 0010:proc_register+0x2a9/0x3e0 [ 226.671612] Code: 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 39 01 00 00 48 8b 04 24 48 89 ea 48 c7 c7 a0 0b 14 9f 48 8b b0 e 0 00 00 00 e8 07 e7 88 ff <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 40 2d a5 9f e8 59 d6 23 01 48 8b 4c 24 10 48 b8 00 [ 226.675007] RSP: 0018:ffff888050e17078 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 226.675761] RAX: dffffc0000000008 RBX: ffff88805fdd0f10 RCX: ffffffff9dd344e2 [ 226.676757] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88806c9f6b8c [ 226.677751] RBP: ffff8880507160f3 R08: ffffed100d940019 R09: ffffed100d940019 [ 226.678761] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed100d940018 R12: ffff888050716008 [ 226.679757] R13: ffff8880507160f2 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffffed100a0e2c1e [ 226.680758] FS: 00007fdc217cc0c0(0000) GS:ffff88806c800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 226.681886] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 226.682719] CR2: 00007f49313424d0 CR3: 0000000050e46001 CR4: 00000000000606f0 [ 226.683727] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 226.684725] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 226.685681] Call Trace: [ 226.687089] proc_create_seq_private+0xb3/0xf0 [ 226.687778] bond_create_proc_entry+0x1b3/0x3f0 [bonding] [ 226.691458] bond_netdev_event+0x433/0x970 [bonding] [ 226.692139] ? __module_text_address+0x13/0x140 [ 226.692779] notifier_call_chain+0x90/0x160 [ 226.693401] register_netdevice+0x9b3/0xd80 [ 226.694010] ? alloc_netdev_mqs+0x854/0xc10 [ 226.694629] ? netdev_change_features+0xa0/0xa0 [ 226.695278] ? rtnl_create_link+0x2ed/0xad0 [ 226.695849] bond_newlink+0x2a/0x60 [bonding] [ 226.696422] __rtnl_newlink+0xb9f/0x11b0 [ 226.696968] ? rtnl_link_unregister+0x220/0x220 [ ... ] Fixes: 0b680e7 ("[PATCH] bonding: Add priv_flag to avoid event mishandling") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
All bonding device has same lockdep key and subclass is initialized with nest_level. But actual nest_level value can be changed when a lower device is attached. And at this moment, the subclass should be updated but it seems to be unsafe. So this patch makes bonding use dynamic lockdep key instead of the subclass. Test commands: ip link add bond0 type bond for i in {1..5} do let A=$i-1 ip link add bond$i type bond ip link set bond$i master bond$A done ip link set bond5 master bond0 Splat looks like: [ 307.992912] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [ 307.993656] 5.4.0-rc3+ #96 Tainted: G W [ 307.994367] -------------------------------------------- [ 307.995092] ip/761 is trying to acquire lock: [ 307.995710] ffff8880513aac60 (&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock#2/2){+.+.}, at: bond_get_stats+0xb8/0x500 [bonding] [ 307.997045] but task is already holding lock: [ 307.997923] ffff88805fcbac60 (&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock#2/2){+.+.}, at: bond_get_stats+0xb8/0x500 [bonding] [ 307.999215] other info that might help us debug this: [ 308.000251] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 308.001137] CPU0 [ 308.001533] ---- [ 308.001915] lock(&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock#2/2); [ 308.002609] lock(&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock#2/2); [ 308.003302] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 308.004310] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 308.005319] 3 locks held by ip/761: [ 308.005830] #0: ffffffff9fcc42b0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x466/0x8a0 [ 308.006894] #1: ffff88805fcbac60 (&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock#2/2){+.+.}, at: bond_get_stats+0xb8/0x500 [bonding] [ 308.008243] #2: ffffffff9f9219c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: bond_get_stats+0x9f/0x500 [bonding] [ 308.009422] stack backtrace: [ 308.010124] CPU: 0 PID: 761 Comm: ip Tainted: G W 5.4.0-rc3+ #96 [ 308.011097] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 308.012179] Call Trace: [ 308.012601] dump_stack+0x7c/0xbb [ 308.013089] __lock_acquire+0x269d/0x3de0 [ 308.013669] ? register_lock_class+0x14d0/0x14d0 [ 308.014318] lock_acquire+0x164/0x3b0 [ 308.014858] ? bond_get_stats+0xb8/0x500 [bonding] [ 308.015520] _raw_spin_lock_nested+0x2e/0x60 [ 308.016129] ? bond_get_stats+0xb8/0x500 [bonding] [ 308.017215] bond_get_stats+0xb8/0x500 [bonding] [ 308.018454] ? bond_arp_rcv+0xf10/0xf10 [bonding] [ 308.019710] ? rcu_read_lock_held+0x90/0xa0 [ 308.020605] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xc0/0xc0 [ 308.021286] ? bond_get_stats+0x9f/0x500 [bonding] [ 308.021953] dev_get_stats+0x1ec/0x270 [ 308.022508] bond_get_stats+0x1d1/0x500 [bonding] Fixes: d3fff6c ("net: add netdev_lockdep_set_classes() helper") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
team interface could be nested and it's lock variable could be nested too. But this lock uses static lockdep key and there is no nested locking handling code such as mutex_lock_nested() and so on. so the Lockdep would warn about the circular locking scenario that couldn't happen. In order to fix, this patch makes the team module to use dynamic lock key instead of static key. Test commands: ip link add team0 type team ip link add team1 type team ip link set team0 master team1 ip link set team0 nomaster ip link set team1 master team0 ip link set team1 nomaster Splat that looks like: [ 40.364352] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [ 40.364964] 5.4.0-rc3+ #96 Not tainted [ 40.365405] -------------------------------------------- [ 40.365973] ip/750 is trying to acquire lock: [ 40.366542] ffff888060b34c40 (&team->lock){+.+.}, at: team_set_mac_address+0x151/0x290 [team] [ 40.367689] but task is already holding lock: [ 40.368729] ffff888051201c40 (&team->lock){+.+.}, at: team_del_slave+0x29/0x60 [team] [ 40.370280] other info that might help us debug this: [ 40.371159] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 40.371942] CPU0 [ 40.372338] ---- [ 40.372673] lock(&team->lock); [ 40.373115] lock(&team->lock); [ 40.373549] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 40.374432] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 40.375338] 2 locks held by ip/750: [ 40.375851] #0: ffffffffabcc42b0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x466/0x8a0 [ 40.376927] #1: ffff888051201c40 (&team->lock){+.+.}, at: team_del_slave+0x29/0x60 [team] [ 40.377989] stack backtrace: [ 40.378650] CPU: 0 PID: 750 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #96 [ 40.379368] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 40.380574] Call Trace: [ 40.381208] dump_stack+0x7c/0xbb [ 40.381959] __lock_acquire+0x269d/0x3de0 [ 40.382817] ? register_lock_class+0x14d0/0x14d0 [ 40.383784] ? check_chain_key+0x236/0x5d0 [ 40.384518] lock_acquire+0x164/0x3b0 [ 40.385074] ? team_set_mac_address+0x151/0x290 [team] [ 40.385805] __mutex_lock+0x14d/0x14c0 [ 40.386371] ? team_set_mac_address+0x151/0x290 [team] [ 40.387038] ? team_set_mac_address+0x151/0x290 [team] [ 40.387632] ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1380/0x1380 [ 40.388245] ? team_del_slave+0x60/0x60 [team] [ 40.388752] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x90/0xc0 [ 40.389304] ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xa0/0xa0 [ 40.389819] ? lock_acquire+0x164/0x3b0 [ 40.390285] ? lockdep_rtnl_is_held+0x16/0x20 [ 40.390797] ? team_port_get_rtnl+0x90/0xe0 [team] [ 40.391353] ? __module_text_address+0x13/0x140 [ 40.391886] ? team_set_mac_address+0x151/0x290 [team] [ 40.392547] team_set_mac_address+0x151/0x290 [team] [ 40.393111] dev_set_mac_address+0x1f0/0x3f0 [ ... ] Fixes: 3d249d4 ("net: introduce ethernet teaming device") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
virt_wifi_newlink() calls netdev_upper_dev_link() and it internally holds reference count of lower interface. Current code does not release a reference count of the lower interface when the lower interface is being deleted. So, reference count leaks occur. Test commands: ip link add dummy0 type dummy ip link add vw1 link dummy0 type virt_wifi ip link del dummy0 Splat looks like: [ 133.787526][ T788] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 788 at net/core/dev.c:8274 rollback_registered_many+0x835/0xc80 [ 133.788355][ T788] Modules linked in: virt_wifi cfg80211 dummy team af_packet sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables unix [ 133.789377][ T788] CPU: 1 PID: 788 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #96 [ 133.790069][ T788] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 133.791167][ T788] RIP: 0010:rollback_registered_many+0x835/0xc80 [ 133.791906][ T788] Code: 00 4d 85 ff 0f 84 b5 fd ff ff ba c0 0c 00 00 48 89 de 4c 89 ff e8 9b 58 04 00 48 89 df e8 30 [ 133.794317][ T788] RSP: 0018:ffff88805ba3f338 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 133.795080][ T788] RAX: ffff88805e57e801 RBX: ffff88805ba34000 RCX: ffffffffa9294723 [ 133.796045][ T788] RDX: 1ffff1100b746816 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffffabcc4240 [ 133.797006][ T788] RBP: ffff88805ba3f4c0 R08: fffffbfff5798849 R09: fffffbfff5798849 [ 133.797993][ T788] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: fffffbfff5798848 R12: dffffc0000000000 [ 133.802514][ T788] R13: ffff88805ba3f440 R14: ffff88805ba3f400 R15: ffff88805ed622c0 [ 133.803237][ T788] FS: 00007f2e9608c0c0(0000) GS:ffff88806cc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 133.804002][ T788] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 133.804664][ T788] CR2: 00007f2e95610603 CR3: 000000005f68c004 CR4: 00000000000606e0 [ 133.805363][ T788] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 133.806073][ T788] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 133.806787][ T788] Call Trace: [ 133.807069][ T788] ? generic_xdp_install+0x310/0x310 [ 133.807612][ T788] ? lock_acquire+0x164/0x3b0 [ 133.808077][ T788] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xf0 [ 133.808640][ T788] ? deref_stack_reg+0x9c/0xd0 [ 133.809138][ T788] ? __nla_validate_parse+0x98/0x1ab0 [ 133.809944][ T788] unregister_netdevice_many.part.122+0x13/0x1b0 [ 133.810599][ T788] rtnl_delete_link+0xbc/0x100 [ 133.811073][ T788] ? rtnl_af_register+0xc0/0xc0 [ 133.811672][ T788] rtnl_dellink+0x30e/0x8a0 [ 133.812205][ T788] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xf0 [ ... ] [ 144.110530][ T788] unregister_netdevice: waiting for dummy0 to become free. Usage count = 1 This patch adds notifier routine to delete upper interface before deleting lower interface. Fixes: c7cdba3 ("mac80211-next: rtnetlink wifi simulation device") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 65de65d ] The IFF_BONDING means bonding master or bonding slave device. ->ndo_add_slave() sets IFF_BONDING flag and ->ndo_del_slave() unsets IFF_BONDING flag. bond0<--bond1 Both bond0 and bond1 are bonding device and these should keep having IFF_BONDING flag until they are removed. But bond1 would lose IFF_BONDING at ->ndo_del_slave() because that routine do not check whether the slave device is the bonding type or not. This patch adds the interface type check routine before removing IFF_BONDING flag. Test commands: ip link add bond0 type bond ip link add bond1 type bond ip link set bond1 master bond0 ip link set bond1 nomaster ip link del bond1 type bond ip link add bond1 type bond Splat looks like: [ 226.665555] proc_dir_entry 'bonding/bond1' already registered [ 226.666440] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 737 at fs/proc/generic.c:361 proc_register+0x2a9/0x3e0 [ 226.667571] Modules linked in: bonding af_packet sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables unix [ 226.668662] CPU: 0 PID: 737 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #96 [ 226.669508] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 226.670652] RIP: 0010:proc_register+0x2a9/0x3e0 [ 226.671612] Code: 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 39 01 00 00 48 8b 04 24 48 89 ea 48 c7 c7 a0 0b 14 9f 48 8b b0 e 0 00 00 00 e8 07 e7 88 ff <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 40 2d a5 9f e8 59 d6 23 01 48 8b 4c 24 10 48 b8 00 [ 226.675007] RSP: 0018:ffff888050e17078 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 226.675761] RAX: dffffc0000000008 RBX: ffff88805fdd0f10 RCX: ffffffff9dd344e2 [ 226.676757] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88806c9f6b8c [ 226.677751] RBP: ffff8880507160f3 R08: ffffed100d940019 R09: ffffed100d940019 [ 226.678761] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed100d940018 R12: ffff888050716008 [ 226.679757] R13: ffff8880507160f2 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffffed100a0e2c1e [ 226.680758] FS: 00007fdc217cc0c0(0000) GS:ffff88806c800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 226.681886] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 226.682719] CR2: 00007f49313424d0 CR3: 0000000050e46001 CR4: 00000000000606f0 [ 226.683727] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 226.684725] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 226.685681] Call Trace: [ 226.687089] proc_create_seq_private+0xb3/0xf0 [ 226.687778] bond_create_proc_entry+0x1b3/0x3f0 [bonding] [ 226.691458] bond_netdev_event+0x433/0x970 [bonding] [ 226.692139] ? __module_text_address+0x13/0x140 [ 226.692779] notifier_call_chain+0x90/0x160 [ 226.693401] register_netdevice+0x9b3/0xd80 [ 226.694010] ? alloc_netdev_mqs+0x854/0xc10 [ 226.694629] ? netdev_change_features+0xa0/0xa0 [ 226.695278] ? rtnl_create_link+0x2ed/0xad0 [ 226.695849] bond_newlink+0x2a/0x60 [bonding] [ 226.696422] __rtnl_newlink+0xb9f/0x11b0 [ 226.696968] ? rtnl_link_unregister+0x220/0x220 [ ... ] Fixes: 0b680e7 ("[PATCH] bonding: Add priv_flag to avoid event mishandling") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 089bca2 ] All bonding device has same lockdep key and subclass is initialized with nest_level. But actual nest_level value can be changed when a lower device is attached. And at this moment, the subclass should be updated but it seems to be unsafe. So this patch makes bonding use dynamic lockdep key instead of the subclass. Test commands: ip link add bond0 type bond for i in {1..5} do let A=$i-1 ip link add bond$i type bond ip link set bond$i master bond$A done ip link set bond5 master bond0 Splat looks like: [ 307.992912] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [ 307.993656] 5.4.0-rc3+ #96 Tainted: G W [ 307.994367] -------------------------------------------- [ 307.995092] ip/761 is trying to acquire lock: [ 307.995710] ffff8880513aac60 (&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock#2/2){+.+.}, at: bond_get_stats+0xb8/0x500 [bonding] [ 307.997045] but task is already holding lock: [ 307.997923] ffff88805fcbac60 (&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock#2/2){+.+.}, at: bond_get_stats+0xb8/0x500 [bonding] [ 307.999215] other info that might help us debug this: [ 308.000251] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 308.001137] CPU0 [ 308.001533] ---- [ 308.001915] lock(&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock#2/2); [ 308.002609] lock(&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock#2/2); [ 308.003302] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 308.004310] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 308.005319] 3 locks held by ip/761: [ 308.005830] #0: ffffffff9fcc42b0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x466/0x8a0 [ 308.006894] #1: ffff88805fcbac60 (&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock#2/2){+.+.}, at: bond_get_stats+0xb8/0x500 [bonding] [ 308.008243] #2: ffffffff9f9219c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: bond_get_stats+0x9f/0x500 [bonding] [ 308.009422] stack backtrace: [ 308.010124] CPU: 0 PID: 761 Comm: ip Tainted: G W 5.4.0-rc3+ #96 [ 308.011097] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 308.012179] Call Trace: [ 308.012601] dump_stack+0x7c/0xbb [ 308.013089] __lock_acquire+0x269d/0x3de0 [ 308.013669] ? register_lock_class+0x14d0/0x14d0 [ 308.014318] lock_acquire+0x164/0x3b0 [ 308.014858] ? bond_get_stats+0xb8/0x500 [bonding] [ 308.015520] _raw_spin_lock_nested+0x2e/0x60 [ 308.016129] ? bond_get_stats+0xb8/0x500 [bonding] [ 308.017215] bond_get_stats+0xb8/0x500 [bonding] [ 308.018454] ? bond_arp_rcv+0xf10/0xf10 [bonding] [ 308.019710] ? rcu_read_lock_held+0x90/0xa0 [ 308.020605] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xc0/0xc0 [ 308.021286] ? bond_get_stats+0x9f/0x500 [bonding] [ 308.021953] dev_get_stats+0x1ec/0x270 [ 308.022508] bond_get_stats+0x1d1/0x500 [bonding] Fixes: d3fff6c ("net: add netdev_lockdep_set_classes() helper") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1962f86 ] virt_wifi_newlink() calls netdev_upper_dev_link() and it internally holds reference count of lower interface. Current code does not release a reference count of the lower interface when the lower interface is being deleted. So, reference count leaks occur. Test commands: ip link add dummy0 type dummy ip link add vw1 link dummy0 type virt_wifi ip link del dummy0 Splat looks like: [ 133.787526][ T788] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 788 at net/core/dev.c:8274 rollback_registered_many+0x835/0xc80 [ 133.788355][ T788] Modules linked in: virt_wifi cfg80211 dummy team af_packet sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables unix [ 133.789377][ T788] CPU: 1 PID: 788 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #96 [ 133.790069][ T788] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 133.791167][ T788] RIP: 0010:rollback_registered_many+0x835/0xc80 [ 133.791906][ T788] Code: 00 4d 85 ff 0f 84 b5 fd ff ff ba c0 0c 00 00 48 89 de 4c 89 ff e8 9b 58 04 00 48 89 df e8 30 [ 133.794317][ T788] RSP: 0018:ffff88805ba3f338 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 133.795080][ T788] RAX: ffff88805e57e801 RBX: ffff88805ba34000 RCX: ffffffffa9294723 [ 133.796045][ T788] RDX: 1ffff1100b746816 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffffabcc4240 [ 133.797006][ T788] RBP: ffff88805ba3f4c0 R08: fffffbfff5798849 R09: fffffbfff5798849 [ 133.797993][ T788] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: fffffbfff5798848 R12: dffffc0000000000 [ 133.802514][ T788] R13: ffff88805ba3f440 R14: ffff88805ba3f400 R15: ffff88805ed622c0 [ 133.803237][ T788] FS: 00007f2e9608c0c0(0000) GS:ffff88806cc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 133.804002][ T788] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 133.804664][ T788] CR2: 00007f2e95610603 CR3: 000000005f68c004 CR4: 00000000000606e0 [ 133.805363][ T788] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 133.806073][ T788] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 133.806787][ T788] Call Trace: [ 133.807069][ T788] ? generic_xdp_install+0x310/0x310 [ 133.807612][ T788] ? lock_acquire+0x164/0x3b0 [ 133.808077][ T788] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xf0 [ 133.808640][ T788] ? deref_stack_reg+0x9c/0xd0 [ 133.809138][ T788] ? __nla_validate_parse+0x98/0x1ab0 [ 133.809944][ T788] unregister_netdevice_many.part.122+0x13/0x1b0 [ 133.810599][ T788] rtnl_delete_link+0xbc/0x100 [ 133.811073][ T788] ? rtnl_af_register+0xc0/0xc0 [ 133.811672][ T788] rtnl_dellink+0x30e/0x8a0 [ 133.812205][ T788] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xf0 [ ... ] [ 144.110530][ T788] unregister_netdevice: waiting for dummy0 to become free. Usage count = 1 This patch adds notifier routine to delete upper interface before deleting lower interface. Fixes: c7cdba3 ("mac80211-next: rtnetlink wifi simulation device") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 65de65d ] The IFF_BONDING means bonding master or bonding slave device. ->ndo_add_slave() sets IFF_BONDING flag and ->ndo_del_slave() unsets IFF_BONDING flag. bond0<--bond1 Both bond0 and bond1 are bonding device and these should keep having IFF_BONDING flag until they are removed. But bond1 would lose IFF_BONDING at ->ndo_del_slave() because that routine do not check whether the slave device is the bonding type or not. This patch adds the interface type check routine before removing IFF_BONDING flag. Test commands: ip link add bond0 type bond ip link add bond1 type bond ip link set bond1 master bond0 ip link set bond1 nomaster ip link del bond1 type bond ip link add bond1 type bond Splat looks like: [ 226.665555] proc_dir_entry 'bonding/bond1' already registered [ 226.666440] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 737 at fs/proc/generic.c:361 proc_register+0x2a9/0x3e0 [ 226.667571] Modules linked in: bonding af_packet sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables unix [ 226.668662] CPU: 0 PID: 737 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ raspberrypi#96 [ 226.669508] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 226.670652] RIP: 0010:proc_register+0x2a9/0x3e0 [ 226.671612] Code: 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 39 01 00 00 48 8b 04 24 48 89 ea 48 c7 c7 a0 0b 14 9f 48 8b b0 e 0 00 00 00 e8 07 e7 88 ff <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 40 2d a5 9f e8 59 d6 23 01 48 8b 4c 24 10 48 b8 00 [ 226.675007] RSP: 0018:ffff888050e17078 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 226.675761] RAX: dffffc0000000008 RBX: ffff88805fdd0f10 RCX: ffffffff9dd344e2 [ 226.676757] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88806c9f6b8c [ 226.677751] RBP: ffff8880507160f3 R08: ffffed100d940019 R09: ffffed100d940019 [ 226.678761] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed100d940018 R12: ffff888050716008 [ 226.679757] R13: ffff8880507160f2 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffffed100a0e2c1e [ 226.680758] FS: 00007fdc217cc0c0(0000) GS:ffff88806c800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 226.681886] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 226.682719] CR2: 00007f49313424d0 CR3: 0000000050e46001 CR4: 00000000000606f0 [ 226.683727] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 226.684725] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 226.685681] Call Trace: [ 226.687089] proc_create_seq_private+0xb3/0xf0 [ 226.687778] bond_create_proc_entry+0x1b3/0x3f0 [bonding] [ 226.691458] bond_netdev_event+0x433/0x970 [bonding] [ 226.692139] ? __module_text_address+0x13/0x140 [ 226.692779] notifier_call_chain+0x90/0x160 [ 226.693401] register_netdevice+0x9b3/0xd80 [ 226.694010] ? alloc_netdev_mqs+0x854/0xc10 [ 226.694629] ? netdev_change_features+0xa0/0xa0 [ 226.695278] ? rtnl_create_link+0x2ed/0xad0 [ 226.695849] bond_newlink+0x2a/0x60 [bonding] [ 226.696422] __rtnl_newlink+0xb9f/0x11b0 [ 226.696968] ? rtnl_link_unregister+0x220/0x220 [ ... ] Fixes: 0b680e7 ("[PATCH] bonding: Add priv_flag to avoid event mishandling") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5343da4 ] Current code doesn't limit the number of nested devices. Nested devices would be handled recursively and this needs huge stack memory. So, unlimited nested devices could make stack overflow. This patch adds upper_level and lower_level, they are common variables and represent maximum lower/upper depth. When upper/lower device is attached or dettached, {lower/upper}_level are updated. and if maximum depth is bigger than 8, attach routine fails and returns -EMLINK. In addition, this patch converts recursive routine of netdev_walk_all_{lower/upper} to iterator routine. Test commands: ip link add dummy0 type dummy ip link add link dummy0 name vlan1 type vlan id 1 ip link set vlan1 up for i in {2..55} do let A=$i-1 ip link add vlan$i link vlan$A type vlan id $i done ip link del dummy0 Splat looks like: [ 155.513226][ T908] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __unwind_start+0x71/0x850 [ 155.514162][ T908] Write of size 88 at addr ffff8880608a6cc0 by task ip/908 [ 155.515048][ T908] [ 155.515333][ T908] CPU: 0 PID: 908 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #96 [ 155.516147][ T908] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 155.517233][ T908] Call Trace: [ 155.517627][ T908] [ 155.517918][ T908] Allocated by task 0: [ 155.518412][ T908] (stack is not available) [ 155.518955][ T908] [ 155.519228][ T908] Freed by task 0: [ 155.519885][ T908] (stack is not available) [ 155.520452][ T908] [ 155.520729][ T908] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880608a6ac0 [ 155.520729][ T908] which belongs to the cache names_cache of size 4096 [ 155.522387][ T908] The buggy address is located 512 bytes inside of [ 155.522387][ T908] 4096-byte region [ffff8880608a6ac0, ffff8880608a7ac0) [ 155.523920][ T908] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 155.524552][ T908] page:ffffea0001822800 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88806c657cc0 index:0x0 compound_mapcount:0 [ 155.525836][ T908] flags: 0x100000000010200(slab|head) [ 155.526445][ T908] raw: 0100000000010200 ffffea0001813808 ffffea0001a26c08 ffff88806c657cc0 [ 155.527424][ T908] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000070007 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 155.528429][ T908] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 155.529158][ T908] [ 155.529410][ T908] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 155.530060][ T908] ffff8880608a6b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 155.530971][ T908] ffff8880608a6c00: fb fb fb fb fb f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f2 f2 f2 f3 f3 f3 [ 155.531889][ T908] >ffff8880608a6c80: f3 fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 155.532806][ T908] ^ [ 155.533509][ T908] ffff8880608a6d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 [ 155.534436][ T908] ffff8880608a6d80: f2 f3 f3 f3 f3 fb fb fb 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ ... ] Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
syzkaller found that with CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE=y, releasing a struct slave device could result in the following splat: kobject: 'bonding_slave' (00000000cecdd4fe): kobject_release, parent 0000000074ceb2b2 (delayed 1000) bond0 (unregistering): (slave bond_slave_1): Releasing backup interface ------------[ cut here ]------------ ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: workqueue_select_cpu_near kernel/workqueue.c:1549 [inline] ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: delayed_work_timer_fn+0x0/0x98 kernel/workqueue.c:1600 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 842 at lib/debugobjects.c:485 debug_print_object+0x180/0x240 lib/debugobjects.c:485 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 1 PID: 842 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G S 5.9.0-rc8+ #96 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Workqueue: netns cleanup_net Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x4d8 include/linux/bitmap.h:239 show_stack+0x34/0x48 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:142 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x174/0x1f8 lib/dump_stack.c:118 panic+0x360/0x7a0 kernel/panic.c:231 __warn+0x244/0x2ec kernel/panic.c:600 report_bug+0x240/0x398 lib/bug.c:198 bug_handler+0x50/0xc0 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:974 call_break_hook+0x160/0x1d8 arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c:322 brk_handler+0x30/0xc0 arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c:329 do_debug_exception+0x184/0x340 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c:864 el1_dbg+0x48/0xb0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:65 el1_sync_handler+0x170/0x1c8 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:93 el1_sync+0x80/0x100 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:594 debug_print_object+0x180/0x240 lib/debugobjects.c:485 __debug_check_no_obj_freed lib/debugobjects.c:967 [inline] debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x200/0x430 lib/debugobjects.c:998 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1536 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook+0x190/0x210 mm/slub.c:1577 slab_free mm/slub.c:3138 [inline] kfree+0x13c/0x460 mm/slub.c:4119 bond_free_slave+0x8c/0xf8 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:1492 __bond_release_one+0xe0c/0xec8 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:2190 bond_slave_netdev_event drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3309 [inline] bond_netdev_event+0x8f0/0xa70 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3420 notifier_call_chain+0xf0/0x200 kernel/notifier.c:83 __raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:361 [inline] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x44/0x58 kernel/notifier.c:368 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xbc/0x150 net/core/dev.c:2033 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2045 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2059 [inline] rollback_registered_many+0x6a4/0xec0 net/core/dev.c:9347 unregister_netdevice_many.part.0+0x2c/0x1c0 net/core/dev.c:10509 unregister_netdevice_many net/core/dev.c:10508 [inline] default_device_exit_batch+0x294/0x338 net/core/dev.c:10992 ops_exit_list.isra.0+0xec/0x150 net/core/net_namespace.c:189 cleanup_net+0x44c/0x888 net/core/net_namespace.c:603 process_one_work+0x96c/0x18c0 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0x3f0/0xc30 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x390/0x498 kernel/kthread.c:292 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:925 This is a potential use-after-free if the sysfs nodes are being accessed whilst removing the struct slave, so wait for the object destruction to complete before freeing the struct slave itself. Fixes: 07699f9 ("bonding: add sysfs /slave dir for bond slave devices.") Fixes: a068aab ("bonding: Fix reference count leak in bond_sysfs_slave_add.") Cc: Qiushi Wu <[email protected]> Cc: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]> Cc: Veaceslav Falico <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jamie Iles <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b9ad3e9 ] syzkaller found that with CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE=y, releasing a struct slave device could result in the following splat: kobject: 'bonding_slave' (00000000cecdd4fe): kobject_release, parent 0000000074ceb2b2 (delayed 1000) bond0 (unregistering): (slave bond_slave_1): Releasing backup interface ------------[ cut here ]------------ ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: workqueue_select_cpu_near kernel/workqueue.c:1549 [inline] ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: delayed_work_timer_fn+0x0/0x98 kernel/workqueue.c:1600 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 842 at lib/debugobjects.c:485 debug_print_object+0x180/0x240 lib/debugobjects.c:485 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 1 PID: 842 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G S 5.9.0-rc8+ #96 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Workqueue: netns cleanup_net Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x4d8 include/linux/bitmap.h:239 show_stack+0x34/0x48 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:142 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x174/0x1f8 lib/dump_stack.c:118 panic+0x360/0x7a0 kernel/panic.c:231 __warn+0x244/0x2ec kernel/panic.c:600 report_bug+0x240/0x398 lib/bug.c:198 bug_handler+0x50/0xc0 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:974 call_break_hook+0x160/0x1d8 arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c:322 brk_handler+0x30/0xc0 arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c:329 do_debug_exception+0x184/0x340 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c:864 el1_dbg+0x48/0xb0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:65 el1_sync_handler+0x170/0x1c8 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:93 el1_sync+0x80/0x100 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:594 debug_print_object+0x180/0x240 lib/debugobjects.c:485 __debug_check_no_obj_freed lib/debugobjects.c:967 [inline] debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x200/0x430 lib/debugobjects.c:998 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1536 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook+0x190/0x210 mm/slub.c:1577 slab_free mm/slub.c:3138 [inline] kfree+0x13c/0x460 mm/slub.c:4119 bond_free_slave+0x8c/0xf8 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:1492 __bond_release_one+0xe0c/0xec8 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:2190 bond_slave_netdev_event drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3309 [inline] bond_netdev_event+0x8f0/0xa70 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3420 notifier_call_chain+0xf0/0x200 kernel/notifier.c:83 __raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:361 [inline] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x44/0x58 kernel/notifier.c:368 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xbc/0x150 net/core/dev.c:2033 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2045 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2059 [inline] rollback_registered_many+0x6a4/0xec0 net/core/dev.c:9347 unregister_netdevice_many.part.0+0x2c/0x1c0 net/core/dev.c:10509 unregister_netdevice_many net/core/dev.c:10508 [inline] default_device_exit_batch+0x294/0x338 net/core/dev.c:10992 ops_exit_list.isra.0+0xec/0x150 net/core/net_namespace.c:189 cleanup_net+0x44c/0x888 net/core/net_namespace.c:603 process_one_work+0x96c/0x18c0 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0x3f0/0xc30 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x390/0x498 kernel/kthread.c:292 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:925 This is a potential use-after-free if the sysfs nodes are being accessed whilst removing the struct slave, so wait for the object destruction to complete before freeing the struct slave itself. Fixes: 07699f9 ("bonding: add sysfs /slave dir for bond slave devices.") Fixes: a068aab ("bonding: Fix reference count leak in bond_sysfs_slave_add.") Cc: Qiushi Wu <[email protected]> Cc: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]> Cc: Veaceslav Falico <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jamie Iles <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b9ad3e9 ] syzkaller found that with CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE=y, releasing a struct slave device could result in the following splat: kobject: 'bonding_slave' (00000000cecdd4fe): kobject_release, parent 0000000074ceb2b2 (delayed 1000) bond0 (unregistering): (slave bond_slave_1): Releasing backup interface ------------[ cut here ]------------ ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: workqueue_select_cpu_near kernel/workqueue.c:1549 [inline] ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: delayed_work_timer_fn+0x0/0x98 kernel/workqueue.c:1600 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 842 at lib/debugobjects.c:485 debug_print_object+0x180/0x240 lib/debugobjects.c:485 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 1 PID: 842 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Tainted: G S 5.9.0-rc8+ #96 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Workqueue: netns cleanup_net Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x4d8 include/linux/bitmap.h:239 show_stack+0x34/0x48 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:142 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x174/0x1f8 lib/dump_stack.c:118 panic+0x360/0x7a0 kernel/panic.c:231 __warn+0x244/0x2ec kernel/panic.c:600 report_bug+0x240/0x398 lib/bug.c:198 bug_handler+0x50/0xc0 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:974 call_break_hook+0x160/0x1d8 arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c:322 brk_handler+0x30/0xc0 arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c:329 do_debug_exception+0x184/0x340 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c:864 el1_dbg+0x48/0xb0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:65 el1_sync_handler+0x170/0x1c8 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:93 el1_sync+0x80/0x100 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:594 debug_print_object+0x180/0x240 lib/debugobjects.c:485 __debug_check_no_obj_freed lib/debugobjects.c:967 [inline] debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x200/0x430 lib/debugobjects.c:998 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1536 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook+0x190/0x210 mm/slub.c:1577 slab_free mm/slub.c:3138 [inline] kfree+0x13c/0x460 mm/slub.c:4119 bond_free_slave+0x8c/0xf8 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:1492 __bond_release_one+0xe0c/0xec8 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:2190 bond_slave_netdev_event drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3309 [inline] bond_netdev_event+0x8f0/0xa70 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3420 notifier_call_chain+0xf0/0x200 kernel/notifier.c:83 __raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:361 [inline] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x44/0x58 kernel/notifier.c:368 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xbc/0x150 net/core/dev.c:2033 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2045 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2059 [inline] rollback_registered_many+0x6a4/0xec0 net/core/dev.c:9347 unregister_netdevice_many.part.0+0x2c/0x1c0 net/core/dev.c:10509 unregister_netdevice_many net/core/dev.c:10508 [inline] default_device_exit_batch+0x294/0x338 net/core/dev.c:10992 ops_exit_list.isra.0+0xec/0x150 net/core/net_namespace.c:189 cleanup_net+0x44c/0x888 net/core/net_namespace.c:603 process_one_work+0x96c/0x18c0 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0x3f0/0xc30 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x390/0x498 kernel/kthread.c:292 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:925 This is a potential use-after-free if the sysfs nodes are being accessed whilst removing the struct slave, so wait for the object destruction to complete before freeing the struct slave itself. Fixes: 07699f9 ("bonding: add sysfs /slave dir for bond slave devices.") Fixes: a068aab ("bonding: Fix reference count leak in bond_sysfs_slave_add.") Cc: Qiushi Wu <[email protected]> Cc: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]> Cc: Veaceslav Falico <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jamie Iles <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
The BPF STX/LDX instruction uses offset relative to the FP to address stack space. Since the BPF_FP locates at the top of the frame, the offset is usually a negative number. However, arm64 str/ldr immediate instruction requires that offset be a positive number. Therefore, this patch tries to convert the offsets. The method is to find the negative offset furthest from the FP firstly. Then add it to the FP, calculate a bottom position, called FPB, and then adjust the offsets in other STR/LDX instructions relative to FPB. FPB is saved using the callee-saved register x27 of arm64 which is not used yet. Before adjusting the offset, the patch checks every instruction to ensure that the FP does not change in run-time. If the FP may change, no offset is adjusted. For example, for the following bpftrace command: bpftrace -e 'kprobe:do_sys_open { printf("opening: %s\n", str(arg1)); }' Without this patch, jited code(fragment): 0: bti c 4: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! 8: mov x29, sp c: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]! 10: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]! 14: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]! 18: mov x25, sp 1c: mov x26, #0x0 // #0 20: bti j 24: sub sp, sp, #0x90 28: add x19, x0, #0x0 2c: mov x0, #0x0 // #0 30: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffff78 // #-136 34: str x0, [x25, x10] 38: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffff80 // #-128 3c: str x0, [x25, x10] 40: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffff88 // #-120 44: str x0, [x25, x10] 48: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffff90 // #-112 4c: str x0, [x25, x10] 50: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffff98 // #-104 54: str x0, [x25, x10] 58: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffa0 // #-96 5c: str x0, [x25, x10] 60: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffa8 // #-88 64: str x0, [x25, x10] 68: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffb0 // #-80 6c: str x0, [x25, x10] 70: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffb8 // #-72 74: str x0, [x25, x10] 78: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffc0 // #-64 7c: str x0, [x25, x10] 80: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffc8 // #-56 84: str x0, [x25, x10] 88: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffd0 // #-48 8c: str x0, [x25, x10] 90: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffd8 // #-40 94: str x0, [x25, x10] 98: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffe0 // #-32 9c: str x0, [x25, x10] a0: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffe8 // #-24 a4: str x0, [x25, x10] a8: mov x10, #0xfffffffffffffff0 // #-16 ac: str x0, [x25, x10] b0: mov x10, #0xfffffffffffffff8 // #-8 b4: str x0, [x25, x10] b8: mov x10, #0x8 // raspberrypi#8 bc: ldr x2, [x19, x10] [...] With this patch, jited code(fragment): 0: bti c 4: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! 8: mov x29, sp c: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]! 10: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]! 14: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]! 18: stp x27, x28, [sp, #-16]! 1c: mov x25, sp 20: sub x27, x25, #0x88 24: mov x26, #0x0 // #0 28: bti j 2c: sub sp, sp, #0x90 30: add x19, x0, #0x0 34: mov x0, #0x0 // #0 38: str x0, [x27] 3c: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#8] 40: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#16] 44: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#24] 48: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#32] 4c: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#40] 50: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#48] 54: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#56] 58: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#64] 5c: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#72] 60: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#80] 64: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#88] 68: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#96] 6c: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#104] 70: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#112] 74: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#120] 78: str x0, [x27, raspberrypi#128] 7c: ldr x2, [x19, raspberrypi#8] [...] Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
The ice driver caches next_to_clean value at the beginning of ice_clean_rx_irq() in order to remember the first buffer that has to be freed/recycled after main Rx processing loop. The end boundary is indicated by first descriptor of frame that Rx processing loop has ended its duties. Note that if mentioned loop ended in the middle of gathering multi-buffer frame, next_to_clean would be pointing to the descriptor in the middle of the frame BUT freeing/recycling stage will stop at the first descriptor. This means that next iteration of ice_clean_rx_irq() will miss the (first_desc, next_to_clean - 1) entries. When running various 9K MTU workloads, such splats were observed: [ 540.780716] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 540.787787] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 540.793002] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 540.798218] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 540.800801] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 540.805231] CPU: 18 PID: 3984 Comm: xskxceiver Tainted: G W 6.3.0-rc7+ #96 [ 540.813619] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019 [ 540.824209] RIP: 0010:ice_clean_rx_irq+0x2b6/0xf00 [ice] [ 540.829678] Code: 74 24 10 e9 aa 00 00 00 8b 55 78 41 31 57 10 41 09 c4 4d 85 ff 0f 84 83 00 00 00 49 8b 57 08 41 8b 4f 1c 65 8b 35 1a fa 4b 3f <48> 8b 02 48 c1 e8 3a 39 c6 0f 85 a2 00 00 00 f6 42 08 02 0f 85 98 [ 540.848717] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000f42fc50 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 540.854029] RAX: 0000000000000004 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000fffe [ 540.861272] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [ 540.868519] RBP: ffff88984a05ac00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: dead000000000100 [ 540.875760] R10: ffff88983fffcd00 R11: 000000000010f2b8 R12: 0000000000000004 [ 540.883008] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000800 R15: ffff889847a10040 [ 540.890253] FS: 00007f6ddf7fe640(0000) GS:ffff88afdf800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 540.898465] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 540.904299] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010d3da001 CR4: 00000000007706e0 [ 540.911542] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 540.918789] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 540.926032] PKRU: 55555554 [ 540.928790] Call Trace: [ 540.931276] <TASK> [ 540.933418] ice_napi_poll+0x4ca/0x6d0 [ice] [ 540.937804] ? __pfx_ice_napi_poll+0x10/0x10 [ice] [ 540.942716] napi_busy_loop+0xd7/0x320 [ 540.946537] xsk_recvmsg+0x143/0x170 [ 540.950178] sock_recvmsg+0x99/0xa0 [ 540.953729] __sys_recvfrom+0xa8/0x120 [ 540.957543] ? do_futex+0xbd/0x1d0 [ 540.961008] ? __x64_sys_futex+0x73/0x1d0 [ 540.965083] __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x20/0x30 [ 540.969155] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 540.972796] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [ 540.977934] RIP: 0033:0x7f6de5f27934 To fix this, set cached_ntc to first_desc so that at the end, when freeing/recycling buffers, descriptors from first to ntc are not missed. Fixes: 2fba7dc ("ice: Add support for XDP multi-buffer on Rx side") Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Tested-by: Chandan Kumar Rout <[email protected]> (A Contingent Worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit abaf8d5 ] The ice driver caches next_to_clean value at the beginning of ice_clean_rx_irq() in order to remember the first buffer that has to be freed/recycled after main Rx processing loop. The end boundary is indicated by first descriptor of frame that Rx processing loop has ended its duties. Note that if mentioned loop ended in the middle of gathering multi-buffer frame, next_to_clean would be pointing to the descriptor in the middle of the frame BUT freeing/recycling stage will stop at the first descriptor. This means that next iteration of ice_clean_rx_irq() will miss the (first_desc, next_to_clean - 1) entries. When running various 9K MTU workloads, such splats were observed: [ 540.780716] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 540.787787] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 540.793002] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 540.798218] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 540.800801] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 540.805231] CPU: 18 PID: 3984 Comm: xskxceiver Tainted: G W 6.3.0-rc7+ #96 [ 540.813619] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019 [ 540.824209] RIP: 0010:ice_clean_rx_irq+0x2b6/0xf00 [ice] [ 540.829678] Code: 74 24 10 e9 aa 00 00 00 8b 55 78 41 31 57 10 41 09 c4 4d 85 ff 0f 84 83 00 00 00 49 8b 57 08 41 8b 4f 1c 65 8b 35 1a fa 4b 3f <48> 8b 02 48 c1 e8 3a 39 c6 0f 85 a2 00 00 00 f6 42 08 02 0f 85 98 [ 540.848717] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000f42fc50 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 540.854029] RAX: 0000000000000004 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000fffe [ 540.861272] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [ 540.868519] RBP: ffff88984a05ac00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: dead000000000100 [ 540.875760] R10: ffff88983fffcd00 R11: 000000000010f2b8 R12: 0000000000000004 [ 540.883008] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000800 R15: ffff889847a10040 [ 540.890253] FS: 00007f6ddf7fe640(0000) GS:ffff88afdf800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 540.898465] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 540.904299] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010d3da001 CR4: 00000000007706e0 [ 540.911542] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 540.918789] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 540.926032] PKRU: 55555554 [ 540.928790] Call Trace: [ 540.931276] <TASK> [ 540.933418] ice_napi_poll+0x4ca/0x6d0 [ice] [ 540.937804] ? __pfx_ice_napi_poll+0x10/0x10 [ice] [ 540.942716] napi_busy_loop+0xd7/0x320 [ 540.946537] xsk_recvmsg+0x143/0x170 [ 540.950178] sock_recvmsg+0x99/0xa0 [ 540.953729] __sys_recvfrom+0xa8/0x120 [ 540.957543] ? do_futex+0xbd/0x1d0 [ 540.961008] ? __x64_sys_futex+0x73/0x1d0 [ 540.965083] __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x20/0x30 [ 540.969155] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 540.972796] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [ 540.977934] RIP: 0033:0x7f6de5f27934 To fix this, set cached_ntc to first_desc so that at the end, when freeing/recycling buffers, descriptors from first to ntc are not missed. Fixes: 2fba7dc ("ice: Add support for XDP multi-buffer on Rx side") Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Tested-by: Chandan Kumar Rout <[email protected]> (A Contingent Worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
scx: Add missing ) to $(error) invocation in Makefile
[ Upstream commit be3f304 ] We must always register the DRM bridge, since zynqmp_dp_hpd_work_func calls drm_bridge_hpd_notify, which in turn expects hpd_mutex to be initialized. We do this before zynqmp_dpsub_drm_init since that calls drm_bridge_attach. This fixes the following lockdep warning: [ 19.217084] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 19.227530] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock) [ 19.227768] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 140 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:582 __mutex_lock+0x4bc/0x550 [ 19.241696] Modules linked in: [ 19.244937] CPU: 0 PID: 140 Comm: kworker/0:4 Not tainted 6.6.20+ #96 [ 19.252046] Hardware name: xlnx,zynqmp (DT) [ 19.256421] Workqueue: events zynqmp_dp_hpd_work_func [ 19.261795] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 19.269104] pc : __mutex_lock+0x4bc/0x550 [ 19.273364] lr : __mutex_lock+0x4bc/0x550 [ 19.277592] sp : ffffffc085c5bbe0 [ 19.281066] x29: ffffffc085c5bbe0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffffff88009417f8 [ 19.288624] x26: ffffff8800941788 x25: ffffff8800020008 x24: ffffffc082aa3000 [ 19.296227] x23: ffffffc080d90e3c x22: 0000000000000002 x21: 0000000000000000 [ 19.303744] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffff88002f5210 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 19.311295] x17: 6c707369642e3030 x16: 3030613464662072 x15: 0720072007200720 [ 19.318922] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 284e4f5f4e524157 x12: 0000000000000001 [ 19.326442] x11: 0001ffc085c5b940 x10: 0001ff88003f388b x9 : 0001ff88003f3888 [ 19.334003] x8 : 0001ff88003f3888 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 19.341537] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000001668 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 19.349054] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffff88003f3880 [ 19.356581] Call trace: [ 19.359160] __mutex_lock+0x4bc/0x550 [ 19.363032] mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x30 [ 19.367187] drm_bridge_hpd_notify+0x2c/0x6c [ 19.371698] zynqmp_dp_hpd_work_func+0x44/0x54 [ 19.376364] process_one_work+0x3ac/0x988 [ 19.380660] worker_thread+0x398/0x694 [ 19.384736] kthread+0x1bc/0x1c0 [ 19.388241] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 19.392031] irq event stamp: 183 [ 19.395450] hardirqs last enabled at (183): [<ffffffc0800b9278>] finish_task_switch.isra.0+0xa8/0x2d4 [ 19.405140] hardirqs last disabled at (182): [<ffffffc081ad3754>] __schedule+0x714/0xd04 [ 19.413612] softirqs last enabled at (114): [<ffffffc080133de8>] srcu_invoke_callbacks+0x158/0x23c [ 19.423128] softirqs last disabled at (110): [<ffffffc080133de8>] srcu_invoke_callbacks+0x158/0x23c [ 19.432614] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: eb2d64b ("drm: xlnx: zynqmp_dpsub: Report HPD through the bridge") Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Tomi Valkeinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tomi Valkeinen <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 61ba791) Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit be3f304 ] We must always register the DRM bridge, since zynqmp_dp_hpd_work_func calls drm_bridge_hpd_notify, which in turn expects hpd_mutex to be initialized. We do this before zynqmp_dpsub_drm_init since that calls drm_bridge_attach. This fixes the following lockdep warning: [ 19.217084] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 19.227530] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock) [ 19.227768] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 140 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:582 __mutex_lock+0x4bc/0x550 [ 19.241696] Modules linked in: [ 19.244937] CPU: 0 PID: 140 Comm: kworker/0:4 Not tainted 6.6.20+ #96 [ 19.252046] Hardware name: xlnx,zynqmp (DT) [ 19.256421] Workqueue: events zynqmp_dp_hpd_work_func [ 19.261795] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 19.269104] pc : __mutex_lock+0x4bc/0x550 [ 19.273364] lr : __mutex_lock+0x4bc/0x550 [ 19.277592] sp : ffffffc085c5bbe0 [ 19.281066] x29: ffffffc085c5bbe0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffffff88009417f8 [ 19.288624] x26: ffffff8800941788 x25: ffffff8800020008 x24: ffffffc082aa3000 [ 19.296227] x23: ffffffc080d90e3c x22: 0000000000000002 x21: 0000000000000000 [ 19.303744] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffff88002f5210 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 19.311295] x17: 6c707369642e3030 x16: 3030613464662072 x15: 0720072007200720 [ 19.318922] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 284e4f5f4e524157 x12: 0000000000000001 [ 19.326442] x11: 0001ffc085c5b940 x10: 0001ff88003f388b x9 : 0001ff88003f3888 [ 19.334003] x8 : 0001ff88003f3888 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 19.341537] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000001668 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 19.349054] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffff88003f3880 [ 19.356581] Call trace: [ 19.359160] __mutex_lock+0x4bc/0x550 [ 19.363032] mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x30 [ 19.367187] drm_bridge_hpd_notify+0x2c/0x6c [ 19.371698] zynqmp_dp_hpd_work_func+0x44/0x54 [ 19.376364] process_one_work+0x3ac/0x988 [ 19.380660] worker_thread+0x398/0x694 [ 19.384736] kthread+0x1bc/0x1c0 [ 19.388241] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 19.392031] irq event stamp: 183 [ 19.395450] hardirqs last enabled at (183): [<ffffffc0800b9278>] finish_task_switch.isra.0+0xa8/0x2d4 [ 19.405140] hardirqs last disabled at (182): [<ffffffc081ad3754>] __schedule+0x714/0xd04 [ 19.413612] softirqs last enabled at (114): [<ffffffc080133de8>] srcu_invoke_callbacks+0x158/0x23c [ 19.423128] softirqs last disabled at (110): [<ffffffc080133de8>] srcu_invoke_callbacks+0x158/0x23c [ 19.432614] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: eb2d64b ("drm: xlnx: zynqmp_dpsub: Report HPD through the bridge") Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Tomi Valkeinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tomi Valkeinen <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 61ba791) Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
We must always register the DRM bridge, since zynqmp_dp_hpd_work_func calls drm_bridge_hpd_notify, which in turn expects hpd_mutex to be initialized. We do this before zynqmp_dpsub_drm_init since that calls drm_bridge_attach. This fixes the following lockdep warning: [ 19.217084] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 19.227530] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock) [ 19.227768] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 140 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:582 __mutex_lock+0x4bc/0x550 [ 19.241696] Modules linked in: [ 19.244937] CPU: 0 PID: 140 Comm: kworker/0:4 Not tainted 6.6.20+ raspberrypi#96 [ 19.252046] Hardware name: xlnx,zynqmp (DT) [ 19.256421] Workqueue: events zynqmp_dp_hpd_work_func [ 19.261795] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 19.269104] pc : __mutex_lock+0x4bc/0x550 [ 19.273364] lr : __mutex_lock+0x4bc/0x550 [ 19.277592] sp : ffffffc085c5bbe0 [ 19.281066] x29: ffffffc085c5bbe0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffffff88009417f8 [ 19.288624] x26: ffffff8800941788 x25: ffffff8800020008 x24: ffffffc082aa3000 [ 19.296227] x23: ffffffc080d90e3c x22: 0000000000000002 x21: 0000000000000000 [ 19.303744] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffff88002f5210 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 19.311295] x17: 6c707369642e3030 x16: 3030613464662072 x15: 0720072007200720 [ 19.318922] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 284e4f5f4e524157 x12: 0000000000000001 [ 19.326442] x11: 0001ffc085c5b940 x10: 0001ff88003f388b x9 : 0001ff88003f3888 [ 19.334003] x8 : 0001ff88003f3888 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 19.341537] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000001668 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 19.349054] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffff88003f3880 [ 19.356581] Call trace: [ 19.359160] __mutex_lock+0x4bc/0x550 [ 19.363032] mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x30 [ 19.367187] drm_bridge_hpd_notify+0x2c/0x6c [ 19.371698] zynqmp_dp_hpd_work_func+0x44/0x54 [ 19.376364] process_one_work+0x3ac/0x988 [ 19.380660] worker_thread+0x398/0x694 [ 19.384736] kthread+0x1bc/0x1c0 [ 19.388241] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 19.392031] irq event stamp: 183 [ 19.395450] hardirqs last enabled at (183): [<ffffffc0800b9278>] finish_task_switch.isra.0+0xa8/0x2d4 [ 19.405140] hardirqs last disabled at (182): [<ffffffc081ad3754>] __schedule+0x714/0xd04 [ 19.413612] softirqs last enabled at (114): [<ffffffc080133de8>] srcu_invoke_callbacks+0x158/0x23c [ 19.423128] softirqs last disabled at (110): [<ffffffc080133de8>] srcu_invoke_callbacks+0x158/0x23c [ 19.432614] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: eb2d64b ("drm: xlnx: zynqmp_dpsub: Report HPD through the bridge") Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Tomi Valkeinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tomi Valkeinen <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
[ Upstream commit be3f304 ] We must always register the DRM bridge, since zynqmp_dp_hpd_work_func calls drm_bridge_hpd_notify, which in turn expects hpd_mutex to be initialized. We do this before zynqmp_dpsub_drm_init since that calls drm_bridge_attach. This fixes the following lockdep warning: [ 19.217084] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 19.227530] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock) [ 19.227768] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 140 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:582 __mutex_lock+0x4bc/0x550 [ 19.241696] Modules linked in: [ 19.244937] CPU: 0 PID: 140 Comm: kworker/0:4 Not tainted 6.6.20+ #96 [ 19.252046] Hardware name: xlnx,zynqmp (DT) [ 19.256421] Workqueue: events zynqmp_dp_hpd_work_func [ 19.261795] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 19.269104] pc : __mutex_lock+0x4bc/0x550 [ 19.273364] lr : __mutex_lock+0x4bc/0x550 [ 19.277592] sp : ffffffc085c5bbe0 [ 19.281066] x29: ffffffc085c5bbe0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffffff88009417f8 [ 19.288624] x26: ffffff8800941788 x25: ffffff8800020008 x24: ffffffc082aa3000 [ 19.296227] x23: ffffffc080d90e3c x22: 0000000000000002 x21: 0000000000000000 [ 19.303744] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffff88002f5210 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 19.311295] x17: 6c707369642e3030 x16: 3030613464662072 x15: 0720072007200720 [ 19.318922] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 284e4f5f4e524157 x12: 0000000000000001 [ 19.326442] x11: 0001ffc085c5b940 x10: 0001ff88003f388b x9 : 0001ff88003f3888 [ 19.334003] x8 : 0001ff88003f3888 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 19.341537] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000001668 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 19.349054] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffff88003f3880 [ 19.356581] Call trace: [ 19.359160] __mutex_lock+0x4bc/0x550 [ 19.363032] mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x30 [ 19.367187] drm_bridge_hpd_notify+0x2c/0x6c [ 19.371698] zynqmp_dp_hpd_work_func+0x44/0x54 [ 19.376364] process_one_work+0x3ac/0x988 [ 19.380660] worker_thread+0x398/0x694 [ 19.384736] kthread+0x1bc/0x1c0 [ 19.388241] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 19.392031] irq event stamp: 183 [ 19.395450] hardirqs last enabled at (183): [<ffffffc0800b9278>] finish_task_switch.isra.0+0xa8/0x2d4 [ 19.405140] hardirqs last disabled at (182): [<ffffffc081ad3754>] __schedule+0x714/0xd04 [ 19.413612] softirqs last enabled at (114): [<ffffffc080133de8>] srcu_invoke_callbacks+0x158/0x23c [ 19.423128] softirqs last disabled at (110): [<ffffffc080133de8>] srcu_invoke_callbacks+0x158/0x23c [ 19.432614] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: eb2d64b ("drm: xlnx: zynqmp_dpsub: Report HPD through the bridge") Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Tomi Valkeinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tomi Valkeinen <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 61ba791) Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
There are a lot of people who are wanting to use the Edimax EW-7811Un Wifi adapter using the RTL8192CU chipset. Would it be possible to integrate this driver into the kernel tree by default to avoid having to rebuild it at every kernel update?
I suspect that the recipe that most follow is from http://lumux.co.uk/2012/06/07/realtek-rtl8192curtl8192c-wifi-on-raspberrypi/
Also, please could the drbd module and any dependencies be enabled in the default kernel? I am using this as part of High Availability and clustering testing as a means of providing a shared storage solution.
Thanks.
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