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[PATCH 0/8] Lockdep fixes #12

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josefbacik opened this issue Aug 20, 2020 · 0 comments
Closed

[PATCH 0/8] Lockdep fixes #12

josefbacik opened this issue Aug 20, 2020 · 0 comments

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@josefbacik
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Link to patches

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/

b4 am [email protected]

@kdave kdave added for-next patches in topic branch in for-next misc-next patches are in misc-next and removed for-next patches in topic branch in for-next labels Aug 25, 2020
@kdave kdave removed the misc-next patches are in misc-next label Oct 1, 2020
@kdave kdave closed this as completed Oct 1, 2020
@kdave kdave added misc-next patches are in misc-next and removed misc-next patches are in misc-next labels Nov 3, 2020
josefbacik added a commit that referenced this issue Jul 12, 2023
While trying to get the subpage blocksize tests running, I hit the
following panic on generic/476

assertion failed: PagePrivate(page) && page->private, in fs/btrfs/subpage.c:229
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/subpage.c:229!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP
CPU: 1 PID: 1453 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7+ #12
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-20230301gitf80f052277c8-26.fc38 03/01/2023
pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0
lr : btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0
Call trace:
 btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0
 btrfs_subpage_clear_checked+0x38/0xc0
 btrfs_page_clear_checked+0x48/0x98
 btrfs_truncate_block+0x5d0/0x6a8
 btrfs_cont_expand+0x5c/0x528
 btrfs_write_check.isra.0+0xf8/0x150
 btrfs_buffered_write+0xb4/0x760
 btrfs_do_write_iter+0x2f8/0x4b0
 btrfs_file_write_iter+0x1c/0x30
 do_iter_readv_writev+0xc8/0x158
 do_iter_write+0x9c/0x210
 vfs_iter_write+0x24/0x40
 iter_file_splice_write+0x224/0x390
 direct_splice_actor+0x38/0x68
 splice_direct_to_actor+0x12c/0x260
 do_splice_direct+0x90/0xe8
 generic_copy_file_range+0x50/0x90
 vfs_copy_file_range+0x29c/0x470
 __arm64_sys_copy_file_range+0xcc/0x498
 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x80/0xd8
 do_el0_svc+0x6c/0x168
 el0_svc+0x50/0x1b0
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x114/0x120
 el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

This happens because during btrfs_cont_expand we'll get a page, set it
as mapped, and if it's not Uptodate we'll read it.  However between the
read and re-locking the page we could have called release_folio() on the
page, but left the page in the file mapping.  release_folio() can clear
the page private, and thus further down we blow up when we go to modify
the subpage bits.  Fix this by putting the set_page_extent_mapped()
after the read.  This is safe because read_folio() will call
set_page_extent_mapped() before it does the read, and then if we clear
page private but leave it on the mapping we're completely safe
re-setting set_page_extent_mapped().  With this patch I can now run
generic/476 without panicing.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
josefbacik added a commit that referenced this issue Jul 24, 2023
While trying to get the subpage blocksize tests running, I hit the
following panic on generic/476

  assertion failed: PagePrivate(page) && page->private, in fs/btrfs/subpage.c:229
  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/subpage.c:229!
  Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP
  CPU: 1 PID: 1453 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7+ #12
  Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-20230301gitf80f052277c8-26.fc38 03/01/2023
  pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
  pc : btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0
  lr : btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0
  Call trace:
   btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0
   btrfs_subpage_clear_checked+0x38/0xc0
   btrfs_page_clear_checked+0x48/0x98
   btrfs_truncate_block+0x5d0/0x6a8
   btrfs_cont_expand+0x5c/0x528
   btrfs_write_check.isra.0+0xf8/0x150
   btrfs_buffered_write+0xb4/0x760
   btrfs_do_write_iter+0x2f8/0x4b0
   btrfs_file_write_iter+0x1c/0x30
   do_iter_readv_writev+0xc8/0x158
   do_iter_write+0x9c/0x210
   vfs_iter_write+0x24/0x40
   iter_file_splice_write+0x224/0x390
   direct_splice_actor+0x38/0x68
   splice_direct_to_actor+0x12c/0x260
   do_splice_direct+0x90/0xe8
   generic_copy_file_range+0x50/0x90
   vfs_copy_file_range+0x29c/0x470
   __arm64_sys_copy_file_range+0xcc/0x498
   invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x80/0xd8
   do_el0_svc+0x6c/0x168
   el0_svc+0x50/0x1b0
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x114/0x120
   el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198

This happens because during btrfs_cont_expand we'll get a page, set it
as mapped, and if it's not Uptodate we'll read it.  However between the
read and re-locking the page we could have called release_folio() on the
page, but left the page in the file mapping.  release_folio() can clear
the page private, and thus further down we blow up when we go to modify
the subpage bits.

Fix this by putting the set_page_extent_mapped() after the read.  This
is safe because read_folio() will call set_page_extent_mapped() before
it does the read, and then if we clear page private but leave it on the
mapping we're completely safe re-setting set_page_extent_mapped().  With
this patch I can now run generic/476 without panicing.

CC: [email protected] # 6.1+
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
josefbacik pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 9, 2023
The cited commit holds encap tbl lock unconditionally when setting
up dests. But it may cause the following deadlock:

 PID: 1063722  TASK: ffffa062ca5d0000  CPU: 13   COMMAND: "handler8"
  #0 [ffffb14de05b7368] __schedule at ffffffffa1d5aa91
  #1 [ffffb14de05b7410] schedule at ffffffffa1d5afdb
  #2 [ffffb14de05b7430] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa1d5b528
  #3 [ffffb14de05b7440] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa1d5d6cb
  #4 [ffffb14de05b74e8] mutex_lock_nested at ffffffffa1d5ddeb
  #5 [ffffb14de05b74f8] mlx5e_tc_tun_encap_dests_set at ffffffffc12f2096 [mlx5_core]
  #6 [ffffb14de05b7568] post_process_attr at ffffffffc12d9fc5 [mlx5_core]
  #7 [ffffb14de05b75a0] mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc12de877 [mlx5_core]
  torvalds#8 [ffffb14de05b75f0] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc12e0eef [mlx5_core]
  torvalds#9 [ffffb14de05b7660] mlx5e_tc_add_flow at ffffffffc12e12f7 [mlx5_core]
 torvalds#10 [ffffb14de05b76b8] mlx5e_configure_flower at ffffffffc12e1686 [mlx5_core]
 torvalds#11 [ffffb14de05b7720] mlx5e_rep_indr_offload at ffffffffc12e3817 [mlx5_core]
 #12 [ffffb14de05b7730] mlx5e_rep_indr_setup_tc_cb at ffffffffc12e388a [mlx5_core]
 #13 [ffffb14de05b7740] tc_setup_cb_add at ffffffffa1ab2ba8
 torvalds#14 [ffffb14de05b77a0] fl_hw_replace_filter at ffffffffc0bdec2f [cls_flower]
 #15 [ffffb14de05b7868] fl_change at ffffffffc0be6caa [cls_flower]
 #16 [ffffb14de05b7908] tc_new_tfilter at ffffffffa1ab71f0

[1031218.028143]  wait_for_completion+0x24/0x30
[1031218.028589]  mlx5e_update_route_decap_flows+0x9a/0x1e0 [mlx5_core]
[1031218.029256]  mlx5e_tc_fib_event_work+0x1ad/0x300 [mlx5_core]
[1031218.029885]  process_one_work+0x24e/0x510

Actually no need to hold encap tbl lock if there is no encap action.
Fix it by checking if encap action exists or not before holding
encap tbl lock.

Fixes: 37c3b9f ("net/mlx5e: Prevent encap offload when neigh update is running")
Signed-off-by: Chris Mi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vlad Buslov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
josefbacik pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 27, 2023
Noticed with:

  make EXTRA_CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" BUILD_BPF_SKEL=1 CORESIGHT=1 O=/tmp/build/perf-tools-next -C tools/perf install-bin

Direct leak of 45 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f213f87243b in strdup (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0x7243b)
    #1 0x63d15f in evsel__set_filter util/evsel.c:1371
    #2 0x63d15f in evsel__append_filter util/evsel.c:1387
    #3 0x63d15f in evsel__append_tp_filter util/evsel.c:1400
    #4 0x62cd52 in evlist__append_tp_filter util/evlist.c:1145
    #5 0x62cd52 in evlist__append_tp_filter_pids util/evlist.c:1196
    #6 0x541e49 in trace__set_filter_loop_pids /home/acme/git/perf-tools/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3646
    #7 0x541e49 in trace__set_filter_pids /home/acme/git/perf-tools/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3670
    torvalds#8 0x541e49 in trace__run /home/acme/git/perf-tools/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3970
    torvalds#9 0x541e49 in cmd_trace /home/acme/git/perf-tools/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5141
    torvalds#10 0x5ef1a2 in run_builtin /home/acme/git/perf-tools/tools/perf/perf.c:323
    torvalds#11 0x4196da in handle_internal_command /home/acme/git/perf-tools/tools/perf/perf.c:377
    #12 0x4196da in run_argv /home/acme/git/perf-tools/tools/perf/perf.c:421
    #13 0x4196da in main /home/acme/git/perf-tools/tools/perf/perf.c:537
    torvalds#14 0x7f213e84a50f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2750f)

Free it on evsel__exit().

Acked-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
josefbacik pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 27, 2023
To plug these leaks detected with:

  $ make EXTRA_CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" BUILD_BPF_SKEL=1 CORESIGHT=1 O=/tmp/build/perf-tools-next -C tools/perf install-bin

  =================================================================
  ==473890==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

  Direct leak of 112 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7fdf19aba097 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xba097)
    #1 0x987836 in zalloc (/home/acme/bin/perf+0x987836)
    #2 0x5367ae in thread_trace__new /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:1289
    #3 0x5367ae in thread__trace /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:1307
    #4 0x5367ae in trace__sys_exit /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2468
    #5 0x52bf34 in trace__handle_event /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3177
    #6 0x52bf34 in __trace__deliver_event /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3685
    #7 0x542927 in trace__deliver_event /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3712
    torvalds#8 0x542927 in trace__run /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:4055
    torvalds#9 0x542927 in cmd_trace /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5141
    torvalds#10 0x5ef1a2 in run_builtin /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:323
    torvalds#11 0x4196da in handle_internal_command /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:377
    #12 0x4196da in run_argv /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:421
    #13 0x4196da in main /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:537
    torvalds#14 0x7fdf18a4a50f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2750f)

  Direct leak of 2048 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f788fcba6af in __interceptor_malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xba6af)
    #1 0x5337c0 in trace__sys_enter /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2342
    #2 0x52bfb4 in trace__handle_event /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3191
    #3 0x52bfb4 in __trace__deliver_event /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3699
    #4 0x542883 in trace__deliver_event /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3726
    #5 0x542883 in trace__run /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:4069
    #6 0x542883 in cmd_trace /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5155
    #7 0x5ef232 in run_builtin /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:323
    torvalds#8 0x4196da in handle_internal_command /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:377
    torvalds#9 0x4196da in run_argv /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:421
    torvalds#10 0x4196da in main /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:537
    torvalds#11 0x7f788ec4a50f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2750f)

  Indirect leak of 48 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7fdf19aba6af in __interceptor_malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xba6af)
    #1 0x77b335 in intlist__new util/intlist.c:116
    #2 0x5367fd in thread_trace__new /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:1293
    #3 0x5367fd in thread__trace /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:1307
    #4 0x5367fd in trace__sys_exit /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2468
    #5 0x52bf34 in trace__handle_event /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3177
    #6 0x52bf34 in __trace__deliver_event /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3685
    #7 0x542927 in trace__deliver_event /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3712
    torvalds#8 0x542927 in trace__run /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:4055
    torvalds#9 0x542927 in cmd_trace /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5141
    torvalds#10 0x5ef1a2 in run_builtin /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:323
    torvalds#11 0x4196da in handle_internal_command /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:377
    #12 0x4196da in run_argv /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:421
    #13 0x4196da in main /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:537
    torvalds#14 0x7fdf18a4a50f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2750f)

Acked-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
josefbacik pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 27, 2023
In 3cb4d5e ("perf trace: Free syscall tp fields in
evsel->priv") it only was freeing if strcmp(evsel->tp_format->system,
"syscalls") returned zero, while the corresponding initialization of
evsel->priv was being performed if it was _not_ zero, i.e. if the tp
system wasn't 'syscalls'.

Just stop looking for that and free it if evsel->priv was set, which
should be equivalent.

Also use the pre-existing evsel_trace__delete() function.

This resolves these leaks, detected with:

  $ make EXTRA_CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" BUILD_BPF_SKEL=1 CORESIGHT=1 O=/tmp/build/perf-tools-next -C tools/perf install-bin

  =================================================================
  ==481565==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

  Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7f7343cba097 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xba097)
      #1 0x987966 in zalloc (/home/acme/bin/perf+0x987966)
      #2 0x52f9b9 in evsel_trace__new /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:307
      #3 0x52f9b9 in evsel__syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:333
      #4 0x52f9b9 in evsel__init_raw_syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:458
      #5 0x52f9b9 in perf_evsel__raw_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:480
      #6 0x540e8b in trace__add_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3212
      #7 0x540e8b in trace__run /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3891
      torvalds#8 0x540e8b in cmd_trace /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5156
      torvalds#9 0x5ef262 in run_builtin /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:323
      torvalds#10 0x4196da in handle_internal_command /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:377
      torvalds#11 0x4196da in run_argv /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:421
      #12 0x4196da in main /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:537
      #13 0x7f7342c4a50f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2750f)

  Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7f7343cba097 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xba097)
      #1 0x987966 in zalloc (/home/acme/bin/perf+0x987966)
      #2 0x52f9b9 in evsel_trace__new /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:307
      #3 0x52f9b9 in evsel__syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:333
      #4 0x52f9b9 in evsel__init_raw_syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:458
      #5 0x52f9b9 in perf_evsel__raw_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:480
      #6 0x540dd1 in trace__add_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3205
      #7 0x540dd1 in trace__run /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3891
      torvalds#8 0x540dd1 in cmd_trace /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5156
      torvalds#9 0x5ef262 in run_builtin /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:323
      torvalds#10 0x4196da in handle_internal_command /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:377
      torvalds#11 0x4196da in run_argv /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:421
      #12 0x4196da in main /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:537
      #13 0x7f7342c4a50f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2750f)

  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 80 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s).
  [root@quaco ~]#

With this we plug all leaks with "perf trace sleep 1".

Fixes: 3cb4d5e ("perf trace: Free syscall tp fields in evsel->priv")
Acked-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Riccardo Mancini <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
josefbacik pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 27, 2023
…failure to add a probe

Building perf with EXTRA_CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" a leak is detect
when trying to add a probe to a non-existent function:

  # perf probe -x ~/bin/perf dso__neW
  Probe point 'dso__neW' not found.
    Error: Failed to add events.

  =================================================================
  ==296634==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

  Direct leak of 128 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7f67642ba097 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xba097)
      #1 0x7f67641a76f1 in allocate_cfi (/lib64/libdw.so.1+0x3f6f1)

  Direct leak of 65 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7f67642b95b5 in __interceptor_realloc.part.0 (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xb95b5)
      #1 0x6cac75 in strbuf_grow util/strbuf.c:64
      #2 0x6ca934 in strbuf_init util/strbuf.c:25
      #3 0x9337d2 in synthesize_perf_probe_point util/probe-event.c:2018
      #4 0x92be51 in try_to_find_probe_trace_events util/probe-event.c:964
      #5 0x93d5c6 in convert_to_probe_trace_events util/probe-event.c:3512
      #6 0x93d6d5 in convert_perf_probe_events util/probe-event.c:3529
      #7 0x56f37f in perf_add_probe_events /var/home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-probe.c:354
      torvalds#8 0x572fbc in __cmd_probe /var/home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-probe.c:738
      torvalds#9 0x5730f2 in cmd_probe /var/home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-probe.c:766
      torvalds#10 0x635d81 in run_builtin /var/home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:323
      torvalds#11 0x6362c1 in handle_internal_command /var/home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:377
      #12 0x63667a in run_argv /var/home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:421
      #13 0x636b8d in main /var/home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:537
      torvalds#14 0x7f676302950f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2950f)

  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 193 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s).
  #

synthesize_perf_probe_point() returns a "detachec" strbuf, i.e. a
malloc'ed string that needs to be free'd.

An audit will be performed to find other such cases.

Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
josefbacik pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 27, 2023
The following processes run into a deadlock. CPU 41 was waiting for CPU 29
to handle a CSD request while holding spinlock "crashdump_lock", but CPU 29
was hung by that spinlock with IRQs disabled.

  PID: 17360    TASK: ffff95c1090c5c40  CPU: 41  COMMAND: "mrdiagd"
  !# 0 [ffffb80edbf37b58] __read_once_size at ffffffff9b871a40 include/linux/compiler.h:185:0
  !# 1 [ffffb80edbf37b58] atomic_read at ffffffff9b871a40 arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:27:0
  !# 2 [ffffb80edbf37b58] dump_stack at ffffffff9b871a40 lib/dump_stack.c:54:0
   # 3 [ffffb80edbf37b78] csd_lock_wait_toolong at ffffffff9b131ad5 kernel/smp.c:364:0
   # 4 [ffffb80edbf37b78] __csd_lock_wait at ffffffff9b131ad5 kernel/smp.c:384:0
   # 5 [ffffb80edbf37bf8] csd_lock_wait at ffffffff9b13267a kernel/smp.c:394:0
   # 6 [ffffb80edbf37bf8] smp_call_function_many at ffffffff9b13267a kernel/smp.c:843:0
   # 7 [ffffb80edbf37c50] smp_call_function at ffffffff9b13279d kernel/smp.c:867:0
   # 8 [ffffb80edbf37c50] on_each_cpu at ffffffff9b13279d kernel/smp.c:976:0
   # 9 [ffffb80edbf37c78] flush_tlb_kernel_range at ffffffff9b085c4b arch/x86/mm/tlb.c:742:0
   torvalds#10 [ffffb80edbf37cb8] __purge_vmap_area_lazy at ffffffff9b23a1e0 mm/vmalloc.c:701:0
   torvalds#11 [ffffb80edbf37ce0] try_purge_vmap_area_lazy at ffffffff9b23a2cc mm/vmalloc.c:722:0
   #12 [ffffb80edbf37ce0] free_vmap_area_noflush at ffffffff9b23a2cc mm/vmalloc.c:754:0
   #13 [ffffb80edbf37cf8] free_unmap_vmap_area at ffffffff9b23bb3b mm/vmalloc.c:764:0
   torvalds#14 [ffffb80edbf37cf8] remove_vm_area at ffffffff9b23bb3b mm/vmalloc.c:1509:0
   #15 [ffffb80edbf37d18] __vunmap at ffffffff9b23bb8a mm/vmalloc.c:1537:0
   #16 [ffffb80edbf37d40] vfree at ffffffff9b23bc85 mm/vmalloc.c:1612:0
   #17 [ffffb80edbf37d58] megasas_free_host_crash_buffer [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc020b7f2 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c:3932:0
   #18 [ffffb80edbf37d80] fw_crash_state_store [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc01f804d drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c:3291:0
   #19 [ffffb80edbf37dc0] dev_attr_store at ffffffff9b56dd7b drivers/base/core.c:758:0
   #20 [ffffb80edbf37dd0] sysfs_kf_write at ffffffff9b326acf fs/sysfs/file.c:144:0
   #21 [ffffb80edbf37de0] kernfs_fop_write at ffffffff9b325fd4 fs/kernfs/file.c:316:0
   #22 [ffffb80edbf37e20] __vfs_write at ffffffff9b29418a fs/read_write.c:480:0
   #23 [ffffb80edbf37ea8] vfs_write at ffffffff9b294462 fs/read_write.c:544:0
   #24 [ffffb80edbf37ee8] SYSC_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:590:0
   #25 [ffffb80edbf37ee8] SyS_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:582:0
   #26 [ffffb80edbf37f30] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9b003ca9 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298:0
   #27 [ffffb80edbf37f58] entry_SYSCALL_64 at ffffffff9ba001b1 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:238:0

  PID: 17355    TASK: ffff95c1090c3d80  CPU: 29  COMMAND: "mrdiagd"
  !# 0 [ffffb80f2d3c7d30] __read_once_size at ffffffff9b0f2ab0 include/linux/compiler.h:185:0
  !# 1 [ffffb80f2d3c7d30] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f2ab0 kernel/locking/qspinlock.c:368:0
   # 2 [ffffb80f2d3c7d58] pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f244b arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:674:0
   # 3 [ffffb80f2d3c7d58] queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f244b arch/x86/include/asm/qspinlock.h:53:0
   # 4 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] queued_spin_lock at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:90:0
   # 5 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] do_raw_spin_lock_flags at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/linux/spinlock.h:173:0
   # 6 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] __raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:122:0
   # 7 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff9b8961a6 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:160:0
   # 8 [ffffb80f2d3c7d88] fw_crash_buffer_store [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc01f8129 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c:3205:0
   # 9 [ffffb80f2d3c7dc0] dev_attr_store at ffffffff9b56dd7b drivers/base/core.c:758:0
   torvalds#10 [ffffb80f2d3c7dd0] sysfs_kf_write at ffffffff9b326acf fs/sysfs/file.c:144:0
   torvalds#11 [ffffb80f2d3c7de0] kernfs_fop_write at ffffffff9b325fd4 fs/kernfs/file.c:316:0
   #12 [ffffb80f2d3c7e20] __vfs_write at ffffffff9b29418a fs/read_write.c:480:0
   #13 [ffffb80f2d3c7ea8] vfs_write at ffffffff9b294462 fs/read_write.c:544:0
   torvalds#14 [ffffb80f2d3c7ee8] SYSC_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:590:0
   #15 [ffffb80f2d3c7ee8] SyS_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:582:0
   #16 [ffffb80f2d3c7f30] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9b003ca9 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298:0
   #17 [ffffb80f2d3c7f58] entry_SYSCALL_64 at ffffffff9ba001b1 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:238:0

The lock is used to synchronize different sysfs operations, it doesn't
protect any resource that will be touched by an interrupt. Consequently
it's not required to disable IRQs. Replace the spinlock with a mutex to fix
the deadlock.

Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
josefbacik pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 27, 2023
Currently, arch_stack_walk() can only get the full stack information
including NMI.  This is because the implementation of arch_stack_walk()
is forced to ignore the information passed by the regs parameter and use
the current stack information instead.

For some detection systems like KFENCE, only partial stack information
is needed.  In particular, the stack frame where the interrupt occurred.

To support KFENCE, this patch modifies the implementation of the
arch_stack_walk() function so that if this function is called with the
regs argument passed, it retains all the stack information in regs and
uses it to provide accurate information.

Before this patch:
[    1.531195 ] ==================================================================
[    1.531442 ] BUG: KFENCE: out-of-bounds read in stack_trace_save_regs+0x48/0x6c
[    1.531442 ]
[    1.531900 ] Out-of-bounds read at 0xffff800012267fff (1B left of kfence-#12):
[    1.532046 ]  stack_trace_save_regs+0x48/0x6c
[    1.532169 ]  kfence_report_error+0xa4/0x528
[    1.532276 ]  kfence_handle_page_fault+0x124/0x270
[    1.532388 ]  no_context+0x50/0x94
[    1.532453 ]  do_page_fault+0x1a8/0x36c
[    1.532524 ]  tlb_do_page_fault_0+0x118/0x1b4
[    1.532623 ]  test_out_of_bounds_read+0xa0/0x1d8
[    1.532745 ]  kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x1c/0x28
[    1.532854 ]  kthread+0x124/0x130
[    1.532922 ]  ret_from_kernel_thread+0xc/0xa4
<snip>

After this patch:
[    1.320220 ] ==================================================================
[    1.320401 ] BUG: KFENCE: out-of-bounds read in test_out_of_bounds_read+0xa8/0x1d8
[    1.320401 ]
[    1.320898 ] Out-of-bounds read at 0xffff800012257fff (1B left of kfence-torvalds#10):
[    1.321134 ]  test_out_of_bounds_read+0xa8/0x1d8
[    1.321264 ]  kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x1c/0x28
[    1.321392 ]  kthread+0x124/0x130
[    1.321459 ]  ret_from_kernel_thread+0xc/0xa4
<snip>

Suggested-by: Jinyang He <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Enze Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <[email protected]>
josefbacik pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 27, 2023
Fix an error detected by memory sanitizer:
```
==4033==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
    #0 0x55fb0fbedfc7 in read_alias_info tools/perf/util/pmu.c:457:6
    #1 0x55fb0fbea339 in check_info_data tools/perf/util/pmu.c:1434:2
    #2 0x55fb0fbea339 in perf_pmu__check_alias tools/perf/util/pmu.c:1504:9
    #3 0x55fb0fbdca85 in parse_events_add_pmu tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:1429:32
    #4 0x55fb0f965230 in parse_events_parse tools/perf/util/parse-events.y:299:6
    #5 0x55fb0fbdf6b2 in parse_events__scanner tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:1822:8
    #6 0x55fb0fbdf8c1 in __parse_events tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:2094:8
    #7 0x55fb0fa8ffa9 in parse_events tools/perf/util/parse-events.h:41:9
    torvalds#8 0x55fb0fa8ffa9 in test_event tools/perf/tests/parse-events.c:2393:8
    torvalds#9 0x55fb0fa8f458 in test__pmu_events tools/perf/tests/parse-events.c:2551:15
    torvalds#10 0x55fb0fa6d93f in run_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:242:9
    torvalds#11 0x55fb0fa6d93f in test_and_print tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:271:8
    #12 0x55fb0fa6d082 in __cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:442:5
    #13 0x55fb0fa6d082 in cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:564:9
    torvalds#14 0x55fb0f942720 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:322:11
    #15 0x55fb0f942486 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:375:8
    #16 0x55fb0f941dab in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:419:2
    #17 0x55fb0f941dab in main tools/perf/perf.c:535:3
```

Fixes: 7b723db ("perf pmu: Be lazy about loading event info files from sysfs")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: James Clark <[email protected]>
Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
kdave pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 22, 2024
nvif_vmm_put gets called if addr is set, but if the allocation
fails we don't need to call put, otherwise we get a warning like

[523232.435671] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[523232.435674] WARNING: CPU: 8 PID: 1505697 at drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvif/vmm.c:68 nvif_vmm_put+0x72/0x80 [nouveau]
[523232.435795] Modules linked in: uinput rfcomm snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set nf_tables nfnetlink qrtr bnep sunrpc binfmt_misc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common intel_uncore_frequency intel_uncore_frequency_common isst_if_common iwlmvm nfit libnvdimm vfat fat x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp mac80211 snd_soc_avs snd_soc_hda_codec coretemp snd_hda_ext_core snd_soc_core snd_hda_codec_realtek kvm_intel snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_compress snd_hda_codec_generic ac97_bus snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_hda_intel libarc4 snd_intel_dspcfg snd_intel_sdw_acpi snd_hda_codec kvm iwlwifi snd_hda_core btusb snd_hwdep btrtl snd_seq btintel irqbypass btbcm rapl snd_seq_device eeepc_wmi btmtk intel_cstate iTCO_wdt cfg80211 snd_pcm asus_wmi bluetooth intel_pmc_bxt iTCO_vendor_support snd_timer ledtrig_audio pktcdvd snd mei_me
[523232.435828]  sparse_keymap intel_uncore i2c_i801 platform_profile wmi_bmof mei pcspkr ioatdma soundcore i2c_smbus rfkill idma64 dca joydev acpi_tad loop zram nouveau drm_ttm_helper ttm video drm_exec drm_gpuvm gpu_sched crct10dif_pclmul i2c_algo_bit nvme crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel drm_display_helper polyval_clmulni nvme_core polyval_generic e1000e mxm_wmi cec ghash_clmulni_intel r8169 sha512_ssse3 nvme_common wmi pinctrl_sunrisepoint uas usb_storage ip6_tables ip_tables fuse
[523232.435849] CPU: 8 PID: 1505697 Comm: gnome-shell Tainted: G        W          6.6.0-rc7-nvk-uapi+ #12
[523232.435851] Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/ROG STRIX X299-E GAMING II, BIOS 1301 09/24/2021
[523232.435852] RIP: 0010:nvif_vmm_put+0x72/0x80 [nouveau]
[523232.435934] Code: 00 00 48 89 e2 be 02 00 00 00 48 c7 04 24 00 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 e8 fc bf ff ff 85
c0 75 0a 48 c7 43 08 00 00 00 00 eb b3 <0f> 0b eb f2 e8 f5 c9 b2 e6 0f 1f 44 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
[523232.435936] RSP: 0018:ffffc900077ffbd8 EFLAGS: 00010282
[523232.435937] RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffffc900077ffc00 RCX: 0000000000000010
[523232.435938] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: ffffc900077ffb38 RDI: ffffc900077ffbd8
[523232.435940] RBP: ffff888e1c4f2140 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[523232.435940] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888503811800
[523232.435941] R13: ffffc900077ffca0 R14: ffff888e1c4f2140 R15: ffff88810317e1e0
[523232.435942] FS:  00007f933a769640(0000) GS:ffff88905fa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[523232.435943] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[523232.435944] CR2: 00007f930bef7000 CR3: 00000005d0322001 CR4: 00000000003706e0
[523232.435945] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[523232.435946] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[523232.435964] Call Trace:
[523232.435965]  <TASK>
[523232.435966]  ? nvif_vmm_put+0x72/0x80 [nouveau]
[523232.436051]  ? __warn+0x81/0x130
[523232.436055]  ? nvif_vmm_put+0x72/0x80 [nouveau]
[523232.436138]  ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0
[523232.436142]  ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80
[523232.436144]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70
[523232.436145]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[523232.436149]  ? nvif_vmm_put+0x72/0x80 [nouveau]
[523232.436230]  ? nvif_vmm_put+0x64/0x80 [nouveau]
[523232.436342]  nouveau_vma_del+0x80/0xd0 [nouveau]
[523232.436506]  nouveau_vma_new+0x1a0/0x210 [nouveau]
[523232.436671]  nouveau_gem_object_open+0x1d0/0x1f0 [nouveau]
[523232.436835]  drm_gem_handle_create_tail+0xd1/0x180
[523232.436840]  drm_prime_fd_to_handle_ioctl+0x12e/0x200
[523232.436844]  ? __pfx_drm_prime_fd_to_handle_ioctl+0x10/0x10
[523232.436847]  drm_ioctl_kernel+0xd3/0x180
[523232.436849]  drm_ioctl+0x26d/0x4b0
[523232.436851]  ? __pfx_drm_prime_fd_to_handle_ioctl+0x10/0x10
[523232.436855]  nouveau_drm_ioctl+0x5a/0xb0 [nouveau]
[523232.437032]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x94/0xd0
[523232.437036]  do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x90
[523232.437040]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x2b/0x40
[523232.437044]  ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x90
[523232.437046]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8

Reported-by: Faith Ekstrand <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
kdave pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 4, 2024
…SR-IOV

When kdump kernel tries to copy dump data over SR-IOV, LPAR panics due
to NULL pointer exception:

  Kernel attempted to read user page (0) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
  BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000000
  Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000020847ad4
  Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
  LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
  Modules linked in: mlx5_core(+) vmx_crypto pseries_wdt papr_scm libnvdimm mlxfw tls psample sunrpc fuse overlay squashfs loop
  CPU: 12 PID: 315 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 6.4.0-Test102+ #12
  Hardware name: IBM,9080-HEX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NH1060_008) hv:phyp pSeries
  NIP:  c000000020847ad4 LR: c00000002083b2dc CTR: 00000000006cd18c
  REGS: c000000029162ca0 TRAP: 0300   Not tainted  (6.4.0-Test102+)
  MSR:  800000000280b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 48288244  XER: 00000008
  CFAR: c00000002083b2d8 DAR: 0000000000000000 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 1
  ...
  NIP _find_next_zero_bit+0x24/0x110
  LR  bitmap_find_next_zero_area_off+0x5c/0xe0
  Call Trace:
    dev_printk_emit+0x38/0x48 (unreliable)
    iommu_area_alloc+0xc4/0x180
    iommu_range_alloc+0x1e8/0x580
    iommu_alloc+0x60/0x130
    iommu_alloc_coherent+0x158/0x2b0
    dma_iommu_alloc_coherent+0x3c/0x50
    dma_alloc_attrs+0x170/0x1f0
    mlx5_cmd_init+0xc0/0x760 [mlx5_core]
    mlx5_function_setup+0xf0/0x510 [mlx5_core]
    mlx5_init_one+0x84/0x210 [mlx5_core]
    probe_one+0x118/0x2c0 [mlx5_core]
    local_pci_probe+0x68/0x110
    pci_call_probe+0x68/0x200
    pci_device_probe+0xbc/0x1a0
    really_probe+0x104/0x540
    __driver_probe_device+0xb4/0x230
    driver_probe_device+0x54/0x130
    __driver_attach+0x158/0x2b0
    bus_for_each_dev+0xa8/0x130
    driver_attach+0x34/0x50
    bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x300
    driver_register+0xa4/0x1b0
    __pci_register_driver+0x68/0x80
    mlx5_init+0xb8/0x100 [mlx5_core]
    do_one_initcall+0x60/0x300
    do_init_module+0x7c/0x2b0

At the time of LPAR dump, before kexec hands over control to kdump
kernel, DDWs (Dynamic DMA Windows) are scanned and added to the FDT.
For the SR-IOV case, default DMA window "ibm,dma-window" is removed from
the FDT and DDW added, for the device.

Now, kexec hands over control to the kdump kernel.

When the kdump kernel initializes, PCI busses are scanned and IOMMU
group/tables created, in pci_dma_bus_setup_pSeriesLP(). For the SR-IOV
case, there is no "ibm,dma-window". The original commit: b1fc44e,
fixes the path where memory is pre-mapped (direct mapped) to the DDW.
When TCEs are direct mapped, there is no need to initialize IOMMU
tables.

iommu_table_setparms_lpar() only considers "ibm,dma-window" property
when initiallizing IOMMU table. In the scenario where TCEs are
dynamically allocated for SR-IOV, newly created IOMMU table is not
initialized. Later, when the device driver tries to enter TCEs for the
SR-IOV device, NULL pointer execption is thrown from iommu_area_alloc().

The fix is to initialize the IOMMU table with DDW property stored in the
FDT. There are 2 points to remember:

	1. For the dedicated adapter, kdump kernel would encounter both
	   default and DDW in FDT. In this case, DDW property is used to
	   initialize the IOMMU table.

	2. A DDW could be direct or dynamic mapped. kdump kernel would
	   initialize IOMMU table and mark the existing DDW as
	   "dynamic". This works fine since, at the time of table
	   initialization, iommu_table_clear() makes some space in the
	   DDW, for some predefined number of TCEs which are needed for
	   kdump to succeed.

Fixes: b1fc44e ("pseries/iommu/ddw: Fix kdump to work in absence of ibm,dma-window")
Signed-off-by: Gaurav Batra <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://msgid.link/[email protected]
kdave pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 23, 2024
vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many
illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents.
When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump
packet and soft lockup will be detected.

net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate.

PID: 33036    TASK: ffff949da6f20000  CPU: 23   COMMAND: "vhost-32980"
 #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253
 #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3
 #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e
 #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d
 #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663
    [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20]
    RIP: ffffffff89792594  RSP: ffffa655314979e8  RFLAGS: 00000002
    RAX: ffffffff89792500  RBX: ffffffff8af428a0  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 00000000000003fd  RSI: 0000000000000005  RDI: ffffffff8af428a0
    RBP: 0000000000002710   R8: 0000000000000004   R9: 000000000000000f
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: ffffffff8acbf64f  R12: 0000000000000020
    R13: ffffffff8acbf698  R14: 0000000000000058  R15: 0000000000000000
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594
 #6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470
 #7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6
 torvalds#8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605
 torvalds#9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558
 torvalds#10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124
 torvalds#11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07
 #12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306
 #13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765
 torvalds#14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun]
 #15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun]
 #16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net]
 #17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost]
 #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72
 #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f

Fixes: ef3db4a ("tun: avoid BUG, dump packet on GSO errors")
Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
kdave pushed a commit that referenced this issue May 2, 2024
Commit 1548036 ("nfs: make the rpc_stat per net namespace") added
functionality to specify rpc_stats function but missed adding it to the
TCP TLS functionality. As the result, mounting with xprtsec=tls lead to
the following kernel oops.

[  128.984192] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
virtual address 000000000000001c
[  128.985058] Mem abort info:
[  128.985372]   ESR = 0x0000000096000004
[  128.985709]   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[  128.986176]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[  128.986521]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[  128.986804]   FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[  128.987229] Data abort info:
[  128.987597]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[  128.988169]   CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[  128.988811]   GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[  128.989302] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000106c84000
[  128.990048] [000000000000001c] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
[  128.990736] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP
[  128.991168] Modules linked in: nfs_layout_nfsv41_files
rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace netfs
uinput dm_mod nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib
nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct
nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 rfkill
ip_set nf_tables nfnetlink qrtr vsock_loopback
vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock
sunrpc vfat fat uvcvideo videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops uvc
videobuf2_v4l2 videodev videobuf2_common mc vmw_vmci xfs libcrc32c
e1000e crct10dif_ce ghash_ce sha2_ce vmwgfx nvme sha256_arm64
nvme_core sr_mod cdrom sha1_ce drm_ttm_helper ttm drm_kms_helper drm
sg fuse
[  128.996466] CPU: 0 PID: 179 Comm: kworker/u4:26 Kdump: loaded Not
tainted 6.8.0-rc6+ #12
[  128.997226] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/VBSA, BIOS
VMW201.00V.21805430.BA64.2305221830 05/22/2023
[  128.998084] Workqueue: xprtiod xs_tcp_tls_setup_socket [sunrpc]
[  128.998701] pstate: 81400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[  128.999384] pc : call_start+0x74/0x138 [sunrpc]
[  128.999809] lr : __rpc_execute+0xb8/0x3e0 [sunrpc]
[  129.000244] sp : ffff8000832b3a00
[  129.000508] x29: ffff8000832b3a00 x28: ffff800081ac79c0 x27: ffff800081ac7000
[  129.001111] x26: 0000000004248060 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff800081596008
[  129.001757] x23: ffff80007b087240 x22: ffff00009a509d30 x21: 0000000000000000
[  129.002345] x20: ffff000090075600 x19: ffff00009a509d00 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[  129.002912] x17: 733d4d4554535953 x16: 42555300312d746e x15: ffff8000832b3a88
[  129.003464] x14: ffffffffffffffff x13: ffff8000832b3a7d x12: 0000000000000008
[  129.004021] x11: 0101010101010101 x10: ffff8000150cb560 x9 : ffff80007b087c00
[  129.004577] x8 : ffff00009a509de0 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 00000000be8c4ee3
[  129.005026] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff000094d56680
[  129.005425] x2 : ffff80007b0637f8 x1 : ffff000090075600 x0 : ffff00009a509d00
[  129.005824] Call trace:
[  129.005967]  call_start+0x74/0x138 [sunrpc]
[  129.006233]  __rpc_execute+0xb8/0x3e0 [sunrpc]
[  129.006506]  rpc_execute+0x160/0x1d8 [sunrpc]
[  129.006778]  rpc_run_task+0x148/0x1f8 [sunrpc]
[  129.007204]  tls_probe+0x80/0xd0 [sunrpc]
[  129.007460]  rpc_ping+0x28/0x80 [sunrpc]
[  129.007715]  rpc_create_xprt+0x134/0x1a0 [sunrpc]
[  129.007999]  rpc_create+0x128/0x2a0 [sunrpc]
[  129.008264]  xs_tcp_tls_setup_socket+0xdc/0x508 [sunrpc]
[  129.008583]  process_one_work+0x174/0x3c8
[  129.008813]  worker_thread+0x2c8/0x3e0
[  129.009033]  kthread+0x100/0x110
[  129.009225]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[  129.009432] Code: f0ffffc2 911fe042 aa1403e1 aa1303e0 (b9401c83)

Fixes: 1548036 ("nfs: make the rpc_stat per net namespace")
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
kdave pushed a commit that referenced this issue May 2, 2024
syzkaller reported a warning [0] triggered while destroying immature
netns.

rpc_proc_register() was called in init_nfs_fs(), but its error
has been ignored since at least the initial commit 1da177e
("Linux-2.6.12-rc2").

Recently, commit d47151b ("nfs: expose /proc/net/sunrpc/nfs
in net namespaces") converted the procfs to per-netns and made
the problem more visible.

Even when rpc_proc_register() fails, nfs_net_init() could succeed,
and thus nfs_net_exit() will be called while destroying the netns.

Then, remove_proc_entry() will be called for non-existing proc
directory and trigger the warning below.

Let's handle the error of rpc_proc_register() properly in nfs_net_init().

[0]:
name 'nfs'
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1710 at fs/proc/generic.c:711 remove_proc_entry+0x1bb/0x2d0 fs/proc/generic.c:711
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 1710 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-12822-gcd51db110a7e #12
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:remove_proc_entry+0x1bb/0x2d0 fs/proc/generic.c:711
Code: 41 5d 41 5e c3 e8 85 09 b5 ff 48 c7 c7 88 58 64 86 e8 09 0e 71 02 e8 74 09 b5 ff 4c 89 e6 48 c7 c7 de 1b 80 84 e8 c5 ad 97 ff <0f> 0b eb b1 e8 5c 09 b5 ff 48 c7 c7 88 58 64 86 e8 e0 0d 71 02 eb
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000c6d7ce0 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8880422b8b00 RCX: ffffffff8110503c
RDX: ffff888030652f00 RSI: ffffffff81105045 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffffff81bb62cb R12: ffffffff84807ffc
R13: ffff88804ad6fcc0 R14: ffffffff84807ffc R15: ffffffff85741ff8
FS:  00007f30cfba8640(0000) GS:ffff88807dd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ff51afe8000 CR3: 000000005a60a005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 rpc_proc_unregister+0x64/0x70 net/sunrpc/stats.c:310
 nfs_net_exit+0x1c/0x30 fs/nfs/inode.c:2438
 ops_exit_list+0x62/0xb0 net/core/net_namespace.c:170
 setup_net+0x46c/0x660 net/core/net_namespace.c:372
 copy_net_ns+0x244/0x590 net/core/net_namespace.c:505
 create_new_namespaces+0x2ed/0x770 kernel/nsproxy.c:110
 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xae/0x160 kernel/nsproxy.c:228
 ksys_unshare+0x342/0x760 kernel/fork.c:3322
 __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3393 [inline]
 __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3391 [inline]
 __x64_sys_unshare+0x1f/0x30 kernel/fork.c:3391
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e
RIP: 0033:0x7f30d0febe5d
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 9f 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f30cfba7cc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000110
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004bbf80 RCX: 00007f30d0febe5d
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000006c020600
RBP: 00000000004bbf80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f30d104c530 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>

Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
kdave pushed a commit that referenced this issue May 2, 2024
With BPF_PROBE_MEM, BPF allows de-referencing an untrusted pointer. To
thwart invalid memory accesses, the JITs add an exception table entry
for all such accesses. But in case the src_reg + offset is a userspace
address, the BPF program might read that memory if the user has
mapped it.

Make the verifier add guard instructions around such memory accesses and
skip the load if the address falls into the userspace region.

The JITs need to implement bpf_arch_uaddress_limit() to define where
the userspace addresses end for that architecture or TASK_SIZE is taken
as default.

The implementation is as follows:

REG_AX =  SRC_REG
if(offset)
	REG_AX += offset;
REG_AX >>= 32;
if (REG_AX <= (uaddress_limit >> 32))
	DST_REG = 0;
else
	DST_REG = *(size *)(SRC_REG + offset);

Comparing just the upper 32 bits of the load address with the upper
32 bits of uaddress_limit implies that the values are being aligned down
to a 4GB boundary before comparison.

The above means that all loads with address <= uaddress_limit + 4GB are
skipped. This is acceptable because there is a large hole (much larger
than 4GB) between userspace and kernel space memory, therefore a
correctly functioning BPF program should not access this 4GB memory
above the userspace.

Let's analyze what this patch does to the following fentry program
dereferencing an untrusted pointer:

  SEC("fentry/tcp_v4_connect")
  int BPF_PROG(fentry_tcp_v4_connect, struct sock *sk)
  {
                *(volatile long *)sk;
                return 0;
  }

    BPF Program before              |           BPF Program after
    ------------------              |           -----------------

  0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)          0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  1: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) --\      1: (bf) r11 = r1
  ----------------------------\   \     2: (77) r11 >>= 32
  2: (b7) r0 = 0               \   \    3: (b5) if r11 <= 0x8000 goto pc+2
  3: (95) exit                  \   \-> 4: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
                                 \      5: (05) goto pc+1
                                  \     6: (b7) r1 = 0
                                   \--------------------------------------
                                        7: (b7) r0 = 0
                                        8: (95) exit

As you can see from above, in the best case (off=0), 5 extra instructions
are emitted.

Now, we analyze the same program after it has gone through the JITs of
ARM64 and RISC-V architectures. We follow the single load instruction
that has the untrusted pointer and see what instrumentation has been
added around it.

                                x86-64 JIT
                                ==========
     JIT's Instrumentation
          (upstream)
     ---------------------

   0:   nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
   5:   xchg   %ax,%ax
   7:   push   %rbp
   8:   mov    %rsp,%rbp
   b:   mov    0x0(%rdi),%rdi
  ---------------------------------
   f:   movabs $0x800000000000,%r11
  19:   cmp    %r11,%rdi
  1c:   jb     0x000000000000002a
  1e:   mov    %rdi,%r11
  21:   add    $0x0,%r11
  28:   jae    0x000000000000002e
  2a:   xor    %edi,%edi
  2c:   jmp    0x0000000000000032
  2e:   mov    0x0(%rdi),%rdi
  ---------------------------------
  32:   xor    %eax,%eax
  34:   leave
  35:   ret

The x86-64 JIT already emits some instructions to protect against user
memory access. This patch doesn't make any changes for the x86-64 JIT.

                                  ARM64 JIT
                                  =========

        No Intrumentation                       Verifier's Instrumentation
           (upstream)                                  (This patch)
        -----------------                       --------------------------

   0:   add     x9, x30, #0x0                0:   add     x9, x30, #0x0
   4:   nop                                  4:   nop
   8:   paciasp                              8:   paciasp
   c:   stp     x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!        c:   stp     x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
  10:   mov     x29, sp                     10:   mov     x29, sp
  14:   stp     x19, x20, [sp, #-16]!       14:   stp     x19, x20, [sp, #-16]!
  18:   stp     x21, x22, [sp, #-16]!       18:   stp     x21, x22, [sp, #-16]!
  1c:   stp     x25, x26, [sp, #-16]!       1c:   stp     x25, x26, [sp, #-16]!
  20:   stp     x27, x28, [sp, #-16]!       20:   stp     x27, x28, [sp, #-16]!
  24:   mov     x25, sp                     24:   mov     x25, sp
  28:   mov     x26, #0x0                   28:   mov     x26, #0x0
  2c:   sub     x27, x25, #0x0              2c:   sub     x27, x25, #0x0
  30:   sub     sp, sp, #0x0                30:   sub     sp, sp, #0x0
  34:   ldr     x0, [x0]                    34:   ldr     x0, [x0]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  38:   ldr     x0, [x0] ----------\        38:   add     x9, x0, #0x0
-----------------------------------\\       3c:   lsr     x9, x9, torvalds#32
  3c:   mov     x7, #0x0            \\      40:   cmp     x9, #0x10, lsl #12
  40:   mov     sp, sp               \\     44:   b.ls    0x0000000000000050
  44:   ldp     x27, x28, [sp], #16   \\--> 48:   ldr     x0, [x0]
  48:   ldp     x25, x26, [sp], #16    \    4c:   b       0x0000000000000054
  4c:   ldp     x21, x22, [sp], #16     \   50:   mov     x0, #0x0
  50:   ldp     x19, x20, [sp], #16      \---------------------------------------
  54:   ldp     x29, x30, [sp], #16         54:   mov     x7, #0x0
  58:   add     x0, x7, #0x0                58:   mov     sp, sp
  5c:   autiasp                             5c:   ldp     x27, x28, [sp], #16
  60:   ret                                 60:   ldp     x25, x26, [sp], #16
  64:   nop                                 64:   ldp     x21, x22, [sp], #16
  68:   ldr     x10, 0x0000000000000070     68:   ldp     x19, x20, [sp], #16
  6c:   br      x10                         6c:   ldp     x29, x30, [sp], #16
                                            70:   add     x0, x7, #0x0
                                            74:   autiasp
                                            78:   ret
                                            7c:   nop
                                            80:   ldr     x10, 0x0000000000000088
                                            84:   br      x10

There are 6 extra instructions added in ARM64 in the best case. This will
become 7 in the worst case (off != 0).

                           RISC-V JIT (RISCV_ISA_C Disabled)
                           ==========

        No Intrumentation           Verifier's Instrumentation
           (upstream)                      (This patch)
        -----------------           --------------------------

   0:   nop                            0:   nop
   4:   nop                            4:   nop
   8:   li      a6, 33                 8:   li      a6, 33
   c:   addi    sp, sp, -16            c:   addi    sp, sp, -16
  10:   sd      s0, 8(sp)             10:   sd      s0, 8(sp)
  14:   addi    s0, sp, 16            14:   addi    s0, sp, 16
  18:   ld      a0, 0(a0)             18:   ld      a0, 0(a0)
---------------------------------------------------------------
  1c:   ld      a0, 0(a0) --\         1c:   mv      t0, a0
--------------------------\  \        20:   srli    t0, t0, 32
  20:   li      a5, 0      \  \       24:   lui     t1, 4096
  24:   ld      s0, 8(sp)   \  \      28:   sext.w  t1, t1
  28:   addi    sp, sp, 16   \  \     2c:   bgeu    t1, t0, 12
  2c:   sext.w  a0, a5        \  \--> 30:   ld      a0, 0(a0)
  30:   ret                    \      34:   j       8
                                \     38:   li      a0, 0
                                 \------------------------------
                                      3c:   li      a5, 0
                                      40:   ld      s0, 8(sp)
                                      44:   addi    sp, sp, 16
                                      48:   sext.w  a0, a5
                                      4c:   ret

There are 7 extra instructions added in RISC-V.

Fixes: 8008342 ("bpf, arm64: Add BPF exception tables")
Reported-by: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
kdave pushed a commit that referenced this issue May 22, 2024
ui_browser__show() is capturing the input title that is stack allocated
memory in hist_browser__run().

Avoid a use after return by strdup-ing the string.

Committer notes:

Further explanation from Ian Rogers:

My command line using tui is:
$ sudo bash -c 'rm /tmp/asan.log*; export
ASAN_OPTIONS="log_path=/tmp/asan.log"; /tmp/perf/perf mem record -a
sleep 1; /tmp/perf/perf mem report'
I then go to the perf annotate view and quit. This triggers the asan
error (from the log file):
```
==1254591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-return on address
0x7f2813331920 at pc 0x7f28180
65991 bp 0x7fff0a21c750 sp 0x7fff0a21bf10
READ of size 80 at 0x7f2813331920 thread T0
    #0 0x7f2818065990 in __interceptor_strlen
../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:461
    #1 0x7f2817698251 in SLsmg_write_wrapped_string
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x98251)
    #2 0x7f28176984b9 in SLsmg_write_nstring
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x984b9)
    #3 0x55c94045b365 in ui_browser__write_nstring ui/browser.c:60
    #4 0x55c94045c558 in __ui_browser__show_title ui/browser.c:266
    #5 0x55c94045c776 in ui_browser__show ui/browser.c:288
    #6 0x55c94045c06d in ui_browser__handle_resize ui/browser.c:206
    #7 0x55c94047979b in do_annotate ui/browsers/hists.c:2458
    torvalds#8 0x55c94047fb17 in evsel__hists_browse ui/browsers/hists.c:3412
    torvalds#9 0x55c940480a0c in perf_evsel_menu__run ui/browsers/hists.c:3527
    torvalds#10 0x55c940481108 in __evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3613
    torvalds#11 0x55c9404813f7 in evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3661
    #12 0x55c93ffa253f in report__browse_hists tools/perf/builtin-report.c:671
    #13 0x55c93ffa58ca in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1141
    torvalds#14 0x55c93ffaf159 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805
    #15 0x55c94000c05c in report_events tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:374
    #16 0x55c94000d96d in cmd_mem tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:516
    #17 0x55c9400e44ee in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350
    #18 0x55c9400e4a5a in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403
    #19 0x55c9400e4e22 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447
    #20 0x55c9400e53ad in main tools/perf/perf.c:561
    #21 0x7f28170456c9 in __libc_start_call_main
../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    #22 0x7f2817045784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    #23 0x55c93ff544c0 in _start (/tmp/perf/perf+0x19a4c0) (BuildId:
84899b0e8c7d3a3eaa67b2eb35e3d8b2f8cd4c93)

Address 0x7f2813331920 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame
    #0 0x55c94046e85e in hist_browser__run ui/browsers/hists.c:746

  This frame has 1 object(s):
    [32, 192) 'title' (line 747) <== Memory access at offset 32 is
inside this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom
stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
```
hist_browser__run isn't on the stack so the asan error looks legit.
There's no clean init/exit on struct ui_browser so I may be trading a
use-after-return for a memory leak, but that seems look a good trade
anyway.

Fixes: 05e8b08 ("perf ui browser: Stop using 'self'")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Athira Rajeev <[email protected]>
Cc: Ben Gainey <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: James Clark <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Kajol Jain <[email protected]>
Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]>
Cc: K Prateek Nayak <[email protected]>
Cc: Li Dong <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Oliver Upton <[email protected]>
Cc: Paran Lee <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <[email protected]>
Cc: Sun Haiyong <[email protected]>
Cc: Tim Chen <[email protected]>
Cc: Yanteng Si <[email protected]>
Cc: Yicong Yang <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
fdmanana pushed a commit that referenced this issue May 30, 2024
We have been seeing crashes on duplicate keys in
btrfs_set_item_key_safe():

  BTRFS critical (device vdb): slot 4 key (450 108 8192) new key (450 108 8192)
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 3139 Comm: xfs_io Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0 #6
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_set_item_key_safe+0x11f/0x290 [btrfs]

With the following stack trace:

  #0  btrfs_set_item_key_safe (fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620:4)
  #1  btrfs_drop_extents (fs/btrfs/file.c:411:4)
  #2  log_one_extent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4732:9)
  #3  btrfs_log_changed_extents (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4955:9)
  #4  btrfs_log_inode (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6626:9)
  #5  btrfs_log_inode_parent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7070:8)
  #6  btrfs_log_dentry_safe (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7171:8)
  #7  btrfs_sync_file (fs/btrfs/file.c:1933:8)
  torvalds#8  vfs_fsync_range (fs/sync.c:188:9)
  torvalds#9  vfs_fsync (fs/sync.c:202:9)
  torvalds#10 do_fsync (fs/sync.c:212:9)
  torvalds#11 __do_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:225:9)
  #12 __se_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1)
  #13 __x64_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1)
  torvalds#14 do_syscall_x64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52:14)
  #15 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:83:7)
  #16 entry_SYSCALL_64+0xaf/0x14c (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)

So we're logging a changed extent from fsync, which is splitting an
extent in the log tree. But this split part already exists in the tree,
triggering the BUG().

This is the state of the log tree at the time of the crash, dumped with
drgn (https://github.com/osandov/drgn/blob/main/contrib/btrfs_tree.py)
to get more details than btrfs_print_leaf() gives us:

  >>> print_extent_buffer(prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[0]["eb"])
  leaf 33439744 level 0 items 72 generation 9 owner 18446744073709551610
  leaf 33439744 flags 0x100000000000000
  fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677
  chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da
          item 0 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 16123 itemsize 160
                  generation 7 transid 9 size 8192 nbytes 8473563889606862198
                  block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0
                  sequence 204 flags 0x10(PREALLOC)
                  atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  ctime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44)
                  mtime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44)
                  otime 17592186044416.000000000 (559444-03-08 01:40:16)
          item 1 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 16110 itemsize 13
                  index 195 namelen 3 name: 193
          item 2 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 16073 itemsize 37
                  location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR
                  transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6
                  name: user.a
                  data a
          item 3 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 16020 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 1 (regular)
                  extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  extent data offset 0 nr 4096 ram 12288
                  extent compression 0 (none)
          item 4 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 4096) itemoff 15967 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 4096 nr 8192
          item 5 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 15914 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096
  ...

So the real problem happened earlier: notice that items 4 (4k-12k) and 5
(8k-12k) overlap. Both are prealloc extents. Item 4 straddles i_size and
item 5 starts at i_size.

Here is the state of the filesystem tree at the time of the crash:

  >>> root = prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[2]["inode"].root
  >>> ret, nodes, slots = btrfs_search_slot(root, BtrfsKey(450, 0, 0))
  >>> print_extent_buffer(nodes[0])
  leaf 30425088 level 0 items 184 generation 9 owner 5
  leaf 30425088 flags 0x100000000000000
  fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677
  chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da
  	...
          item 179 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 4907 itemsize 160
                  generation 7 transid 7 size 4096 nbytes 12288
                  block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0
                  sequence 6 flags 0x10(PREALLOC)
                  atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  ctime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  mtime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  otime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
          item 180 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 4894 itemsize 13
                  index 195 namelen 3 name: 193
          item 181 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 4857 itemsize 37
                  location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR
                  transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6
                  name: user.a
                  data a
          item 182 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 4804 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 1 (regular)
                  extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  extent data offset 0 nr 8192 ram 12288
                  extent compression 0 (none)
          item 183 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 4751 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096

Item 5 in the log tree corresponds to item 183 in the filesystem tree,
but nothing matches item 4. Furthermore, item 183 is the last item in
the leaf.

btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() is responsible for logging prealloc extents
beyond i_size. It first truncates any previously logged prealloc extents
that start beyond i_size. Then, it walks the filesystem tree and copies
the prealloc extent items to the log tree.

If it hits the end of a leaf, then it calls btrfs_next_leaf(), which
unlocks the tree and does another search. However, while the filesystem
tree is unlocked, an ordered extent completion may modify the tree. In
particular, it may insert an extent item that overlaps with an extent
item that was already copied to the log tree.

This may manifest in several ways depending on the exact scenario,
including an EEXIST error that is silently translated to a full sync,
overlapping items in the log tree, or this crash. This particular crash
is triggered by the following sequence of events:

- Initially, the file has i_size=4k, a regular extent from 0-4k, and a
  prealloc extent beyond i_size from 4k-12k. The prealloc extent item is
  the last item in its B-tree leaf.
- The file is fsync'd, which copies its inode item and both extent items
  to the log tree.
- An xattr is set on the file, which sets the
  BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING flag.
- The range 4k-8k in the file is written using direct I/O. i_size is
  extended to 8k, but the ordered extent is still in flight.
- The file is fsync'd. Since BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING is set, this
  calls copy_inode_items_to_log(), which calls
  btrfs_log_prealloc_extents().
- btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() finds the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the
  filesystem tree. Since it starts before i_size, it skips it. Since it
  is the last item in its B-tree leaf, it calls btrfs_next_leaf().
- btrfs_next_leaf() unlocks the path.
- The ordered extent completion runs, which converts the 4k-8k part of
  the prealloc extent to written and inserts the remaining prealloc part
  from 8k-12k.
- btrfs_next_leaf() does a search and finds the new prealloc extent
  8k-12k.
- btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() copies the 8k-12k prealloc extent into
  the log tree. Note that it overlaps with the 4k-12k prealloc extent
  that was copied to the log tree by the first fsync.
- fsync calls btrfs_log_changed_extents(), which tries to log the 4k-8k
  extent that was written.
- This tries to drop the range 4k-8k in the log tree, which requires
  adjusting the start of the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the log tree to
  8k.
- btrfs_set_item_key_safe() sees that there is already an extent
  starting at 8k in the log tree and calls BUG().

Fix this by detecting when we're about to insert an overlapping file
extent item in the log tree and truncating the part that would overlap.

Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <[email protected]>
kdave pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 3, 2024
Once unix_sk(sk)->addr is assigned under net->unx.table.locks and
unix_sk(sk)->bindlock, *(unix_sk(sk)->addr) and unix_sk(sk)->path are
fully set up, and unix_sk(sk)->addr is never changed.

unix_getname() and unix_copy_addr() access the two fields locklessly,
and commit ae3b564 ("missing barriers in some of unix_sock ->addr
and ->path accesses") added smp_store_release() and smp_load_acquire()
pairs.

In other functions, we still read unix_sk(sk)->addr locklessly to check
if the socket is bound, and KCSAN complains about it.  [0]

Given these functions have no dependency for *(unix_sk(sk)->addr) and
unix_sk(sk)->path, READ_ONCE() is enough to annotate the data-race.

Note that it is safe to access unix_sk(sk)->addr locklessly if the socket
is found in the hash table.  For example, the lockless read of otheru->addr
in unix_stream_connect() is safe.

Note also that newu->addr there is of the child socket that is still not
accessible from userspace, and smp_store_release() publishes the address
in case the socket is accept()ed and unix_getname() / unix_copy_addr()
is called.

[0]:
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in unix_bind / unix_listen

write (marked) to 0xffff88805f8d1840 of 8 bytes by task 13723 on cpu 0:
 __unix_set_addr_hash net/unix/af_unix.c:329 [inline]
 unix_bind_bsd net/unix/af_unix.c:1241 [inline]
 unix_bind+0x881/0x1000 net/unix/af_unix.c:1319
 __sys_bind+0x194/0x1e0 net/socket.c:1847
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1858 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1856 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bind+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1856
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e

read to 0xffff88805f8d1840 of 8 bytes by task 13724 on cpu 1:
 unix_listen+0x72/0x180 net/unix/af_unix.c:734
 __sys_listen+0xdc/0x160 net/socket.c:1881
 __do_sys_listen net/socket.c:1890 [inline]
 __se_sys_listen net/socket.c:1888 [inline]
 __x64_sys_listen+0x2e/0x40 net/socket.c:1888
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e

value changed: 0x0000000000000000 -> 0xffff88807b5b1b40

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 13724 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.8.0-12822-gcd51db110a7e #12
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014

Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
kdave pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 3, 2024
syzkaller reported data-race of sk->sk_hash in unix_autobind() [0],
and the same ones exist in unix_bind_bsd() and unix_bind_abstract().

The three bind() functions prefetch sk->sk_hash locklessly and
use it later after validating that unix_sk(sk)->addr is NULL under
unix_sk(sk)->bindlock.

The prefetched sk->sk_hash is the hash value of unbound socket set
in unix_create1() and does not change until bind() completes.

There could be a chance that sk->sk_hash changes after the lockless
read.  However, in such a case, non-NULL unix_sk(sk)->addr is visible
under unix_sk(sk)->bindlock, and bind() returns -EINVAL without using
the prefetched value.

The KCSAN splat is false-positive, but let's silence it by reading
sk->sk_hash under unix_sk(sk)->bindlock.

[0]:
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in unix_autobind / unix_autobind

write to 0xffff888034a9fb88 of 4 bytes by task 4468 on cpu 0:
 __unix_set_addr_hash net/unix/af_unix.c:331 [inline]
 unix_autobind+0x47a/0x7d0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1185
 unix_dgram_connect+0x7e3/0x890 net/unix/af_unix.c:1373
 __sys_connect_file+0xd7/0xe0 net/socket.c:2048
 __sys_connect+0x114/0x140 net/socket.c:2065
 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2075 [inline]
 __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2072 [inline]
 __x64_sys_connect+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:2072
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e

read to 0xffff888034a9fb88 of 4 bytes by task 4465 on cpu 1:
 unix_autobind+0x28/0x7d0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1134
 unix_dgram_connect+0x7e3/0x890 net/unix/af_unix.c:1373
 __sys_connect_file+0xd7/0xe0 net/socket.c:2048
 __sys_connect+0x114/0x140 net/socket.c:2065
 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2075 [inline]
 __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2072 [inline]
 __x64_sys_connect+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:2072
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e

value changed: 0x000000e4 -> 0x000001e3

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 4465 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.8.0-12822-gcd51db110a7e #12
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014

Fixes: afd20b9 ("af_unix: Replace the big lock with small locks.")
Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
kdave pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 3, 2024
We have been seeing crashes on duplicate keys in
btrfs_set_item_key_safe():

  BTRFS critical (device vdb): slot 4 key (450 108 8192) new key (450 108 8192)
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 3139 Comm: xfs_io Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0 #6
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_set_item_key_safe+0x11f/0x290 [btrfs]

With the following stack trace:

  #0  btrfs_set_item_key_safe (fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620:4)
  #1  btrfs_drop_extents (fs/btrfs/file.c:411:4)
  #2  log_one_extent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4732:9)
  #3  btrfs_log_changed_extents (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4955:9)
  #4  btrfs_log_inode (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6626:9)
  #5  btrfs_log_inode_parent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7070:8)
  #6  btrfs_log_dentry_safe (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7171:8)
  #7  btrfs_sync_file (fs/btrfs/file.c:1933:8)
  torvalds#8  vfs_fsync_range (fs/sync.c:188:9)
  torvalds#9  vfs_fsync (fs/sync.c:202:9)
  torvalds#10 do_fsync (fs/sync.c:212:9)
  torvalds#11 __do_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:225:9)
  #12 __se_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1)
  #13 __x64_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1)
  torvalds#14 do_syscall_x64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52:14)
  #15 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:83:7)
  #16 entry_SYSCALL_64+0xaf/0x14c (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)

So we're logging a changed extent from fsync, which is splitting an
extent in the log tree. But this split part already exists in the tree,
triggering the BUG().

This is the state of the log tree at the time of the crash, dumped with
drgn (https://github.com/osandov/drgn/blob/main/contrib/btrfs_tree.py)
to get more details than btrfs_print_leaf() gives us:

  >>> print_extent_buffer(prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[0]["eb"])
  leaf 33439744 level 0 items 72 generation 9 owner 18446744073709551610
  leaf 33439744 flags 0x100000000000000
  fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677
  chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da
          item 0 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 16123 itemsize 160
                  generation 7 transid 9 size 8192 nbytes 8473563889606862198
                  block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0
                  sequence 204 flags 0x10(PREALLOC)
                  atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  ctime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44)
                  mtime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44)
                  otime 17592186044416.000000000 (559444-03-08 01:40:16)
          item 1 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 16110 itemsize 13
                  index 195 namelen 3 name: 193
          item 2 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 16073 itemsize 37
                  location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR
                  transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6
                  name: user.a
                  data a
          item 3 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 16020 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 1 (regular)
                  extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  extent data offset 0 nr 4096 ram 12288
                  extent compression 0 (none)
          item 4 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 4096) itemoff 15967 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 4096 nr 8192
          item 5 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 15914 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096
  ...

So the real problem happened earlier: notice that items 4 (4k-12k) and 5
(8k-12k) overlap. Both are prealloc extents. Item 4 straddles i_size and
item 5 starts at i_size.

Here is the state of the filesystem tree at the time of the crash:

  >>> root = prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[2]["inode"].root
  >>> ret, nodes, slots = btrfs_search_slot(root, BtrfsKey(450, 0, 0))
  >>> print_extent_buffer(nodes[0])
  leaf 30425088 level 0 items 184 generation 9 owner 5
  leaf 30425088 flags 0x100000000000000
  fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677
  chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da
  	...
          item 179 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 4907 itemsize 160
                  generation 7 transid 7 size 4096 nbytes 12288
                  block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0
                  sequence 6 flags 0x10(PREALLOC)
                  atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  ctime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  mtime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  otime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
          item 180 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 4894 itemsize 13
                  index 195 namelen 3 name: 193
          item 181 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 4857 itemsize 37
                  location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR
                  transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6
                  name: user.a
                  data a
          item 182 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 4804 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 1 (regular)
                  extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  extent data offset 0 nr 8192 ram 12288
                  extent compression 0 (none)
          item 183 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 4751 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096

Item 5 in the log tree corresponds to item 183 in the filesystem tree,
but nothing matches item 4. Furthermore, item 183 is the last item in
the leaf.

btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() is responsible for logging prealloc extents
beyond i_size. It first truncates any previously logged prealloc extents
that start beyond i_size. Then, it walks the filesystem tree and copies
the prealloc extent items to the log tree.

If it hits the end of a leaf, then it calls btrfs_next_leaf(), which
unlocks the tree and does another search. However, while the filesystem
tree is unlocked, an ordered extent completion may modify the tree. In
particular, it may insert an extent item that overlaps with an extent
item that was already copied to the log tree.

This may manifest in several ways depending on the exact scenario,
including an EEXIST error that is silently translated to a full sync,
overlapping items in the log tree, or this crash. This particular crash
is triggered by the following sequence of events:

- Initially, the file has i_size=4k, a regular extent from 0-4k, and a
  prealloc extent beyond i_size from 4k-12k. The prealloc extent item is
  the last item in its B-tree leaf.
- The file is fsync'd, which copies its inode item and both extent items
  to the log tree.
- An xattr is set on the file, which sets the
  BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING flag.
- The range 4k-8k in the file is written using direct I/O. i_size is
  extended to 8k, but the ordered extent is still in flight.
- The file is fsync'd. Since BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING is set, this
  calls copy_inode_items_to_log(), which calls
  btrfs_log_prealloc_extents().
- btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() finds the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the
  filesystem tree. Since it starts before i_size, it skips it. Since it
  is the last item in its B-tree leaf, it calls btrfs_next_leaf().
- btrfs_next_leaf() unlocks the path.
- The ordered extent completion runs, which converts the 4k-8k part of
  the prealloc extent to written and inserts the remaining prealloc part
  from 8k-12k.
- btrfs_next_leaf() does a search and finds the new prealloc extent
  8k-12k.
- btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() copies the 8k-12k prealloc extent into
  the log tree. Note that it overlaps with the 4k-12k prealloc extent
  that was copied to the log tree by the first fsync.
- fsync calls btrfs_log_changed_extents(), which tries to log the 4k-8k
  extent that was written.
- This tries to drop the range 4k-8k in the log tree, which requires
  adjusting the start of the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the log tree to
  8k.
- btrfs_set_item_key_safe() sees that there is already an extent
  starting at 8k in the log tree and calls BUG().

Fix this by detecting when we're about to insert an overlapping file
extent item in the log tree and truncating the part that would overlap.

Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
kdave pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 11, 2024
…PLES event"

This reverts commit 7d1405c.

This causes segfaults in some cases, as reported by Milian:

  ```
  sudo /usr/bin/perf record -z --call-graph dwarf -e cycles -e
  raw_syscalls:sys_enter ls
  ...
  [ perf record: Woken up 3 times to write data ]
  malloc(): invalid next size (unsorted)
  Aborted
  ```

  Backtrace with GDB + debuginfod:

  ```
  malloc(): invalid next size (unsorted)

  Thread 1 "perf" received signal SIGABRT, Aborted.
  __pthread_kill_implementation (threadid=<optimized out>, signo=signo@entry=6,
  no_tid=no_tid@entry=0) at pthread_kill.c:44
  Downloading source file /usr/src/debug/glibc/glibc/nptl/pthread_kill.c
  44            return INTERNAL_SYSCALL_ERROR_P (ret) ? INTERNAL_SYSCALL_ERRNO
  (ret) : 0;
  (gdb) bt
  #0  __pthread_kill_implementation (threadid=<optimized out>,
  signo=signo@entry=6, no_tid=no_tid@entry=0) at pthread_kill.c:44
  #1  0x00007ffff6ea8eb3 in __pthread_kill_internal (threadid=<optimized out>,
  signo=6) at pthread_kill.c:78
  #2  0x00007ffff6e50a30 in __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at ../sysdeps/posix/
  raise.c:26
  #3  0x00007ffff6e384c3 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:79
  #4  0x00007ffff6e39354 in __libc_message_impl (fmt=fmt@entry=0x7ffff6fc22ea
  "%s\n") at ../sysdeps/posix/libc_fatal.c:132
  #5  0x00007ffff6eb3085 in malloc_printerr (str=str@entry=0x7ffff6fc5850
  "malloc(): invalid next size (unsorted)") at malloc.c:5772
  #6  0x00007ffff6eb657c in _int_malloc (av=av@entry=0x7ffff6ff6ac0
  <main_arena>, bytes=bytes@entry=368) at malloc.c:4081
  #7  0x00007ffff6eb877e in __libc_calloc (n=<optimized out>,
  elem_size=<optimized out>) at malloc.c:3754
  torvalds#8  0x000055555569bdb6 in perf_session.do_write_header ()
  torvalds#9  0x00005555555a373a in __cmd_record.constprop.0 ()
  torvalds#10 0x00005555555a6846 in cmd_record ()
  torvalds#11 0x000055555564db7f in run_builtin ()
  #12 0x000055555558ed77 in main ()
  ```

  Valgrind memcheck:
  ```
  ==45136== Invalid write of size 8
  ==45136==    at 0x2B38A5: perf_event__synthesize_id_sample (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x157069: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==  Address 0x6a866a8 is 0 bytes after a block of size 40 alloc'd
  ==45136==    at 0x4849BF3: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1675)
  ==45136==    by 0x3574AB: zalloc (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x1570E0: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==
  ==45136== Syscall param write(buf) points to unaddressable byte(s)
  ==45136==    at 0x575953D: __libc_write (write.c:26)
  ==45136==    by 0x575953D: write (write.c:24)
  ==45136==    by 0x35761F: ion (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x357778: writen (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x1548F7: record__write (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x15708A: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==  Address 0x6a866a8 is 0 bytes after a block of size 40 alloc'd
  ==45136==    at 0x4849BF3: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1675)
  ==45136==    by 0x3574AB: zalloc (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x1570E0: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==
 -----

Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-perf-users/23879991.0LEYPuXRzz@milian-workstation/
Reported-by: Milian Wolff <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Milian Wolff <[email protected]>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # 6.8+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Zl9ksOlHJHnKM70p@x1
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
kdave pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 11, 2024
We have been seeing crashes on duplicate keys in
btrfs_set_item_key_safe():

  BTRFS critical (device vdb): slot 4 key (450 108 8192) new key (450 108 8192)
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 3139 Comm: xfs_io Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0 #6
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_set_item_key_safe+0x11f/0x290 [btrfs]

With the following stack trace:

  #0  btrfs_set_item_key_safe (fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620:4)
  #1  btrfs_drop_extents (fs/btrfs/file.c:411:4)
  #2  log_one_extent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4732:9)
  #3  btrfs_log_changed_extents (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4955:9)
  #4  btrfs_log_inode (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6626:9)
  #5  btrfs_log_inode_parent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7070:8)
  #6  btrfs_log_dentry_safe (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7171:8)
  #7  btrfs_sync_file (fs/btrfs/file.c:1933:8)
  torvalds#8  vfs_fsync_range (fs/sync.c:188:9)
  torvalds#9  vfs_fsync (fs/sync.c:202:9)
  torvalds#10 do_fsync (fs/sync.c:212:9)
  torvalds#11 __do_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:225:9)
  #12 __se_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1)
  #13 __x64_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1)
  torvalds#14 do_syscall_x64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52:14)
  #15 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:83:7)
  #16 entry_SYSCALL_64+0xaf/0x14c (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)

So we're logging a changed extent from fsync, which is splitting an
extent in the log tree. But this split part already exists in the tree,
triggering the BUG().

This is the state of the log tree at the time of the crash, dumped with
drgn (https://github.com/osandov/drgn/blob/main/contrib/btrfs_tree.py)
to get more details than btrfs_print_leaf() gives us:

  >>> print_extent_buffer(prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[0]["eb"])
  leaf 33439744 level 0 items 72 generation 9 owner 18446744073709551610
  leaf 33439744 flags 0x100000000000000
  fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677
  chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da
          item 0 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 16123 itemsize 160
                  generation 7 transid 9 size 8192 nbytes 8473563889606862198
                  block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0
                  sequence 204 flags 0x10(PREALLOC)
                  atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  ctime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44)
                  mtime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44)
                  otime 17592186044416.000000000 (559444-03-08 01:40:16)
          item 1 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 16110 itemsize 13
                  index 195 namelen 3 name: 193
          item 2 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 16073 itemsize 37
                  location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR
                  transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6
                  name: user.a
                  data a
          item 3 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 16020 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 1 (regular)
                  extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  extent data offset 0 nr 4096 ram 12288
                  extent compression 0 (none)
          item 4 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 4096) itemoff 15967 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 4096 nr 8192
          item 5 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 15914 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096
  ...

So the real problem happened earlier: notice that items 4 (4k-12k) and 5
(8k-12k) overlap. Both are prealloc extents. Item 4 straddles i_size and
item 5 starts at i_size.

Here is the state of the filesystem tree at the time of the crash:

  >>> root = prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[2]["inode"].root
  >>> ret, nodes, slots = btrfs_search_slot(root, BtrfsKey(450, 0, 0))
  >>> print_extent_buffer(nodes[0])
  leaf 30425088 level 0 items 184 generation 9 owner 5
  leaf 30425088 flags 0x100000000000000
  fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677
  chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da
  	...
          item 179 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 4907 itemsize 160
                  generation 7 transid 7 size 4096 nbytes 12288
                  block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0
                  sequence 6 flags 0x10(PREALLOC)
                  atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  ctime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  mtime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  otime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
          item 180 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 4894 itemsize 13
                  index 195 namelen 3 name: 193
          item 181 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 4857 itemsize 37
                  location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR
                  transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6
                  name: user.a
                  data a
          item 182 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 4804 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 1 (regular)
                  extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  extent data offset 0 nr 8192 ram 12288
                  extent compression 0 (none)
          item 183 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 4751 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096

Item 5 in the log tree corresponds to item 183 in the filesystem tree,
but nothing matches item 4. Furthermore, item 183 is the last item in
the leaf.

btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() is responsible for logging prealloc extents
beyond i_size. It first truncates any previously logged prealloc extents
that start beyond i_size. Then, it walks the filesystem tree and copies
the prealloc extent items to the log tree.

If it hits the end of a leaf, then it calls btrfs_next_leaf(), which
unlocks the tree and does another search. However, while the filesystem
tree is unlocked, an ordered extent completion may modify the tree. In
particular, it may insert an extent item that overlaps with an extent
item that was already copied to the log tree.

This may manifest in several ways depending on the exact scenario,
including an EEXIST error that is silently translated to a full sync,
overlapping items in the log tree, or this crash. This particular crash
is triggered by the following sequence of events:

- Initially, the file has i_size=4k, a regular extent from 0-4k, and a
  prealloc extent beyond i_size from 4k-12k. The prealloc extent item is
  the last item in its B-tree leaf.
- The file is fsync'd, which copies its inode item and both extent items
  to the log tree.
- An xattr is set on the file, which sets the
  BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING flag.
- The range 4k-8k in the file is written using direct I/O. i_size is
  extended to 8k, but the ordered extent is still in flight.
- The file is fsync'd. Since BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING is set, this
  calls copy_inode_items_to_log(), which calls
  btrfs_log_prealloc_extents().
- btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() finds the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the
  filesystem tree. Since it starts before i_size, it skips it. Since it
  is the last item in its B-tree leaf, it calls btrfs_next_leaf().
- btrfs_next_leaf() unlocks the path.
- The ordered extent completion runs, which converts the 4k-8k part of
  the prealloc extent to written and inserts the remaining prealloc part
  from 8k-12k.
- btrfs_next_leaf() does a search and finds the new prealloc extent
  8k-12k.
- btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() copies the 8k-12k prealloc extent into
  the log tree. Note that it overlaps with the 4k-12k prealloc extent
  that was copied to the log tree by the first fsync.
- fsync calls btrfs_log_changed_extents(), which tries to log the 4k-8k
  extent that was written.
- This tries to drop the range 4k-8k in the log tree, which requires
  adjusting the start of the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the log tree to
  8k.
- btrfs_set_item_key_safe() sees that there is already an extent
  starting at 8k in the log tree and calls BUG().

Fix this by detecting when we're about to insert an overlapping file
extent item in the log tree and truncating the part that would overlap.

CC: [email protected] # 6.1+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
kdave pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 27, 2024
The code in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() estimates number of necessary
transaction credits using ocfs2_calc_extend_credits().  This however does
not take into account that the IO could be arbitrarily large and can
contain arbitrary number of extents.

Extent tree manipulations do often extend the current transaction but not
in all of the cases.  For example if we have only single block extents in
the tree, ocfs2_mark_extent_written() will end up calling
ocfs2_replace_extent_rec() all the time and we will never extend the
current transaction and eventually exhaust all the transaction credits if
the IO contains many single block extents.  Once that happens a
WARN_ON(jbd2_handle_buffer_credits(handle) <= 0) is triggered in
jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata() and subsequently OCFS2 aborts in response to
this error.  This was actually triggered by one of our customers on a
heavily fragmented OCFS2 filesystem.

To fix the issue make sure the transaction always has enough credits for
one extent insert before each call of ocfs2_mark_extent_written().

Heming Zhao said:

------
PANIC: "Kernel panic - not syncing: OCFS2: (device dm-1): panic forced after error"

PID: xxx  TASK: xxxx  CPU: 5  COMMAND: "SubmitThread-CA"
  #0 machine_kexec at ffffffff8c069932
  #1 __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c1338fa
  #2 panic at ffffffff8c1d69b9
  #3 ocfs2_handle_error at ffffffffc0c86c0c [ocfs2]
  #4 __ocfs2_abort at ffffffffc0c88387 [ocfs2]
  #5 ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc0c51e98 [ocfs2]
  #6 ocfs2_split_extent at ffffffffc0c27ea3 [ocfs2]
  #7 ocfs2_change_extent_flag at ffffffffc0c28053 [ocfs2]
  torvalds#8 ocfs2_mark_extent_written at ffffffffc0c28347 [ocfs2]
  torvalds#9 ocfs2_dio_end_io_write at ffffffffc0c2bef9 [ocfs2]
torvalds#10 ocfs2_dio_end_io at ffffffffc0c2c0f5 [ocfs2]
torvalds#11 dio_complete at ffffffff8c2b9fa7
#12 do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff8c2bc09f
#13 ocfs2_direct_IO at ffffffffc0c2b653 [ocfs2]
torvalds#14 generic_file_direct_write at ffffffff8c1dcf14
#15 __generic_file_write_iter at ffffffff8c1dd07b
#16 ocfs2_file_write_iter at ffffffffc0c49f1f [ocfs2]
#17 aio_write at ffffffff8c2cc72e
#18 kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8c248dde
#19 do_io_submit at ffffffff8c2ccada
#20 do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8c004984
#21 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8c8000ba

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: c15471f ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]>
Cc: Gang He <[email protected]>
Cc: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
kdave pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 1, 2024
KFENCE reports the following UAF:

 BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free read in __pci_enable_msi_range+0x2c0/0x488

 Use-after-free read at 0x0000000024629571 (in kfence-#12):
  __pci_enable_msi_range+0x2c0/0x488
  pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0xec/0x14c
  pci_alloc_irq_vectors+0x18/0x28

 kfence-#12: 0x0000000008614900-0x00000000e06c228d, size=104, cache=kmalloc-128

 allocated by task 81 on cpu 7 at 10.808142s:
  __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1f0/0x2bc
  kmalloc_trace+0x44/0x138
  msi_alloc_desc+0x3c/0x9c
  msi_domain_insert_msi_desc+0x30/0x78
  msi_setup_msi_desc+0x13c/0x184
  __pci_enable_msi_range+0x258/0x488
  pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0xec/0x14c
  pci_alloc_irq_vectors+0x18/0x28

 freed by task 81 on cpu 7 at 10.811436s:
  msi_domain_free_descs+0xd4/0x10c
  msi_domain_free_locked.part.0+0xc0/0x1d8
  msi_domain_alloc_irqs_all_locked+0xb4/0xbc
  pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs+0x30/0x4c
  __pci_enable_msi_range+0x2a8/0x488
  pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0xec/0x14c
  pci_alloc_irq_vectors+0x18/0x28

Descriptor allocation done in:
__pci_enable_msi_range
    msi_capability_init
        msi_setup_msi_desc
            msi_insert_msi_desc
                msi_domain_insert_msi_desc
                    msi_alloc_desc
                        ...

Freed in case of failure in __msi_domain_alloc_locked()
__pci_enable_msi_range
    msi_capability_init
        pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs
            msi_domain_alloc_irqs_all_locked
                msi_domain_alloc_locked
                    __msi_domain_alloc_locked => fails
                    msi_domain_free_locked
                        ...

That failure propagates back to pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs() in
msi_capability_init() which accesses the descriptor for unmasking in the
error exit path.

Cure it by copying the descriptor and using the copy for the error exit path
unmask operation.

[ tglx: Massaged change log ]

Fixes: bf6e054 ("genirq/msi: Provide msi_device_populate/destroy_sysfs()")
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mostafa Saleh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Bjorn Heelgas <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
kdave pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 11, 2024
Patch series "mm/filemap: Limit page cache size to that supported by
xarray", v2.

Currently, xarray can't support arbitrary page cache size.  More details
can be found from the WARN_ON() statement in xas_split_alloc().  In our
test whose code is attached below, we hit the WARN_ON() on ARM64 system
where the base page size is 64KB and huge page size is 512MB.  The issue
was reported long time ago and some discussions on it can be found here
[1].

[1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-xfs/msg75404.html

In order to fix the issue, we need to adjust MAX_PAGECACHE_ORDER to one
supported by xarray and avoid PMD-sized page cache if needed.  The code
changes are suggested by David Hildenbrand.

PATCH[1] adjusts MAX_PAGECACHE_ORDER to that supported by xarray
PATCH[2-3] avoids PMD-sized page cache in the synchronous readahead path
PATCH[4] avoids PMD-sized page cache for shmem files if needed

Test program
============
# cat test.c
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>

#define TEST_XFS_FILENAME	"/tmp/data"
#define TEST_SHMEM_FILENAME	"/dev/shm/data"
#define TEST_MEM_SIZE		0x20000000

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	const char *filename;
	int fd = 0;
	void *buf = (void *)-1, *p;
	int pgsize = getpagesize();
	int ret;

	if (pgsize != 0x10000) {
		fprintf(stderr, "64KB base page size is required\n");
		return -EPERM;
	}

	system("echo force > /sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/shmem_enabled");
	system("rm -fr /tmp/data");
	system("rm -fr /dev/shm/data");
	system("echo 1 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches");

	/* Open xfs or shmem file */
	filename = TEST_XFS_FILENAME;
	if (argc > 1 && !strcmp(argv[1], "shmem"))
		filename = TEST_SHMEM_FILENAME;

	fd = open(filename, O_CREAT | O_RDWR | O_TRUNC);
	if (fd < 0) {
		fprintf(stderr, "Unable to open <%s>\n", filename);
		return -EIO;
	}

	/* Extend file size */
	ret = ftruncate(fd, TEST_MEM_SIZE);
	if (ret) {
		fprintf(stderr, "Error %d to ftruncate()\n", ret);
		goto cleanup;
	}

	/* Create VMA */
	buf = mmap(NULL, TEST_MEM_SIZE,
		   PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
	if (buf == (void *)-1) {
		fprintf(stderr, "Unable to mmap <%s>\n", filename);
		goto cleanup;
	}

	fprintf(stdout, "mapped buffer at 0x%p\n", buf);
	ret = madvise(buf, TEST_MEM_SIZE, MADV_HUGEPAGE);
        if (ret) {
		fprintf(stderr, "Unable to madvise(MADV_HUGEPAGE)\n");
		goto cleanup;
	}

	/* Populate VMA */
	ret = madvise(buf, TEST_MEM_SIZE, MADV_POPULATE_WRITE);
	if (ret) {
		fprintf(stderr, "Error %d to madvise(MADV_POPULATE_WRITE)\n", ret);
		goto cleanup;
	}

	/* Punch the file to enforce xarray split */
	ret = fallocate(fd, FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE | FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE,
        		TEST_MEM_SIZE - pgsize, pgsize);
	if (ret)
		fprintf(stderr, "Error %d to fallocate()\n", ret);

cleanup:
	if (buf != (void *)-1)
		munmap(buf, TEST_MEM_SIZE);
	if (fd > 0)
		close(fd);

	return 0;
}

# gcc test.c -o test
# cat /proc/1/smaps | grep KernelPageSize | head -n 1
KernelPageSize:       64 kB
# ./test shmem
   :
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 17 PID: 5253 at lib/xarray.c:1025 xas_split_alloc+0xf8/0x128
Modules linked in: nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib  \
nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct    \
nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4    \
ip_set nf_tables rfkill nfnetlink vfat fat virtio_balloon          \
drm fuse xfs libcrc32c crct10dif_ce ghash_ce sha2_ce sha256_arm64  \
virtio_net sha1_ce net_failover failover virtio_console virtio_blk \
dimlib virtio_mmio
CPU: 17 PID: 5253 Comm: test Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 6.10.0-rc5-gavin+ #12
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-20240524-1.el9 05/24/2024
pstate: 83400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : xas_split_alloc+0xf8/0x128
lr : split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x1c4/0x720
sp : ffff80008a92f5b0
x29: ffff80008a92f5b0 x28: ffff80008a92f610 x27: ffff80008a92f728
x26: 0000000000000cc0 x25: 000000000000000d x24: ffff0000cf00c858
x23: ffff80008a92f610 x22: ffffffdfc0600000 x21: 0000000000000000
x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffffdfc0600000 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000018000000000 x15: 3374004000000000
x14: 0000e00000000000 x13: 0000000000002000 x12: 0000000000000020
x11: 3374000000000000 x10: 3374e1c0ffff6000 x9 : ffffb463a84c681c
x8 : 0000000000000003 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff00011c976ce0
x5 : ffffb463aa47e378 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000cc0
x2 : 000000000000000d x1 : 000000000000000c x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
 xas_split_alloc+0xf8/0x128
 split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x1c4/0x720
 truncate_inode_partial_folio+0xdc/0x160
 shmem_undo_range+0x2bc/0x6a8
 shmem_fallocate+0x134/0x430
 vfs_fallocate+0x124/0x2e8
 ksys_fallocate+0x4c/0xa0
 __arm64_sys_fallocate+0x24/0x38
 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x7c/0xd8
 do_el0_svc+0xb4/0xd0
 el0_svc+0x44/0x1d8
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x134/0x150
 el0t_64_sync+0x17c/0x180


This patch (of 4):

The largest page cache order can be HPAGE_PMD_ORDER (13) on ARM64 with
64KB base page size.  The xarray entry with this order can't be split as
the following error messages indicate.

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 35 PID: 7484 at lib/xarray.c:1025 xas_split_alloc+0xf8/0x128
Modules linked in: nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib  \
nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct    \
nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4    \
ip_set rfkill nf_tables nfnetlink vfat fat virtio_balloon drm      \
fuse xfs libcrc32c crct10dif_ce ghash_ce sha2_ce sha256_arm64      \
sha1_ce virtio_net net_failover virtio_console virtio_blk failover \
dimlib virtio_mmio
CPU: 35 PID: 7484 Comm: test Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 6.10.0-rc5-gavin+ torvalds#9
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-20240524-1.el9 05/24/2024
pstate: 83400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : xas_split_alloc+0xf8/0x128
lr : split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x1c4/0x720
sp : ffff800087a4f6c0
x29: ffff800087a4f6c0 x28: ffff800087a4f720 x27: 000000001fffffff
x26: 0000000000000c40 x25: 000000000000000d x24: ffff00010625b858
x23: ffff800087a4f720 x22: ffffffdfc0780000 x21: 0000000000000000
x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffffdfc0780000 x18: 000000001ff40000
x17: 00000000ffffffff x16: 0000018000000000 x15: 51ec004000000000
x14: 0000e00000000000 x13: 0000000000002000 x12: 0000000000000020
x11: 51ec000000000000 x10: 51ece1c0ffff8000 x9 : ffffbeb961a44d28
x8 : 0000000000000003 x7 : ffffffdfc0456420 x6 : ffff0000e1aa6eb8
x5 : 20bf08b4fe778fca x4 : ffffffdfc0456420 x3 : 0000000000000c40
x2 : 000000000000000d x1 : 000000000000000c x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
 xas_split_alloc+0xf8/0x128
 split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x1c4/0x720
 truncate_inode_partial_folio+0xdc/0x160
 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x1b4/0x4a8
 truncate_pagecache_range+0x84/0xa0
 xfs_flush_unmap_range+0x70/0x90 [xfs]
 xfs_file_fallocate+0xfc/0x4d8 [xfs]
 vfs_fallocate+0x124/0x2e8
 ksys_fallocate+0x4c/0xa0
 __arm64_sys_fallocate+0x24/0x38
 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x7c/0xd8
 do_el0_svc+0xb4/0xd0
 el0_svc+0x44/0x1d8
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x134/0x150
 el0t_64_sync+0x17c/0x180

Fix it by decreasing MAX_PAGECACHE_ORDER to the largest supported order
by xarray. For this specific case, MAX_PAGECACHE_ORDER is dropped from
13 to 11 when CONFIG_BASE_SMALL is disabled.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 793917d ("mm/readahead: Add large folio readahead")
Signed-off-by: Gavin Shan <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Cc: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Dutile <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <[email protected]>
Cc: William Kucharski <[email protected]>
Cc: Zhenyu Zhang <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>	[5.18+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
kdave pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 17, 2024
Petr Machata says:

====================
selftest: Clean-up and stabilize mirroring tests

The mirroring selftests work by sending ICMP traffic between two hosts.
Along the way, this traffic is mirrored to a gretap netdevice, and counter
taps are then installed strategically along the path of the mirrored
traffic to verify the mirroring took place.

The problem with this is that besides mirroring the primary traffic, any
other service traffic is mirrored as well. At the same time, because the
tests need to work in HW-offloaded scenarios, the ability of the device to
do arbitrary packet inspection should not be taken for granted. Most tests
therefore simply use matchall, one uses flower to match on IP address.
As a result, the selftests are noisy.

mirror_test() accommodated this noisiness by giving the counters an
allowance of several packets. But that only works up to a point, and on
busy systems won't be always enough.

In this patch set, clean up and stabilize the mirroring selftests. The
original intention was to port the tests over to UDP, but the logic of
ICMP ends up being so entangled in the mirroring selftests that the
changes feel overly invasive. Instead, ICMP is kept, but where possible,
we match on ICMP message type, thus filtering out hits by other ICMP
messages.

Where this is not practical (where the counter tap is put on a device
that carries encapsulated packets), switch the counter condition to _at
least_ X observed packets. This is less robust, but barely so --
probably the only scenario that this would not catch is something like
erroneous packet duplication, which would hopefully get caught by the
numerous other tests in this extensive suite.

- Patches #1 to #3 clean up parameters at various helpers.

- Patches #4 to #6 stabilize the mirroring selftests as described above.

- Mirroring tests currently allow testing SW datapath even on HW
  netdevices by trapping traffic to the SW datapath. This complicates
  the tests a bit without a good reason: to test SW datapath, just run
  the selftests on the veth topology. Thus in patch #7, drop support for
  this dual SW/HW testing.

- At this point, some cleanups were either made possible by the previous
  patches, or were always possible. In patches torvalds#8 to torvalds#11, realize these
  cleanups.

- In patch #12, fix mlxsw mirror_gre selftest to respect setting TESTS.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
kdave pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 17, 2024
…rnel/git/netfilter/nf-next into main

Pablo Neira Ayuso says:

====================
Netfilter/IPVS updates for net-next

The following patchset contains Netfilter/IPVS updates for net-next:

Patch #1 to torvalds#11 to shrink memory consumption for transaction objects:

  struct nft_trans_chain { /* size: 120 (-32), cachelines: 2, members: 10 */
  struct nft_trans_elem { /* size: 72 (-40), cachelines: 2, members: 4 */
  struct nft_trans_flowtable { /* size: 80 (-48), cachelines: 2, members: 5 */
  struct nft_trans_obj { /* size: 72 (-40), cachelines: 2, members: 4 */
  struct nft_trans_rule { /* size: 80 (-32), cachelines: 2, members: 6 */
  struct nft_trans_set { /* size: 96 (-24), cachelines: 2, members: 8 */
  struct nft_trans_table { /* size: 56 (-40), cachelines: 1, members: 2 */

  struct nft_trans_elem can now be allocated from kmalloc-96 instead of
  kmalloc-128 slab.

  Series from Florian Westphal. For the record, I have mangled patch #1
  to add nft_trans_container_*() and use if for every transaction object.
   I have also added BUILD_BUG_ON to ensure struct nft_trans always comes
  at the beginning of the container transaction object. And few minor
  cleanups, any new bugs are of my own.

Patch #12 simplify check for SCTP GSO in IPVS, from Ismael Luceno.

Patch #13 nf_conncount key length remains in the u32 bound, from Yunjian Wang.

Patch torvalds#14 removes unnecessary check for CTA_TIMEOUT_L3PROTO when setting
          default conntrack timeouts via nfnetlink_cttimeout API, from
          Lin Ma.

Patch #15 updates NFT_SECMARK_CTX_MAXLEN to 4096, SELinux could use
          larger secctx names than the existing 256 bytes length.

Patch #16 adds a selftest to exercise nfnetlink_queue listeners leaving
          nfnetlink_queue, from Florian Westphal.

Patch #17 increases hitcount from 255 to 65535 in xt_recent, from Phil Sutter.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
kdave pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 25, 2024
We shouldn't set real_dev to NULL because packets can be in transit and
xfrm might call xdo_dev_offload_ok() in parallel. All callbacks assume
real_dev is set.

 Example trace:
 kernel: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000001030
 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one
 kernel: #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
 kernel: #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
 kernel: PGD 0 P4D 0
 kernel: Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
 kernel: CPU: 4 PID: 2237 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.7.7+ #12
 kernel: Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
 kernel: RIP: 0010:nsim_ipsec_offload_ok+0xc/0x20 [netdevsim]
 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bond_ipsec_add_sa_all: failed to add SA
 kernel: Code: e0 0f 0b 48 83 7f 38 00 74 de 0f 0b 48 8b 47 08 48 8b 37 48 8b 78 40 e9 b2 e5 9a d7 66 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 86 80 02 00 00 <83> 80 30 10 00 00 01 b8 01 00 00 00 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f 1f
 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one
 kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffabde81553b98 EFLAGS: 00010246
 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bond_ipsec_add_sa_all: failed to add SA
 kernel:
 kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9eb404e74900 RCX: ffff9eb403d97c60
 kernel: RDX: ffffffffc090de10 RSI: ffff9eb404e74900 RDI: ffff9eb3c5de9e00
 kernel: RBP: ffff9eb3c0a42000 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000014
 kernel: R10: 7974203030303030 R11: 3030303030303030 R12: 0000000000000000
 kernel: R13: ffff9eb3c5de9e00 R14: ffffabde81553cc8 R15: ffff9eb404c53000
 kernel: FS:  00007f2a77a3ad00(0000) GS:ffff9eb43bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 kernel: CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 kernel: CR2: 0000000000001030 CR3: 00000001122ab000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one
 kernel: Call Trace:
 kernel:  <TASK>
 kernel:  ? __die+0x1f/0x60
 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bond_ipsec_add_sa_all: failed to add SA
 kernel:  ? page_fault_oops+0x142/0x4c0
 kernel:  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x65/0x670
 kernel:  ? kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags+0x3b/0x50
 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one
 kernel:  ? exc_page_fault+0x7b/0x180
 kernel:  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
 kernel:  ? nsim_bpf_uninit+0x50/0x50 [netdevsim]
 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bond_ipsec_add_sa_all: failed to add SA
 kernel:  ? nsim_ipsec_offload_ok+0xc/0x20 [netdevsim]
 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one
 kernel:  bond_ipsec_offload_ok+0x7b/0x90 [bonding]
 kernel:  xfrm_output+0x61/0x3b0
 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bond_ipsec_add_sa_all: failed to add SA
 kernel:  ip_push_pending_frames+0x56/0x80

Fixes: 18cb261 ("bonding: support hardware encryption offload to slaves")
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
kdave pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 29, 2024
A sysfs reader can race with a device reset or removal, attempting to
read device state when the device is not actually present. eg:

     [exception RIP: qed_get_current_link+17]
  torvalds#8 [ffffb9e4f2907c48] qede_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc07a994a [qede]
  torvalds#9 [ffffb9e4f2907cd8] __rh_call_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b01a3
 torvalds#10 [ffffb9e4f2907d38] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b04e4
 torvalds#11 [ffffb9e4f2907d90] duplex_show at ffffffff99260300
 #12 [ffffb9e4f2907e38] dev_attr_show at ffffffff9905a01c
 #13 [ffffb9e4f2907e50] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff98e0145b
 torvalds#14 [ffffb9e4f2907e68] seq_read at ffffffff98d902e3
 #15 [ffffb9e4f2907ec8] vfs_read at ffffffff98d657d1
 #16 [ffffb9e4f2907f00] ksys_read at ffffffff98d65c3f
 #17 [ffffb9e4f2907f38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff98a052fb

 crash> struct net_device.state ffff9a9d21336000
    state = 5,

state 5 is __LINK_STATE_START (0b1) and __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER (0b100).
The device is not present, note lack of __LINK_STATE_PRESENT (0b10).

This is the same sort of panic as observed in commit 4224cfd
("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show").

There are many other callers of __ethtool_get_link_ksettings() which
don't have a device presence check.

Move this check into ethtool to protect all callers.

Fixes: d519e17 ("net: export device speed and duplex via sysfs")
Fixes: 4224cfd ("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show")
Signed-off-by: Jamie Bainbridge <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8bae218864beaa44ed01628140475b9bf641c5b0.1724393671.git.jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
kdave pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 23, 2024
The fields in the hist_entry are filled on-demand which means they only
have meaningful values when relevant sort keys are used.

So if neither of 'dso' nor 'sym' sort keys are used, the map/symbols in
the hist entry can be garbage.  So it shouldn't access it
unconditionally.

I got a segfault, when I wanted to see cgroup profiles.

  $ sudo perf record -a --all-cgroups --synth=cgroup true

  $ sudo perf report -s cgroup

  Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
  0x00005555557a8d90 in map__dso (map=0x0) at util/map.h:48
  48		return RC_CHK_ACCESS(map)->dso;
  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x00005555557a8d90 in map__dso (map=0x0) at util/map.h:48
  #1  0x00005555557aa39b in map__load (map=0x0) at util/map.c:344
  #2  0x00005555557aa592 in map__find_symbol (map=0x0, addr=140736115941088) at util/map.c:385
  #3  0x00005555557ef000 in hists__findnew_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, entry=0x7fffffffa4c0, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sample_self=true)
      at util/hist.c:644
  #4  0x00005555557ef61c in __hists__add_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sym_parent=0x0, bi=0x0, mi=0x0, ki=0x0,
      block_info=0x0, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, sample_self=true, ops=0x0) at util/hist.c:761
  #5  0x00005555557ef71f in hists__add_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sym_parent=0x0, bi=0x0, mi=0x0, ki=0x0,
      sample=0x7fffffffaa90, sample_self=true) at util/hist.c:779
  #6  0x00005555557f00fb in iter_add_single_normal_entry (iter=0x7fffffffa900, al=0x7fffffffa8c0) at util/hist.c:1015
  #7  0x00005555557f09a7 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=0x7fffffffa900, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, max_stack_depth=127, arg=0x7fffffffbce0)
      at util/hist.c:1260
  torvalds#8  0x00005555555ba7ce in process_sample_event (tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c14128, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, evsel=0x555556039ad0,
      machine=0x5555560388e8) at builtin-report.c:334
  torvalds#9  0x00005555557b30c8 in evlist__deliver_sample (evlist=0x555556039010, tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c14128,
      sample=0x7fffffffaa90, evsel=0x555556039ad0, machine=0x5555560388e8) at util/session.c:1232
  torvalds#10 0x00005555557b32bc in machines__deliver_event (machines=0x5555560388e8, evlist=0x555556039010, event=0x7ffff7c14128,
      sample=0x7fffffffaa90, tool=0x7fffffffbce0, file_offset=110888, file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1271
  torvalds#11 0x00005555557b3848 in perf_session__deliver_event (session=0x5555560386d0, event=0x7ffff7c14128, tool=0x7fffffffbce0,
      file_offset=110888, file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1354
  #12 0x00005555557affaf in ordered_events__deliver_event (oe=0x555556038e60, event=0x555556135aa0) at util/session.c:132
  #13 0x00005555557bb605 in do_flush (oe=0x555556038e60, show_progress=false) at util/ordered-events.c:245
  torvalds#14 0x00005555557bb95c in __ordered_events__flush (oe=0x555556038e60, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND, timestamp=0) at util/ordered-events.c:324
  #15 0x00005555557bba46 in ordered_events__flush (oe=0x555556038e60, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND) at util/ordered-events.c:342
  #16 0x00005555557b1b3b in perf_event__process_finished_round (tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c15bb8, oe=0x555556038e60)
      at util/session.c:780
  #17 0x00005555557b3b27 in perf_session__process_user_event (session=0x5555560386d0, event=0x7ffff7c15bb8, file_offset=117688,
      file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1406

As you can see the entry->ms.map was NULL even if he->ms.map has a
value.  This is because 'sym' sort key is not given, so it cannot assume
whether he->ms.sym and entry->ms.sym is the same.  I only checked the
'sym' sort key here as it implies 'dso' behavior (so maps are the same).

Fixes: ac01c8c ("perf hist: Update hist symbol when updating maps")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]>
Cc: Matt Fleming <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
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