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issue with make #17
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Either disable |
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oh definitely. I built without it, it's just your repo isn't super friendly to work with as it. |
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To be entirely fair, this is a personal repo that I choose to share and release with the world. It is more effort for me to try and maintain something that others can work with and I am already overloaded as it is. |
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[BUG] When running generic/095, there is a high chance to crash with subpage data RW support: assertion failed: PagePrivate(page) && page->private ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3403! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP CPU: 1 PID: 3567 Comm: fio Tainted: 5.12.0-rc7-custom+ #17 Hardware name: Khadas VIM3 (DT) Call trace: assertfail.constprop.0+0x28/0x2c [btrfs] btrfs_subpage_assert+0x80/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_subpage_set_uptodate+0x34/0xec [btrfs] btrfs_page_clamp_set_uptodate+0x74/0xa4 [btrfs] btrfs_dirty_pages+0x160/0x270 [btrfs] btrfs_buffered_write+0x444/0x630 [btrfs] btrfs_direct_write+0x1cc/0x2d0 [btrfs] btrfs_file_write_iter+0xc0/0x160 [btrfs] new_sync_write+0xe8/0x180 vfs_write+0x1b4/0x210 ksys_pwrite64+0x7c/0xc0 __arm64_sys_pwrite64+0x24/0x30 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x140 do_el0_svc+0x28/0x90 el0_svc+0x2c/0x54 el0_sync_handler+0x1a8/0x1ac el0_sync+0x170/0x180 Code: f0000160 913be042 913c4000 955444bc (d4210000) ---[ end trace 3fdd39f4cccedd68 ]--- [CAUSE] Although prepare_pages() calls find_or_create_page(), which returns the page locked, but in later prepare_uptodate_page() calls, we may call btrfs_readpage() which will unlock the page before it returns. This leaves a window where btrfs_releasepage() can sneak in and release the page, clearing page->private and causing above ASSERT(). [FIX] In prepare_uptodate_page(), we should not only check page->mapping, but also PagePrivate() to ensure we are still holding the correct page which has proper fs context setup. Reported-by: Ritesh Harjani <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ritesh Harjani <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
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[BUG] When running generic/095, there is a high chance to crash with subpage data RW support: assertion failed: PagePrivate(page) && page->private ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3403! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP CPU: 1 PID: 3567 Comm: fio Tainted: 5.12.0-rc7-custom+ #17 Hardware name: Khadas VIM3 (DT) Call trace: assertfail.constprop.0+0x28/0x2c [btrfs] btrfs_subpage_assert+0x80/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_subpage_set_uptodate+0x34/0xec [btrfs] btrfs_page_clamp_set_uptodate+0x74/0xa4 [btrfs] btrfs_dirty_pages+0x160/0x270 [btrfs] btrfs_buffered_write+0x444/0x630 [btrfs] btrfs_direct_write+0x1cc/0x2d0 [btrfs] btrfs_file_write_iter+0xc0/0x160 [btrfs] new_sync_write+0xe8/0x180 vfs_write+0x1b4/0x210 ksys_pwrite64+0x7c/0xc0 __arm64_sys_pwrite64+0x24/0x30 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x140 do_el0_svc+0x28/0x90 el0_svc+0x2c/0x54 el0_sync_handler+0x1a8/0x1ac el0_sync+0x170/0x180 Code: f0000160 913be042 913c4000 955444bc (d4210000) ---[ end trace 3fdd39f4cccedd68 ]--- [CAUSE] Although prepare_pages() calls find_or_create_page(), which returns the page locked, but in later prepare_uptodate_page() calls, we may call btrfs_readpage() which will unlock the page before it returns. This leaves a window where btrfs_releasepage() can sneak in and release the page, clearing page->private and causing above ASSERT(). [FIX] In prepare_uptodate_page(), we should not only check page->mapping, but also PagePrivate() to ensure we are still holding the correct page which has proper fs context setup. Reported-by: Ritesh Harjani <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ritesh Harjani <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
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[BUG] When running generic/095, there is a high chance to crash with subpage data RW support: assertion failed: PagePrivate(page) && page->private ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3403! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP CPU: 1 PID: 3567 Comm: fio Tainted: 5.12.0-rc7-custom+ #17 Hardware name: Khadas VIM3 (DT) Call trace: assertfail.constprop.0+0x28/0x2c [btrfs] btrfs_subpage_assert+0x80/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_subpage_set_uptodate+0x34/0xec [btrfs] btrfs_page_clamp_set_uptodate+0x74/0xa4 [btrfs] btrfs_dirty_pages+0x160/0x270 [btrfs] btrfs_buffered_write+0x444/0x630 [btrfs] btrfs_direct_write+0x1cc/0x2d0 [btrfs] btrfs_file_write_iter+0xc0/0x160 [btrfs] new_sync_write+0xe8/0x180 vfs_write+0x1b4/0x210 ksys_pwrite64+0x7c/0xc0 __arm64_sys_pwrite64+0x24/0x30 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x140 do_el0_svc+0x28/0x90 el0_svc+0x2c/0x54 el0_sync_handler+0x1a8/0x1ac el0_sync+0x170/0x180 Code: f0000160 913be042 913c4000 955444bc (d4210000) ---[ end trace 3fdd39f4cccedd68 ]--- [CAUSE] Although prepare_pages() calls find_or_create_page(), which returns the page locked, but in later prepare_uptodate_page() calls, we may call btrfs_readpage() which will unlock the page before it returns. This leaves a window where btrfs_releasepage() can sneak in and release the page, clearing page->private and causing above ASSERT(). [FIX] In prepare_uptodate_page(), we should not only check page->mapping, but also PagePrivate() to ensure we are still holding the correct page which has proper fs context setup. Reported-by: Ritesh Harjani <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ritesh Harjani <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
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It's later supposed to be either a correct address or NULL. Without the initialization, it may contain an undefined value which results in the following segmentation fault: # perf top --sort comm -g --ignore-callees=do_idle terminates with: #0 0x00007ffff56b7685 in __strlen_avx2 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #1 0x00007ffff55e3802 in strdup () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x00005555558cb139 in hist_entry__init (callchain_size=<optimized out>, sample_self=true, template=0x7fffde7fb110, he=0x7fffd801c250) at util/hist.c:489 #3 hist_entry__new (template=template@entry=0x7fffde7fb110, sample_self=sample_self@entry=true) at util/hist.c:564 #4 0x00005555558cb4ba in hists__findnew_entry (hists=hists@entry=0x5555561d9e38, entry=entry@entry=0x7fffde7fb110, al=al@entry=0x7fffde7fb420, sample_self=sample_self@entry=true) at util/hist.c:657 #5 0x00005555558cba1b in __hists__add_entry (hists=hists@entry=0x5555561d9e38, al=0x7fffde7fb420, sym_parent=<optimized out>, bi=bi@entry=0x0, mi=mi@entry=0x0, sample=sample@entry=0x7fffde7fb4b0, sample_self=true, ops=0x0, block_info=0x0) at util/hist.c:288 #6 0x00005555558cbb70 in hists__add_entry (sample_self=true, sample=0x7fffde7fb4b0, mi=0x0, bi=0x0, sym_parent=<optimized out>, al=<optimized out>, hists=0x5555561d9e38) at util/hist.c:1056 #7 iter_add_single_cumulative_entry (iter=0x7fffde7fb460, al=<optimized out>) at util/hist.c:1056 #8 0x00005555558cc8a4 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=iter@entry=0x7fffde7fb460, al=al@entry=0x7fffde7fb420, max_stack_depth=<optimized out>, arg=arg@entry=0x7fffffff7db0) at util/hist.c:1231 #9 0x00005555557cdc9a in perf_event__process_sample (machine=<optimized out>, sample=0x7fffde7fb4b0, evsel=<optimized out>, event=<optimized out>, tool=0x7fffffff7db0) at builtin-top.c:842 #10 deliver_event (qe=<optimized out>, qevent=<optimized out>) at builtin-top.c:1202 #11 0x00005555558a9318 in do_flush (show_progress=false, oe=0x7fffffff80e0) at util/ordered-events.c:244 #12 __ordered_events__flush (oe=oe@entry=0x7fffffff80e0, how=how@entry=OE_FLUSH__TOP, timestamp=timestamp@entry=0) at util/ordered-events.c:323 #13 0x00005555558a9789 in __ordered_events__flush (timestamp=<optimized out>, how=<optimized out>, oe=<optimized out>) at util/ordered-events.c:339 #14 ordered_events__flush (how=OE_FLUSH__TOP, oe=0x7fffffff80e0) at util/ordered-events.c:341 #15 ordered_events__flush (oe=oe@entry=0x7fffffff80e0, how=how@entry=OE_FLUSH__TOP) at util/ordered-events.c:339 #16 0x00005555557cd631 in process_thread (arg=0x7fffffff7db0) at builtin-top.c:1114 #17 0x00007ffff7bb817a in start_thread () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0 #18 0x00007ffff5656dc3 in clone () from /lib64/libc.so.6 If you look at the frame #2, the code is: 488 if (he->srcline) { 489 he->srcline = strdup(he->srcline); 490 if (he->srcline == NULL) 491 goto err_rawdata; 492 } If he->srcline is not NULL (it is not NULL if it is uninitialized rubbish), it gets strdupped and strdupping a rubbish random string causes the problem. Also, if you look at the commit 1fb7d06, it adds the srcline property into the struct, but not initializing it everywhere needed. Committer notes: Now I see, when using --ignore-callees=do_idle we end up here at line 2189 in add_callchain_ip(): 2181 if (al.sym != NULL) { 2182 if (perf_hpp_list.parent && !*parent && 2183 symbol__match_regex(al.sym, &parent_regex)) 2184 *parent = al.sym; 2185 else if (have_ignore_callees && root_al && 2186 symbol__match_regex(al.sym, &ignore_callees_regex)) { 2187 /* Treat this symbol as the root, 2188 forgetting its callees. */ 2189 *root_al = al; 2190 callchain_cursor_reset(cursor); 2191 } 2192 } And the al that doesn't have the ->srcline field initialized will be copied to the root_al, so then, back to: 1211 int hist_entry_iter__add(struct hist_entry_iter *iter, struct addr_location *al, 1212 int max_stack_depth, void *arg) 1213 { 1214 int err, err2; 1215 struct map *alm = NULL; 1216 1217 if (al) 1218 alm = map__get(al->map); 1219 1220 err = sample__resolve_callchain(iter->sample, &callchain_cursor, &iter->parent, 1221 iter->evsel, al, max_stack_depth); 1222 if (err) { 1223 map__put(alm); 1224 return err; 1225 } 1226 1227 err = iter->ops->prepare_entry(iter, al); 1228 if (err) 1229 goto out; 1230 1231 err = iter->ops->add_single_entry(iter, al); 1232 if (err) 1233 goto out; 1234 That al at line 1221 is what hist_entry_iter__add() (called from sample__resolve_callchain()) saw as 'root_al', and then: iter->ops->add_single_entry(iter, al); will go on with al->srcline with a bogus value, I'll add the above sequence to the cset and apply, thanks! Signed-off-by: Michael Petlan <[email protected]> CC: Milian Wolff <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Fixes: 1fb7d06 ("perf report Use srcline from callchain for hist entries") Link: https //lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reported-by: Juri Lelli <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
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Attempting to defragment a Btrfs file containing a transparent huge page immediately deadlocks with the following stack trace: #0 context_switch (kernel/sched/core.c:4940:2) #1 __schedule (kernel/sched/core.c:6287:8) #2 schedule (kernel/sched/core.c:6366:3) #3 io_schedule (kernel/sched/core.c:8389:2) #4 wait_on_page_bit_common (mm/filemap.c:1356:4) #5 __lock_page (mm/filemap.c:1648:2) #6 lock_page (./include/linux/pagemap.h:625:3) #7 pagecache_get_page (mm/filemap.c:1910:4) #8 find_or_create_page (./include/linux/pagemap.h:420:9) #9 defrag_prepare_one_page (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1068:9) #10 defrag_one_range (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1326:14) #11 defrag_one_cluster (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1421:9) #12 btrfs_defrag_file (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1523:9) #13 btrfs_ioctl_defrag (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3117:9) #14 btrfs_ioctl (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:4872:10) #15 vfs_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:51:10) #16 __do_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:874:11) #17 __se_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:860:1) #18 __x64_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:860:1) #19 do_syscall_x64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50:14) #20 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:80:7) #21 entry_SYSCALL_64+0x7c/0x15b (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:113) A huge page is represented by a compound page, which consists of a struct page for each PAGE_SIZE page within the huge page. The first struct page is the "head page", and the remaining are "tail pages". Defragmentation attempts to lock each page in the range. However, lock_page() on a tail page actually locks the corresponding head page. So, if defragmentation tries to lock more than one struct page in a compound page, it tries to lock the same head page twice and deadlocks with itself. Ideally, we should be able to defragment transparent huge pages. However, THP for filesystems is currently read-only, so a lot of code is not ready to use huge pages for I/O. For now, let's just return ETXTBUSY. This can be reproduced with the following on a kernel with CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS=y: $ cat create_thp_file.c #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdbool.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/mman.h> static const char zeroes[1024 * 1024]; static const size_t FILE_SIZE = 2 * 1024 * 1024; int main(int argc, char **argv) { if (argc != 2) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s PATH\n", argv[0]); return EXIT_FAILURE; } int fd = creat(argv[1], 0777); if (fd == -1) { perror("creat"); return EXIT_FAILURE; } size_t written = 0; while (written < FILE_SIZE) { ssize_t ret = write(fd, zeroes, sizeof(zeroes) < FILE_SIZE - written ? sizeof(zeroes) : FILE_SIZE - written); if (ret < 0) { perror("write"); return EXIT_FAILURE; } written += ret; } close(fd); fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY); if (fd == -1) { perror("open"); return EXIT_FAILURE; } /* * Reserve some address space so that we can align the file mapping to * the huge page size. */ void *placeholder_map = mmap(NULL, FILE_SIZE * 2, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); if (placeholder_map == MAP_FAILED) { perror("mmap (placeholder)"); return EXIT_FAILURE; } void *aligned_address = (void *)(((uintptr_t)placeholder_map + FILE_SIZE - 1) & ~(FILE_SIZE - 1)); void *map = mmap(aligned_address, FILE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED, fd, 0); if (map == MAP_FAILED) { perror("mmap"); return EXIT_FAILURE; } if (madvise(map, FILE_SIZE, MADV_HUGEPAGE) < 0) { perror("madvise"); return EXIT_FAILURE; } char *line = NULL; size_t line_capacity = 0; FILE *smaps_file = fopen("/proc/self/smaps", "r"); if (!smaps_file) { perror("fopen"); return EXIT_FAILURE; } for (;;) { for (size_t off = 0; off < FILE_SIZE; off += 4096) ((volatile char *)map)[off]; ssize_t ret; bool this_mapping = false; while ((ret = getline(&line, &line_capacity, smaps_file)) > 0) { unsigned long start, end, huge; if (sscanf(line, "%lx-%lx", &start, &end) == 2) { this_mapping = (start <= (uintptr_t)map && (uintptr_t)map < end); } else if (this_mapping && sscanf(line, "FilePmdMapped: %ld", &huge) == 1 && huge > 0) { return EXIT_SUCCESS; } } sleep(6); rewind(smaps_file); fflush(smaps_file); } } $ ./create_thp_file huge $ btrfs fi defrag -czstd ./huge Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
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This patch fixes the checkpatch.pl errors and warnings: < ERROR: trailing whitespace < #5: FILE: drivers/dio/dio.c:5: < + * $ < < ERROR: trailing whitespace < #11: FILE: drivers/dio/dio.c:11: < + * This means that framebuffers should pass it as $ < < ERROR: trailing whitespace < #17: FILE: drivers/dio/dio.c:17: < + * Every DIO card has a fixed interrupt priority level. This function $ < < ERROR: trailing whitespace < #20: FILE: drivers/dio/dio.c:20: < + * Return a character string describing this board [might be "" if $ < < ERROR: trailing whitespace < #25: FILE: drivers/dio/dio.c:25: < + * This file is based on the way the Amiga port handles Zorro II cards, $ + 15 more errors and warnings of type "trailing whitespace" Signed-off-by: Aleksa Vučković <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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In calipso_map_cat_ntoh(), in the for loop, if the return value of netlbl_bitmap_walk() is equal to (net_clen_bits - 1), when netlbl_bitmap_walk() is called next time, out-of-bounds memory accesses of bitmap[byte_offset] occurs. The bug was found during fuzzing. The following is the fuzzing report BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in netlbl_bitmap_walk+0x3c/0xd0 Read of size 1 at addr ffffff8107bf6f70 by task err_OH/252 CPU: 7 PID: 252 Comm: err_OH Not tainted 5.17.0-rc7+ #17 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x21c/0x230 show_stack+0x1c/0x60 dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x7c print_address_description.constprop.0+0x70/0x2d0 __kasan_report+0x158/0x16c kasan_report+0x74/0x120 __asan_load1+0x80/0xa0 netlbl_bitmap_walk+0x3c/0xd0 calipso_opt_getattr+0x1a8/0x230 calipso_sock_getattr+0x218/0x340 calipso_sock_getattr+0x44/0x60 netlbl_sock_getattr+0x44/0x80 selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt+0x138/0x170 selinux_socket_setsockopt+0x4c/0x60 security_socket_setsockopt+0x4c/0x90 __sys_setsockopt+0xbc/0x2b0 __arm64_sys_setsockopt+0x6c/0x84 invoke_syscall+0x64/0x190 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x88/0x200 do_el0_svc+0x88/0xa0 el0_svc+0x128/0x1b0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x9c/0x120 el0t_64_sync+0x16c/0x170 Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <[email protected]> Acked-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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Apr 8, 2022
In the "ath11k_wow_init", error value "EINVAL" is returned when the check for firmware support of WoW feature fails, which in turn stops the driver initialization. Warning message: [ 31.040144] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 31.040185] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 51 at drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/wow.c:813 ath11k_wow_init+0xc8/0x13a8 [ath11k] [ 31.043846] Modules linked in: ath11k_pci ath11k qmi_helpers [ 31.054341] CPU: 1 PID: 51 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Tainted: G W 5.17.0-wt-ath-594817-ga7f6aa925cf8-dirty #17 [ 31.060078] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. IPQ8074/AP-HK10-C2 (DT) [ 31.070578] Workqueue: ath11k_qmi_driver_event ath11k_qmi_driver_event_work [ath11k] [ 31.077782] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 31.085676] pc : ath11k_wow_init+0xc8/0x13a8 [ath11k] [ 31.092359] lr : ath11k_mac_register+0x548/0xb98 [ath11k] [ 31.097567] sp : ffff80000aa13c40 [ 31.102944] x29: ffff80000aa13c40 x28: ffff800009184390 x27: ffff000002959f20 [ 31.106251] x26: ffff000002828000 x25: ffff000002830000 x24: ffff000002830000 [ 31.113369] x23: ffff000002820000 x22: ffff00000282854c x21: 0000000000000000 [ 31.120487] x20: ffff00000295cf20 x19: ffff000002828540 x18: 0000000000000031 [ 31.127605] x17: 0000000000000004 x16: ffff0000028285fc x15: ffff00000295b040 [ 31.134723] x14: 0000000000000067 x13: ffff00000282859c x12: 000000000000000d [ 31.141840] x11: 0000000000000018 x10: 0000000000000004 x9 : 0000000000000000 [ 31.148959] x8 : ffff00000289d680 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f [ 31.156077] x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff000002820968 [ 31.163196] x2 : 0000000000000080 x1 : 0080008af9981779 x0 : ffff000002959f20 [ 31.170314] Call trace: [ 31.177421] ath11k_wow_init+0xc8/0x13a8 [ath11k] [ 31.179684] ath11k_core_qmi_firmware_ready+0x430/0x5e0 [ath11k] [ 31.184548] ath11k_qmi_driver_event_work+0x16c/0x4f8 [ath11k] [ 31.190623] process_one_work+0x134/0x350 [ 31.196262] worker_thread+0x12c/0x450 [ 31.200340] kthread+0xf4/0x110 [ 31.203986] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 31.207026] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 31.210894] ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed to init wow: -22 [ 31.215467] ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed register the radio with mac80211: -22 [ 31.221117] ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed to create pdev core: -22 Fix this by returning value "0" when FW doesn't support WoW to allow driver to proceed with initialize sequence and also remove the unnecessary "WARN_ON". Tested-on: QCN9074 hw1.0 PCI WLAN.HK.2.5.0.1-01100-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1 Fixes: ba9177f ("ath11k: Add basic WoW functionalities") Signed-off-by: Nagarajan Maran <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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Aug 3, 2022
Hulk Robot reported a issue: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x18ab/0x3500 Write of size 4105 at addr ffff8881675ef5f4 by task syz-executor.0/7092 CPU: 1 PID: 7092 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 4.19.90-dirty #17 Call Trace: [...] memcpy+0x34/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303 ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x18ab/0x3500 fs/ext4/xattr.c:1747 ext4_xattr_ibody_inline_set+0x86/0x2a0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2205 ext4_xattr_set_handle+0x940/0x1300 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2386 ext4_xattr_set+0x1da/0x300 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2498 __vfs_setxattr+0x112/0x170 fs/xattr.c:149 __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x11b/0x2a0 fs/xattr.c:180 __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x17b/0x250 fs/xattr.c:238 vfs_setxattr+0xed/0x270 fs/xattr.c:255 setxattr+0x235/0x330 fs/xattr.c:520 path_setxattr+0x176/0x190 fs/xattr.c:539 __do_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:561 [inline] __se_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:557 [inline] __x64_sys_lsetxattr+0xc2/0x160 fs/xattr.c:557 do_syscall_64+0xdf/0x530 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x459fe9 RSP: 002b:00007fa5e54b4c08 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000bd RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000051bf60 RCX: 0000000000459fe9 RDX: 00000000200003c0 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000020000140 RBP: 000000000051bf60 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000001009 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffc73c93fc0 R14: 000000000051bf60 R15: 00007fa5e54b4d80 [...] ================================================================== Above issue may happen as follows: ------------------------------------- ext4_xattr_set ext4_xattr_set_handle ext4_xattr_ibody_find >> s->end < s->base >> no EXT4_STATE_XATTR >> xattr_check_inode is not executed ext4_xattr_ibody_set ext4_xattr_set_entry >> size_t min_offs = s->end - s->base >> UAF in memcpy we can easily reproduce this problem with the following commands: mkfs.ext4 -F /dev/sda mount -o debug_want_extra_isize=128 /dev/sda /mnt touch /mnt/file setfattr -n user.cat -v `seq -s z 4096|tr -d '[:digit:]'` /mnt/file In ext4_xattr_ibody_find, we have the following assignment logic: header = IHDR(inode, raw_inode) = raw_inode + EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + i_extra_isize is->s.base = IFIRST(header) = header + sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header) is->s.end = raw_inode + s_inode_size In ext4_xattr_set_entry min_offs = s->end - s->base = s_inode_size - EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE - i_extra_isize - sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header) last = s->first free = min_offs - ((void *)last - s->base) - sizeof(__u32) = s_inode_size - EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE - i_extra_isize - sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header) - sizeof(__u32) In the calculation formula, all values except s_inode_size and i_extra_size are fixed values. When i_extra_size is the maximum value s_inode_size - EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE, min_offs is -4 and free is -8. The value overflows. As a result, the preceding issue is triggered when memcpy is executed. Therefore, when finding xattr or setting xattr, check whether there is space for storing xattr in the inode to resolve this issue. Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
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Aug 3, 2022
Hulk Robot reported a issue: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x18ab/0x3500 Write of size 4105 at addr ffff8881675ef5f4 by task syz-executor.0/7092 CPU: 1 PID: 7092 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 4.19.90-dirty #17 Call Trace: [...] memcpy+0x34/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303 ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x18ab/0x3500 fs/ext4/xattr.c:1747 ext4_xattr_ibody_inline_set+0x86/0x2a0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2205 ext4_xattr_set_handle+0x940/0x1300 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2386 ext4_xattr_set+0x1da/0x300 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2498 __vfs_setxattr+0x112/0x170 fs/xattr.c:149 __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x11b/0x2a0 fs/xattr.c:180 __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x17b/0x250 fs/xattr.c:238 vfs_setxattr+0xed/0x270 fs/xattr.c:255 setxattr+0x235/0x330 fs/xattr.c:520 path_setxattr+0x176/0x190 fs/xattr.c:539 __do_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:561 [inline] __se_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:557 [inline] __x64_sys_lsetxattr+0xc2/0x160 fs/xattr.c:557 do_syscall_64+0xdf/0x530 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x459fe9 RSP: 002b:00007fa5e54b4c08 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000bd RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000051bf60 RCX: 0000000000459fe9 RDX: 00000000200003c0 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000020000140 RBP: 000000000051bf60 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000001009 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffc73c93fc0 R14: 000000000051bf60 R15: 00007fa5e54b4d80 [...] ================================================================== Above issue may happen as follows: ------------------------------------- ext4_xattr_set ext4_xattr_set_handle ext4_xattr_ibody_find >> s->end < s->base >> no EXT4_STATE_XATTR >> xattr_check_inode is not executed ext4_xattr_ibody_set ext4_xattr_set_entry >> size_t min_offs = s->end - s->base >> UAF in memcpy we can easily reproduce this problem with the following commands: mkfs.ext4 -F /dev/sda mount -o debug_want_extra_isize=128 /dev/sda /mnt touch /mnt/file setfattr -n user.cat -v `seq -s z 4096|tr -d '[:digit:]'` /mnt/file In ext4_xattr_ibody_find, we have the following assignment logic: header = IHDR(inode, raw_inode) = raw_inode + EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + i_extra_isize is->s.base = IFIRST(header) = header + sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header) is->s.end = raw_inode + s_inode_size In ext4_xattr_set_entry min_offs = s->end - s->base = s_inode_size - EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE - i_extra_isize - sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header) last = s->first free = min_offs - ((void *)last - s->base) - sizeof(__u32) = s_inode_size - EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE - i_extra_isize - sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header) - sizeof(__u32) In the calculation formula, all values except s_inode_size and i_extra_size are fixed values. When i_extra_size is the maximum value s_inode_size - EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE, min_offs is -4 and free is -8. The value overflows. As a result, the preceding issue is triggered when memcpy is executed. Therefore, when finding xattr or setting xattr, check whether there is space for storing xattr in the inode to resolve this issue. Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
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Sep 20, 2022
When doing slub_debug test, kfence's 'test_memcache_typesafe_by_rcu' kunit test case cause a use-after-free error: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kobject_del+0x14/0x30 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888007679090 by task kunit_try_catch/261 CPU: 1 PID: 261 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G B N 6.0.0-rc5-next-20220916 #17 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x48 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x87/0x2a5 print_report+0x103/0x1ed kasan_report+0xb7/0x140 kobject_del+0x14/0x30 kmem_cache_destroy+0x130/0x170 test_exit+0x1a/0x30 kunit_try_run_case+0xad/0xc0 kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x26/0x50 kthread+0x17b/0x1b0 </TASK> The cause is inside kmem_cache_destroy(): kmem_cache_destroy acquire lock/mutex shutdown_cache schedule_work(kmem_cache_release) (if RCU flag set) release lock/mutex kmem_cache_release (if RCU flag not set) In some certain timing, the scheduled work could be run before the next RCU flag checking, which can then get a wrong value and lead to double kmem_cache_release(). Fix it by caching the RCU flag inside protected area, just like 'refcnt' Fixes: 0495e33 ("mm/slab_common: Deleting kobject in kmem_cache_destroy() without holding slab_mutex/cpu_hotplug_lock") Signed-off-by: Feng Tang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
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Oct 4, 2022
Some metadata files are handled before MFT. This adds a null pointer check for some corner cases that could lead to NPD while reading these metadata files for a malformed NTFS image. [ 240.190827] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000158 [ 240.191583] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 240.191956] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 240.192391] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 240.192897] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 240.193805] CPU: 0 PID: 242 Comm: mount Tainted: G B 5.19.0+ #17 [ 240.194477] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 240.195152] RIP: 0010:ni_find_attr+0xae/0x300 [ 240.195679] Code: c8 48 c7 45 88 c0 4e 5e 86 c7 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 c7 40 04 00 f3 f3 f3 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d0 31 c0 e8 e2 d9f [ 240.196642] RSP: 0018:ffff88800812f690 EFLAGS: 00000286 [ 240.197019] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff85ef037a [ 240.197523] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff88e95f60 [ 240.197877] RBP: ffff88800812f738 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff11d2bed [ 240.198292] R10: ffffffff88e95f67 R11: fffffbfff11d2bec R12: 0000000000000000 [ 240.198647] R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 240.199410] FS: 00007f233c33be40(0000) GS:ffff888058200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 240.199895] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 240.200314] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 0000000004d32000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 240.200839] Call Trace: [ 240.201104] <TASK> [ 240.201502] ? ni_load_mi+0x80/0x80 [ 240.202297] ? ___slab_alloc+0x465/0x830 [ 240.202614] attr_load_runs_vcn+0x8c/0x1a0 [ 240.202886] ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x32/0x90 [ 240.203157] ? attr_data_write_resident+0x250/0x250 [ 240.203543] mi_read+0x133/0x2c0 [ 240.203785] mi_get+0x70/0x140 [ 240.204012] ni_load_mi_ex+0xfa/0x190 [ 240.204346] ? ni_std5+0x90/0x90 [ 240.204588] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0 [ 240.204859] ni_enum_attr_ex+0xf1/0x1c0 [ 240.205107] ? ni_fname_type.part.0+0xd0/0xd0 [ 240.205600] ? ntfs_load_attr_list+0xbe/0x300 [ 240.205864] ? ntfs_cmp_names_cpu+0x125/0x180 [ 240.206157] ntfs_iget5+0x56c/0x1870 [ 240.206510] ? ntfs_get_block_bmap+0x70/0x70 [ 240.206776] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0 [ 240.207030] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150 [ 240.207545] ntfs_fill_super+0xb8f/0x1e20 [ 240.207839] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 240.208069] ? vsprintf+0x20/0x20 [ 240.208467] ? mutex_unlock+0x81/0xd0 [ 240.208846] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150 [ 240.209221] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370 [ 240.209804] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 240.210519] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [ 240.210991] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130 [ 240.211455] path_mount+0x645/0xfd0 [ 240.211806] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 240.212112] ? finish_automount+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ 240.212559] ? kmem_cache_free+0x110/0x390 [ 240.212906] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 240.213329] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0 [ 240.213829] ? path_mount+0xfd0/0xfd0 [ 240.214246] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 240.214774] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110 [ 240.215080] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 240.215442] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 240.215811] RIP: 0033:0x7f233b4e948a [ 240.216104] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008 [ 240.217615] RSP: 002b:00007fff02211ec8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 240.218718] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000561cdc35b060 RCX: 00007f233b4e948a [ 240.219556] RDX: 0000561cdc35b260 RSI: 0000561cdc35b2e0 RDI: 0000561cdc363af0 [ 240.219975] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000561cdc35b280 R09: 0000000000000020 [ 240.220403] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000561cdc363af0 [ 240.220803] R13: 0000561cdc35b260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff [ 240.221256] </TASK> [ 240.221567] Modules linked in: [ 240.222028] CR2: 0000000000000158 [ 240.223291] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 240.223669] RIP: 0010:ni_find_attr+0xae/0x300 [ 240.224058] Code: c8 48 c7 45 88 c0 4e 5e 86 c7 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 c7 40 04 00 f3 f3 f3 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d0 31 c0 e8 e2 d9f [ 240.225033] RSP: 0018:ffff88800812f690 EFLAGS: 00000286 [ 240.225968] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff85ef037a [ 240.226624] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff88e95f60 [ 240.227307] RBP: ffff88800812f738 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff11d2bed [ 240.227816] R10: ffffffff88e95f67 R11: fffffbfff11d2bec R12: 0000000000000000 [ 240.228330] R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 240.228729] FS: 00007f233c33be40(0000) GS:ffff888058200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 240.229281] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 240.230298] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 0000000004d32000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Signed-off-by: Edward Lo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <[email protected]>
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when i run
make -j8I get
running /bin/build.fish yields:
with root
and running /bin/gen_wsl_config.fish yields
and with root
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