open: add Open(at)InRoot and Reopen

These are very thin wrappers around the existing partialLookupInRoot and
doProcSelfMagiclink infrastructure to allow user to get a much safer API
for operating on paths than SecureJoin. In principle, with very careful
usage, these operations should be sufficient to make any program safe
against races.

In theory we could disable the symlink stack when doing OpenInRoot
(because the symlink stack is only relevant for partial lookups), but
for now we'll just keep the codepaths the same. Also, add a note to
SecureJoin to tell users that you should probably use OpenInRoot if you
can.

This API is based on the libpathrs base API.

Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <[email protected]>

join.go

@@ -41,6 +41,12 @@ func IsNotExist(err error) bool {
 // replaced with symlinks on the filesystem) after this function has returned.
 // Such a symlink race is necessarily out-of-scope of SecureJoin.
 //
+// NOTE: Due to the above limitation, Linux users are strongly encouraged to
+// use OpenInRoot instead, which does safely protect against these kinds of
+// attacks. There is no way to solve this problem with SecureJoinVFS because
+// the API is fundamentally wrong (you cannot return a "safe" path string and
+// guarantee it won't be modified afterwards).
+//
 // Volume names in unsafePath are always discarded, regardless if they are
 // provided via direct input or when evaluating symlinks. Therefore:
 //

open_linux.go

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+//go:build linux
+
+// Copyright (C) 2024 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package securejoin
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+)
+
+// OpenatInRoot is equivalent to OpenInRoot, except that the root is provided
+// using an *os.File handle, to ensure that the correct root directory is used.
+func OpenatInRoot(root *os.File, unsafePath string) (*os.File, error) {
+	handle, remainingPath, err := partialLookupInRoot(root, unsafePath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if remainingPath != "" {
+		_ = handle.Close()
+		return nil, &os.PathError{Op: "securejoin.OpenInRoot", Path: unsafePath, Err: unix.ENOENT}
+	}
+	return handle, nil
+}
+
+// OpenInRoot safely opens the provided unsafePath within the root.
+// Effectively, OpenInRoot(root, unsafePath) is equivalent to
+//
+//	path, _ := securejoin.SecureJoin(root, unsafePath)
+//	handle, err := os.OpenFile(path, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_CLOEXEC)
+//
+// But is much safer. The above implementation is unsafe because if an attacker
+// can modify the filesystem tree between SecureJoin and OpenFile, it is
+// possible for the returned file to be outside of the root.
+//
+// Note that the returned handle is an O_PATH handle, meaning that only a very
+// limited set of operations will work on the handle. This is done to avoid
+// accidentally opening an untrusted file that could cause issues (such as a
+// disconnected TTY that could cause a DoS, or some other issue). In order to
+// use the returned handle, you can "upgrade" it to a proper handle using
+// Reopen.
+func OpenInRoot(root, unsafePath string) (*os.File, error) {
+	rootDir, err := os.OpenFile(root, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer rootDir.Close()
+	return OpenatInRoot(rootDir, unsafePath)
+}
+
+// Reopen takes an *os.File handle and re-opens it through /proc/self/fd.
+// Reopen(file, flags) is effectively equivalent to
+//
+//	fdPath := fmt.Sprintf("/proc/self/fd/%d", file.Fd())
+//	os.OpenFile(fdPath, flags|unix.O_CLOEXEC)
+//
+// But with some extra hardenings to ensure that we are not tricked by a
+// maliciously-configured /proc mount. While this attack scenario is not
+// common, in container runtimes it is possible for higher-level runtimes to be
+// tricked into configuring an unsafe /proc that can be used to attack file
+// operations. See CVE-2019-19921 for more details.
+func Reopen(handle *os.File, flags int) (*os.File, error) {
+	procRoot, err := getProcRoot()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	flags |= unix.O_CLOEXEC
+	fdPath := fmt.Sprintf("fd/%d", handle.Fd())
+	return doProcSelfMagiclink(procRoot, fdPath, func(procDirHandle *os.File, base string) (*os.File, error) {
+		// Rather than just wrapping openatFile, open-code it so we can copy
+		// handle.Name().
+		reopenFd, err := unix.Openat(int(procDirHandle.Fd()), base, flags, 0)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("reopen fd %d: %w", handle.Fd(), err)
+		}
+		return os.NewFile(uintptr(reopenFd), handle.Name()), nil
+	})
+}