Merge pull request #2 from torvalds/master #134

dabrace · 2014-11-09T17:52:34Z

Sync as of 10272014

WARNING: 'dependant' may be misspelled - perhaps 'dependent'? torvalds#134: FILE: include/uapi/linux/msg.h:66: + * size. The optimal value is application dependant. total: 0 errors, 1 warnings, 378 lines checked ./patches/ipc-msg-increase-msgmni-remove-scaling.patch has style problems, please review. If any of these errors are false positives, please report them to the maintainer, see CHECKPATCH in MAINTAINERS. Please run checkpatch prior to sending patches Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]> Cc: Manfred Spraul <[email protected]> Cc: Rafael Aquini <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

When tiecap is used as a module, then while doing a rmmod I get the following dump. root@am437x-evm:/# rmmod pwm_tiecap [ 219.539245] [ 219.540771] ====================================================== [ 219.546936] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] [ 219.553192] 3.12.4-01557-g9921cde-dirty torvalds#134 Not tainted [ 219.558471] ------------------------------------------------------- [ 219.564727] rmmod/1517 is trying to acquire lock: [ 219.569427] (s_active#35){++++.+}, at: [<c017ab00>] sysfs_hash_and_remove+0x4c/0x8c [ 219.577239] [ 219.577239] but task is already holding lock: [ 219.583068] (pwm_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<c0303598>] pwmchip_remove+0x14/0xf8 [ 219.589996] [ 219.589996] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 219.589996] [ 219.598144] [ 219.598144] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 219.605590] -> #1 (pwm_lock){+.+.+.}: [ 219.609497] [<c00a2d1c>] lock_acquire+0x9c/0x128 [ 219.614746] [<c0639bc0>] mutex_lock_nested+0x50/0x3dc [ 219.620391] [<c0303974>] pwm_request_from_chip+0x38/0x6c [ 219.626312] [<c0303fe0>] pwm_export_store+0x50/0x140 [ 219.631896] [<c039aba8>] dev_attr_store+0x18/0x24 [ 219.637207] [<c017aff0>] sysfs_write_file+0x16c/0x1a0 [ 219.642883] [<c0119084>] vfs_write+0xb0/0x188 [ 219.647857] [<c0119478>] SyS_write+0x3c/0x70 [ 219.652770] [<c0014100>] ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48 [ 219.658172] -> #0 (s_active#35){++++.+}: [ 219.662353] [<c00a2778>] __lock_acquire+0x1b28/0x1b70 [ 219.667999] [<c00a2d1c>] lock_acquire+0x9c/0x128 [ 219.673248] [<c017c780>] sysfs_addrm_finish+0xe8/0x158 [ 219.678985] [<c017ab00>] sysfs_hash_and_remove+0x4c/0x8c [ 219.684906] [<c017e224>] remove_files+0x38/0x74 [ 219.690063] [<c017e2a4>] sysfs_remove_group+0x44/0x108 [ 219.695800] [<c017e38c>] sysfs_remove_groups+0x24/0x34 [ 219.701538] [<c039bc2c>] device_del+0xec/0x178 [ 219.706604] [<c039bcc4>] device_unregister+0xc/0x18 [ 219.712097] [<c0303658>] pwmchip_remove+0xd4/0xf8 [ 219.717407] [<c039fdc4>] platform_drv_remove+0x18/0x1c [ 219.723175] [<c039e6c4>] __device_release_driver+0x70/0xc8 [ 219.729248] [<c039eec8>] driver_detach+0xb4/0xb8 [ 219.734497] [<c039e4ec>] bus_remove_driver+0x8c/0xd0 [ 219.740081] [<c00abd2c>] SyS_delete_module+0x118/0x22c [ 219.745819] [<c0014100>] ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48 [ 219.751220] [ 219.751220] other info that might help us debug this: [ 219.751220] [ 219.759216] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 219.759216] [ 219.765106] CPU0 CPU1 [ 219.769622] ---- ---- [ 219.774139] lock(pwm_lock); [ 219.777130] lock(s_active#35); [ 219.782897] lock(pwm_lock); [ 219.788391] lock(s_active#35); [ 219.791656] [ 219.791656] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 219.791656] [ 219.797546] 3 locks held by rmmod/1517: [ 219.801391] #0: (&__lockdep_no_validate__){......}, at: [<c039ee58>] driver_detach+0x44/0xb8 [ 219.810028] #1: (&__lockdep_no_validate__){......}, at: [<c039ee64>] driver_detach+0x50/0xb8 [ 219.818695] #2: (pwm_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<c0303598>] pwmchip_remove+0x14/0xf8 [ 219.826049] [ 219.826049] stack backtrace: [ 219.830413] CPU: 0 PID: 1517 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 3.12.4-01557-g9921cde-dirty torvalds#134 [ 219.838256] [<c001cc98>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0xf0) from [<c0018124>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [ 219.846771] [<c0018124>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) from [<c0636728>] (dump_stack+0x74/0xb4) [ 219.854858] [<c0636728>] (dump_stack+0x74/0xb4) from [<c06344e4>] (print_circular_bug+0x284/0x2d8) [ 219.863830] [<c06344e4>] (print_circular_bug+0x284/0x2d8) from [<c00a2778>] (__lock_acquire+0x1b28/0x1b70) [ 219.873443] [<c00a2778>] (__lock_acquire+0x1b28/0x1b70) from [<c00a2d1c>] (lock_acquire+0x9c/0x128) [ 219.882476] [<c00a2d1c>] (lock_acquire+0x9c/0x128) from [<c017c780>] (sysfs_addrm_finish+0xe8/0x158) [ 219.891601] [<c017c780>] (sysfs_addrm_finish+0xe8/0x158) from [<c017ab00>] (sysfs_hash_and_remove+0x4c/0x8c) [ 219.901397] [<c017ab00>] (sysfs_hash_and_remove+0x4c/0x8c) from [<c017e224>] (remove_files+0x38/0x74) [ 219.910614] [<c017e224>] (remove_files+0x38/0x74) from [<c017e2a4>] (sysfs_remove_group+0x44/0x108) [ 219.919647] [<c017e2a4>] (sysfs_remove_group+0x44/0x108) from [<c017e38c>] (sysfs_remove_groups+0x24/0x34) [ 219.929260] [<c017e38c>] (sysfs_remove_groups+0x24/0x34) from [<c039bc2c>] (device_del+0xec/0x178) [ 219.938201] [<c039bc2c>] (device_del+0xec/0x178) from [<c039bcc4>] (device_unregister+0xc/0x18) [ 219.946899] [<c039bcc4>] (device_unregister+0xc/0x18) from [<c0303658>] (pwmchip_remove+0xd4/0xf8) [ 219.955841] [<c0303658>] (pwmchip_remove+0xd4/0xf8) from [<c039fdc4>] (platform_drv_remove+0x18/0x1c) [ 219.965057] [<c039fdc4>] (platform_drv_remove+0x18/0x1c) from [<c039e6c4>] (__device_release_driver+0x70/0xc8) [ 219.975006] [<c039e6c4>] (__device_release_driver+0x70/0xc8) from [<c039eec8>] (driver_detach+0xb4/0xb8) [ 219.984466] [<c039eec8>] (driver_detach+0xb4/0xb8) from [<c039e4ec>] (bus_remove_driver+0x8c/0xd0) [ 219.993438] [<c039e4ec>] (bus_remove_driver+0x8c/0xd0) from [<c00abd2c>] (SyS_delete_module+0x118/0x22c) [ 220.002899] [<c00abd2c>] (SyS_delete_module+0x118/0x22c) from [<c0014100>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48) Looks like s_active lock cannot be held while pwm lock is held. The patch fixes the above issue by unlocking the pwm lock before acquiring the sysfs lock. Signed-off-by: Sourav Poddar <[email protected]>

…heckpatch-fixes ERROR: code indent should use tabs where possible torvalds#120: FILE: include/linux/capability.h:220: + return true;$ WARNING: please, no spaces at the start of a line torvalds#120: FILE: include/linux/capability.h:220: + return true;$ ERROR: code indent should use tabs where possible torvalds#125: FILE: include/linux/capability.h:225: + return true;$ WARNING: please, no spaces at the start of a line torvalds#125: FILE: include/linux/capability.h:225: + return true;$ ERROR: code indent should use tabs where possible torvalds#129: FILE: include/linux/capability.h:229: + return true;$ WARNING: please, no spaces at the start of a line torvalds#129: FILE: include/linux/capability.h:229: + return true;$ ERROR: code indent should use tabs where possible torvalds#134: FILE: include/linux/capability.h:234: + return true;$ WARNING: please, no spaces at the start of a line torvalds#134: FILE: include/linux/capability.h:234: + return true;$ ERROR: code indent should use tabs where possible torvalds#170: FILE: include/linux/cred.h:79: + return 1;$ WARNING: please, no spaces at the start of a line torvalds#170: FILE: include/linux/cred.h:79: + return 1;$ ERROR: code indent should use tabs where possible torvalds#174: FILE: include/linux/cred.h:83: + return 1;$ WARNING: please, no spaces at the start of a line torvalds#174: FILE: include/linux/cred.h:83: + return 1;$ total: 6 errors, 6 warnings, 310 lines checked NOTE: whitespace errors detected, you may wish to use scripts/cleanpatch or scripts/cleanfile ./patches/kernel-conditionally-support-non-root-users-groups-and-capabilities.patch has style problems, please review. If any of these errors are false positives, please report them to the maintainer, see CHECKPATCH in MAINTAINERS. Please run checkpatch prior to sending patches Cc: Iulia Manda <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> WARNING: line over 80 characters torvalds#99: FILE: mm/page_alloc.c:2965: + * zone list (with a backoff mechanism which is a function of no_progress_loops). WARNING: line over 80 characters torvalds#129: FILE: mm/page_alloc.c:2995: + * Keep reclaiming pages while there is a chance this will lead somewhere. WARNING: line over 80 characters torvalds#134: FILE: mm/page_alloc.c:3000: + for_each_zone_zonelist_nodemask(zone, z, ac->zonelist, ac->high_zoneidx, ac->nodemask) { WARNING: line over 80 characters torvalds#138: FILE: mm/page_alloc.c:3004: + available -= DIV_ROUND_UP(no_progress_loops * available, MAX_RECLAIM_RETRIES); WARNING: line over 80 characters torvalds#142: FILE: mm/page_alloc.c:3008: + * Would the allocation succeed if we reclaimed the whole available? WARNING: line over 80 characters torvalds#146: FILE: mm/page_alloc.c:3012: + /* Wait for some write requests to complete then retry */ total: 0 errors, 6 warnings, 202 lines checked ./patches/mm-oom-rework-oom-detection.patch has style problems, please review. NOTE: If any of the errors are false positives, please report them to the maintainer, see CHECKPATCH in MAINTAINERS. Please run checkpatch prior to sending patches Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Hillf Danton <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <[email protected]> Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

Patch series "kasan, slub: reset tag when printing address", v3. With hardware tag-based kasan enabled, we reset the tag when we access metadata to avoid from false alarm. This patch (of 2): Kmemleak needs to scan kernel memory to check memory leak. With hardware tag-based kasan enabled, when it scans on the invalid slab and dereference, the issue will occur as below. Hardware tag-based KASAN doesn't use compiler instrumentation, we can not use kasan_disable_current() to ignore tag check. Based on the below report, there are 11 0xf7 granules, which amounts to 176 bytes, and the object is allocated from the kmalloc-256 cache. So when kmemleak accesses the last 256-176 bytes, it causes faults, as those are marked with KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE == KASAN_TAG_INVALID == 0xfe. Thus, we reset tags before accessing metadata to avoid from false positives. BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in scan_block+0x58/0x170 Read at addr f7ff0000c0074eb0 by task kmemleak/138 Pointer tag: [f7], memory tag: [fe] CPU: 7 PID: 138 Comm: kmemleak Not tainted 5.14.0-rc2-00001-g8cae8cd89f05-dirty torvalds#134 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1b0 show_stack+0x1c/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84 print_address_description+0x7c/0x2b4 kasan_report+0x138/0x38c __do_kernel_fault+0x190/0x1c4 do_tag_check_fault+0x78/0x90 do_mem_abort+0x44/0xb4 el1_abort+0x40/0x60 el1h_64_sync_handler+0xb4/0xd0 el1h_64_sync+0x78/0x7c scan_block+0x58/0x170 scan_gray_list+0xdc/0x1a0 kmemleak_scan+0x2ac/0x560 kmemleak_scan_thread+0xb0/0xe0 kthread+0x154/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Allocated by task 0: kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x60 __kasan_kmalloc+0xec/0x104 __kmalloc+0x224/0x3c4 __register_sysctl_paths+0x200/0x290 register_sysctl_table+0x2c/0x40 sysctl_init+0x20/0x34 proc_sys_init+0x3c/0x48 proc_root_init+0x80/0x9c start_kernel+0x648/0x6a4 __primary_switched+0xc0/0xc8 Freed by task 0: kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x60 kasan_set_track+0x2c/0x40 kasan_set_free_info+0x44/0x54 ____kasan_slab_free.constprop.0+0x150/0x1b0 __kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x20 slab_free_freelist_hook+0xa4/0x1fc kfree+0x1e8/0x30c put_fs_context+0x124/0x220 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x60/0xd4 kern_mount+0x24/0x4c bdev_cache_init+0x70/0x9c vfs_caches_init+0xdc/0xf4 start_kernel+0x638/0x6a4 __primary_switched+0xc0/0xc8 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff0000c0074e00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 The buggy address is located 176 bytes inside of 256-byte region [ffff0000c0074e00, ffff0000c0074f00) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:(____ptrval____) refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x100074 head:(____ptrval____) order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0xbfffc0000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0xffff|kasantag=0x0) raw: 0bfffc0000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 f5ff0000c0002300 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff0000c0074c00: f0 f0 f0 f0 f0 f0 f0 f0 f0 fe fe fe fe fe fe fe ffff0000c0074d00: fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe >ffff0000c0074e00: f7 f7 f7 f7 f7 f7 f7 f7 f7 f7 f7 fe fe fe fe fe ^ ffff0000c0074f00: fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe ffff0000c0075000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint kmemleak: 181 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Kuan-Ying Lee <[email protected]> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Nicholas Tang <[email protected]> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Chinwen Chang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 6c7a00b) Bug: 217222520 Change-Id: Id1a3764f60bf3df77d92a9db8e4ec9217ef1a582 Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>

Patch series "kasan, slub: reset tag when printing address", v3. With hardware tag-based kasan enabled, we reset the tag when we access metadata to avoid from false alarm. This patch (of 2): Kmemleak needs to scan kernel memory to check memory leak. With hardware tag-based kasan enabled, when it scans on the invalid slab and dereference, the issue will occur as below. Hardware tag-based KASAN doesn't use compiler instrumentation, we can not use kasan_disable_current() to ignore tag check. Based on the below report, there are 11 0xf7 granules, which amounts to 176 bytes, and the object is allocated from the kmalloc-256 cache. So when kmemleak accesses the last 256-176 bytes, it causes faults, as those are marked with KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE == KASAN_TAG_INVALID == 0xfe. Thus, we reset tags before accessing metadata to avoid from false positives. BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in scan_block+0x58/0x170 Read at addr f7ff0000c0074eb0 by task kmemleak/138 Pointer tag: [f7], memory tag: [fe] CPU: 7 PID: 138 Comm: kmemleak Not tainted 5.14.0-rc2-00001-g8cae8cd89f05-dirty torvalds#134 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1b0 show_stack+0x1c/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84 print_address_description+0x7c/0x2b4 kasan_report+0x138/0x38c __do_kernel_fault+0x190/0x1c4 do_tag_check_fault+0x78/0x90 do_mem_abort+0x44/0xb4 el1_abort+0x40/0x60 el1h_64_sync_handler+0xb4/0xd0 el1h_64_sync+0x78/0x7c scan_block+0x58/0x170 scan_gray_list+0xdc/0x1a0 kmemleak_scan+0x2ac/0x560 kmemleak_scan_thread+0xb0/0xe0 kthread+0x154/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Allocated by task 0: kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x60 __kasan_kmalloc+0xec/0x104 __kmalloc+0x224/0x3c4 __register_sysctl_paths+0x200/0x290 register_sysctl_table+0x2c/0x40 sysctl_init+0x20/0x34 proc_sys_init+0x3c/0x48 proc_root_init+0x80/0x9c start_kernel+0x648/0x6a4 __primary_switched+0xc0/0xc8 Freed by task 0: kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x60 kasan_set_track+0x2c/0x40 kasan_set_free_info+0x44/0x54 ____kasan_slab_free.constprop.0+0x150/0x1b0 __kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x20 slab_free_freelist_hook+0xa4/0x1fc kfree+0x1e8/0x30c put_fs_context+0x124/0x220 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x60/0xd4 kern_mount+0x24/0x4c bdev_cache_init+0x70/0x9c vfs_caches_init+0xdc/0xf4 start_kernel+0x638/0x6a4 __primary_switched+0xc0/0xc8 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff0000c0074e00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 The buggy address is located 176 bytes inside of 256-byte region [ffff0000c0074e00, ffff0000c0074f00) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:(____ptrval____) refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x100074 head:(____ptrval____) order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0xbfffc0000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0xffff|kasantag=0x0) raw: 0bfffc0000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 f5ff0000c0002300 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff0000c0074c00: f0 f0 f0 f0 f0 f0 f0 f0 f0 fe fe fe fe fe fe fe ffff0000c0074d00: fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe >ffff0000c0074e00: f7 f7 f7 f7 f7 f7 f7 f7 f7 f7 f7 fe fe fe fe fe ^ ffff0000c0074f00: fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe ffff0000c0075000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint kmemleak: 181 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Kuan-Ying Lee <[email protected]> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Nicholas Tang <[email protected]> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Chinwen Chang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Bug: 197723947 (cherry picked from commit 6c7a00b ) Change-Id: I236560a20bafe78643a182fb4c82f0bd7d15ed87 Signed-off-by: Yee Lee <[email protected]>

Reported by checkpatch: security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c --------------------------- ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line torvalds#29: FILE: security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c:29: +static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_route_perms[] = +{ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line torvalds#97: FILE: security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c:97: +static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms[] = +{ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line torvalds#105: FILE: security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c:105: +static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_xfrm_perms[] = +{ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line torvalds#134: FILE: security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c:134: +static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] = +{ security/selinux/ss/policydb.c ------------------------------ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line torvalds#318: FILE: security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:318: +static int (*destroy_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = +{ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line torvalds#674: FILE: security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:674: +static int (*index_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = +{ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line #1643: FILE: security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:1643: +static int (*read_f[SYM_NUM]) (struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp) = +{ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line #3246: FILE: security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:3246: + void *datap) = +{ Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>

Reported by checkpatch: security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c --------------------------- ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line torvalds#29: FILE: security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c:29: +static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_route_perms[] = +{ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line torvalds#97: FILE: security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c:97: +static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms[] = +{ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line torvalds#105: FILE: security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c:105: +static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_xfrm_perms[] = +{ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line torvalds#134: FILE: security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c:134: +static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] = +{ security/selinux/ss/policydb.c ------------------------------ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line torvalds#318: FILE: security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:318: +static int (*destroy_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = +{ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line torvalds#674: FILE: security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:674: +static int (*index_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = +{ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line #1643: FILE: security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:1643: +static int (*read_f[SYM_NUM]) (struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp) = +{ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line #3246: FILE: security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:3246: + void *datap) = +{ Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

…-fixes WARNING: 'an user' may be misspelled - perhaps 'a user'? torvalds#33: address may not always an user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag in ^^^^^^^ WARNING: please, no spaces at the start of a line torvalds#133: FILE: lib/iov_iter.c:637: + if (iov_iter_is_copy_mc(i))$ WARNING: suspect code indent for conditional statements (7, 15) torvalds#133: FILE: lib/iov_iter.c:637: + if (iov_iter_is_copy_mc(i)) + return (void *)copy_mc_to_kernel(to, from, size); ERROR: code indent should use tabs where possible torvalds#134: FILE: lib/iov_iter.c:638: + return (void *)copy_mc_to_kernel(to, from, size);$ WARNING: please, no spaces at the start of a line torvalds#134: FILE: lib/iov_iter.c:638: + return (void *)copy_mc_to_kernel(to, from, size);$ total: 1 errors, 4 warnings, 118 lines checked NOTE: For some of the reported defects, checkpatch may be able to mechanically convert to the typical style using --fix or --fix-inplace. NOTE: Whitespace errors detected. You may wish to use scripts/cleanpatch or scripts/cleanfile ./patches/mm-hwpoison-coredump-support-recovery-from-dump_user_range.patch has style problems, please review. NOTE: If any of the errors are false positives, please report them to the maintainer, see CHECKPATCH in MAINTAINERS. Please run checkpatch prior to sending patches Cc: Kefeng Wang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

LE Create CIS command shall not be sent before all CIS Established events from its previous invocation have been processed. Currently it is sent via hci_sync but that only waits for the first event, but there can be multiple. Make it wait for all events, and simplify the CIS creation as follows: Add new flag HCI_CONN_CREATE_CIS, which is set if Create CIS has been sent for the connection but it is not yet completed. Make BT_CONNECT state to mean the connection wants Create CIS. On events after which new Create CIS may need to be sent, send it if possible and some connections need it. These events are: hci_connect_cis, iso_connect_cfm, hci_cs_le_create_cis, hci_le_cis_estabilished_evt. The Create CIS status/completion events shall queue new Create CIS only if at least one of the connections transitions away from BT_CONNECT, so that we don't loop if controller is sending bogus events. This fixes sending multiple CIS Create for the same CIS in the "ISO AC 6(i) - Success" BlueZ test case: < HCI Command: LE Create Co.. (0x08|0x0064) plen 9 torvalds#129 [hci0] Number of CIS: 2 CIS Handle: 257 ACL Handle: 42 CIS Handle: 258 ACL Handle: 42 > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 torvalds#130 [hci0] LE Create Connected Isochronous Stream (0x08|0x0064) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 29 torvalds#131 [hci0] LE Connected Isochronous Stream Established (0x19) Status: Success (0x00) Connection Handle: 257 ... < HCI Command: LE Setup Is.. (0x08|0x006e) plen 13 torvalds#132 [hci0] ... > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 6 torvalds#133 [hci0] LE Setup Isochronous Data Path (0x08|0x006e) ncmd 1 ... < HCI Command: LE Create Co.. (0x08|0x0064) plen 5 torvalds#134 [hci0] Number of CIS: 1 CIS Handle: 258 ACL Handle: 42 > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 torvalds#135 [hci0] LE Create Connected Isochronous Stream (0x08|0x0064) ncmd 1 Status: ACL Connection Already Exists (0x0b) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 29 torvalds#136 [hci0] LE Connected Isochronous Stream Established (0x19) Status: Success (0x00) Connection Handle: 258 ... Fixes: c09b80b ("Bluetooth: hci_conn: Fix not waiting for HCI_EVT_LE_CIS_ESTABLISHED") Signed-off-by: Pauli Virtanen <[email protected]>

LE Create CIS command shall not be sent before all CIS Established events from its previous invocation have been processed. Currently it is sent via hci_sync but that only waits for the first event, but there can be multiple. Make it wait for all events, and simplify the CIS creation as follows: Add new flag HCI_CONN_CREATE_CIS, which is set if Create CIS has been sent for the connection but it is not yet completed. Make BT_CONNECT state to mean the connection wants Create CIS. On events after which new Create CIS may need to be sent, send it if possible and some connections need it. These events are: hci_connect_cis, iso_connect_cfm, hci_cs_le_create_cis, hci_le_cis_estabilished_evt. The Create CIS status/completion events shall queue new Create CIS only if at least one of the connections transitions away from BT_CONNECT, so that we don't loop if controller is sending bogus events. This fixes sending multiple CIS Create for the same CIS in the "ISO AC 6(i) - Success" BlueZ test case: < HCI Command: LE Create Co.. (0x08|0x0064) plen 9 torvalds#129 [hci0] Number of CIS: 2 CIS Handle: 257 ACL Handle: 42 CIS Handle: 258 ACL Handle: 42 > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 torvalds#130 [hci0] LE Create Connected Isochronous Stream (0x08|0x0064) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 29 torvalds#131 [hci0] LE Connected Isochronous Stream Established (0x19) Status: Success (0x00) Connection Handle: 257 ... < HCI Command: LE Setup Is.. (0x08|0x006e) plen 13 torvalds#132 [hci0] ... > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 6 torvalds#133 [hci0] LE Setup Isochronous Data Path (0x08|0x006e) ncmd 1 ... < HCI Command: LE Create Co.. (0x08|0x0064) plen 5 torvalds#134 [hci0] Number of CIS: 1 CIS Handle: 258 ACL Handle: 42 > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 torvalds#135 [hci0] LE Create Connected Isochronous Stream (0x08|0x0064) ncmd 1 Status: ACL Connection Already Exists (0x0b) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 29 torvalds#136 [hci0] LE Connected Isochronous Stream Established (0x19) Status: Success (0x00) Connection Handle: 258 ... Fixes: c09b80b ("Bluetooth: hci_conn: Fix not waiting for HCI_EVT_LE_CIS_ESTABLISHED") Signed-off-by: Pauli Virtanen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

LE Create CIS command shall not be sent before all CIS Established events from its previous invocation have been processed. Currently it is sent via hci_sync but that only waits for the first event, but there can be multiple. Make it wait for all events, and simplify the CIS creation as follows: Add new flag HCI_CONN_CREATE_CIS, which is set if Create CIS has been sent for the connection but it is not yet completed. Make BT_CONNECT state to mean the connection wants Create CIS. On events after which new Create CIS may need to be sent, send it if possible and some connections need it. These events are: hci_connect_cis, iso_connect_cfm, hci_cs_le_create_cis, hci_le_cis_estabilished_evt. The Create CIS status/completion events shall queue new Create CIS only if at least one of the connections transitions away from BT_CONNECT, so that we don't loop if controller is sending bogus events. This fixes sending multiple CIS Create for the same CIS in the "ISO AC 6(i) - Success" BlueZ test case: < HCI Command: LE Create Co.. (0x08|0x0064) plen 9 torvalds#129 [hci0] Number of CIS: 2 CIS Handle: 257 ACL Handle: 42 CIS Handle: 258 ACL Handle: 42 > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 torvalds#130 [hci0] LE Create Connected Isochronous Stream (0x08|0x0064) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 29 torvalds#131 [hci0] LE Connected Isochronous Stream Established (0x19) Status: Success (0x00) Connection Handle: 257 ... < HCI Command: LE Setup Is.. (0x08|0x006e) plen 13 torvalds#132 [hci0] ... > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 6 torvalds#133 [hci0] LE Setup Isochronous Data Path (0x08|0x006e) ncmd 1 ... < HCI Command: LE Create Co.. (0x08|0x0064) plen 5 torvalds#134 [hci0] Number of CIS: 1 CIS Handle: 258 ACL Handle: 42 > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 torvalds#135 [hci0] LE Create Connected Isochronous Stream (0x08|0x0064) ncmd 1 Status: ACL Connection Already Exists (0x0b) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 29 torvalds#136 [hci0] LE Connected Isochronous Stream Established (0x19) Status: Success (0x00) Connection Handle: 258 ... Fixes: c09b80b ("Bluetooth: hci_conn: Fix not waiting for HCI_EVT_LE_CIS_ESTABLISHED") Signed-off-by: Pauli Virtanen <[email protected]>

LE Create CIS command shall not be sent before all CIS Established events from its previous invocation have been processed. Currently it is sent via hci_sync but that only waits for the first event, but there can be multiple. Make it wait for all events, and simplify the CIS creation as follows: Add new flag HCI_CONN_CREATE_CIS, which is set if Create CIS has been sent for the connection but it is not yet completed. Make BT_CONNECT state to mean the connection wants Create CIS. On events after which new Create CIS may need to be sent, send it if possible and some connections need it. These events are: hci_connect_cis, iso_connect_cfm, hci_cs_le_create_cis, hci_le_cis_estabilished_evt. The Create CIS status/completion events shall queue new Create CIS only if at least one of the connections transitions away from BT_CONNECT, so that we don't loop if controller is sending bogus events. This fixes sending multiple CIS Create for the same CIS in the "ISO AC 6(i) - Success" BlueZ test case: < HCI Command: LE Create Co.. (0x08|0x0064) plen 9 torvalds#129 [hci0] Number of CIS: 2 CIS Handle: 257 ACL Handle: 42 CIS Handle: 258 ACL Handle: 42 > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 torvalds#130 [hci0] LE Create Connected Isochronous Stream (0x08|0x0064) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 29 torvalds#131 [hci0] LE Connected Isochronous Stream Established (0x19) Status: Success (0x00) Connection Handle: 257 ... < HCI Command: LE Setup Is.. (0x08|0x006e) plen 13 torvalds#132 [hci0] ... > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 6 torvalds#133 [hci0] LE Setup Isochronous Data Path (0x08|0x006e) ncmd 1 ... < HCI Command: LE Create Co.. (0x08|0x0064) plen 5 torvalds#134 [hci0] Number of CIS: 1 CIS Handle: 258 ACL Handle: 42 > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 torvalds#135 [hci0] LE Create Connected Isochronous Stream (0x08|0x0064) ncmd 1 Status: ACL Connection Already Exists (0x0b) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 29 torvalds#136 [hci0] LE Connected Isochronous Stream Established (0x19) Status: Success (0x00) Connection Handle: 258 ... Fixes: c09b80b ("Bluetooth: hci_conn: Fix not waiting for HCI_EVT_LE_CIS_ESTABLISHED") Signed-off-by: Pauli Virtanen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7f74563 ] LE Create CIS command shall not be sent before all CIS Established events from its previous invocation have been processed. Currently it is sent via hci_sync but that only waits for the first event, but there can be multiple. Make it wait for all events, and simplify the CIS creation as follows: Add new flag HCI_CONN_CREATE_CIS, which is set if Create CIS has been sent for the connection but it is not yet completed. Make BT_CONNECT state to mean the connection wants Create CIS. On events after which new Create CIS may need to be sent, send it if possible and some connections need it. These events are: hci_connect_cis, iso_connect_cfm, hci_cs_le_create_cis, hci_le_cis_estabilished_evt. The Create CIS status/completion events shall queue new Create CIS only if at least one of the connections transitions away from BT_CONNECT, so that we don't loop if controller is sending bogus events. This fixes sending multiple CIS Create for the same CIS in the "ISO AC 6(i) - Success" BlueZ test case: < HCI Command: LE Create Co.. (0x08|0x0064) plen 9 torvalds#129 [hci0] Number of CIS: 2 CIS Handle: 257 ACL Handle: 42 CIS Handle: 258 ACL Handle: 42 > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 torvalds#130 [hci0] LE Create Connected Isochronous Stream (0x08|0x0064) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 29 torvalds#131 [hci0] LE Connected Isochronous Stream Established (0x19) Status: Success (0x00) Connection Handle: 257 ... < HCI Command: LE Setup Is.. (0x08|0x006e) plen 13 torvalds#132 [hci0] ... > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 6 torvalds#133 [hci0] LE Setup Isochronous Data Path (0x08|0x006e) ncmd 1 ... < HCI Command: LE Create Co.. (0x08|0x0064) plen 5 torvalds#134 [hci0] Number of CIS: 1 CIS Handle: 258 ACL Handle: 42 > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 torvalds#135 [hci0] LE Create Connected Isochronous Stream (0x08|0x0064) ncmd 1 Status: ACL Connection Already Exists (0x0b) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 29 torvalds#136 [hci0] LE Connected Isochronous Stream Established (0x19) Status: Success (0x00) Connection Handle: 258 ... Fixes: c09b80b ("Bluetooth: hci_conn: Fix not waiting for HCI_EVT_LE_CIS_ESTABLISHED") Signed-off-by: Pauli Virtanen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2035588 [ Upstream commit 7f74563 ] LE Create CIS command shall not be sent before all CIS Established events from its previous invocation have been processed. Currently it is sent via hci_sync but that only waits for the first event, but there can be multiple. Make it wait for all events, and simplify the CIS creation as follows: Add new flag HCI_CONN_CREATE_CIS, which is set if Create CIS has been sent for the connection but it is not yet completed. Make BT_CONNECT state to mean the connection wants Create CIS. On events after which new Create CIS may need to be sent, send it if possible and some connections need it. These events are: hci_connect_cis, iso_connect_cfm, hci_cs_le_create_cis, hci_le_cis_estabilished_evt. The Create CIS status/completion events shall queue new Create CIS only if at least one of the connections transitions away from BT_CONNECT, so that we don't loop if controller is sending bogus events. This fixes sending multiple CIS Create for the same CIS in the "ISO AC 6(i) - Success" BlueZ test case: < HCI Command: LE Create Co.. (0x08|0x0064) plen 9 torvalds#129 [hci0] Number of CIS: 2 CIS Handle: 257 ACL Handle: 42 CIS Handle: 258 ACL Handle: 42 > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 torvalds#130 [hci0] LE Create Connected Isochronous Stream (0x08|0x0064) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 29 torvalds#131 [hci0] LE Connected Isochronous Stream Established (0x19) Status: Success (0x00) Connection Handle: 257 ... < HCI Command: LE Setup Is.. (0x08|0x006e) plen 13 torvalds#132 [hci0] ... > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 6 torvalds#133 [hci0] LE Setup Isochronous Data Path (0x08|0x006e) ncmd 1 ... < HCI Command: LE Create Co.. (0x08|0x0064) plen 5 torvalds#134 [hci0] Number of CIS: 1 CIS Handle: 258 ACL Handle: 42 > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 torvalds#135 [hci0] LE Create Connected Isochronous Stream (0x08|0x0064) ncmd 1 Status: ACL Connection Already Exists (0x0b) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 29 torvalds#136 [hci0] LE Connected Isochronous Stream Established (0x19) Status: Success (0x00) Connection Handle: 258 ... Fixes: c09b80b ("Bluetooth: hci_conn: Fix not waiting for HCI_EVT_LE_CIS_ESTABLISHED") Signed-off-by: Pauli Virtanen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <[email protected]>

This reverts commit c3c7041. We hit a locking ordering issue in the other direction. Let's revert for now. [ 9.378773] ====================================================== [ 9.379476] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 9.379532] 6.6.0-work-10442-ga7150a9168f8-dirty torvalds#134 Not tainted [ 9.379532] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 9.379532] scx_rustland/1622 is trying to acquire lock: [ 9.379532] ffffffff8325f828 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: bpf_scx_reg+0xe4/0xcf0 [ 9.379532] [ 9.379532] but task is already holding lock: [ 9.379532] ffffffff83271be8 (scx_cgroup_rwsem){++++}-{0:0}, at: bpf_scx_reg+0xdf/0xcf0 [ 9.379532] [ 9.379532] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 9.379532] [ 9.379532] [ 9.379532] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 9.379532] [ 9.379532] -> #2 (scx_cgroup_rwsem){++++}-{0:0}: [ 9.379532] percpu_down_read+0x2e/0xb0 [ 9.379532] scx_cgroup_can_attach+0x25/0x200 [ 9.379532] cpu_cgroup_can_attach+0xe/0x10 [ 9.379532] cgroup_migrate_execute+0xaf/0x450 [ 9.379532] cgroup_apply_control+0x227/0x2a0 [ 9.379532] cgroup_subtree_control_write+0x425/0x4b0 [ 9.379532] cgroup_file_write+0x82/0x260 [ 9.379532] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x131/0x1c0 [ 9.379532] vfs_write+0x1f9/0x270 [ 9.379532] ksys_write+0x62/0xc0 [ 9.379532] __x64_sys_write+0x1b/0x20 [ 9.379532] do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 [ 9.379532] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e [ 9.379532] [ 9.379532] -> #1 (cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem){++++}-{0:0}: [ 9.379532] percpu_down_write+0x35/0x1e0 [ 9.379532] cgroup_procs_write_start+0x8a/0x210 [ 9.379532] __cgroup_procs_write+0x4c/0x160 [ 9.379532] cgroup_procs_write+0x17/0x30 [ 9.379532] cgroup_file_write+0x82/0x260 [ 9.379532] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x131/0x1c0 [ 9.379532] vfs_write+0x1f9/0x270 [ 9.379532] ksys_write+0x62/0xc0 [ 9.379532] __x64_sys_write+0x1b/0x20 [ 9.379532] do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 [ 9.379532] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e [ 9.379532] [ 9.379532] -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: [ 9.379532] __lock_acquire+0x142d/0x2a30 [ 9.379532] lock_acquire+0xbf/0x1f0 [ 9.379532] cpus_read_lock+0x2f/0xc0 [ 9.379532] bpf_scx_reg+0xe4/0xcf0 [ 9.379532] bpf_struct_ops_link_create+0xb6/0x100 [ 9.379532] link_create+0x49/0x200 [ 9.379532] __sys_bpf+0x351/0x3e0 [ 9.379532] __x64_sys_bpf+0x1c/0x20 [ 9.379532] do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 [ 9.379532] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e [ 9.379532] [ 9.379532] other info that might help us debug this: [ 9.379532] [ 9.379532] Chain exists of: [ 9.379532] cpu_hotplug_lock --> cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem --> scx_cgroup_rwsem [ 9.379532] [ 9.379532] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 9.379532] [ 9.379532] CPU0 CPU1 [ 9.379532] ---- ---- [ 9.379532] lock(scx_cgroup_rwsem); [ 9.379532] lock(cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem); [ 9.379532] lock(scx_cgroup_rwsem); [ 9.379532] rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock); [ 9.379532] [ 9.379532] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 9.379532] [ 9.379532] 3 locks held by scx_rustland/1622: [ 9.379532] #0: ffffffff83272708 (scx_ops_enable_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: bpf_scx_reg+0x2a/0xcf0 [ 9.379532] #1: ffffffff83271aa0 (scx_fork_rwsem){++++}-{0:0}, at: bpf_scx_reg+0xd3/0xcf0 [ 9.379532] #2: ffffffff83271be8 (scx_cgroup_rwsem){++++}-{0:0}, at: bpf_scx_reg+0xdf/0xcf0 [ 9.379532] [ 9.379532] stack backtrace: [ 9.379532] CPU: 7 PID: 1622 Comm: scx_rustland Not tainted 6.6.0-work-10442-ga7150a9168f8-dirty torvalds#134 [ 9.379532] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS unknown 2/2/2022 [ 9.379532] Sched_ext: rustland (prepping) [ 9.379532] Call Trace: [ 9.379532] <TASK> [ 9.379532] dump_stack_lvl+0x55/0x70 [ 9.379532] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [ 9.379532] print_circular_bug+0x2ea/0x2f0 [ 9.379532] check_noncircular+0xe2/0x100 [ 9.379532] __lock_acquire+0x142d/0x2a30 [ 9.379532] ? lock_acquire+0xbf/0x1f0 [ 9.379532] ? rcu_sync_func+0x2c/0xa0 [ 9.379532] lock_acquire+0xbf/0x1f0 [ 9.379532] ? bpf_scx_reg+0xe4/0xcf0 [ 9.379532] cpus_read_lock+0x2f/0xc0 [ 9.379532] ? bpf_scx_reg+0xe4/0xcf0 [ 9.379532] bpf_scx_reg+0xe4/0xcf0 [ 9.379532] ? alloc_file+0xa4/0x160 [ 9.379532] ? alloc_file_pseudo+0x99/0xd0 [ 9.379532] ? anon_inode_getfile+0x79/0xc0 [ 9.379532] ? bpf_link_prime+0xe2/0x1a0 [ 9.379532] bpf_struct_ops_link_create+0xb6/0x100 [ 9.379532] link_create+0x49/0x200 [ 9.379532] __sys_bpf+0x351/0x3e0 [ 9.379532] __x64_sys_bpf+0x1c/0x20 [ 9.379532] do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 [ 9.379532] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x44/0x80 [ 9.379532] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e [ 9.379532] RIP: 0033:0x7fc391f7473d [ 9.379532] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d c3 95 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 9.379532] RSP: 002b:00007ffeb4fe4108 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141 [ 9.379532] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fc391f7473d [ 9.379532] RDX: 0000000000000030 RSI: 00007ffeb4fe4120 RDI: 000000000000001c [ 9.379532] RBP: 000000000000000c R08: 000000000000000c R09: 000055d0a75b1a10 [ 9.379532] R10: 0000000000000050 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000002c [ 9.379532] R13: 00007ffeb4fe4628 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffeb4fe4328 [ 9.379532] </TASK>

* rk3588-fxblox-rk1a dd edp and user leds to dts * Update rk3588-fxblox-rk1.dts

In the current interrupt reporting mode, each CQ entry reports an interrupt. However, when there are a large number of I/O hardware completion interrupts, the following issue may occur: [ 4682.678657][ C129] irq 134: nobody cared (try booting with the "irqpoll" option) [ 4682.708455][ C129] Call trace: [ 4682.711589][ C129] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1e4 [ 4682.715934][ C129] show_stack+0x20/0x2c [ 4682.719933][ C129] dump_stack+0xd8/0x140 [ 4682.724017][ C129] __report_bad_irq+0x54/0x180 [ 4682.728625][ C129] note_interrupt+0x1ec/0x2f0 [ 4682.733143][ C129] handle_irq_event+0x118/0x1ac [ 4682.737834][ C129] handle_fasteoi_irq+0xc8/0x200 [ 4682.742613][ C129] __handle_domain_irq+0x84/0xf0 [ 4682.747391][ C129] gic_handle_irq+0x88/0x2c0 [ 4682.751822][ C129] el1_irq+0xbc/0x140 [ 4682.755648][ C129] _find_next_bit.constprop.0+0x20/0x94 [ 4682.761036][ C129] cpumask_next+0x24/0x30 [ 4682.765208][ C129] gic_ipi_send_mask+0x48/0x170 [ 4682.769900][ C129] __ipi_send_mask+0x34/0x110 [ 4682.775720][ C129] smp_cross_call+0x3c/0xcc [ 4682.780064][ C129] arch_send_call_function_single_ipi+0x38/0x44 [ 4682.786146][ C129] send_call_function_single_ipi+0xd0/0xe0 [ 4682.791794][ C129] generic_exec_single+0xb4/0x170 [ 4682.796659][ C129] smp_call_function_single_async+0x2c/0x40 [ 4682.802395][ C129] blk_mq_complete_request_remote.part.0+0xec/0x100 [ 4682.808822][ C129] blk_mq_complete_request+0x30/0x70 [ 4682.813950][ C129] scsi_mq_done+0x48/0xac [ 4682.818128][ C129] sas_scsi_task_done+0xb0/0x150 [libsas] [ 4682.823692][ C129] slot_complete_v3_hw+0x230/0x710 [hisi_sas_v3_hw] [ 4682.830120][ C129] cq_thread_v3_hw+0xbc/0x190 [hisi_sas_v3_hw] [ 4682.836114][ C129] irq_thread_fn+0x34/0xa4 [ 4682.840371][ C129] irq_thread+0xc4/0x130 [ 4682.844455][ C129] kthread+0x108/0x13c [ 4682.848365][ C129] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 [ 4682.852621][ C129] handlers: [ 4682.855577][ C129] [<00000000949e52bf>] cq_interrupt_v3_hw [hisi_sas_v3_hw] threaded [<000000005d8e3b68>] cq_thread_v3_hw [hisi_sas_v3_hw] [ 4682.868084][ C129] Disabling IRQ torvalds#134 When the IRQ management layer processes each hardware interrupt, if the return value of the interrupt handler is IRQ_WAKE_THREAD, it will wake up the handler thread for this interrupt action and set IRQTF_RUNTHREAD flag, wait for the interrupt handling thread to clear the IRQTF_RUNTHREAD flag after execution. Later in note_interrupt(), use irq_count to count hardware interrupts and irqs_unhandled to count interrupts for which no thread handler is responsible. When irq_count reaches 100000 and irqs_unhandled reaches 99000, irq will be disabled. In the performance test scenario, I/O completion hardware interrupts are continuously and quickly generated. As a result, the interrupt processing thread is cyclically called in irq_thread() and does not exit, this affects the response of the interrupt thread to the hardware interrupt and causes irqs_unhandled to grow to 99000. Finally, the irq is disabled. Therefore, default enable interrupt coalescing to reduce the generation of hardware interrupts, this helps interrupt processing threads to stop calling in irq_thread(). For interrupt coalescing, according to the actual performance test, set the count of CQ entries to 10 and the interrupt coalescing timeout period to 10us based on the actual performance test. Before and after interrupt coalescing is enabled, the 4K read/write performance is improved by about 3%, and the 256K read/write performance is basically the same. Signed-off-by: Yihang Li <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Xiang Chen <[email protected]>

Merge pull request #1 from torvalds/master

a1d0b61

Sync as of 10272014

dabrace closed this Nov 9, 2014

rpardini pushed a commit to rpardini/linux that referenced this pull request Jul 9, 2024

arm64: dts: rk3588-fxblox-rk1: add edp and user leds (torvalds#134)

408b805

* rk3588-fxblox-rk1a dd edp and user leds to dts * Update rk3588-fxblox-rk1.dts

Provide feedback

Saved searches

Use saved searches to filter your results more quickly

Merge pull request #2 from torvalds/master #134

Merge pull request #2 from torvalds/master #134

dabrace commented Nov 9, 2014

Merge pull request #2 from torvalds/master #134

Merge pull request #2 from torvalds/master #134

Conversation

dabrace commented Nov 9, 2014